Posts by Dr. Petr Oskolkov

In August 2026, PSCRP analytical materials largely focused on developments in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia.

The PSCRP team provides an overview of the year that has passed since the joint declaration was signed in Washington between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, potentially ending the long-lasting conflict between the countries. The authors accentuate the fact that this was the initiative of Baku, and that during this year, numerous economic opportunities were opened for cooperation between the two states, namely, “lifting restrictions on cargo shipments to Armenia, starting Azerbaijani petroleum exports across the border, and moving grain through territory that was, until recently, closed to Armenian trucks entirely.” Also, the establishment of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity is underway. The authors claim that, to reach this stage of relationship, the conflict in Karabakh should have been resolved. They posit that Russian authorities might have regarded the Karabakh stalemate as leverage to influence and control the situation in the South Caucasus, and when this problem disappeared, the region might have become less controllable for Moscow.

In the same vein, the PSCRP team analyzes the role of the Middle Corridor, officially known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, in Azerbaijan’s contemporary efforts to strengthen its geopolitical position. The TITR is perceived as a potentially vital logistics route connecting East Asia and Europe that may solidify Baku’s role as the principal transit hub in cooperation with the regional states, the EU (interested in diversifying its energy supplies and building resilient trade routes), and the US (seeing the TITR as part of a broader open trade supporting strategy). However, achieving these goals remains contingent on developing and modernizing infrastructure at every operational level and on political stability in the regions concerned.

Gershon Kogan scrutinizes the recent political and cultural processes surrounding the choice of written scripts in the post-Soviet space, foregrounding the premise that an alphabet can be chosen as a “declared vector of civilization allegiance.” In 2024, the Common Turkic Alphabet project was approved by the Turkic Academy; in 2026, the Tajikistani Ministry of Education formed a working group to strengthen instruction in the traditional Perso-Arabic script. Placing these events within a broader framework, Kogan points to several mechanisms of influence employed by potential civilizational centers in the post-Soviet space. Turkey prefers to build infrastructure to make itself the center of the Turkic shared communicative space, including by means of spreading the Turkic Latin script. However, the latter contradicts the recent ideological turn towards re-Islamization and a bid for leadership in the Sunni Muslim world. Azerbaijan’s mechanisms accentuate agency and not a passive submission, positioning itself as the administrative hub of Turkic script integration; this also produces a reputation of an independently minded actor that is a more useful partner for outside actors than a satellite of another power center. Russia exploits the inertia of labor market dynamics, not directly pushing Cyrillic script but understanding its role for Central Asian labor migrants. Iran enjoys the strength of tradition and the abundance of heritage, which, however, is not translated into Tehran’s diplomatic leverage. Kogan concludes by predicting a “functionally stratified writing landscape”, where Latin script would be consolidated “as the medium of Turkic integration and digital modernity,” Cyrillic would persist wherever Russian-language labor markets and infrastructure remain most valuable, and Perso-Arabic script would be reserved for religion and classical literature. He concludes by noting that the decisive question would be which power “proves able to convert written heritage into a functioning instrument of statecraft.”

Providing a broader background to this issue, Gershon Kogan sheds light on Tehran’s alleged attempts to build a cultural, historical, or linguistic community with its neighboring countries. In 2026, the Iranian First Vice-President proposed building a “Union of Persian-Speaking Countries and Regions” with Tajikistan. This was not the first time such a proposal came to light; however, it was never implemented. To the impoverished linguistic club, the notion of a “Persianate world” might be juxtaposed, which would not exclude Turkey. However, since Tehran’s approach to Central Asia has remained non-ideological and strictly pragmatic, the IRI still has not organized its strategy around it. The author concludes that, “for four decades, the Islamic Republic constructed its foreign policy around what makes Iran part of a larger Islamic world. Confronted with a rising Turkic order it cannot out-compete on ideological terms, it may be discovering (…) what makes Iran a world of its own.”

Velvl Chernin overviews the transformation of Kazakhstan’s ethnic composition in the post-independence years, with significant growth of the share of an ethnically Kazakh population attributed to higher birth rates, emigration of Russian-speaking groups, and repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs from abroad, together with state-tailored measures aimed at the “re-Kazakhization” of northern regions. He specifically points to the ethnic Kazakh population in Russia’s regions bordering Kazakhstan – what he calls “Kazakh Irredenta,” with relatively large numbers of Kazakhs living in such regions as Astrakhan, Orenburg, Omsk, and Saratov oblasts, whose assimilation is prevented by the practice of Islam and physical differences with the Slavic population. He concludes that the Kazakhs in Russia remain a potentially significant source of ethnic Kazakh repatriation.

Vladimir Ze’ev Khanin provides a thorough overview of the development of Russian-Israeli relations since their restoration. He divides them into 3 main stages. The first, comprising Boris Yeltsin’s presidency and Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term, was rather restrained: Israeli actions were mostly confined to encouraging repatriation, arranging energy resource imports, and (attempts at) supporting Israeli business in Russia, and official visits were mostly tied to either urgent crisis management attempts or to the national elections. The second stage, comprising the 2nd and 3rd Putin’s presidential terms and his tenure as a Prime Minister, was characterized by noticeable improvement, growth in economic partnership, joint projects, expanding ties, and numerous mutual visits; it was also believed that Russia’s and Israel’s leaders had developed a “special personal relationship” based on mutual trust. De facto, it was rather a “tactical partnership based on overlapping interests.” The third stage started in February 2022, with the outbreak of full-scale military hostilities. Although Israel did not directly join the bloc of Western countries confronting Russia, all dimensions of cooperation have evidently declined, including not only economic ties but also shared narrative frameworks regarding World War II. This process was exacerbated after October 7th, when the Russian authorities sided with its long-standing strategic ally in Tehran and its proxies. Although no definite rupture has been in the bilateral ties, the author concludes that “Russian-Israeli relations today represent a combination of tactical clashes of interests on one level and fundamental uncertainty on another,” with the realistic “red lines” being seen by both sides as follows: “Israel does not participate directly in the war in Ukraine and does not provide it with large-scale military assistance, while Russia does not intervene in the Middle Eastern conflict on Iran’s side and does not directly assist the development of Iran’s nuclear program.”

Finally, Alexander Shpunt has prepared a monthly overview of several important academic publications concerning post-Soviet affairs.

In the upcoming months, the PSCR program will continue working on the analysis of the ongoing events in the post-Soviet space.

In July 2026, the BESA PSCR program analyzed political developments in Ukraine, Russia, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus.

Velvl Chernin shares his perspective concerning the identity of the Ukrainian Jewry against the backdrop of the recent political developments in Ukraine. He points to the conflict of historical narratives that surrounds the contemporary relations between Ukrainian Jews and the Ukrainian state, specifically pointing to the recent far-right rally at the Independence Square in Kyiv, official Jerusalem’s reactions to the manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism and commemorations of controversial historical figures, and the counter-reactions in the Ukrainian social media. Special attention is paid to the problem of the classification of the Holodomor as the genocide of the Ukrainian people, which Israel does not recognize as such and which is accompanied by the official, and rather tendentious, list of perpetrators including a large share of people of Jewish and Latvian ethnic origin. Chernin underlines that the contemporary Ukrainian Jewish community is rather small and not represented by a universally recognized and influential secular organization; also, Israel is not listed among the countries whose citizenship Ukrainian nationals may legally hold alongside the Ukrainian one, and the linguistic aspect is still able to create tensions within the community, since most informal interactions within the post-Soviet Jewry continue to be held in Russian. The author concludes that it is not certain that, “when confronted with a clash of narratives, they [Ukrainian Jews] sincerely choose the Ukrainian national narrative over the Jewish one.”

Vladimir Ze’ev Khanin sheds light on the potential implications of Foreign Minister Saar’s initiative for a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide, which was unanimously approved by the government in June 2026 and is waiting for the parliamentary vote. Numerous previous attempts to officially discuss this issue have failed, since an average Israeli is still not willing to equate other tragedies with the Holocaust, and because of the complex relationship with Turkey – the genocide discussions resurfaced whenever Turkish-Israeli relations were reaching a low level. The effectiveness of the recent resolution as a diplomatic move remains questionable, first of all because of the strategic relations Jerusalem has with Baku, where the issue of Armenian genocide recognition is still received painfully. Khanin contends that the Israeli government’s demarche may indeed damage this strategic partnership. Importantly, Azerbaijani Jewish communities have sent letters to the Knesset asking that the recognition resolution not be adopted in a parliamentary vote, and even the Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, has reacted rather indifferently, stating that the Armenian authorities “are not obliged to comment” on this move. Numerous commentators also warn that “advancing the Israeli foreign minister’s bill will strengthen Erdoğan’s standing among Islamist circles in Turkey, worsen the attitude of many Azerbaijanis toward Israel, and is unlikely to improve relations between Jerusalem and Yerevan.”

Gershon Kogan analyzes the same issue from a different but equally important perspective. He contends that in contemporary Iran, where the Armenian minority is among the oldest minority groups, legally recognized, and enjoying its own cultural institutions and two reserved seats in the parliament, the memory of the genocide is tolerated and acknowledged, but without any formal recognition. While Tehran actively denies the Holocaust, the Armenian grief is surrounded by “muted empathy” – not least because the IRI would not like to disrupt its functional relationship with Turkey. The official protest note from the Azerbaijani MFA, demanding reconsideration of the Israeli government’s decision, can be attributed to the pan-Turkic solidarity and the inseparability of any Armenian claims from the conflict in Karabakh. However, this position does not affect the ethnic Azerbaijanis historically living in Iran and deeply integrated into the Iranian society: for them, Armenians are not enemies but old neighbors.

Boris Ginzburg presents his practical analysis of the Azerbaijani-led mediation efforts between Israel and Turkey. For Azerbaijan, both are among the most important allies, but since October 7, 2023, Ankara has significantly hardened its rhetoric against the Jewish state. Baku has mostly provided for “ad hoc measures to de-escalate tensions between Jerusalem and Ankara, aiming to prevent them from spilling over into an open military conflict.” Notably, the talks largely take place directly through the presidential offices and the Prime Minister’s office (in Israel's case), demonstrating the significance the three parties attach to the current tensions between Ankara and Jerusalem, but, as it was throughout 2025, mostly do not involve any direct meetings. Ginzburg recommends that the Jewish state, at the same time, demonstrate its readiness to de-escalate the tensions and keep undertaking precautionary measures towards Turkey, with the latter including keeping the new Syrian regime, closely aligned with Ankara, out of Lebanon, and strengthening the “Hellenic Alliance” between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus (whose northern part has been occupied by Turkey since 1974). He further stresses the need to differentiate between Turkish domestic and international rhetoric and to involve national foreign ministries in the “crisis management,” since otherwise, an important opportunity to fortify the trust base between the two countries may be missed. Ginzburg additionally recommends including Germany as an additional pillar of support for Israeli-Turkish mediation, as an important ally of Israel and a home to the largest Turkish diaspora in the world. In doing so, Germany might strengthen its role as a peace facilitator, Azerbaijan may deepen its ties with the biggest economy in Europe, and Israel may solidify its ally’s position on the international stage.

Gershon Kogan sheds light on the context within which, in November 2025, the Turkish Ministry of Education replaced the term “Central Asia” (perceived as a Soviet-era geographic category) with “Turkestan” in the Turkish national history curriculum, calling this “correcting a historical injustice” that divided the Turkic world. This was done in the framework of the “Turkey’s Century” education model that has been realized under the patronage of Erdoğan since 2024. The term “Turkestan,” historically associated with the Russian Empire’s legacy, was redeployed with a pan-Turkic ideological charge, effectively “writing over a Persian palimpsest”. In the post-Soviet period, Iran had three instruments of cultural influence in Central Asia, namely, institutional (Saadi Foundation), diplomatic-ceremonial (Nowruz celebrations), and religious (Shia networks). Each of them has significantly degraded in recent years, leading to the “Persophonie” assuming a fragmented, defensive posture, which was accelerated by the 2026 war. Iranian cultural influence was now perceived through the lens of political Islam, with the “added weight of military defeat and internal repression”. Thus, Turkey chose to decisively engage in the cultural competition and cognitive warfare exactly when the instruments for Tehran’s response are degraded, and its regional reputation is damaged.

Alexander Shpunt provides a typological overview of the conflicts surrounding the status of indigenous small-numbered peoples (ISNP) in Russia. Based on the 2025-2026 empirics, he outlines the systemic conflict effects caused by the differentiated legal regime. These include: (1) normative uncertainty of compensatory mechanisms (when the very procedure for calculating losses to the traditional habitat, sometimes excluding key stakeholders from decision-making, is challenged); (2) unclear interpretation of liability for environmental damage; (3) recognition of territories of traditional nature use (especially if they might overlap with the existing production facilities); (4) criteria of belonging to the ISNP; (5) access to preferences associated with the status (with administrative barriers exacerbated by the contradictions between regional and federal approaches). Among the institutional root causes of these conflicts are (1) the multi-level nature of legal regulation; (2) a gap between declaratory norms and law enforcement practice; (3) the competition between industrial and traditional models of territorial development; (4) the bureaucratization of access to preferences. The situation is further aggravated by the clashes between special status and universal state obligations (such as military mobilization), and between national legislation and international commitments.

Last but not least, Alexander Shpunt has prepared his regular overview of several important academic publications that deal with post-Soviet political and economic development.

In the coming months, more analytic materials discussing the ever-changing political and ideological landscape in the post-Soviet space, are to be expected.

In June 2026, the BESA PSCRP authors have analyzed a wide range of regional issues, including the recent developments in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia.

In his thought-provoking opinion piece, Kiryl Kascian draws parallels between the contemporary anti-colonial critique and narratives inherent in Russian official propaganda. While “Russian official discourse has consistently promoted the claim that smaller states pursuing policies critical towards Russia, (…) do not possess fully authentic sovereignty,” the post-colonial discourse of today tends to treat smaller states as genuinely sovereign “mainly when they position themselves against the West”; otherwise, “their political agency suddenly becomes questionable.” The example of the Albanian leadership that supported Israel and was criticized for “ceding its sovereignty to Jerusalem” may be extrapolated to broader geopolitical rhetoric.

Velvl Chernin shares his observations on the Israeli perspective towards the future of the “decolonization movements of the peoples of the Russian Federation.” He finds it useful to understand what could potentially be at stake, even though the likelihood of these plans’ realization is very low at this moment. Chernin points to the noticeable “predominance of national movements representing traditionally Muslim peoples” within the Free Nations League, an umbrella organization for separatist and regionalist movements claiming parts of the Russian Federation’s territory. In May 2026, the “Council of the Tatars of the World” joined the FNL, which was announced by Ruslan Aysin, a prominent Tatar activist who has lived in Turkey since 2022 and was designated by Russian authorities as a foreign agent. Aysin is known to be openly hostile towards Israel and Jews, being a prominent supporter of Islamist movements. Among other controversial figures in the FNL is the President of the “Assembly of the Peoples of the Caucasus” and former Deputy Prime Minister of Ichkeria, Ruslan Kutayev, who had publicly attacked Israel and openly supported Hamas.

Velvl Chernin futher observes several challenges that the Ukrainian state and society may face if/when the country has the opportunity to return to peaceful life, based on both expert knowledge and personal experiences. Firstly, with the presidential elections postponed indefinitely, Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s popularity is now affected by public fatigue, frustration, corruption scandals, and latent antisemitism. Secondly, relationships between different groups of Ukrainian citizens may become challenging: between those who served at the front and who remained in the rear (this issue is further aggravated by the public resentment toward the Territorial Recruitment Centers), those who remained in the country and refugee emigrants (some of which will eventually return and bring totally different experiences), and the attitude toward the population of the territories that have long been under Russian control.

Boris Ginzburg overviews strategic (re)considerations by Azerbaijan towards potential joining the Abraham Accords Declaration. He posits that Baku might have begun questioning the necessity of joining the AAD for the realization of Azerbaijan’s strategic goals in the region, considering that most of the motives behind the potential accession focus mainly on “improving Azerbaijan’s standing in Washington.” The public discourse in Azerbaijan is now less focused on the AAD, not least because relations with Washington have deepened even without the accession, and because of the fears of retaliatory measures by (now even less predictable) Iran. Ginzburg concludes that “Azerbaijan’s value to the Jewish state” will remain crucial even outside the AAD framework, especially in what concerns the relations with the new regime in Syria, as well as with Türkiye, Russia (to secure “at least a modest continuation of Russian military presence in post-Assad Syria”), and France.

Gershon Kogan analyzes the Tehran regime’s attempts to target the political imagination in post-Soviet societies. Across international platforms oriented toward Central Asian audiences, “Tehran is framed overwhelmingly as the aggrieved party,” and “internal Iranian dissent is systematically recast as externally sponsored provocation.” Central Asian states are effectively targeted because of transit and economic interdependence (generating “editorial self-restraint” when the “absence of critical coverage” is viewed as a signal) and Islamic networks and cultural proximity (which “produce a baseline interpretive disposition toward Iranian narratives”). Since the Iranian narrative reach in Central Asia cannot “operate through direct consumption of Persian- or Arabic-language state media,” it does so through indirect and uncoordinated media amplification (via Turkish-language outlets embedding Iranian framing within an Islamic solidarity narrative, and Russian-language aggregators and Telegram channels), which produce the “inoculation effect,” i.e., resistance to counter-narratives. Azerbaijan is a different narrative target and structurally inconvenient reference point, being framed as a platform for hostile operations against the IRI. Kogan also claims that “the analytical gap between Iran specialists and post-Soviet analysts is a structural vulnerability” that needs to be overcome.

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman shares his perspective on how the evolving role of the Middle Corridor as an indispensable land artery and its integration with the Indo-Israeli “Spice Route” can “forge a resilient, multilateral network of interchangeable nodes,” which he calls a “Eurasian arc of connectivity,” where “the interests of global actors no longer merely collide but have become functionally dependent on the stability of local states.” For regional actors, the priority remains the “maximization of cargo flows while maintaining the openness and de-politicization of the route,” and India is striving to secure stable access to Central Eurasia to establish a reliable bypass route that would function even in the event of regional destabilization. Kazakhstan may serve as the central gateway of the Middle Corridor and a “translator of interests,” capable of maintaining balance among various actors. Israel’s role may be one of the “intellectual integrator” of the MC and the “Spice Route,” providing AI-driven logistics, supply chain cybersecurity, and “smart customs,” which would transform Jerusalem into a “strategic crossroads for two of Eurasia’s largest logistical systems.”

Last but not least, Alexander Shpunt has prepared his regular overview of several important academic publications that address post-Soviet political and economic development.

In the upcoming months, the post-Soviet conflicts research program will continue to provide timely analysis of the ongoing events in the post-Soviet space.

In May 2026, the PSCRP papers addressed a wide array of topics, including the developments in and around Russia, Armenia, and Central Asian states.

Gershon Kogan retrospectively analyzes the outcomes of the Soviet Union’s dissolution for its former member states, based on the economic and demographic statistics and institutional context. He concludes that the “single strongest predictor of post-Soviet modernization is (…) institutional anchor.” While the Belovezha Accords were a “ratification of disintegration already underway,” post-Soviet development has produced certain modernization gains, which have been “purchased at a demographic price that standard development metrics do not capture.” Freedom of movement produced huge demographic losses. There is no single post-Soviet development trajectory but rather three internally coherent pathways, which the author calls “Liberal Prosperity, Authoritarian Stability, and Demographic Expansion.” The opportunities for institutional and geopolitical choices available for a multiethnic state’s successors are inevitably uneven, and that is what Gershon Kogan considers to be the paper’s main conclusion.

Alexander Shpunt provides a thorough and structured overview of the recent crisis in state-church relations in Armenia. As root causes for the conflict, he lists the dismantling of the “theocratic-political symbiosis” between the Church and the former elites, ideological clash between the ideologies of “Historical” and “Real” Armenia, as well as geopolitical and electoral considerations (the AAC being at times perceived as a channel of external influence, and the incumbent elite’s actions being considered attempts at silencing the major opposition voice). Shpunt traces the crisis’s chronology from the 2015 constitutional referendum, which laid the legislative ground for authority misinterpretations, through the 2018 Velvet Revolution and the 2020 and 2023 defeats in the Karabakh wars, followed by the establishment of the Church-led “Tavush for Homeland” opposition movement, to the 2025 formulation of the “Real Armenia” ideology. The conflict escalated in 2025, when mass arrests of the Armenian clergy took place, and in 2026, when a “roadmap for Church Reforms” (including the demand for the incumbent Church leader’s removal) was formulated. The author specifically points to the roles of several external stakeholders, such as Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, the EU, and the Armenian global diaspora. Shpunt concludes his overview with several possible scenarios, including further escalation and institutional polarization, the canonical schism within the AAC, “institutional Cold War,” and peaceful diaspora-mediated de-escalation, although the latter does not seem the most feasible at the moment.

The authors from the PSCRP team present their view of what they consider a coordinated campaign against the incumbent Armenian authorities, orchestrated by Moscow. They point to Armenia’s NSS suspicions regarding the AAC officials’ role in potential undermining of the upcoming elections, paired with the public accusations against the Catholicos made by the Prime Minister. Subsequently, the PSCRP authors emphasize the alleged significant presence of Russia’s security services in Russia’s embassy in Yerevan, with “Rossotrudnichestvo,” Russia’s cultural outreach agency, acting as a soft-power provider. Furthermore, the analysis points to the potential role, reported by Azerbaijani outlets, of the former ICC prosecutor in attempts to “correct” the West’s policy toward Yerevan; reportedly, Ocampo’s efforts are backed by the Armenian diaspora, including oligarchs based in Russia. Finally, the authors note the recent filmed assassination warning against the incumbent Prime Minister, and Russia’s supposed use of regulatory pressure as a political instrument, with the regulatory agencies responsible for consumer safety and agriculture imposing restrictions on the Armenian goods several weeks before the scheduled election day.

Alexander Shpunt presents an original overview of the internal political situation in Russia in light of the upcoming State Duma elections. He deliberately abstains from drawing on non-Russian and Kremlin-opposed sources to grasp how Russia itself perceives the picture. Firstly, Shpunt points to the reduction of “quotas” traditionally allocated to the systemic parliamentary opposition for single-member constituencies. Then he evaluates the specific trajectories of each of the major parties in the Russian political field. The ruling party, “United Russia,” underwent substantial leadership restructuring in 2025, making it more centralized and compact. The party’s internal primary system transitioned to the country’s Public Services digital platform, enabling an increase in the number of rank-and-file party members participating in candidate selection, and the incumbent MPs are evaluated based on their legislative activity and the base of committed supporters. The Communist Party, enjoying an effective network of regional and local party branches, has recently engaged in confrontations with the Kremlin’s political management, openly criticizing the government’s socio-economic policy and restrictions, and the pressure on the regional branches has intensified. The Liberal Democratic Party has recently moved from personalized eccentric populism to a more systematic agenda, comprising the “Russian Question,” social priorities, and economic policy suggestions. The “Just Russia” party, which reverted to its original name in 2025, and which considers “angry patriots” its target electorate, is now facing existential uncertainty, and the upcoming election results will probably determine the very continued existence of this political project. The “New People” party, presenting itself as a “party of no prohibitions,” is now considered among the possible candidates for the second place in the race, especially after the merger with the “Party of Growth,” which brought it substantial business resources and attracted, to an even bigger extent, the “systemic liberal” electorate. The potential involvement of the SVO veterans in the electoral campaign may entail significant risks to political manageability, since this cohort is not disposed toward political compromise in the fight against “internal enemies.” Shpunt concludes that the upcoming elections may be viewed as a plebiscite on the very survival of the “systemic opposition” model.

Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin discusses the interim impacts of the Second Iran War on Moscow’s geopolitical considerations. As for now, Russia’s support to Iran remains minimal and mostly verbal. Moscow might view the war as an opportunity to receive unexpected additional dividends: the prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and destruction of oil and gas export facilities may expand the market for sanctioned Russian energy resources, and the massive use of Tomahawk missiles against Iran makes supplies of these missiles to Ukraine less likely. However, at the same time, the destroyed Iranian plants will cease to be sources of ammunition and weapons supplies for the Russian army, and the Kremlin’s refusal to condemn Iran’s actions, including those aimed against the UAE and Saudi Arabia, might damage Moscow’s position in the Gulf. Also, Iran’s direct military confrontation with the Gulf states can undermine the schemes of sanctioned goods supply developed by Iran and involving these countries.

The paper by Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman discusses the new U.S. strategy for Central Asia, in light of the 2019-2025 Strategy’s expiration. In line with their traditional multi-vector foreign policy approaches, the Central Asian states currently seek to deepen dialogue and cooperation with the United States, but in terms not implying military and political confrontation with Russia or China. (Since Iran is now undergoing a major internal and external crisis, these countries may afford serious disagreements with Tehran’s opinion concerning their cooperation with the US and Israel). These desires now correspond with the Trump administration’s preference for flexible diplomacy based on business deals and not on outward geopolitical containment, being formulated as a strategy emphasizing infrastructure, transit, resources, and flexible diplomacy. The C5+1 summit in Washington in 2025, the growing role of the Middle Corridor in the functioning of Central Asian economies, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s significant role in the inaugural summit of the Board of Peace further demonstrate the prospects of this policy vector.

Finally, Alexander Shpunt presents his monthly overview of several new academic publications focused on the post-Soviet space.

In summer 2026, we are going to continue publishing timely and professional analytical commentaries on the ongoing developments in the post-Soviet area. Stay tuned!

In April 2026, the PSCR program has prepared analytical materials covering a wide range of developments in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia, and Ukraine.

Alexander Shpunt provides a comprehensive analysis of the decision by the Georgian authorities, officially dismantling the so-called Provisional Administration of South Ossetia. It took just a couple of months to finalize the abolishment by January 1, 2026. This body was an institutional manifestation of the Georgian policy of non-recognition of the separatist entities on its territory and of the consensus regarding the country’s territorial integrity shaped under Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency. The decision was taken de facto unilaterally by the parliamentarians from the ruling “Georgian Dream” party, often considered pro-Russian and blamed for re-orienting Georgian foreign policy from the Euro-Atlantic track towards reconciliation with Moscow. Although the operational scope of the Provisional Administration has been limited in recent years, many observers view the decision as yet another symbolic step away from the recent decades’ pro-European path and as an acknowledgment that hopes for re-integrating South Ossetia are in effect abandoned. However, the municipal administrations for Georgia’s regions included in South Ossetian territory continue to operate in exile, as does the exiled Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, meaning that “Georgian Dream” is still not ready to abandon the “formal architecture of non-recognition” altogether.

The PSCRP team has prepared a material discussing the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia set for June 7, 2026, against the background of what the authors called an intense media campaign to remove the incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from his post. This campaign, as the authors frame it, is led by the Russian state media, and at the same time by the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. (notably, ANCA). Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow in April 2026, when the Armenian PM rebuffed the arguments voiced by Vladimir Putin regarding the future of Russian-Armenian cooperation, served as a starting point for a “state media offensive”: “Every major Russian state-aligned outlet framed Pashinyan as ungrateful, deluded, or outright treacherous.” Apart from this, several hundred protesters gathered outside the Armenian embassy in Moscow during Pashinyan’s visit. Indeed, the PM’s “Civil Contract” party advocates for normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, enhanced partnership with the U.S., and potential EU accession; all these points are viewed with suspicion from both Moscow and Armenian diaspora circles, with the U.S.-initiated TRIPP corridor being one of the “hinge issues” in the relevant discussions.

The PSCRP team has analyzed Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Azerbaijan in April 2026. The Ukrainian president’s first trip to the South Caucasus since 2022 was marked by a discussion of military-technical cooperation between Kyiv and Baku, Zelenskyy’s proposal to hold trilateral negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, and the US in Azerbaijan, and Ilham Aliyev’s expression of support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. While the nationalist ecosystem on Telegram responded to the summit in Gabala with invectives and alternative explanations, the Russian state media reported on the event without any substantive analytical commentary and traditional triumphalism, confining itself to factual reports and “institutional minimalism,” which the authors find telling in itself.

Boris Ginzburg provides a careful reassessment of what some media sources dubbed the “first official meeting” between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in Vilnius in January 2026. He proposes several explanations for Kyiv’s motives to end the previously maintained “strategic distancing” of the Belarusian opposition. First, Ginzburg thinks that Zelenskyy might want to strengthen the latter’s pro-European camp, since the stance of several prominent opposition leaders released by Minsk in December 2025 on the Russian-Ukrainian war might be described as “ambiguous.” Second, Kyiv might try to gain leverage in negotiations with Washington by counter-signaling the incumbent administration’s potential rapprochement with the official Minsk. Third, this move could be seen as an investment in Ukraine’s relations with Lithuania and Poland, so as to promote Ukraine’s fast-track EU accession. Fourth, Zelenskyy’s change in communication strategy, which has become visibly harsher since January 2026, might serve domestic political needs, to create a “strongman-image” if the presidential elections are to take place.

Velvl Chernin presents his analytical overview of the book “The Path to Freedom” by Ruslan Gabbasov, one of the leaders of the “Bashkort” Bashkir nationalist organization (banned in Russia in 2020), who was designated by the Russian authorities as a foreign agent and an extremist. The book is a programmatic document for the Bashkir nationalist movement, advocating the establishment of an independent Bashkir state as the only means to resist what Gabbasov calls “forced assimilation.” He sees the chance for such developments in the political crisis that might hypothetically emerge in Russia as a result of the ongoing war. Gabbasov envisions a Western-style democracy as an ideal for the Bashkir state, but only when ethnic Bashkirs become the majority; before this, autocracy is needed. Turkic post-Soviet states, especially Kazakhstan, are regarded as models, and a pan-Turkic political unity is a goal to be achieved. Bashkir nationalists, according to Gabbasov, should rely on a small and active nationalist elite and act in close cooperation with other national movements. The book’s author advocates for the migration of “ethnically close populations” to the independent Bashkortostan, sketches both “minimal” and “maximal” territorial claims, underlines the importance of Islam as an “ethnic symbol,” and calls for armed confrontation with what he labels “occupational authorities.” Although more an interesting artefact than a political program having any realistic potential, the book still captures a mindset widespread in certain circles associated with the “national movements” in Russia’s regions and in emigration.

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman continues his monitoring of the public narratives surrounding the U.S./Israeli-Iranian war in the Central Asian countries. On social media, conspiracy narratives are widely shared, including those of Israeli/Jewish control over world politics, and reports of Iran’s “successes” in the war. The main sections of the anti-Israeli sentiment on social media in Central Asia are Islamist-fundamentalist discourse (focused on pan-Islamic solidarity and spread through the Arab, Turkish, and Iranian media), Western left-radical discourse (focused on anti-imperial and anti-colonial narratives), and Russian-language anti-Western discourse. The fusion of these sources “creates an informational landscape in which religious solidarity, geopolitical resentment, and conspiracy narratives reinforce one another.”

Nati Cantorovich documents the recent surge in antisemitic discourse across the countries of the former Soviet Union. Since June 2025, when the operation “Rising Lion” was launched, the external influence (mainly from Iranian and Hamas-affiliated sources) has transformed from marginal to core components of mainstream propaganda in several regions and countries, with the narratives being based on a “synthesis of classical antisemitism, Soviet-era anti-Zionism, and modern geopolitical grievances, alongside radical Christian and Islamic religious motifs.” When the “Lion’s Roar” operation started, most prominent narratives in the post-Soviet hate discourse were global Jewish control, radical religious rhetoric (including blood libel), Nazi comparisons as a way for delegitimizing Zionism, competing victimhood, and more locally rooted propaganda motifs (like the Jewish origin of opposition figures, the “hypocrisy” of political emigrants who left for Israel, the strategic conflation of Ukrainian and Israeli policies, etc.). If in Central Asian and Caucasian states, this discourse was largely confined to social media, in Belarus, as Cantorovich notes, “hate speech is spearheaded by the highest echelons of the regime’s media apparatus.” In this regard, the situation in Russia is different, since overt antisemitic expressions are normally confined to only the “second or third tier of the propaganda hierarchy.”

Last but not least, Alexander Shpunt presents his monthly overview of important new academic publications focused on the post-Soviet space. 

Regardless of our intentions, the March of 2026 became thematic in terms of the BESA PSCRP publications: all of them focus on various aspects of the ongoing military campaigns against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Gershon Kogan provides a structured overview of the geopolitical risks that instability in Iran might bear for the post-Soviet region. He recommends understanding fragmentation as not an event but a process of gradual transformation and erosion, consisting of territorial, institutional, functional, and cognitive aspects. Kogan considers political-institutional, military, and peripheral drivers of instability. The Iranian situation demonstrates the limits of a securitization strategy in foreign and internal politics, and military conflict risks turning the country not into a “besieged fortress” but into a field of narrative fragmentation. The peripheral power vacuum, caused by the redistribution of governance resources toward key security nodes, might be easily filled by alternative actors. Fragmentation processes in the IRI are likely to affect the South Caucasus (border instability and migration pressure) and Central Asia (transforming transit routes and logistics, radicalization and information campaigns, and the weakening of border control). Kogan recommends four monitoring priorities regarding the Iranian destabilization, namely, border corridors, information operations, regional diplomatic signals, and proxy-structure activity.

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman focuses on the Central Asian subregion and scrutinizes official and unofficial reactions to the war with Iran in these states. The domineering official reactions are those of expressing concerns but maintaining a rather neutral stance, which allows for greater flexibility in managing potential risks. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have sent formal condolences over the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, but generally remained neutral in assessing the situation. The author claims the public attitudes toward the actions of the US and Israel depend on various factors, inter alia, the strength of fundamentalist Islamic influence in particular regions, susceptibility to external informational influence, the degree of state control over public expression, and the internal political positioning of the actors.

The PSCRP team further zooms in to concentrate on the strategic vulnerabilities Tajikistan is facing now, as both its key geopolitical partners, Russia and Iran, are confronted with major crises of a military nature. The strategic dependence of Dushanbe on Russia is evident, manifesting in remittances from the diaspora, military infrastructure, and economic ties. However, in recent years, these levers have proved less reliable than they once were. Consequently, a dangerous situation might emerge if the Tajik-Afghan border remains without the Russian protection and if the Tajik diaspora in Russia is targeted to leverage influence on Dushanbe. In the case of Iran, the ties are more ideological and cultural but still have a significant economic component. The regimes, however, are strikingly different, and civilizational affinity may be easily overwhelmed by other interests. China is trying to fill the void, but Beijing’s influence may be equally disruptive for Tajik economic development and societal stability. The authors claim that, should Dushanbe wish to use the strategic opportunity to reorient its foreign policy partially, it should prioritize its geographic position as a stronghold against the flow of illicit substances from Afghanistan, its natural resources (minerals and hydropower potential), “civilizational” traits, and an emerging security architecture in the region.

Moving to the South Caucasian area, the PSCRP team assesses the Iranian strikes against targets in Azerbaijan, namely, an airport in Nakhchivan and a school in Shekerabad. Baku has harshly reacted to these drone assaults, but in a diplomatic way. The Iranian government denied its involvement in the incident, unlike the IRGC, which has acted nearly autonomously since mid-2025 and has now claimed responsibility for attacks against Baku. The goals may include further restricting the airspace corridor or driving up oil prices. However, it is also possible that IRCG tries to provoke Azerbaijan and Turkey into intervening and thus making the people rally around the flag—echoing the situation of the Iraqi invasion in 1980. Although in reality, such a situation could be catastrophic for Iran, Baku is unlikely to yield to these provocations.

Vladimir Ze’ev Khanin shifts attention to the Eastern European part of the post-Soviet space and provides an analysis of reactions from Russia and Ukraine to the ongoing Israeli and U.S. operations against the IRI. While the official Kyiv has explicitly supported the intervention, the Moscow authorities have condemned it as an act of unprovoked aggression. As part of bilateral cooperation, Moscow and Tehran have supplied each other with certain military technologies; however, this does not entail direct military action for the sake of the partner’s protection, and at the moment, the Kremlin has limited itself to official condemnations and offers of assistance in achieving a peaceful solution. On the contrary, Kyiv offered its assistance in dealing with the Iranian drones. Moscow’s cautious stance, despite the significance of the infrastructure Iran has provided to it in recent years and the investments it has made into the IRI economy, may also be influenced by the involvement of the Gulf states and the fact that Russia may also expect to gain some economic and military profits from the current war. Khanin draws readers’ attention to the fact that both the U.S. and Israeli leaders face important elections in the fall this year, with the coming months being politically decisive. Thus, they both need a short, decisive campaign that presents a “picture of victory,” while Donald Trump must also persuade the electorate that the operation itself was justified.

Finally, Kyril Kascian describes Belarus’s foreign political attitude towards the ongoing U.S. and Israeli operations against Iran as rhetoric supportive of the Tehran regime, but not entailing any practical actions or risks to Minsk. In the author’s words, the authorities in Belarus and Iran have long cooperated due to the shared challenges posed by Western sanctions and the close nature of their ruling regimes. So, the official rhetoric of Lukashenka, as the most prominent foreign political actor of Belarus, remains anti-Western and, in part, anti-Israeli. This happens despite the historical role of the Belarusian Jewish community in both Belarus and Israel and the multifold personal ties between many Belarusians and Israelis.

Last but not least, Alexander Shpunt shares his monthly overview of several important academic publications focused on the post-Soviet space.

We wish our readers a Happy Passover and continue our analysis of the ongoing events in Eastern Eurasia. 

In February 2026, the research by the PSCR program was focused on the dynamics in the European part of the post-Soviet space (namely, Ukraine and Belarus), the South Caucasus, and Kazakhstan.

Velvl Chernin recalls his recent long experience of visiting various Ukrainian cities and working with Ukrainian refugees, to tentatively assess the impact of the war on Ukrainian society. He notes the widespread fatigue of the war, embitterment towards Russians, and the similarities between Israeli and Ukrainian societies experiencing post-traumatic stress; the similarities are even more enhanced by the fact that many Jews and Israelis serve in the Ukrainian army, while a lot of Israelis of Ukrainian origin serve in the IDF. The author also stresses the importance of the societal divisions that emerged among Ukrainians living near the front line, in the rear, and in the occupied territories.

Boris Ginzburg analyzes Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s foreign policy specifics in light of his recent visits to several Middle Eastern and Northern African countries. Ginzburg emphasizes several structural characteristics of Belarus’ foreign policy highlighted by the leader’s MENA tour, namely, the use of foreign political moves to enhance domestic and international legitimacy, the personalist character of international relations and distrust towards the diplomatic profession, and the role of mediator often assumed by Lukashenka in international conflicts (even if such a role was not solicited). The author assumes these characteristics, if taken into account, might help Israeli foreign policy to more neatly leverage its diplomatic potential in dealing with Minsk, most importantly, to recalibrate the latter’s relations with Tehran.

The material by the PSCRP team reacts to the US Vice President Vance’s visit to Azerbaijan and Armenia in February this year. The authors describe the current geopolitical situation surrounding Armenia, which is disappointed in its strategic alliance with Russia and might seek alternatives, in cooperation with the U.S., to the Iranian influence. The paper argues that the window of opportunities for enhanced dialogue with South Caucasian nations is now open for Washington, due to the geopolitical realignments in the post-Soviet space. However, Yerevan’s strategic choice depends on the figure of Nikol Pashinyan, the incumbent prime minister, who faces growing opposition to his rule, partly influenced by Russia and by nationalist circles in the diaspora.

The PSCRP team assesses the reasons for and implications of the ongoing backsliding of Georgia’s EU accession process, symbolically marked this month by the inclusion of a Georgian port into another EU sanctions package. Reportedly, the port of Kulevi is increasingly used to circumvent the European sanctions against Moscow. The authors emphasize the role of the “Georgian Dream” party and its de facto leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili, having close ties to Moscow, in the rapid re-orientation of Tbilisi’s foreign policy aspirations from EU-oriented to Russia-tied. They argue that the reasons might lie in the party’s unwillingness to implement the enhanced EU democratic control mechanisms, while cooperation with Russia might yield economic dividends without any infringements on the potential political monopoly. At the same time, Brussels’ available tools to influence Georgia remain limited, since targeted personal sanctions and suspending a EU candidate status require anonymity, which can hardly be reached.

Alexander Shpunt analyzes Kazakhstan’s recent constitutional amendments – a draft for a new Constitution, with 84 % of the text changed compared to the previous version, was published in January and will be subject to a referendum. The new constitutional draft significantly alters the entire structure of political power in Kazakhstan, inter alia, making the legislative organ unicameral and creating a post of vice-president. Shpunt argues that, considering the external danger of Russia’s influence (which the incumbent president is attempting to resolve by allying more closely with China) and the internal discrepancies caused by the residual presence of the former president’s inner circle, constitutional amendments may be aimed at preserving the incumbent’s position in power even after his official presidential term ends (in 2029). While preparing the reform, the Kazakhstan authorities have secured the ground by legally discouraging political opposition from parliamentary representation and any political activities, and by introducing stronger control over the media landscape. The author concludes that Kazakhstan’s strategic choices may be diverse, but all of them are highly dependent on the figure of the president.

Also, traditionally, Alexander Shpunt has prepared a monthly overview of significant and interesting publications concerning the conflicts and political transformations in the post-Communist space.

Despite the challenges of the turbulent global geopolitics, the PSCRP continues its work, highlighting the specifics of the intersection between conflicts and politics in the post-Soviet space. Stay tuned!

In January 2025, the research papers produced by the PSCR program covered the developments in such subregions as the South Caucasus, the Baltics, Central Asia, and Russia.

Kiryl Kascian overviews the situation concerning LRT, Lithuania’s public broadcasting corporation. Recently, a populist, far-right party, “Nemunas Dawn,” which gained a chance to enter the ruling coalition because of the extreme pluralism in the Lithuanian party landscape, proposed amendments to the law concerning the broadcaster status. The amendments would facilitate the removal of LRT’s Director General and thus diminish the independence of the media corporation. Opposition parties responded with filibustering tactics, and civil society organized rallies to protect media freedom from infringements, while also speculating about the personal aspects of the desire to oust the incumbent Director General. Eventually, the government decided not to fast-track the legislative amendments.

Against the background of the recently announced changes in the regulations concerning the official Russian migration policy, Alexander Shpunt outlines the main milestones in the development of a stable Vietnamese diaspora in Russia. He stresses the initially temporary character of Vietnamese migration based on the agreements between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, with subsequent turning of a part of the Vietnamese workers into an element of the “shadow market,” and main channels for the Vietnamese workforce to enter the Russian economy in the post-Soviet period. The demographic characteristics and networked human capital allowed for the creation of a stable and resilient migrant community that, at the same time, remains highly dependent on “exploitative market regimes” and “opportunistic criminals.” Based on the above, the author doubts that, after working in Russia, “new Vietnamese migrants (…) will all return to Vietnam” – and this conclusion may be extrapolated to other potential migrant communities from the “far abroad.”

The PSCRP team summarizes the strategic choices Armenia is facing at the moment. The authors view the country as caught between competing geopolitical ambitions, but at the same time, facing the prospect of tangible positive changes. The latter are, however, highly dependent on the position of the incumbent leader, Nikol Pashinyan, and the upcoming constitutional referendum. In the meantime, Moscow and Tehran are trying to exert influence on the political decisions made in Yerevan, and the Armenian diaspora is now acting against the changes envisioned by the Pashinyan administration. The authors conclude that “Armenia must end its strategic ambiguity and demonstrate that it is prepared to anchor itself in the Western orbit. And the West must be prepared to support that choice with more than rhetoric.”

Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin analyzes how the current wave of anti-government protests in Iran is viewed in Russia and Ukraine. The position of Kyiv is a vocal support for the potential revolution, since Iran is regarded as the main ally of Russia and one of its major arms suppliers. Moscow’s position is more complicated, since, although officially being Tehran’s ally, with multiple documents signed regarding this alliance, the official Kremlin maintains rather restrained rhetoric and avoids undertaking any sustained practical steps. This may be motivated by Moscow’s unwillingness to enter into direct conflict with the Trump administration, and by the arguments of Russia’s oil lobby. Russia’s reaction is mostly confined to diplomatic efforts aimed at the conflict de-escalation. The Israeli position is no less ambiguous, because of the presumed insufficient readiness of the Jewish state to debunk possible Iranian attacks, and the fears that the ayatollah regime is not weakened enough to fall because of external action.

Gershon Kogan thoroughly analyzes the strategic anxiety that Israeli-Azerbaijanian cooperation creates for Iran’s regional security considerations. Amid the internal crisis, Tehran’s sensitivity to external reference points is heightened, and Baku is perceived there as a “structurally inconvenient reference point,” whose very existence challenges the narrative of the “presumed inseparability of Shi‘ite identity from Islamic governance and clerical authority.” The outcome of the recent wars in Karabakh, influenced, inter alia, by Baku’s cooperation with Israel, meant a qualitative shift in Tehran’s northern security environment. For Jerusalem, strategic cooperation with Azerbaijan, which has a long border with Iran, is, among other things, a tool to generate “a persistent sense of strategic uncertainty in Tehran.”

Andrey Kazantsev-Vaisman outlines the opportunities that are now emerging for Israeli foreign policy in Central Asia. While the relations with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are already well-developed, especially upon the former’s accession to the Abraham Accords, the broader regional diplomatic efforts by Jerusalem might mean expanding Israel’s strategic contacts in the “Islamic world.” At the moment, Turkey, Russia, and China tend to assume the position of pragmatic tolerance towards such developments, Iran is largely absorbed by its own internal challenges, and other Central Asian states closely monitor the development of Israel-Kazakhstan relations, maintaining a cautiously positive view towards following the example. The most positive scenario for Israeli diplomacy can be the establishment of a permanent consultative format with the “Central Asian Six” (where now Baku is also represented), which can be non-institutional, non-binding, demilitarized, depoliticized, and focused on economic and infrastructural development.

Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin further draws the readers’ attention to the recent trilateral summit Israel-Cyprus-Greece. The parties have discussed “planning large-scale joint exercises, enhancing the operational readiness of their armed forces, and exchanging intelligence”; the issues of energy trade were raised, as well as the projects for establishing TITR and IMEC economic corridors. However, it was primarily the discussions on the post-conflict arrangement of the Gaza Strip that raised significant concerns in Turkey. Ankara perceives this move “as a challenge to its aspiration to replicate in Gaza the Syrian model — that is, to establish external control over the enclave and keep in power the radical Islamist group Hamas.” As Turkey is looking for actors that might potentially support it in the confrontation “with the Athens–Jerusalem–Nicosia triangle,” it might possibly count on Moscow. However, the latter’s position is rather ambivalent: although Russia’s relations with Greece and Cyprus have deteriorated in recent years, Moscow-Ankara relations are rather cool as well, mostly because of Turkey’s cooperation with Ukraine and the US, and regional ambitions for leadership and influence in the post-Soviet space, traditionally considered by Russia as its exclusive zone of interests.

Last but not least, as always, Alexander Shpunt has prepared his monthly digest of five research publications concerning the conflict dynamics in the post-Soviet space.

We are now already working on the research papers to be published in the next few months, so as to keep the readership updated regarding the post-Soviet events.

The publication portfolio of the PSCR program in December 2025 was as diverse as to cover the security problems of the Baltic states, the new U.S. National Security Strategy, antisemitic tropes in post-Soviet wars, the difficulties faced by the post-Soviet Jewish immigrants in Poland, and Iranian officials’ reaction to Armenia’s foreign policies.

Velvl Chernin presents his view, based on both expert knowledge and personal institutional experience, of the Jews from the post-Soviet countries residing in Poland. He notes the limited institutional potential and human resources of the local Jewish organizations, and delves into the particular problems faced by the recent (post-2022) immigrants, some of whom consider Poland as just a transit station to Israel. Chernin specifically points to the problems such potential repatriates have in obtaining the necessary documents (which mostly concern immigrants from Belarus), visiting Nativ consuls, and challenges concerning integration into Polish society for those who opt for remaining in the country.

Ze’ev Khanin’s analysis focuses on the instrumental use of antisemitic conspiracy theories in the post-Soviet conflicts. He points at the instrumentalization of claims of antisemitism in both Russian (accusing Ukrainian leadership of Judeophobia) and Ukrainian (comparing Russia’s actions to the Holocaust and the Soviet anti-Zionism) public discourse. Conspiratorial claims about Jews who are going to “settle” in Eastern Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, or in Azerbaijan (“like they did in Palestine”) are spread by Iranian state-affiliated agencies, some Turkish ideologues, and radical antisemitic (semi)political circles in Armenia, Ukraine, and Russia. Khanin concludes that these theories, “when overlaid on latent or overt antisemitism,” may “become a trigger for both domestic and internal conflicts.”

The PSCRP team describes the newest security threats that the Baltic states can possibly face. The authors focus on Russia’s alleged efforts to damage the local infrastructure, violations of European countries’ airspaces, and the fears around the possible seizure of the Suwalki Gap. The Baltic governments especially fear Washington’s possible disengagement from European security, underline the necessity of supporting Ukraine as self-defense, and actively prepare for the war, which, they believe, can be imminent. Another material prepared by the PSCRP team suggests extrapolating the Baltic states’ security practices to Kazakhstan, against the background of recent arbitrary checks on the country’s border by Russian customs services and Astana’s preservation of strategic vulnerability caused by its reliance on supply routes it does not control.

The material by the PSCRP profoundly analyzes the (semi-)official Tehran’s reaction to the Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister’s recent visit to Israel. The authors argue that Iranian officials are highly sensitive to any moves, however symbolic and impractical, that Yerevan may make towards any external actors, which is supported by numerous examples of Iranian media op-eds and interviews. The main Tehran’s concerns include Israel’s alleged strategic intentions to penetrate Armenia by “soft influence,” and the enactment of the plans of the TRIPP/Zangezur corridor, potentially limiting Iran’s geopolitical and economic capabilities. Armenia, in its turn, is now extremely cautious in its geopolitical choices, since the old alliances proved not to be that reliable, and the new ones are still a work in progress. So, various Armenian officials have spared no effort in reassuring the Islamic Republic of being the “main partner” and “strategic ally.”

Alexander Shpunt critically assesses the U.S. National Security Strategy released in November 2025. Following the “America First” doctrine and based on the idea of the “primacy of nations,” the document shifts the mode of the U.S. foreign policy from value-based to rigidly pragmatic. Declaring non-intervention, non-contingency of particular policies on the counteractor’s political regime and traditions, and de facto recognizing the division of the world into spheres of influence, the NSS stresses the importance of economic security and technological superiority “as the main arena of global competition.” In the doctrine, the U.S. declares the abandonment of the “global policeman” role and shifts the primary burden of international security to its allies. Among the particular post-Soviet countries and regions, for Belarus, the shift in the U.S. approach might mean legitimation; for Ukraine, settlement rather than victory as the objective; and for the Baltic states, the level of guarantees becomes reduced. Russia’s role in the NSS can be described as a “potential deal-making partner,” with whom managed engagement is possible and desirable. However, Shpunt sees several risks derived from the Strategy, including the potential escalation of global conflicts “due to the perception of a power vacuum.” Also, by “surgical” de-escalation and rapid deals among the elites, the root causes of the conflicts may be ignored and preserved.

Last but not least, as always, Alexander Shpunt has prepared his monthly digest of five research publications concerning the conflict dynamics in the post-Soviet space. This month, the broad theme can be described as “civilizational” influence the Soviet past has on various regions long after the USSR’s collapse.

The PSCRP team wishes our readership a productive and inspirational year of 2026, and we will do our best to keep you informed about the post-Soviet regional dynamics. 

In November 2025, the materials published by the Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program at BESA focused mainly on the issue of Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords and on the problem of combatants’ reintegration and political participation in Russia and Ukraine.

Andrey Kazantsev-Vaisman notes that Astana’s joining the Abraham Accords is a very convenient and low-risk way to build political rapport with the US, while not undermining the regional geopolitical alliances and not annoying Moscow or Beijing. Especially at a time when a political gesture in support of the economic cooperation was needed, Kazakhstan took advantage of the Gaza ceasefire and of easing tensions between Washington and Beijing, and Washington and Moscow, respectively. Being a “symbolic layer” that speaks to Trump’s geopolitical priorities, the accession to the Accords means, mostly, the facilitation of economic cooperation between Astana and Jerusalem. However, geopolitically, this move establishes a new precedent within the Muslim world.

The material by the PSCRP team frames Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords as an “explicit rejection of extremist ideologies” that projects an image of the country as a responsible international actor, a “secular, open, and investment-friendly” state. At the same time, the paper highlights the geostrategic necessity of including Azerbaijan in this process, while also overcoming the outdated legislation concerning Baku’s cooperation with the US.

Finally, Vladimir Ze’ev Khanin describes Kazakhstan’s joining the Abrahamic club as the result of a long-term development, which included the creation of multilateral bodies coordinating US-Central Asian ties, and as a move aimed primarily towards enhancing Astana-Washington relations. This decision is in line with the new administration’s idea of extending the initial “target” of the Accords, namely, the previously hostile Muslim states with no relations with Israel, to those countries that have long before established diplomatic ties with Jerusalem. Experts call this move of Trump’s administration putting a “boot between China and Russia.” Despite the hopes and expectations, it is not Azerbaijan that became the first post-Soviet state to join the club, which can be possibly explained by Baku’s wish to enter the Accords after they prove their relevance, and as a symbolic culmination.

Alexander Shpunt analyzes the multifold implications of a new social group now being forged in Russia, namely, the veterans of the “special military operation” coming home from the battlefield. He points at, first, the contractual basis of the draft, creating financial incentives, especially in depressed regions; second, at the “elitization” of the combatants’ families who now may have money but nowhere to spend it, which leads to frustration. Third, of certain importance is the “military rehabilitation” of convicted criminals: although the (former) prison population constitutes just a small percentage of those fighting in the “SVO,” the very mechanism deserves close attention. Shpunt also highlights the growing role of combat service as a social lift and entry ticket to the administrative elites, and the potential that the returning combatants might have in the eyes of organized crime.

In a similar vein, Shpunt goes on to analyze the conflict’s impact on civil life in Ukraine. He notes that, due to the significantly increased public trust in the Armed Forces, the political and electoral role of veterans and combatants has also grown substantially, with a particular focus on the potential of combat generals, such as Budanov and Zaluzhny, to challenge the power of the “Zelensky bloc.” This causes the political forces’ efforts to draw veterans to their orbit. The author also highlights the criminal potential of the returning (and deserting) combatants, caused by a conscription situation that led to a significant percentage of men leaving in semi-legal conditions, and thus prone to criminal recruitment. Another problem, acknowledged by the security forces, is the attempts of the international, specifically South American, organized crime groups to gain battlefield experience by joining certain combat units that recruit foreign citizens.

Traditionally, Alexander Shpunt has prepared a monthly overview of several significant publications on the post-Soviet conflicts – this time, focusing on various methods in the research of political and economic processes in the region.

In November, in addition to preparing the analytical materials, the PSCR program organized a book launch seminar for the newly published “Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Belarus.” The volume was presented by its editor, Dr. Aliaksei Kazharski (Charles University, Czechia), as well as some chapters’ authors, namely, Pavel Kotau (Palacky University, Czechia) and Tatsiana Kulakevich (University of South Florida, US).

In the coming months, the PSCRP is going to publish even more research materials and (co-)organize more research events, so stay tuned!

In October 2025, the analytical materials by PSCRP covered a wide range of countries and sub-regions within the post-Soviet area, including Russia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Armenia.

The PSCRP team has analyzed the recent elections in Moldova, which have secured the pro-European PAS party led by Maia Sandu, the incumbent president, a parliamentary majority. The authors note Russia’s alleged attempts to interfere in the elections to support pro-Russian forces, including disinformation and intimidation campaigns and preparations to provoke mass unrest. However, the electoral strategy of the pro-European actors was also problematic, since PAS has largely employed institutional leverage, including barring pro-Russian parties from participation shortly before the elections (based solely on suspicions from the security services) and reducing the number of polling stations in areas with a predominantly pro-Russian electorate.

Velvl Chernin sheds light on the political (and ethno-political) situation in the Republic of Altai, a region within the Russian Federation. He describes the recent protests against the proposed amendments to the regional constitution that might remove the clause on territorial integrity, and against the abolition of village councils, local self-governance bodies, pushed by the Head of the region in line with the law recently adopted by the federal parliament. Aruna Arna, the charismatic leader of the protests, was recently detained by the Russian security forces and charged with public calls for separatism. Generally, Chernin is quite pessimistic in assessing the protests’ prospects, considering the small size of the indigenous Altai population and the overall possibilities of dissent in the current political environment.

Further on, Velvl Chernin shares his analysis of the PACE’s recent decision to “establish a platform for dialogue with Russian democratic forces,” meaning that, in the absence of Moscow’s official participation, opposition representatives are granted certain rights and will be able to exchange views and “address issues of mutual interests.” Although Chernin assesses this decision as long-awaited, he underlines the continuous infighting between various groups of Russian opposition, which makes any coordination between them close to unfeasible, the PACE’s requirement to sign the so-called “Berlin Declaration of Russian Democratic Forces” (April 2023) to participate in the platform (which benefits the groups associated with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and disadvantages the “Anti-Corruption Foundation”), and the controversial nature of the informal leadership within the platform (the proposed candidature of Vladimir Kara-Murza Jr. is not unquestionable). Moreover, Chernin highlights the criticism of the platform by the “League of Free Nations,” a conglomerate of separatist movements that envision the “postcolonial disintegration” of Russia and consider the oppositional forces represented in PACE as equally “Russian chauvinist” and “imperialist” as the Kremlin.

The PSCRP team critically observes the recent discrepancies in Armenian politics and the controversy between the political power (Nikol Pashinyan’s government, which has opted for a pro-European orientation and peace with Azerbaijan) and the Armenian Apostolic Church, which advocates for the traditional alliance with Russia and zero concessions to Baku. Recently, several high-ranked clergy representatives were arrested, as well as a Russian-Armenian businessman, Samvel Karapetyan; they are accused of various anti-state and anti-government activities. The authors note that “the Armenian Apostolic Church, through its network of religious institutions, can mobilize public sentiment, while wealthy individuals like Karapetyan provide financial support. In this context, Armenia’s internal politics take on broader regional significance.”

Another material by the PSCRP team critically assesses Western policies towards Kazakhstan, focusing on the strategic disengagement of Western powers from the fate of Central Asian states and markets. The authors warn against blanket sanctioning of the Kazakh economy and offer, instead, several ways to enhance Astana’s multivectoral position – given its unavoidable dependence on Moscow. Namely, they emphasize cooperation and identity-building within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States, diversification of oil export routes, and Astana’s role in negotiations on the future of the ongoing conflicts.

Traditionally, Alexander Shpunt has prepared a monthly overview of several significant publications on the post-Soviet conflicts.

In the upcoming months, the PSCRP will publish more analytical papers and organize several interesting events, so stay tuned!

In September 2025, the analytical papers produced by the PSCRP covered such subregions as Central Asia, South Caucasus, and the Western part of the post-Soviet space.

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman provides an analytical overview of the diplomatic moves undertaken by Central Asian and South Caucasus states in the Summer and Fall of 2025. He underlines that all these countries focus their foreign policies on “multivectoralism” and balancing between the interests of the “collective West” and the so-called “China-Russia axis.” Kazantsev-Vaisman notes that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are seeking to “strengthen their position (…) by deepening ties with the U.S. administration,” with diplomacy being “pursued through expanding economic cooperation with the United States and promoting transport corridors that enhance economic diversification.” Armenia and Azerbaijan are attempting to do the same; however, they differ in their diplomatic style: “Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while strengthening the American vector, seek to avoid conflict with other foreign policy vectors (…), whereas Azerbaijan and Armenia act much more assertively — though still maintaining elements of a multivector ‘insurance policy’”.

Developing further the regional focus on Central Asia, the material by the PSCRP team highlights the remaining (and growing) dependence of Kyrgyzstan on Russian financial and infrastructural projects, as well as the influence of Moscow in commerce, higher education, and labor migration flows. At the same time, Bishkek is cautiously developing infrastructural projects initiated by China, including the CKU railway, which demonstrates Kyrgyzstan’s pragmatic embracement of both Chinese and Russian strategic influence amid the “West’s failure to invest politically and financially in the region.”

 Regarding the South Caucasus, the PSCRP team scrutinizes informational campaigns surrounding the now complex relationships of Moscow with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The narratives circulating (and, as the authors claim, deliberately spread) on social and “traditional” media in and regarding Azerbaijan, amid worsening of the relationships, include Baku’s “alleged hostility toward Russia, its pro-Western or pro-Turkish policy, and even talk of NATO membership.” This rhetoric has coincided in time with Iran’s anti-Azerbaijani information campaign and the signing of the Washington agreements between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the auspices of Donald Trump. In the case of Armenia, the authors claim that Nikol Pashinyan is the main target of the alleged disinformation campaigns. He is accused of “betrayal of Karabakh,” “anti-Christian policies,” and even of hosting “secret NATO bases” in the country.

 Another analysis by the PSCRP team casts serious doubts on Europe’s ability to prevent Georgia, the third South Caucasus nation, from disengagement from the idea of European integration and joining forces with Moscow. The highly doubtful and counter-effective measure of revoking the visa-free regime remains by far the only effective leverage that Brussels authorities may still threaten Tbilisi with, and the incumbent Georgian government actively tries to exploit the cooling between Washington and Brussels to its advantage. In a situation when Europe’s “appeal as a model and idea” seems to be in crisis, the vested interests of the Georgian elites in cooperation with Moscow are likely to outweigh the possible (and ineffective) sanctions.

 Moving to the Western part of the post-Soviet space, Alexander Shpunt analyzes the national ideology of Belarus, highlighting the increasing prominence of the national Belarusian identity in public discourse. Importantly, he notes that “conflict-prone themes … show no visible political prospects” and that, unlike in Ukraine, the symbolic role of the Belarusian language is not an issue of sociopolitical divide. Shpunt claims that, after 2014, “the Belarusian authorities adjusted their official discourse, emphasizing a distinct, routine, and stable Belarusian identity,” promoting “from above” the role of the Belarusian language in official state communication and the “long genealogy” of national history, portraying Russia “primarily as a historical neighbor rather than the source of Belarusian statehood.”

Finally, Vladimir Ze’ev Khanin summarizes the results of several opinion polls undertaken in Russia and Ukraine regarding the ongoing military conflict between the two countries. He notes that all the polls in Ukraine indicate the public’s growing inclination to “move toward negotiations that could bring the war to an end,” because of the general fatigue, high losses, and absence of clear prospects for a military victory. However, the plans drafted by Moscow and by Washington are still perceived (extremely, in the former case) negatively, with the Ukrainian public favoring the peace proposals formulated jointly in Kyiv and Brussels. At the same time, in Russia, there is a similar trend toward preferring “moving to peace negotiations rather than continuing military action,” as well as the reliance on the country’s leadership in the conflict’s resolution. However, the idea of certain concessions to Ukraine, as well as ending hostilities without “eliminating the root causes of the conflict” (whatever they might be), is largely rejected by the Russian public opinion.

 Traditionally, Alexander Shpunt has prepared a monthly overview of several significant publications on the post-Soviet conflicts.

In the upcoming months, more publications and events from the PSCRP are to appear.

In July 2025, the PSCR program focused on extensively analyzing various aspects of Russia’s foreign and internal politics, while also keeping an eye on developments in Central Asia and Moldova.

Alexander Shpunt continues to analyze the peculiarities of Moldova’s relationships with the EU in the challenging context of the conflict between political and economic elites, also typical of some other post-Soviet states. If political elites are oriented towards the European accession process, business circles are entrenched in the structural ties with the Russian economy. In Moldova, this tension is manifested, inter alia, in the energy sector: energy supplies have been long monopolized by Moldovagaz, largely under the control of Russian Gazprom. Also, Chisinau enjoyed cheap energy from Transnistria, where the Moldovan GRES is located, and which has profited from special relations with Moscow. However, supplies through the territory of Ukraine have recently ceased, and Moldova has had to buy more expensive energy from Romania while simultaneously attempting to nationalize its key energy assets. The escalation of Chisinau-Tiraspol relations, amid rumors about the former’s plans to seize the Moldovan GRES by force, was overcome in January. However, the upcoming fall and winter may be challenging for the frozen status of the conflict, especially against the backdrop of the state of economic emergency introduced in Transnistria in December 2024 and subsequently extended several times.

The brief but significant military escalation between Iran and Israel has become a point of attention for all scholars of the region. Maxim Starchak overviews and summarizes the opinions of the Russian expert community on Israel’s decision to physically destroy Iran’s nuclear program. One of the main concerns associated with this action is that Iran’s nuclear potential was not actually destroyed, although its development was slowed down by a year or two. The proliferation threat is not eliminated, and Iran may have developed a smaller secret nuclear facility not affected by the attack. Now, many influential actors in Tehran advocate for further tightening of internal and foreign policies and restructuring the nuclear program by making it even more secretive and focused on weapons. The joint attack by Israel and the US has demonstrated that nuclear non-proliferation may be upheld not by diplomacy but by the use of force, which creates a dangerous precedent. At the same time, Moscow has not provided any effective support to Tehran in the course of the conflict, not least because Russia itself, “despite the official rhetoric, (…) would not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and would be satisfied with maintaining the nonproliferation regime.” Dangerously, “Iran’s creation of nuclear weapons can show that even with a dangerous neighbor, being subjected to sanctions and missile attacks, it is realistic to implement a military nuclear program.”

Demonstrating yet another facet of the problem, Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman explains why Pakistan and the Central Asian states have not provided any significant support to Iran during the brief open war with Israel. Beyond the very threat of the potential nuclear strikes, the countries of Central Asia fear the possible collapse of transport and communication projects in the region and the influx of refugees, as well as the radicalization of pro-Iranian and anti-Israeli Islamist circles in their respective societies. That is why Iran could only count on occasional expressions of rhetorical solidarity, while the priority of its neighboring countries “remains regime survival and internal stability, not ideological adventurism on behalf of regional allies.” The position of Pakistan, with its military and nuclear capacities, is even more important, and it “maintains a delicate balancing act between its Sunni Islamic ideological identity and its geostrategic interests,” while the sympathy towards Tehran can be rhetorical at its very best. Especially amid the false claims about Pakistan’s support for Iran and the dangerous escalation with India, Islamabad realizes that any military entanglement, especially in a “foreign” conflict, might compromise and undermine its reputation as a defensive nuclear power. The strained nature of Pakistan-Iran bilateral relations, because of military incursions in the border regions and mutual accusations of harboring militant proxies, should also be taken into account.

Alexander Grinberg sheds light on the recent crisis in the Russian-Azerbaijani relations caused by the detention, brutal handling, and subsequent injuries and even deaths of several prominent members of the Azerbaijani diaspora, accused of criminal offenses, in the city of Yekaterinburg. The absence of the awaited reactions from Russian officials has prompted Baku to retaliate with repressive measures against Russian media and cultural projects and provoked rather hostile rhetoric in Azerbaijani and Turkish media. In their turn, Russian authorities labeled Azerbaijan’s reaction as unfriendly and disruptive to the bilateral relations, and further escalation of these tensions (first caused by the Azerbaijani airplane catastrophe in December 2024) might be well expected. Apart from the immediate causes, Grinberg ascribes the ongoing crisis to the “Kremlin’s dissatisfaction with Baku’s excessive independence and the formation of a Turkey-Azerbaijan axis in the South Caucasus,” noting, at the same time, that Azerbaijan “is not interested in further deterioration but only in protecting its vital interests vis-à-vis the Kremlin.”

Turning to the part of the Caucasus that is situated within Russia’s borders, the PSCRP team traces the consequences of the antisemitic pogrom at the airport in Makhachkala, in Russia’s region of Dagestan. Twenty months have passed since this unprecedented event, allowing for a preliminary assessment. The authors underline the rather harsh sentences (but generally corresponding to the respective legal framework) that the mass riot participants were sentenced to, the role of the Telegram channel “Utro Dagestan” (associated with certain emigrant circles) in orchestrating the pogrom, and the authorities’ desire to conceal their immediate inability to prevent this scenario by harsh rhetoric and drastic measures. The authors’ team also notices that the recent escalation between Iran and Israel has not provoked a similar spike in public antisemitism in Dagestan, not least because (1) the Iranians are mostly Shia Muslims (unlike most Dagestani Muslims), (2) no significant organizational force similar to the “Utro Dagestan” has emerged, and (3) the coverage of the conflict by the local media was quite cautious. The experts conclude that “with sufficient political will and competence, it is possible to keep not necessarily antisemitic attitudes themselves, but at least their violent public expressions, under control.”

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman provides his analysis of the repercussions that Russia’s recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate political regime in Afghanistan might have for the global geopolitical order. This process has occurred gradually and was initially objected to by a significant part of Russia’s counter-terrorist security personnel, taking into account that the Taliban was officially listed as a terrorist organization by the Russian authorities. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has pushed for the official recognition of the “de facto” state of affairs in Afghanistan, with one of the reasons being hopes for a joint operation against ISIS-Khorasan (which organized a deadly terror attack in Moscow in 2024). Also, the official recognition of the Taliban can be considered a political and ideological move, since it is considered a part of the “anti-Western” world. However, deep internal contradictions between the potential authoritarian “Eurasian” bloc’s prospective members (Iran vs. Taliban because of the sectarian hostility, China vs. Taliban because of the Xinjiang concerns, Pakistan vs. Taliban because of the border problems, etc.) make its creation largely hypothetical. The author concludes that, because of the movement’s lack of democratic legitimacy and human rights violations, “the recognition of the Taliban (…) is likely to undermine prospects for sustainable peace in Eurasia and the wider Middle East.”

As usual, Alexander Shpunt presents his monthly monitoring of analytical publications focused on post-Soviet conflicts, summarizing the five most interesting papers/monographs, in the author’s assessment, covering politics and economy in the post-Soviet space.

The PSCRP stays true to its mission of providing expert opinions and overviews of the current affairs in the post-Soviet region.

In June 2025, the PSCR program published analytical papers on the political and economic developments in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Ukraine, and Russia.

The PSCRP team sheds light on the broader context of the free trade agreement signed by Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which has come into force recently. The authors regard this as a part of Iran’s strategy to build stronger ties with Central Asian states while Russia, the traditional powerful actor in the region, is distracted by the war. In this power vacuum, the Iranian government’s attempts to create additional regional alignments appear to be part of its “Look East” geopolitical strategy, which does not aim to establish durable alliances. Among other things, Tehran may offer control over key transport routes that are alternatives to those controlled and offered by Russia. Iranian economic influence manifests itself not only in trade numbers but also in the emerging joint ventures between Iran’s industry and its neighbors. These developments seem risky in terms of the ayatollah regime’s possibilities of creating proxy networks, evidenced by its track record in Middle Eastern countries. Also, excessive influence from Tehran might affect voting patterns at international forums and non-participation in sanction regimes.

Ze’ev Khanin provides his perspective on the complex relationships between Israel and the countries of the “Great Middle East.” He describes the context of the possible continuation of the “Abrahamic Alliance” initiated during Trump’s first term in office and weighs possibilities for Saudi Arabia to join this group. At the same time, Khanin emphasizes Azerbaijan’s constructive role in the region and Baku’s strategic partnership with Israel, thereby stressing the need to include the country in multilateral configurations. Particularly important are Baku’s efforts to mediate some rapprochement between Jerusalem and Ankara, which, however, still seem far away; the complicated bilateral dynamics between Israel and Turkey were further catalyzed by the Oct. 7th massacre (and its aftermath) and the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria. Khanin concludes with cautious optimism regarding the (re)establishment of Jerusalem-Baku “working relations,” although not meaning either sustainable cooperation or a strategic partnership.

The PSCRP team compares the positions taken by the governments and societies in Azerbaijan and Armenia regarding the war between Israel and Iran (the IDF operation “Rising Lion”). Azerbaijani politicians have immediately taken a neutral stance (while sending messages to the Israeli leadership not to target Iran’s regions inhabited by ethnic Azerbaijanis, and denouncing false claims about Azerbaijan’s territory being used by the Israeli air force), and some major media outlets have taken an openly pro-Israeli position. In contrast, all major Armenian actors, including the government, opposition parties, media, and diaspora—most notably the ANCA—have condemned the Israeli operation, expressing varying degrees of emotional intensity. Apart from this, numerous fake news narratives were spread by the Armenian media and Telegram channels, most of them originating from the Iranian outlets and social networks affiliated with the IRGC. However, in Iran, the target of these fakes was their citizens, to explain why Tehran’s vaunted military might was eventually so easy to destroy. On the contrary, in Armenia, the target audience was external: fakes were spread to “foment hostility towards Azerbaijan in Iran and gain support among left and right-wing critics of Israel by tying in Israel’s strikes on Iran to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.”

The PSCRP team analyzes the background and causes of the spontaneous protests in Dagestan. The Dagestani phenomenon is that these protests are quite frequent, populous (compared to the other regions), and normally do not result in waves of repression. However, land disputes and infrastructure problems primarily trigger these protests, rendering them apolitical and exploiting power disparities among various levels. In contrast, the protests against military mobilization and the infamous pogrom at Makhachkala airport—both of which are nearly unique in Russia—were violently suppressed due to their potential for politicization. The authors ascribe the Dagestani protests’ uniqueness to the ethnic and cultural patchwork of its population that demands constant balancing of various interests, the remnants of independent civil society institutions, the republican government’s relatively weak capabilities of running Dagestan effectively, and the republic’s comparatively young population (which is considered a driver of social unrest). However, the protests are unlikely to become a threat to the regime: the “authorities will likely continue to tolerate some level of local protest, as long as it remains fragmented and focused on mundane issues. Larger demonstrations, especially those with any political overtones, will be suppressed.”

Velvl Chernin provides his view of what the future of the Russia-Ukraine war can be through the lens of postcolonialism studies. The author claims that, since the Trump administration’s peace plans are somewhat delayed and since several European actors have intensified direct military support to Kyiv, the prospects for Russia’s disintegration might be analyzed, at least from a theoretical perspective. Chernin highlights the diverging positions on this issue by Ukrainian and Western politicians, as the former must form any kind of alliances, while the latter do not face an existential threat and may hope for a peaceful resolution with the current Kremlin regime. At the same time, even if some new states are to be formed on Russia’s territory, not all of them will likely adhere to the standards of Western liberal democracy: at least a part of the “potential states,” with a traditional Muslim majority, might get influenced by the ideas of radical Islam.

Dmitry Kovchegin shares his view of the problem often neglected by the political analysts in the context of the ongoing war: the operation of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. He stresses the fact that Ukraine has one of Europe’s most extensive nuclear power programs, comprising four active nuclear power plants, the decommissioning site in Chernobyl, and several nuclear research facilities. The author points to the (limited) direct attacks against Ukrainian nuclear sites; high risks from off-site disruptions of the facilities that provide critical infrastructure; problems faced by the nuclear plants’ personnel under the war situation and, in some cases, direct military occupation; and the IAEA’s limited possibilities to protect the nuclear sites. Kovchegin concludes that “current legal frameworks are inadequate when faced with state-level military aggression, highlighting inherent weaknesses and the urgent need for comprehensive reform of both international humanitarian law and nuclear security arrangements.”

And as usual, Alexander Shpunt presents his monthly monitoring of analytical publications focused on post-Soviet conflicts, summarizing the five most interesting papers/monographs, in the author’s assessment, covering politics and economy in the post-Soviet region.

Stay tuned—much else is still to be explored in post-Soviet politics.

In May 2025, the operative analysis published by the PSCR program at BESA has extensively focused on the ongoing and potential conflicts in Central Asia, South and North Caucasus, Russia, and Moldova.

Alexander Shpunt analyses the rare case of a peaceful resolution of the post-Soviet territorial conflict as a result of territorial swaps that take into account the national interests of the two post-Soviet countries. The dispute around the Vorukh enclave, contested by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, emerged in its open form in the 1950s, with the grounds being formed during the Soviet delimitation in the 1920s. The Soviet authorities were interested in concealing the problem and not solving it; thus, during the Soviet, as well as post-Soviet decades, no compromise was reached. On the contrary, violent confrontation erupted in 2022 in the enclave. It was only the rejection of references to the Soviet principles and documentation, very vague in determining the precise territories and conflict resolution options, that aided in (seemingly) resolving the conflict in 2025 to the mutual satisfaction of both conflicting sides.

The PSCRP team provides an account of another long-standing dispute over the territories that was formed under Soviet (namely, Stalin’s) rule, one between Chechnya and Ingushetia. Though being parts of a single supranational (binational) group, the Vainakhs, the two closely related ethnic groups share a solid history of post-Soviet confrontation. The transfer of the contested lands of Ingushetia’s Sunzhensky district to Chechnya in 2018 caused prolonged protest rallies and has led to the “Ingush affair,” the prosecution of public Ingush figures, which was perceived by Ingush society as a slap in the face. More recent outbreaks of public confrontation occurred in 2022, when Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, publicly sided with the Batalkhajin brotherhood that was being persecuted in Ingushetia, and again in 2024 during a shootout near the Wildberries marketplace headquarters. In the latter situation, the “Kadyrovites” supported one side of the conflict, while several Ingush and Dagestani politicians had their vested interests associated with the other side. Two Ingush guards were killed, and Kadyrov claimed to be a subject of the assassination plot and declared a blood vengeance. This conflict, although largely not impacting individual interethnic interactions, might further escalate because of Chechnya’s leadership’s need to test their strength and expand their sphere of influence.

The PSCRP Team investigates the conflict potential of interactions between the “Russian Community,” a network of pro-government nationalist groups operating throughout Russia that rose to prominence after 2022, and ethnic minorities in southern Russia. Among the latter are such groups as Armenians, Kazakhs, Kurds, and Circassians, as well as labor migrants from Central Asia. The authors conclude that the main actors in conflict interactions include not only the “Russian Community,” but also the so-called “siloviki” (security forces that control the “Community” and approve its actions), the Central Investigative Committee (that frequently intervenes in the smallest conflicts involving “non-Russians”), and the Chechen authorities (that remain the only force that openly expresses disapproval of the nationalist groups’ and security institutions’ actions).

Anna Ayvazyan sheds light on the recent geopolitical developments in Armenia’s politics. After the violent “resolution” of the Karabakh problem by Azerbaijan, the main issue structuring Armenia’s foreign policy for the last decades started to fade away, while former geopolitical alliances (mostly in Russia) proved not sufficiently reliable. Against this background, Armenia’s leadership began looking for alternatives, the most viable of which is the potential EU accession. Russia’s war against Ukraine, as well as Armenia’s subsequent efforts to reduce security dependence on Moscow and diversify security partnerships, have directly impacted the perception and vector of Yerevan’s European aspirations. The author underlines that regional countries are doomed to constantly engage in delicate acts of balancing between major powers, and the rising inter-power tensions might disrupt this balance.

Alexander Shpunt presents the conflict around the political power in Gagauzia through the prism of the struggle between big businesses, oriented towards the East, and the political elite whose political future is tied to the West (namely, Romania and the EU)—a struggle typical for post-Soviet states. Eugenia Gutul, the head of the Gagauz autonomy, has been put under house arrest and is now facing the threat of being removed from her position, with the official reason being a criminal case related to financing her election campaign. Gagauzia has recently turned into a kind of “internal offshore” for the Moldovan business elites, allowing significant budgetary interventions from the side of Russia’s state-affiliated banks. At the same time, Turkic-speaking Gagauzians fear the “Romanization” of the country occurring in the form of rapid integration of Romanian officials into Chisinau’s political fabric. Simultaneously, Turkey is also exploring “the contours of a new location of influence.”

Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin shares his observations on the attitude of the “Russian street” in Israeli society towards the war in Ukraine. He demonstrates that the dominant political attitude in Israel towards Russia was largely formed by the significant share of former Soviet and Russian citizens in the Israeli electorate and the realization of Russia’s increasing role in the Middle East. However, among the Russophone Israelis, support for Ukraine was larger both after the annexation of Crimea (2014) and after the start of the full-scale war (2022); in the latter case, support for Kyiv was even more visible. Nevertheless, in their majority, Russophone respondents (regardless of their particular origin) did not advocate a more direct Israeli intervention in the war. All in all, their “Russianness” or “Ukrainianness” proved to be less significant than their Israeli identity; “Russian-speaking immigrants have largely integrated into Israeli society and adopted its dominant system of values and political beliefs.”

Last but not least, in accordance with what is now a good tradition, Alexander Shpunt presents his monthly monitoring of analytical publications focused on post-Soviet conflicts. This initiative summarizes the five most interesting publications, in the author’s assessment, focused on politics and economy in the post-Soviet region.

We continue to keep our readership constantly updated in these turbulent times.

In April 2025, the materials published by the PSCRP program covered a wide range of post-Soviet subregions, from Estonia to Central Asia.

Petr Oskolkov analyzed the potential consequences of the urgent changes in the Estonian constitution that abolish the voting rights of non-EU citizens in the country’s local/municipal elections. He concludes that, even though this measure might potentially solidify the demise of the moderate Center Party, for which many Russophone voters cast their votes, the effect might be contrary to the MPs’ expectations in the long run. Negatively affecting the voting rights of the country’s non-citizens, who have no official connection to Russia or Belarus (although the amendment’s goal was to diminish these countries’ influence on Estonia’s domestic affairs), the constitutional amendment might spur protest voting (for both moderate Centrists and radical populists) by those Russophones who have Estonian citizenship.

Alexander Shpunt focuses in his paper on the Russian influence on Armenia’s economy and geopolitical orientation. He underlines the enormous share of Armenia’s imports provided by Russia, Yerevan’s membership in the EAEU, and the “grassroots support” for maintaining strong ties with Moscow, largely absent in Georgia, caused by the households’ dependency on the income coming from Russia. Apart from this, Shpunt highlights the Russian business’s dominant position in the Armenian national economy and the extent to which Russia controls the country’s national infrastructure.

The paper by Velvl Chernin sheds light on the Islamist and Muslim actors opposing Russia’s central authorities. He points at the special role of Salafism, spread in the Chechen Republic (where its revival is tied to the Chechen returnees from Jordan) and Dagestan (where it is practiced mostly by Avars and Dargins), in resisting the influence of state-aligned Muslim structures. Since Russian serves as a lingua franca in Dagestan, Dagestani Salafi preachers may reach Muslims across the entire country. Chechen Salafis are one of the two mutually hostile groups that oppose the incumbent Kadyrov regime in Chechnya, together with the supporters of the “government of Ichkeria in exile.” The Salafis representing the radical organization “Hizb ut-Tahrir” have been freely operating among the Crimean Tatars before 2014. Afterwards, the Russian authorities started persecuting this group’s members in the peninsula, a move some actors view as political repression. The absence of Islamists is noteworthy among the League of Free Nations, which serves as the umbrella organization for oppositional separatist movements.

Further elaborating on the events in the North Caucasus, the PSCRP team has tackled the issue of potential succession in the Chechen Republic. The authors postulate that, possibly, the change of top political figures in this region of Russia might occur earlier than in the Kremlin. However, in the authors’ assessment, the children (both sons and daughters) of Ramzan Kadyrov, the incumbent personalist head of the Republic, even though they now occupy key positions in various domains, cannot be considered as potential successors (because of their gender, age, lack of experience, or unwillingness to embark on this path). Adam Delimkhanov, MP and a close ally of Kadyrov, can become a successor, but the central authorities might be afraid of his presumed connections in the criminal underworld. Despite Magomed Daudov’s professionalism in administrative tasks, Moscow claims he lacks influence among the siloviki. In his turn, while Apti Alaudinov is often considered the most feasible candidate for political succession in Grozny, he reportedly does not have a firm and well-established position within the Chechen elites. The authors conclude that, since “Kadyrov has no unconditional and universally recognized successor, it is possible that attempts will be made to build complex combinations based on a balance of interests among a number of key figures, with the federal center retaining the role of arbiter.”

The PSCRP team further provides an overview of Russia’s increasing efforts to anchor Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in its sphere of geopolitical influence. The authors cite the intensive developments in the spheres of energy transit and parallel import (leading to a huge trade deficit of these countries with Moscow), and stress that Tashkent and Astana provide “logistic corridors immune to Western naval power,” “hard currency from transit fees,” a “covert route for sanctioned technology,” and “political optics that Moscow is not internationally isolated.” The PSCRP team assumes that, if the West would wish to overpower Russia’s and China’s (which is also taking part in the race) influence in the region, it may undertake several steps, including “fast-track Global Gateway disbursements,” linking money and transparency, enforcement of “export-control intelligence sharing,” and signaling “political stakes.” However, the authors perceive this window of opportunities as relatively brief.

Last but not least, as usual, Alexander Shpunt presents his monthly monitoring of analytical publications focused on post-Soviet conflicts. This initiative summarizes the five most interesting publications, in the author’s assessment, focused on politics and economy in the post-Soviet region.

Our Program is eager to further update you on the most recent and important developments in the post-Soviet space.