Posts by Gela Vasadze

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 116 (February 26, 2025)

The countries of the South Caucasus have approached Trump’s presidency under vastly different circumstances, which is unsurprising given that this region has never been geopolitically unified. Until recently, Georgia appeared aligned with the West, Armenia with Eurasia, and Azerbaijan with Central Asia. Yet, despite these orientations, they managed to interact—whether through alliances, conflicts, or trade.

The situation changed after 2020, when the 44-day war forced both Azerbaijan and Armenia to confront geopolitical realities, culminating between September 2023 and March 2024. The events of this brief period have presented the region’s countries with urgent challenges demanding immediate solutions.

Georgia’s leadership

Since Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine, Georgia’s leadership has focused almost exclusively on maintaining power. The government opted for confrontation with its Western partners, appeasement of Russia, and the entrenchment of a political system where the informal rule of Bidzina Ivanishvili would remain unchallenged. This path was highly risky, as alienating Western allies not only exposed Georgia to severe socio-economic shocks but also increased its vulnerability to Kremlin influence. The Georgian economy relies heavily on a banking and financial sector integrated into international (i.e., Western) financial institutions, as well as on raw material exports (such as manganese and ferroalloys) to the EU. Additionally, its transport infrastructure plays a crucial role in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TCITR, also known as the Middle Corridor). All these elements are critically susceptible to potential sanctions from both Europe and the United States.

Nevertheless, the Georgian authorities, seemingly resigned to their fate, severed ties with the West, openly abandoning past achievements and shaping an image of a nation that has rejected democracy, even as an idea. This culminated in the adoption of a series of anti-democratic laws, particularly in the electoral and judicial spheres, the blatant falsification of the October 2024 elections, a deliberate provocation in withdrawing from EU membership negotiations, and, finally, the brutal suppression of protests—actions that neither the EU nor the US could ignore.

This policy would have been politically suicidal for both the country and its leadership were it not for their bet on Trump’s victory. The Georgian government calculated that, with Trump in power, it could negotiate with the new US administration on the basis of ideological alignment and a shared enemy—an idea they began promoting from the moment of Trump’s victory by rebranding the “global war party” as the deep state. This bet paid off, as Georgia’s authorities now have the opportunity to gain Trump’s attention by co-authoring an alternative UN resolution on Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Whether the Trump administration will appreciate this move remains to be seen. The future of Georgia’s leadership now depends less on ideological affinity and diplomatic support and more on Trump’s negotiations with Moscow, Ankara, and Beijing.

Armenia’s Position

On the surface, Armenia appears to be the ultimate loser. The war was lost. An adversary that Armenians occupied for 30 years now stands at their borders, militarily capable of seizing the entire country and cutting it off from its ally, Iran. Hopes that a Democratic administration in Washington—one that had steadfastly supported Armenia without demanding concessions—would remain in power have been dashed. The strategic plan of waiting for a systemic crisis in Azerbaijan (and perhaps even facilitating it) before reviving the Karabakh conflict along the Kosovo model—a plan long supported by Armenian society and its diaspora—has collapsed.

For Armenia’s leadership, the widespread expectation of Karabakh’s reoccupation is a major obstacle to achieving peace and relieving the national psychological distress that has persisted since autumn 2020. However, the present moment offers an opportunity to abandon these long-term, illusory hopes of revanche, allowing Prime Minister Pashinyan room for compromise with Baku. Ultimately, these aspirations can always be revisited, but for now, progress in the peace process and improved relations with Turkey could serve as strong electoral assets for Pashinyan.

Thus, Armenia’s main expectations from Trump’s administration revolve around maintaining the status quo and securing guarantees that Azerbaijan will not resort to force. While the probability of Azerbaijan using force remains minimal, it is not zero, and the situation could change. To mitigate this risk, Armenia has influential allies within Trump’s administration, ranging from the establishment figure Marco Rubio to the anti-establishment Tulsi Gabbard. Therefore, Yerevan’s position is not as dire as it may seem. Moreover, the Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed under the previous US administration, serves as a tangible roadmap for advancing Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. If Georgia was able to extract significant benefits from a similar agreement in the late 2000s, there is no reason why Armenia, with its stronger foothold in US political circles, cannot do the same.

Azerbaijan’s Strategy

Azerbaijan, in the most advantageous position of the three, is now operating on a completely different level. The lingering psychological scars of its long war with Armenia remain, yet Baku is acutely aware of its economy’s critical dependence on European energy markets. However, this market is primarily Italian, where Azerbaijan enjoys strong relations, and Eastern European, where Baku has not just partners but genuine allies. Additionally, Azerbaijan’s energy exports extend beyond Europe to Israel, a strategic partner and major consumer of Azerbaijani oil.

With Trump’s administration, the risk of sanctions against Azerbaijan has diminished to near zero, allowing Baku to postpone Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement efforts and pursue concessions—from changes to Armenia’s constitution to opening a corridor to Nakhchivan and Turkey. There is no need for Baku to rush.

More importantly, Azerbaijan is undertaking a much more ambitious initiative: securing its long-term security through active participation in Middle Eastern and Eurasian (Central Asian) projects. Baku’s strong partnerships with Turkey, Israel, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan provide a solid foundation for this strategy. These projects not only yield economic dividends (such as involvement in TCITR, the development of Israel’s Tamar gas field, and Syria’s reconstruction) but also establish a political buffer against two existential threats to Azerbaijan: Russia and Iran. The recent diplomatic travels of Hikmet Hajiyev, Azerbaijan’s Presidential Advisor, underscore this approach.

The only potential weak link in Azerbaijan’s carefully constructed network is Georgia. Should Georgia fall under Russian influence, it would pose an unpleasant surprise for Baku. However, Azerbaijan’s leverage in this scenario is limited, leaving it to hope that this does not come to pass. Otherwise, Azerbaijan’s main expectations from Trump’s administration lie in US support for regional projects that will solidify its status as a mid-tier power.

In summary, Tbilisi seeks Trump’s recognition of its government as an ideological ally; Yerevan hopes for security assurances and the preservation of the status quo; and Baku anticipates US backing for its regional ambitions. The rest will be determined by time.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 86 (Sept 24, 2024)

Recently, there has been more and more talk about a multipolar world: the U.S. hegemony established after the Cold War is allegedly over, and the country can no longer claim global domination. This is a delusion— the U.S. still surpasses all other countries in terms of resources, finance, technology and military power. However, to maintain this leadership, it must hold its ground in all these areas.

Without leadership, the very existence of the U.S., as well as the global financial and security system, will be jeopardized. However, U.S. resources are limited and it has to choose its priorities, although many believe it is making wrong choices. The American political elite is not a monolithic entity, but rather a conglomerate of competing groups, each of which puts its own agenda above national interests. The so-called “deep state,” that is, the bureaucracy, defines the boundaries of national interests. Thus, U.S. foreign policy is a compromise between different political groups and the worldview of the “deep state.”

I will put forward a thesis that many may disagree with: today no one is seriously challenging the United States except marginal forces acting as proxies for other systemic players. Anti-Americanism is an attempt to negotiate with Washington on their own terms, and the success of such negotiations depends not only on a country’s resources, but also on its influence on the American domestic political landscape. This is true for other countries as well, but the U.S. remains the most powerful nation.

This is important for understanding the hopes of the political elites in the South Caucasus for the U.S. elections. Although the countries of this region are geographically close, they differ significantly. The expectations of Baku and Yerevan cannot be viewed in isolation, and in terms of influencing American political factions, Armenia has an advantage over Azerbaijan.

The public opinion formed about 150 years ago at the Berlin Congress of 1878 on the “Armenian question in the Ottoman Empire” created a powerful Armenian lobby in Western countries, particularly the United States. It has a well-developed infrastructure aimed at protecting Armenian interests and countering “Turkish” influence in a broad sense, including Azerbaijan. This structure, which includes political, financial and media resources, operates autonomously. Any reconciliation between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey would deal a fatal blow to it, as the very basis for protecting Armenia from the “threat” posed by Turkey would vanish. It is not a single organization, but rather a conglomerate of groups and political traditions that have developed over the last 150 years.

Add to the mix the ideological dimension of the Democratic Party, the leader of modern liberalism. Many in this camp consider Erdoğan a dictator, and their position is non-negotiable. In addition, the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. is traditionally more organized and can exert more influence, especially on Democrats, than Azerbaijanis. The Armenian lobby is traditionally supported by the Greek and Assyrian lobbies, and its main instrument of influence is the U.S. Congress.

Democratic candidate Kamala Harris actively supports the interests of the Armenian community and recognizes the Armenian Genocide, which is important for the lobby. She opposed the use of force by Azerbaijan against the territorial integrity of Armenia, although Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan. While the support of the Armenian lobby is not decisive for Harris, Democrats do not want to lose the Armenian vote. The lobby takes advantage of this and pressures Harris to increase her support.

Unlike Harris, Donald Trump is not connected to the Armenian lobby, and the majority of American Armenians are not his voters, so he has no obligations to them. Moreover, under Trump, the position of the Armenian lobby in the U.S. has weakened. Although Trump has no particular sympathy for Azerbaijan, his neutral stance is more favorable for Baku than the Democrats with their close ties with Azerbaijan’s opponents.

Armenia benefits from Harris’ victory, while Azerbaijan would very much prefer Trump. However, there is a nuance: Azerbaijan has a clear advantage in its relationship with the “deep state.” The influence of the Armenian lobby extends to the State Department: first, it is the Congress that approves ambassadors, and second, high-ranking State Department employees often have to deal with uncomfortable questions from the House Foreign Affairs Committee. However, for the Pentagon, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. intelligence agencies, Azerbaijan is much more important than Armenia because of its role in the Middle East, especially with regard to Iran.

Can the victory of a particular candidate radically change the situation in the South Caucasus? No, but politics is a process of creating new realities. Important topics for the region include the strengthening of Russian influence, the implementation of the Trans-Caspian transport and energy corridors with the EU, and the integration of the Caucasus and Central Asia (the Turkic project). The success of these projects requires political stability, which is impossible without a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The success of this process largely depends on U.S. policy.

Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia doesn’t have a powerful lobby, strategic geopolitical position or natural resources to sustain U.S. interest. The neoconservative political group that supported Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations is now weak. Obama’s attempt to reset relations with Russia, which brought Ivanishvili to power, has shifted Georgia’s foreign policy toward the “Russian world.” It is still an open question as to which of the American candidates will challenge this.

The ruling circles believe that Trump is more favorable to the current government than Harris, based on his isolationism and ties to Viktor Orbán, who supports the “Georgian Dream” in the West. However, this approach is quite simplistic. It is more important to ask which American administration is willing to cede the South Caucasus to Russia and increase Moscow’s influence over Turkey and the Middle East. The effectiveness of the Democrats in this matter is evident from the current situation in Georgia. The upcoming elections in Georgia will show whether the current or future administration (if the Democrats win) is ready to take real steps to prevent the country from falling into the “Russian world.”

What the Trump administration will do if he wins remains an open question. Will it ignore Georgia’s integration into Russia’s economic and political system while maintaining the illusion of a Euro-Atlantic course? Most likely, no. There are no serious political groups in the U.S. that support the current Georgian government, and the “deep state” understands the real balance of forces in the region.

For the U.S., it is also important to redirect Turkey’s geopolitical interests from the Middle East to Central Asia. West-East projects (Trans-Caspian transport corridor, energy corridor, Turkic initiatives) are impossible without the participation of Turkey and Georgia. This requires the U.S. to improve relations with Ankara and prevent Russia from increasing its influence in Georgia. Which administration will be more successful on this issue remains unclear.

In conclusion, supporting candidates in U.S. elections is like rooting for a sports team. Not only is it uncertain who will win, but it is also unclear how the new U.S. administration will act in the Caucasus region.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 72 (July 25, 2024)

There is a well-known observation that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. However, it is often the other way around, and in general this division is unnecessary. The example of Iran today proves this. To say that Pezeshkian’s victory came as a surprise to most Iranian experts is to say nothing. Everyone expected Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf to become president. Moreover, some even saw the dark shadow of this son of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps behind the plane crash that took place in the mountains of West Azerbaijan Province. But, as it turned out, not everything is so clear cut. The speaker remained a speaker, not even making it to the second round. And even the war hero, veteran invalid, ultra-conservative Saeed Jalili had to experience the bitterness of defeat against a unique, modest doctor from Tabriz, Masoud Pezeshkian.

However, speaking about the modest doctor, I have somewhat exaggerated. Of course, even before his election, Masoud Pezeshkian was a prominent political figure — he is a former Minister of Health and a former Deputy Speaker of Parliament. However, this does not even come close to the regalia of the political heavyweights among his competitors. Now evil tongues can say as much as they like that Rahbar, facing eternity, needed a politically weak president, who under no circumstances could not only compete (Jalili could not have done that either), but also interfere in the process of transfer of supreme power, which will inevitably come sooner or later. Rahbar looked quite cheerful during the elections, though, but the Iranian political elites decided to hedge their bets.

To say that political weakness is the only reason for Masoud Pezeshkian’s victory would be grossly unfair. The system for admitting presidential candidates is strictly regulated: the Guardian Council can reject anyone on the basis of any carelessly spoken word. This initial screening allows for a relatively fair election later on, since all undesirable candidates are already weeded out at the initial stage. But even against this background, Pezeshkian stood out. The only reformer, as much as one can be a reformer in Iran, the only representative of an ethnic minority (at least among those who do not hide it in public). To what extent Azerbaijani Turks are an ethnic minority in Iran, though, is debatable. But that is not what is at issue here.

The presidential election in Iran is both a kind of barometer of public opinion and an answer to the question of what the active part of the public wants. This time, the active part of the public really wanted change, despite the fact that the two previous attempts to bring such desires to fruition, under Presidents Khatami and Rouhani, can hardly be called successful. The reforms of these reformers were too superficial, if they can be called reforms at all. Time will tell how deep the changes will be this time, but one way or another, we are dealing with a new political reality in Iran, and this reality directly affects all of Iran’s neighbors, including the countries of the South Caucasus.

Azerbaijan

Perhaps, the only people who were also satisfied by Masoud Pezeshkian’s victory were Azerbaijanis. But we are talking about the public emotion. And it is not only because Pezeshkian is an ethnic Azerbaijani. After all, Rahbar himself is an ethnic Azerbaijani. But in the case of Pezeshkian, another thing is important: the president-elect not only does not hide his Azerbaijani origin, but also emphasizes it, and even publicly takes pride in it. By the way, his opponents tried to use this against him, accusing him of Turkism during the elections, but the effect was the opposite.

The enthusiasm of the general public is pretty high: on the “News of Caucasus” channel during a live broadcast I was even asked whether Iran would join the Organization of Turkic States. At the same time, the general opinion of experts can be described as restrained optimism. It is clear why it is restrained – the very nature of the Iranian state considers Azerbaijan, a country with a Shiite majority, as a “legitimate” target for promoting of the Islamic revolution, in other words, Iranian interventionism. However, the optimism is no less understandable. The fact that Iran’s top political leadership has allowed a candidate like Pezeshkian to win is evidence of Iran’s willingness to settle relations with its northern neighbor, which have been very problematic in recent years.

The normalization of relations began under former Iranian President Raisi, who in fact died while returning from a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. And Raisi, as is well known, was neither a Turk nor a reformer. In the current situation, it is imperative for Iran to take advantage of the new geopolitical realities in the South Caucasus. All previous schemes were destroyed after the 44-day war. And nothing new has emerged yet. However, Armenia’s stubbornness in the issue of the Zangezur corridor (a 40-kilometer stretch of road linking the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the rest of Azerbaijan) has allowed Iran to propose a similar corridor through its own territory, along the right bank of the border river Aras. Agreements have already been reached and work has already begun on the road route, which is part of a large-scale set of works to develop transportation infrastructure linking Iran and Azerbaijan, launched by Baku after the 44-day war in 2020.  The construction of the Rasht-Astara section of the railroad, in which Russia is extremely interested and which Iran has been sabotaging for more than a decade, is another matter. And while Pezeshkian’s support for the construction of roads along the Aras is unquestionable, things may not be so clear-cut in the case of the Rasht-Astara section. After all, Pezeshkian has been a prominent figure in the Iranian-Turkish friendship community for years. Nothing is yet known about Pezeshkian’s attitude toward Russia.

It must be noted that, the voices in Iran that are constantly talking about the “Zionist Baku Republic” will now have to, if not fall silent, then significantly diminish. However, so far we are only talking about the potentialities, but time will show what they will turn into.

Armenia

The formula “the friend of my enemy is my enemy” does not always work in politics, but it is never neglected. In this sense, Armenia is no exception: everything that pleases Azerbaijanis almost immediately becomes a matter of concern for Armenians. Especially when it comes to a country like Iran.

For thirty years after independence, Russia has been Armenia’s main security guarantor, but Iran was always perceived as a reliable safety net. After the defeat in the 44-day war in 2020 and the special operation in September 2023, when frustration with Moscow peaked in Armenia, many opinion polls pointed to a military alliance with Iran as the most reliable security format. This is despite the fact that the society as a whole is oriented toward the West. This is not surprising: Europe is far away, the U.S. is even farther away, and Iran is close by.

A colleague of mine who recently returned from Armenia told me that Yerevan was very concerned about Aliyev’s invitation to Tehran, to which I reasonably objected that Aliyev had also invited Pezeshkian to Baku. This is not a fundamental issue, but it is very revealing. However, one should not draw far-reaching conclusions. For Iran, Armenia remains an extremely important country that ensures the balance of power in the region and the possibility, albeit potential, of a presence in the South Caucasus. In this sense, Armenia has nothing to worry about: if necessary, Iran will provide it with gas and will gladly fill the void left by Russia. Although hopes for escalation, especially military escalation, between Azerbaijan and Iran will have to be abandoned for now. Both Tehran and Baku are well aware of the cost of such a scenario, so they will try to make the most of the Pezeshkian factor.

Georgia

Georgia is the only country in the South Caucasus that does not border Iran. In Georgia there is little interest in what is happening in Iran, not only among the general public, but also among political analysts and politicians. TV channels give a very simplified picture of events in this country, and Iranians are perceived only as tourists who come to Georgia as the nearest Western country to get away from the realities of their regime.

However, if Georgia is not interested in Iran, it does not mean that Iran is not interested in Georgia. First of all, it is interested in Georgian Azerbaijanis as a target audience for ideological influence. It should be said that over the last thirty years Iran has managed to achieve serious success in this field. A small but organized group of population has been created for whom Shiism is a priority marker of identity (which, by the way, does not prevent them from being loyal and even patriotic citizens of the country). This group is referred to as “religiozniks” in areas populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis; this term is not widespread elsewhere. The organization and cohesion of this group is so great that in recent years political parties have become seriously engaged in them, hoping to get their votes in elections. In addition, this ethnic minority provides a disproportionate number of opinion leaders: its members lead in industries such as journalism, teaching, and politics.

Naturally, in the areas populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis the elections were followed very closely and their results were received with great enthusiasm. Otherwise, the only episode related to Iran, which got the media attention, was the trip of the Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Kobakhidze to the funeral of the President of Iran. The pro-governmental media covered this trip quite neutrally, while the opposition media presented it as a marker of Georgia’s foreign policy U-turn from the West. Which, by the way, is not groundless. And yes, today Georgia can hardly be called a partner of Iran, but everything is changing very quickly.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 67 (July 05, 2024)

On June 30, 2024, the Georgian national football team lost 4:1 to Spain in 1/8 final of the UEFA European Championship. In most countries, such a defeat would be considered a failure, and in some countries — a national tragedy. But in Georgia, the players were welcomed as heroes. Why? Because reaching the final part of the championship was a dream come true for most people in the country, and reaching 1/8 final was nothing short of a miracle.

People react to events depending on their expectations, and this applies not only to the sport of football, but also to politics. In Georgia, despite its modest standard of living, the rights and freedoms of citizens are generally safeguarded and respected. The exception was the first years of independence, when the country was ruled by a criminal junta. The majority of citizens associated the improvement of living standards and development of the country with European integration enshrined in the Constitution. Everyone was confident in the irreversibility of this process, but reality forced some adjustments.

In April, the ruling party introduced a bill on “foreign influence,” causing consternation. The Georgian Dream had a chance to win a solid majority in the elections, and returning to a law that had been abandoned a year earlier due to protests seemed illogical. This led to mass protests unprecedented in Georgia’s history.

The question “why?” has become the main focus of Georgian politics. Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and honorary chairman of the Georgian Dream, said at the rally that before he took over the country was ruled from outside and a certain global war party wants to destroy Georgia. He presented himself and his party as saviors amidst the world geopolitics and said that Georgia is not loved in Europe, but it will come there anyway. This was a de facto statement of a change of foreign policy course. The work of the parliament in passing anti-democratic laws was part of this change.

Now is the time to answer the question: Why? A simple explanation: Ivanishvili and his party want to rule forever, and this is incompatible with the course towards Europe. It is impossible to rule forever, but hardly anyone from Ivanishvili’s entourage will dare to remind him of this. In fact, there must be another good reason that forced him to leave his comfort zone. And that reason can only be Moscow.

Historically, Georgia has always been problematic for Moscow. Despite bribing the elite, Georgia remained a hotbed of resistance to the empire. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia would not have attracted much attention were it not for its geographic location. Georgia blocks the East-West corridor, bypassing Russia and Iran, so Russia has always sought political control over it, often in a crude and inept manner.

In the early nineties, the Russian Federation failed to dismember Georgia into states under its control. Thanks to the international influence of Eduard Shevardnadze, the U.S. and Europe thwarted these plans, but Georgia fell temporarily under Russian influence. Shevardnadze and Azerbaijani leader Heydar Aliyev then played a grandmaster’s game: Aliyev had the oil; Shevardnadze had the territory for transportation. The Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan projects laid the foundation for the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan from Russia. Moscow also failed to capitalize on the 2003 Rose Revolution, although the inexperienced Saakashvili seemed more amenable than Shevardnadze.

Moscow tried to negotiate the following things with Saakashvili:

1. No withdrawal of Russian troops from the bases in Batumi, Akhalkalaki and Vaziani, which was stipulated in the 1999 treaty at the OSCE summit in Istanbul. This meant the loss of Russia’s military presence in the western part of the South Caucasus and the creation of transportation corridors for energy resources bypassing Russia from Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

2. Transfer of Georgia’s transportation infrastructure under Russian control, including the railroad. It was planned to create the South Caucasus Railway, which would have united the railroads of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with access to Georgian seaports.

3. Control over the ports of Poti and Batumi was part of Moscow’s plan to regain control of the South Caucasus. Russia helped Tbilisi regain sovereignty over Adjara, where the then ruler Aslan Abashidze handed over the Batumi oil terminal to the Danes. Chechen oil was also exported through Batumi.

4. Russia also demanded the purchase of the North-South pipeline, which transported gas to Georgia and Armenia. Although it only transported Russian gas, buying the pipeline gave Moscow the opportunity to create its own gas transportation project to Turkey. This would have increased Georgia’s dependence on Russian gas and hindered the Baku — Tbilisi — Ceyhan project, preventing the transportation of energy resources from Central Asia bypassing Russia.

After Adjara was returned to Tbilisi’s control, Saakashvili refused to sell the North-South gas pipeline to Russia, which triggered an armed conflict in the Tskhinvali region in 2004, an economic blockade and war in August 2008, after which Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These events led to the severance of diplomatic relations and stagnation in Georgian-Russian relations.

Since the 2012 electoral revolution, Russia has restricted itself to unfreezing trade relations with Georgia and some formative operations. These include the renegotiation of the North-South gas agreement with Armenia in 2016, the opening of a railroad through Abkhazia in 2017, and the increased presence of Russian business in Georgia’s economy.

After February 2024, Russia found itself under sanctions and logistically isolated from the West. Under such circumstances, it has become critical for Moscow to develop an independent logistics ecosystem, especially in the South Caucasus, which provides access to the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Russia’s diminishing influence in Azerbaijan after Baku ended the Karabakh conflict, by returning its territory, and negative public opinion in Armenia became a challenge for Moscow. Under these circumstances, Georgia has become a key region capable of restoring Russia’s influence.

The Russian Federation has already begun to restore its influence in Georgia through the formation of a political crisis brought about by the Georgian authorities. This has led to increased tensions between Tbilisi and its Western allies. Moscow is actively exploiting this situation, probably playing a role in shaping the crisis.

Short-term goals:

• To create an illusion in the minds of the Georgian authorities through their allies in the West (Hungary, Slovakia) that the collective West will not break off relations with Georgia and that public opinion will be led to believe that it is possible to be a European country and be friends with Russia.

• Breaking off relations with the West by intensifying internal repression and rigging elections. Political isolation of Georgia.

• Expansion of trade and economic partnership between Russia and Georgia within the framework of the Russian ecosystem of survival under sanctions. Development of trade and financial schemes West — Georgia — Russia (EAEU countries).

• Participation of Russian companies in major infrastructure projects, especially in the transportation and energy sectors.

• Increased presence of Russian capital in Georgia, growth of Russian assets, especially in the banking and financial sector.

• Georgia’s withdrawal from the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG, also known as the Ramstein group).

• Changing the Georgian media mainstream narrative and public opinion on the war in Ukraine.

• Removing the syndrome of aversion to Russia, among other things, through the formation of the image of an enemy among Georgians on the basis of Turkophobia and Islamophobia, with reliance on specific representatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC).

Medium-term goals:

• Launching a railroad through Abkhazia that will provide access to the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi, as well as to the Tbilisi-Kars railroad connecting Georgia and Turkey, with the prospect of using the deep-water port of Anaklia as a backup port for Novorossiysk.

• Breakdown of relations with SOCAR and return to monopoly gas supplies from Russia.

• Georgia’s rejection of European and Euro-Atlantic integration at the institutional level, amendment of the Constitution.

• Restoration of diplomatic relations with Georgia against the background of negotiations on the unification of the “three countries of the South Caucasus” into a federation or confederation.

Long-term goals:

• Transfer to concession of the railroad and the ports of Poti and Batumi by Georgia.

• Return of Russian military bases to Vaziani, Batumi and Akhalkalaki.

• Georgia’s accession to the EAEU and CSTO.

• The unification of Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjara into a confederation or federation, and Georgia’s accession to a union state.

Russia has long been developing plans to strengthen its influence in Georgia, and today they are close to materialization. The main goal is to strengthen its influence in the country, and how Russia gets Ivanishvili to do it is not really important. The protests in Georgia are aimed at opposing this turn.

As a result, Georgia falls under Russian influence, although this is not technically formalized. The reaction of the West, including the U.S. and Europe, has been hurtful, but without a clear political opposition in the country, they have little support, despite the support of the population. It is difficult to make predictions in such a situation. Protests will continue even after the elections. The future remains uncertain but very interesting.

  Armenia and Georgia: Two Very Different Protests. Part 1.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 62 (June 7, 2024)

The South Caucasus has been in a zone of political turbulence since September 2020, when after 44 days of fighting Azerbaijan managed to regain control over most of the occupied territories. Much more could have been achieved, however, in November 2020 Moscow intervened, whose aggressive actions forced Baku to sit down at a virtual negotiating table with Armenia and agree to the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping contingent on the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. The parties’ statement of nine points issued at night regulated virtually everything, but solved nothing. However, subsequent events turned out to be extremely favorable for Azerbaijan and extremely unfavorable for Armenia.

The failure of Moscow’s plans to seize Ukraine and the practical implementation of the “USSR 2.0” project, whatever its name may be, untied Baku’s hands in resolving the Karabakh conflict. Already in September 2022, as a result of a brief military operation, the Azerbaijani armed forces took over a number of dominant heights on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and brought under fire control the communications linking the southern Armenian region of Syunik with the central part of the country. For the first time, the territories that were part of the Armenian SSR came under the control of Azerbaijan. For the first time, Armenian society faced a real threat of losing not only Karabakh (in the public Armenian consciousness — the territory of the former NKAO and adjacent occupied Azerbaijani regions), but also the territory of Armenia proper. The Syunik district separating the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic from the central part of Azerbaijan was of particular concern to the Armenian side. By that time, the implementation of almost all the points of interest to Azerbaijan in the trilateral agreements between Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan concluded after the 44-day war had hit a dead end. The Russians stationed their military in Karabakh, provided a transportation corridor with Armenia and “forgot” both about the issues of reintegration of the region into Azerbaijan and the opening of communication with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. However, the Russian military never received the mandate of peacekeepers, but who cared about such trifles, especially since in Baku they were called peacekeepers, trying not to poke the bear.

Therefore, as soon as Baku had an opportunity to change the status quo on the ground, it did not fail to seize it. Let me remind you once again that such an opportunity appeared as a result of the Kharkiv offensive of the Ukrainian armed forces. Then there was a long story with a strange blockade of Karabakh by Azerbaijani environmentalists. Strange, because for several months the de facto authorities of Karabakh were constantly offered to receive everything they needed, however, not through the Lachin corridor, which was controlled by the Russian military, but through the territory of Azerbaijan. In fact, decisions on this issue were made not so much by the Karabakh authorities but in Moscow. And Moscow did not want Karabakh to be reintegrated into Azerbaijan at all.

This situation lasted from December 2022 to September 2023, when Baku managed to regain control over Karabakh as a result of a military operation. The Armenian population, however, left Karabakh. Why this happened is the subject of another detailed discussion. Baku managed to take advantage of another weakness of Russia: let us recall that it was at this time that Ukraine tried to organize an offensive in the Zaporizhzhya region. The offensive was not successful, but then, in September 2022, no one knew how it would turn out. Thus, in fact, the Karabakh issue was completely resolved by Azerbaijan.

The issue of Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement, border delimitation, opening communications and overcoming the burden of the historical past still remains. It is extremely difficult to do all this. There is a comfortable confidence in Armenian society, regardless of political orientation, that the war for Karabakh was lost not to Azerbaijan, but to hostile Turkey and to Russia, which betrayed Armenia. This unwittingly paints a picture of further expansion of Azerbaijan and Turkey against Armenia with the tacit consent of Russia. This, in turn, calls into question the political leadership of the country, and more precisely, the ability of this political leadership to ensure Armenia’s security without Russia.

To be fair, it should be noted that the Armenian leadership has been sparing no effort to address pressing security issues all this time. All possible players were involved in the process, from France and the United States to Iran, India and some Arab countries. The political situation in France and the United States allowed the Armenian diaspora to actively lobby on this issue: with elections ahead, the votes of voters sympathetic to Armenia were not insignificant. There was no need to convince Iran and India of anything. However, it was obvious from the very beginning that the capabilities and even the willingness of external players were clearly insufficient to replace Russia, which for many years had been the exclusive guarantor of Armenia’s security.

Subsequently, Pashinyan and members of his team became convinced that there was no alternative to the agreements with Baku. The last large-scale political attack on Azerbaijan was launched in late 2023-early 2024. But Baku cared little about all those angry resolutions of various parliaments, congressional hearings and so on. Everyone knew that the reaction would be limited to indignant statements that would eventually fade away. The point is that the demand to transfer this territory under some prospective international jurisdiction and to ensure the return of the Armenian population there was so unrealistic that it was, to put it mildly, not serious to consider all this outside the context of election campaigns. And so it happened: the West made some noise and moved on, Tehran started looking for ways to normalize relations with Baku, and Pashinian’s government started normalizing relations with Azerbaijan, not forgetting the normalization of relations with Turkey.

The reason for this development was objective necessity. Many people in today’s Armenia understand this perfectly well. In the absence of any reasonable alternative to himself in the form of an opposition, Pashinyan could afford it. The losing side here were the forces opposing Nikol Pashinyan, and these are the forces associated with the Armenian diaspora. Let us remind the reader that the largest Armenian diasporas are located in Russia, the United States and France. And one of the most important institutions uniting the Armenian diaspora is the Armenian Apostolic Church. The rejection of the idea of miatsum (“unification”) and, what is even scarier for the diaspora, the normalization of relations with Turkey, which is inevitable after the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan, deprives the Armenian diaspora of the political platform on which they have stood for more than a hundred years. Therefore, they could not ignore what was happening.

The most convenient moment to start to sway Pashinyan’s power was the decision to hand over to Azerbaijan four deserted villages (or rather, the ruins thereof) that were part of the Azerbaijani SSR and were seized by the Armenian side during the First Karabakh War.

Archbishop Bagrat was at the head of the protests against the current government. The move has resonated widely both inside and outside the country, especially among the Armenian diaspora, which actively supports the protest movement. For the first time since 2018, the protests have been led by a figure who does not irritate the majority of Armenian society (both inside the country and in the diaspora). And this circumstance may prove to be a key factor in the future.

But who is he, Archbishop Bagrat? Archbishop Bagrat (Vazgen Galstanyan), also known as Bagrat Srbazan, is a well-known figure of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Archbishop of the Diocese of Tavush. He was born on May 20, 1971 in the city of Leninakan (Gyumri). In 2006 Bagrat Galstyan was ordained to the diaconate. He was the head of the Department of Conceptual Provisions of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin.

He actively participated in church events and patriotic movements. In 2018, Bagrat Galstyan became a member of the Board of Trustees of the Aurora Foundation. In 2019, he became a goodwill ambassador of this foundation. And the founder of the Aurora Foundation is none other than Ruben Vardanyan, who is now in a Baku pre-trial detention center. In addition to Armenian citizenship, Bagrat also has Canadian citizenship, which he received while serving in that country. The Canadian passport, by the way, blocks Bagrat’s possibility to take the prime minister’s chair. However, if the case takes a revolutionary turn, no one will pay attention to it.

The “Tavush in the Name of Motherland” movement, created by Archbishop Bagrat, opposes the demarcation of the border with Azerbaijan and believes that Karabakh should not be part of Azerbaijan. In fact, the protest offers nothing new and actually copies the events of 2018. The same foot march of one person, joined by others who are caring about the cause, along with rallying in the square and blocking the streets. What’s different is that, unlike 2018, this protest is not gaining a critical mass of support. And this is understandable. The Achilles’ heel of the current protest is the absence of a positive program — not because Archbishop Bagrat cannot offer it, but because it does not exist in principle. The balance of forces in the region is such that no matter who and no matter how loud calls for the return of Karabakh and the continuation of the struggle, it is physically impossible. Archbishop Bagrat’s protest is based not on calculation, but on emotions — love for one’s homeland, people, history and so on. On the fact that any leader is inevitably responsible for the country’s defeat, and what has happened, in the collective unconscious of the Armenian people, is undoubtedly a defeat and a severe psychological trauma. And those involved in this protest want not so much to change the future as to punish Pashinyan and his revolutionary team for the past.

As of today, it is clear that Pashinyan’s power is not threatened yet, but these actions may well be seen as a potential plan for the future. After all, Pashinyan will still have to make unpopular decisions. Attempts of the opposition from among the former representatives of the ruling elite to take part in the protest are more harmful than useful. But it can’t be helped, no one can forbid them. As for Moscow’s position, everything that weakens Pashinyan in the public space is objectively beneficial to the Kremlin. However, this protest is hardly perceived there as an opportunity to replace the authorities in Armenia. Rather, it is a potential future option in case Pashinyan really decides to reformat Armenia’s foreign policy course and finally move away from Russia. However, this hardly depends on Pashinyan today: at the global level, everything is decided on the fronts of Ukraine, and at the regional level — in Georgia. More on what is happening in Georgia will follow in the next part of this piece.