Posts by Prof. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 231 (September 21, 2026)

Part 2. Election campaign and evolution of party-political system.

Party Competition and the Transformation of Kazakhstan’s Party System in the 2026 Kurultai Election

The election of 23 August 2026 substantially reshaped Kazakhstan’s party system. Seven registered political parties contested all 145 seats in the newly established unicameral Kurultai, elected entirely through nationwide party lists. Five parties that represented all political spectrum crossed the 5 per cent electoral threshold: Adilet, Auyl, Respublica, Ak Zhol and the Nationwide Social Democratic Party (OSDP). Two left parties (The People’s Party of Kazakhstan and the Baitaq Green Party) failed to enter the new legislature. The official results were highly concentrated. Adilet received 71.17 per cent of the vote and 110 seats; Auyl 6.26 per cent and 10 seats; Respublica 5.56 per cent and nine seats; Ak Zhol 5.21 per cent and eight seats; and OSDP 5.11 per cent and eight seats. The People’s Party received 3.11 per cent and Baitaq only 1.07 per cent. The most significant feature of the election, however, was not simply Adilet’s overwhelming victory. It was the reorganization of party system, combined with a weakening of virtually all the smaller parties that had entered the Mazhilis in 2023.

1. Adilet: from a “party of power” to a party of presidential modernization

The current ruling party, Adilet, traces its institutional origins to Nur Otan (“Light of the Fatherland”), the pro-presidential party that dominated Kazakhstan’s political system under Nursultan Nazarbayev. At that period it looked like specific Post-Soviet “party of power” (with “United Russia” in neighboring Russian Federation being one of the examples of such a party) lacking any clear ideology and reform program. In the wake of President Tokayev’s reform agenda, the party after the January 2022 unrest was first reformed as Amanat (“Entrusted Legacy”) in March 2022, and subsequently seriously reorganized as Adilet (“Justice”) in 2026. Both transformations formed part of a broader effort to distance the political system from the Nazarbayev era, marked by the departure of many prominent figures associated with the former president and the construction of a new clearly cut political identity centered on Tokayev’s concept of a “New Kazakhstan”.

Adilet was formed only several months before the election and it directly incorporated Amanat in June 2026. So, the ruling party was not simply reformed twice, during the last reform it joined a completely new party, which emphasized an institutional and what is most important in Kazakhstan’s context personal breakthrough with the past.

Adilet therefore should not be understood simply as another new entrant to the political system. Institutionally, it inherited the organizational infrastructure and much of the political space previously occupied by Amanat, while simultaneously creating a new political identity associated more directly with the current stage of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s reforms.

The electoral effect of this transformation was substantial. Amanat had received 53.90 per cent of the party-list vote in the 2023 Mazhilis election. Adilet received 71.17 per cent in 2026. Although the two results cannot be treated as perfectly comparable because both the institutional setting and electoral context changed, the difference nevertheless points to a major consolidation of the presidential electoral bloc.

Ideologically, Adilet describes itself as a party of “reformist centrism” and explicitly rejects the conventional left-right division. Its program combines several elements that are characteristic of Tokayev’s broader political discourse: social justice, the rule of law, patriotism, personal responsibility, hard work, technological modernization, education, environmental responsibility, and the strengthening of a common civic identity. Its ideological formula is therefore neither classical conservatism nor social democracy, but rather state-centered developmental centrism. To a certain respect this program resembles political programs in the East Asian democracies (Japan, South Korea, etc).

This is an important change from the traditional function of Kazakhstan’s dominant party. Whereas Nur Otan and later Amanat largely functioned as broad parties of administrative and political consolidation (i.e. “parties of power”), Adilet seeks to present itself more explicitly as a party of modernization. Its role is to translate presidential reforms into policy and to mobilize social support for them.

The 2026 result gives this model an exceptionally strong parliamentary base: with 110 of 145 seats, Adilet possesses roughly three quarters of the Kurultai.

2. Auyl: agrarian interests combined with cultural conservatism

Auyl (“Village”)’s political profile is readily understandable to anyone familiar with the history of party politics in the post-Soviet space. Agrarian parties that emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s were often ideologically located on the left, in part because they represented the interests of former Soviet collective and state farm elites and frequently cooperated with, or electorally supported, Communist parties. Over time, however, this social base changed. In Kazakhstan, Auyl increasingly came to represent the interests of a modern agricultural sector, including commercial farming and agribusiness, while placing greater emphasis on traditional values, rural communities, national culture, and social conservatism. As a result, the party gradually moved away from its earlier left-agrarian profile toward a more conservative agrarian position.

Auyl emerged as the strongest of the smaller parties, receiving 6.26 per cent and ten seats. Yet this result also represents a marked electoral decline. In 2023, Auyl had obtained 10.90 per cent, making it the second strongest party in the proportional component of that election.

Auyl occupies perhaps the clearest sociological niche in Kazakhstan’s party system. It is fundamentally an agrarian and regional party, emphasizing rural development, food security, agricultural modernization, stronger regional economies and better infrastructure outside the largest cities. Its formula of “strong regions – strong center” summarizes this orientation.

At the same time, Auyl is not merely an economic interest party. Its platform also combines agrarian politics with relatively conservative communitarian themes: family, national traditions, cultural heritage, patriotism and the moral value of the responsible citizen. It can therefore be described as a form of agrarian communitarianism or moderate national conservatism, although it operates firmly within the general framework of support for the state’s modernization agenda.

Its decline from 10.90 to 6.26 per cent may indicate that part of the electorate attracted in 2023 by Auyl’s patriotic and socially conservative message migrated toward the much broader political platform offered by Adilet. Nevertheless, Auyl retained a distinctive constituency and still remains the second-largest party in the Kurultai.

3. Respublica: entrepreneurial modernization and a generational political niche

Respublica received 5.56 per cent and nine seats, compared with 8.59 per cent in its first parliamentary election in 2023. Thus, although the party survived the new electoral environment, it lost roughly three percentage points. Respublica is one of the most interesting products of the political opening that preceded the 2023 election. Unlike the older parliamentary parties, it was constructed around a younger generation of entrepreneurs and managers. Its political vocabulary emphasizes entrepreneurship, efficiency, modernization, digitalization and practical problem-solving.

Its ideological profile can best be described as economic pragmatism with a technocratic and entrepreneurial orientation. Its 2026 program was organized around the sequence “prosperous citizen – responsible society – effective state – secure country”.

This distinguishes Respublica from another right party Ak Zhol. Both appeal to entrepreneurial constituencies, but whereas Ak Zhol represents the institutionalized interests of established domestic business and has developed a long tradition of parliamentary economic advocacy, Respublica has sought to embody a newer, younger, more innovation-oriented segment of Kazakhstan’s middle class.

Its weaker result in 2026 suggests that the initial novelty effect surrounding the party in 2023 has faded. Some experts also say that since this party is the youngest, it still has no effective party machinery. An attempt to include popular figures to compensate for the absence of organization has not worked well. Yet crossing the threshold for a second consecutive election is politically important: it suggests that Respublica is becoming institutionalized rather than remaining a one-election project.

4. Ak Zhol: the established party of business

Ak Zhol (“Bright Path”) crossed the threshold with 5.21 per cent, securing eight seats. This was a significant decline from its 8.41 per cent result in 2023 and from the stronger positions the party enjoyed in several earlier parliamentary elections. Ideologically, Ak Zhol remains the closest Kazakhstan has to a classical economic liberal or pro-business party, although its contemporary position is more accurately described as entrepreneurial centrism.

Its historical transformation is particularly revealing. Ak Zhol emerged in the early 2000s from the reformist and initially oppositional Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. Over time (particularly after Azat Peruashev became its leader in 2011) it evolved from a broad democratic opposition party into a highly institutionalized parliamentary representative of domestic entrepreneurs and private business. Its core issues now include protection of small and medium-sized enterprises, opposition to excessive taxation and regulatory pressure, limiting the expansion of the quasi-state sector, defending domestic producers, stronger parliamentary control over public finances and reducing the criminalization of economic disputes.

The arrival of Respublica has created an obvious competition within this electoral niche. Ak Zhol represents the older, institutionally established business community, while Respublica appeals more heavily to younger entrepreneurs, new-economy sectors and managerial constituencies. Their almost identical 2026 results – 5.21 and 5.56 per cent respectively – suggest that Kazakhstan now has two competing versions of pro-market or entrepreneurial politics.

5. OSDP: a small but remarkably stable social-democratic electorate

The Nationwide Social Democratic Party (OSDP), the only left party in the parliament, received 5.11 per cent and eight seats. Numerically, its performance was strikingly stable, although, traditionally not very strong: it received 5.20 per cent in 2023. Among all the smaller parliamentary parties, OSDP therefore demonstrated the greatest electoral continuity.

Ideologically it also occupies the clearest conventional position on the left-right spectrum. OSDP explicitly identifies itself with social democracy and emphasizes redistribution, social protection, labor rights, stronger trade unions, political accountability, demonopolization, competitive elections and parliamentary government. Its 2026 program combines demands for social responsibility with technological and economic modernization. This makes it a moderate center-left party rather than a traditional socialist organization.

Historically, OSDP has also possessed stronger roots in Kazakhstan’s opposition tradition than most parties represented in parliament. It posed a left-wing alternative to neoliberal policy of the government for many years. Its survival at just above the threshold is therefore significant. It suggests the existence of a relatively small but persistent electorate for a more socially redistributive and politically pluralist alternative.

Paradoxically, because all the other smaller parliamentary parties lost considerably more electoral support between 2023 and 2026, OSDP’s unchanged five-per-cent constituency gave it greater relative parliamentary importance: its representation increased from four party-list mandates in the 2023 Mazhilis to eight seats in the larger Kurultai.

6. Ex-Communists and the Green lost the election

The most noticeable loser was the People’s Party of Kazakhstan, which fell from 6.80 per cent in 2023 to 3.11 per cent in 2026 and therefore lost its parliamentary representation. The party represents the successor to Kazakhstan’s Communist political tradition, but in recent years it has increasingly defined itself through the language of modern socialism rather than orthodox communism. Its program stresses labor incomes, social equality, healthcare, inclusion, affordable public services and reducing regional disparities.

Its problem is partly one of ideological competition. The social-policy agenda is now crowded. OSDP can articulate similar concerns through a contemporary European-style social-democratic vocabulary, while ruling Adilet party itself has incorporated social justice and redistribution into a broad centrist presidential agenda. Exclusion of former Communists from the Kurultai is therefore more than a simple electoral setback. It may represent the gradual decline of the post-Communist branch of Kazakhstan’s party system.

The other party excluded from the Kurultai was the Kazakhstan Green Party Baitaq (“Vast Land”), which received only 1.07 per cent, down from 2.30 per cent in 2023. The 2026 result suggests that environmental politics in Kazakhstan continues to function primarily as a cross-party issue rather than an independent electoral cleavage. Environmental concerns are increasingly incorporated into the programs of larger parties, including Adilet and Auyl, which reduces Baitaq’s ability to monopolize the issue.

7. Election Results: Key Takeaways

First, the overall outcome of the election – a decisive victory for the pro-presidential party combined with a nationwide turnout of 74.08 percent – points to a high degree of political stability. Turnout was almost twenty percentage points higher than in the 2023 parliamentary election, when it stood at 54.19 percent. The most striking exception was Almaty, where turnout was only 43.23 percent, the lowest in the country. Yet even there participation increased substantially from 25.82 percent in 2023. Astana, by comparison, recorded turnout of 51.67 percent in 2026.

Almaty’s distinctiveness is politically significant. It is the country’s principal student and educational center and, together with Astana, one of Kazakhstan’s most economically and socially developed urban areas. Unlike Astana, however, its economy and social structure are considerably less centered on the national government bureaucracy. Its persistently lower electoral participation may therefore reflect the existence of younger, more autonomous, socially differentiated and politically demanding urban electorate. How to engage this electorate is a challenge that the new party system will have to address in the future.

Second, the pro-presidential party now exercises overwhelming control over parliament, while at the same time having largely distanced itself from both the personnel and the ideological legacy of the preceding political era. A similar process of generational and personnel renewal can be observed in other parties as well, both at the national and regional levels. This is consistent with President Tokayev’s repeated emphasis that one of the goals of the political modernization is to create opportunities for new people to enter politics and public life.

Third, Kazakhstan has traditionally differed from countries such as Russia in the relatively limited role played by the political left, and especially by Communist forces. The latest election reinforced this pattern. Parties associated with the post-Communist left, as well as the New Left as Greens, failed to enter the Kurultai, although the Social Democrats did cross the electoral threshold. This suggests that the left forces remain fragmented and electorally weak, while the center, center-right, agrarian, and technocratic segments of the party system continue to dominate.

Fourth, the role of political parties themselves is clearly increasing. This is visible not only at the institutional level: the new constitutional framework has eliminated the previous combination of party and regional representation in parliament, making political parties the principal foundation of national representation. At the same time, modernization appears to be taking place inside the parties themselves. One notable feature of the campaign according to the opinion of some interviewed experts was the declining role of outside political consultants and public-relations specialists. For many years, the extensive use of specialized campaign and PR consultants was a characteristic feature of electoral politics across much of the post-Soviet space, including Kazakhstan. In the 2026 election, by contrast, party organizations themselves increasingly controlled campaign strategy and implementation. The institutionalization of Kazakhstan’s parties has been a gradual process, but its maturation has now coincided with the constitutional consolidation of parties as the central actors of the political system.

Fifth, artificial intelligence emerged as a visible feature both of the campaign itself and of party programs. AI was used in the production of visual and textual campaign content, as well as for analytics, while at a more substantive level it occupied an important place in the modernization agendas of several parties. This reflects a broader shift in Kazakhstan’s political discourse: technological transformation, digitalization, and artificial intelligence are increasingly treated not as narrowly sectoral issues, but as central components of the country’s long-term development strategy.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 230 (September 15, 2026)

Part 1. Specificity of Kazakhstan’s political modernization model.

1. Kazakhstan’s road to current political modernization policy

Before Kassym-Jomart Tokayev came to power in 2019, Kazakhstan under Nursultan Nazarbayev combined a highly centralized political system with broadly neoliberal socioeconomic policies. In this respect, the Kazakhstani model displayed certain similarities with the previous developmental trajectories of several twentieth-century Asian states, including South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, where strong centralized authority coexisted with market-oriented economic modernization and deep integration into the global economy. Kazakhstan likewise achieved substantial (by Post-Soviet standards) economic growth, attracted large-scale foreign investment and built a relatively open market economy, while preserving a strongly personalized and vertically organized political system, which created a clear contradiction.

At the same time, however, the Kazakhstani model under Nazarbayev was specific in one particularly important respect. Members of the president’s extended family and individuals closely associated with them acquired a highly visible role in major sectors of the economy and in the political system. The concentration of political power was therefore accompanied by a popular perception that access to economic opportunities, state resources and political influence was distributed unequally. Over time, this contributed to a growing sense of social injustice and to a widening gap between the country’s considerable macroeconomic achievements that have significantly transformed Kazakh society and the way in which many citizens perceived the distribution of the benefits of modernization.

One of the most significant achievements of Kazakhstan during the first three decades of independence was the development of its distinctive multi-vector foreign policy. Situated between Russia and China, while simultaneously seeking close economic and political relations with the United States, the European Union and other major international actors, Kazakhstan avoided an exclusive geopolitical alignment and instead sought to maintain constructive relations with all major centers of global power. For Israeli readers, it is important to note that, as part of its multi-vector foreign policy, Kazakhstan’s leadership has traditionally maintained stable and constructive relations with the Jewish state. This strategy helped the country strengthen its sovereignty, attract investment from competing external partners and acquire a positive international profile. At the same time, Kazakhstan sought to present itself not merely as a geopolitical balancer but as a responsible international actor, emphasizing nuclear non-proliferation, multilateral diplomacy, dialogue and mediation in the conflicts.

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was one of the central figures in the construction and implementation of this foreign-policy model. A polyglot and professional diplomat, he served as Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister in the period of development of distinctive multivector foreign policy and, from 2011, served as United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva, while also representing the UN Secretary-General at the Conference on Disarmament. His career was therefore closely associated with precisely those elements that had become trademarks of Kazakhstan’s international strategy: multi-vector diplomacy, nuclear non-proliferation, engagement with different great powers and a strong commitment to multilateral institutions. This background also helps explain why Tokayev emerged as a new president in 2019. He had an unusually strong international reputation and extensive experience in both domestic government and global diplomacy. In this sense, the 2019 transition initially appeared to guarantee continuity in one of the most successful dimensions of the Nazarbayev-era model – Kazakhstan’s foreign policy – while opening the possibility of gradual transformation in those areas, particularly domestic political and socioeconomic governance, where the limitations of the previous model had become increasingly visible.

2. The logic of political modernization under Tokayev’s leadership

The 2026 Kurultai election should be understood not as an isolated institutional change, but as the element of a political modernization process that began with Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s accession to the presidency in 2019.

The underlying logic of this process has been adaptation. Kazakhstan itself has changed substantially over the past three decades. It has become more urban, more educated, more digitally connected and socially differentiated. A younger (and what is also important in a country with highly ethnically mixed population – ethnically mostly Kazakh) generation has entered public life with different expectations concerning government responsiveness, social mobility, participation and access to information. At the same time, the country is attempting to move beyond the economic and political structures inherited from the first decades of independence toward a more diversified, innovative and eventually post-industrial model of development.

Such socioeconomic modernization inevitably creates pressure for political modernization as well. Institutions designed primarily to guarantee combination of political stability with centralized and broadly neo-Liberal socio-economic decision-making increasingly need additional mechanisms of feedback, representation and responsiveness. Tokayev’s reforms can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to preserve political stability not by freezing the existing institutional system, but by gradually adapting it to a changing society.

Tokayev articulated this principle very early in his presidency. In his first State of the Nation Address in September 2019, he introduced the concept of the “Listening State” (“Slyshashchee gosudarstvo”) and linked it to the broader formula of a “Strong President–Influential Parliament–Accountable Government”. For someone familiar with Soviet and post-Communist political discourse, this may sound like a certain combination of Gorbachev-era ideas of political reform – such as glasnost and democratization – with reforms inspired by the East Asian developmental model (when a development of society produced a need for democratization in the states like South Korea or Taiwan, and created demands for political liberalization in China).

A “listening” state in Kazakhstan was not simply supposed to process citizens’ complaints more efficiently. It implied a different understanding of political stability: government would have to receive continuous feedback from society and respond institutionally to changing public expectations.

Tokayev simultaneously rejected the idea of abrupt political liberalization that can, according to the opinion of many Kazakh experts with whom I communicated (and who prefer to be anonymous), bring destabilization and consecutive degradation of institutions well known by the example of neighboring Kyrgyzstan (or even produce Lebanese-style conflicts in a very religiously and culturally heterogeneous society). Tokayev’s preferred model is one of controlled, gradual and cumulative political modernization. The first reform packages of 2019–2021 followed this logic from reduction of barriers to the registration of political parties to direct elections of rural heads of administrations (akims).

The January 2022 unrest, which increasingly came to reflect popular resentment against the continuing influence of Nazarbayev, his family and the economic elite associated with the former president, dramatically accelerated this process. For the authorities, January demonstrated the risks generated by a widening gap between the modernization of society and the capacity of existing political institutions to aggregate social demands, communicate with citizens and manage conflicts.

Tokayev used the crisis as a starting point for a considerably more ambitious institutional restructuring under the broader project of building a “(socially) just Kazakhstan”. In March 2022, he proposed a first constitutional reform intended to move Kazakhstan away from an excessively concentrated super-presidential model and toward a system with a stronger parliament, more competitive elections and clearer institutional checks.

The reform reduced several presidential powers, strengthened Parliament, established the Constitutional Court, prohibited the president from belonging to a political party while in office, simplified political-party registration, and restored a mixed electoral system for the Mazhilis. In specific Central Asian conditions a very important element of the reform was introduction of restrictions concerning the president’s close relatives holding senior public positions

These measures were followed by a broader electoral reset. Tokayev was re-elected in November 2022 under the newly introduced single seven-year presidential term, while the March 2023 parliamentary election was conducted under the revised rules and brought a more diverse set of parties into the Mazhilis. This set of parties created the party-system background for 2026 elections. The reforms also extended downward into local government. Direct elections of heads of local administrations were expanded.

The reforms of 2019–2023 had altered individual components of the political system. The next question was how these institutions should fit together as a coherent political architecture. This was particularly important because Kazakhstan was simultaneously confronting a new stage of socioeconomic transformation. Society becomes younger – about 28% of Kazakhstan’s population today is represented by the youth. Digitalization, artificial intelligence, changes in patterns of education and employment, the growing importance of a knowledge economy all strengthened the perceived need for a state capable not only of maintaining stability but also of making complex long-term policy choices.

Simultaneously, against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in the global geopolitical environment (including the conflict in Ukraine affecting Kazakh export and import, heightened tensions in the Middle East, continuing instability around Afghanistan, and the intensifying rivalry between China and the United States) Kazakhstan came under growing external pressure. This, in turn, influenced its domestic agenda, increasing the importance of resilience, balance, and the overall effectiveness of the political system.

The process culminated in a much more fundamental constitutional restructuring in 2026. On 15 March 2026 following several months of public discussion, including the work of a 130-member Constitutional Commission, a draft of an entirely new Constitution was approved by a national referendum. The new constitutional architecture replaced the previous bicameral Parliament with a unicameral Kurultai, which became the country’s highest representative legislative body when the new Constitution entered into force on 1 July 2026.

The significance of this reform extends beyond the replacement of the Senate and Mazhilis with a single chamber. The creation of the Kurultai represents an attempt to simplify the institutional structure of representation while simultaneously strengthening the political role of parties. This is particularly important because all members of the new Kurultai are elected through party lists, rather than through a combination of party-based and regional representation, as was previously the case.

Kazakhstani experts with whom I spoke suggested that this measure may have three main rationales. First, it creates an institutional foundation for the further development of the party system as an important element of future democratization. During the preceding period, party structures remained relatively weak, and one of the key questions is now whether these parties can develop recognizable constituencies, coherent policy identities, and meaningful connections with different groups within a rapidly changing Kazakhstani society. Second, the new system already reduces the opportunities for representatives of regional elites with strong patronal networks, many of them rooted in the Nazarbayev era, to enter parliament through territorially based channels. This consideration is particularly important in the specific political context of Central Asia. In this context, it is worth recalling that a number of scholars described the early years of Kazakhstan’s independence under Nazarbayev as a period in which former Soviet party and economic officials, often embedded in powerful regional and informal networks, continued to play a dominant role. Such senior figures were popularly referred to as agashki. Third, a fully party-based system makes legislative decision-making simpler and potentially faster, which may be especially valuable in conditions of global crisis. Against the backdrop of growing international instability, the strengthening of a genuinely nationwide party-political system may also reduce the influence of narrowly based regional interest groups. On the basis of these institutional changes, the first election to the Kurultai has been held on 23 August 2026.

3. Political Modernization in Kazakhstan Against the Backdrop of Global and Regional Democratic Recession

Because the policy of political modernization pursued by Kazakhstan’s leadership has been highly cautious, and because Kazakhstan still remains far from the contemporary Western model of liberal democracy, this policy – and, in particular, the recent Kurultai elections held within its framework – has been subject to criticism, in particular by European organizations working in these fields. For example, OSCE observers noted that the Kurultai elections were technically well organized, but stated that, in their view, they “lacked political pluralism”. Of course, inside Kazakhstan there are also critics that insist on quicker democratization.

At the same time, Kazakhstani experts with whom I spoke emphasized that the country’s political modernization should be understood in the specific context of current developments in the world in general, and in Eurasia in particular. The contemporary international environment, and especially the region in which Kazakhstan is located, is marked by a large number of conflicts and geopolitical tensions that are clearly not conducive to democratization. This specific context, according to this opinion, underscores the significance of the Kazakhstani leadership’s efforts to maintain its course of political modernization despite such unfavorable external conditions.

Freedom House has documented twenty consecutive years of global decline in political rights and civil liberties, beginning in 2006. In its Freedom in the World 2026 report, Freedom House notes that conditions for freedom deteriorated in 54 countries in 2025.  The democratic recession is clearly visible across the post-Soviet space. Between 2020 and 2026, due to different reasons, including war, Freedom House scores declined — often dramatically — in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. In several of these countries, particularly in Central Asia, the scores were already very low in 2020. In Kazakhstan there has been no comparable erosion of representative institutions of the kind seen by Freedom House in many neighboring states, while in some areas (most notably internet freedom) there a progress observed in this country.

Moreover, as several Kazakhstani experts I interviewed pointed out, there is a clear effort to incorporate political modernization into the broader formula of national development: an approach that stands out particularly sharply against the regional background described above. They also point out that Kazakhstan stands out positively among many other post-Soviet states because its approach to political modernization is relatively systematic. Democratic development is presented not as an isolated political objective, but as an organic part of a broader strategy aimed at preserving peace and tolerance, preventing ethnic and religious conflict, and maintaining stability in a highly diverse society. At the same time, political reform is closely linked to the country’s longer-term socioeconomic modernization, with greater participation, institutional responsiveness, and social development treated as mutually reinforcing elements of national progress.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 212 (June 22, 2026)

The architecture of Eurasian connectivity is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation, driven by the systemic destabilization of traditional trade routes. As sanctions and geopolitical risks render the Northern and Southern corridors increasingly unreliable, the Middle Corridor is probably evolving from a supplementary diversification tool into an indispensable land artery linking the markets of the East and West. Furthermore, the potential integration of the Middle Corridor with the Indo-Israeli “Spice Route” creates a new “Eurasian arc of connectivity”. In this framework, Israel can emerge as a vital technological hub and “intellectual integrator,” bridging regional logistics through innovation. This analysis explores how these intersecting interests can forge a resilient, multilateral network of interchangeable nodes, where the stability of transit states becomes the cornerstone of Eurasian and global economic security.

The Collapse of Traditional Eurasian Connectivity: Implications for China, the U.S., and the EU.

For decades, the architecture of Eurasian logistics within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has leaned primarily on the Northern (via the Russian Federation) and Southern (via Iran) land routes. During this period, the Middle Corridor was largely perceived by China as merely a supplementary diversification tool, essential only for safeguarding primary arteries. However, the current geopolitical landscape, defined by sanctions pressure on Russia and the heightened risks of military escalation involving Iran, has radically shifted this balance, rendering traditional trajectories critically unreliable for trade between Asia and Europe. From the perspective of Chinese strategists, the development of this route is a pivotal element in overcoming the “Malacca Dilemma”—the PRC’s excessive reliance on maritime routes that are vulnerable in the event of a conflict with the United States in the Indo-Pacific.

For Washington, the Middle Corridor has consistently been regarded as a strategic instrument for reinforcing the sovereignty of Central Asian and South Caucasian states. Under the current administration, this geopolitical objective is increasingly complemented by an economic agenda focused on supply chain resilience and fiscal efficiency. Consequently, Washington is incentivized to ensure the corridor maintains a multilateral character, preventing the emergence of a closed infrastructural system under the exclusive control of Beijing.

The European Union occupies a pivotal position in the emerging Eurasian landscape, navigating a dual-pronged strategy that bridges the geopolitical objectives of the United States and the geo-economic imperatives of China. For Brussels, the Middle Corridor is a strategic necessity, serving both to bolster the sovereignty of Central Asian states and to preserve vital commercial links with Beijing. This dualism allows the EU to align with Washington’s goal of securing infrastructural independence of the states of Central Asia and South Caucasus while simultaneously mirroring China’s interest in ensuring the resilience of global supply chains.

Regional Agency: Kazakhstan and the States of the Transit Arc

Within the emerging architecture of Eurasian connectivity, the nations of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are undergoing a fundamental transformation of their role in the global system. For decades, this region was perceived primarily as a periphery of great powers; today, it is evolving into a network of intersecting nodes where the interests of global actors no longer merely collide but have become functionally dependent on the stability of local states. The Middle Corridor creates conditions in which no major power can fully realize its objectives without considering the interests of transit countries, significantly enhancing their political value and strategic agency.

The common interests of the states along the transit arc lie in strengthening national sovereignty and expanding foreign policy autonomy through deep integration into global supply chains. For these countries such the development of the corridor is not only an economic project but a strategic instrument of multi-vectorism, enabling simultaneous cooperation with the U.S., EU, China, Russia and other nations of the West and the East without falling into exclusive dependence on any single actor. The primary priority for regional actors remains the maximization of cargo flows while maintaining the openness and de-politicization of the route, which transforms infrastructure into a mechanism of protection against destructive great-power confrontation.

The specificity of Kazakhstan as the “central gateway” of the Middle Corridor is defined by its unique geographical position and its capacity to serve as a political mediator. Unlike many other participants, Kazakhstan possesses a critical resource: political trust from all centers of power. Astana, probably, most successfully of all the actors of the region, maintains a multilateral dialogue by developing pragmatic engagement with Washington and Brussels, while simultaneously deepening its partnership with Beijing and preserving traditional relations with Moscow. This allows Kazakhstan to function as a “translator of interests”, understanding the logics of various players and moderating their intersection across the Eurasian space.

Kazakhstan’s strategy regarding the Middle Corridor is anchored in the principle of “complementarity, not substitution” relative to traditional routes. This approach stems from Astana’s established multi-vector foreign policy, which prioritizes constructive engagement with all major Eurasian stakeholders. To prevent the project from becoming a source of systemic friction with Moscow, Astana consistently frames the corridor as a tool for diversification while developing the Caspian Sea as a zone of joint coordination rather than a line of geopolitical rupture. Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), with its common market and industrial coordination, facilitates seamless access for Russian firms to the Kazakh segment of the Middle Corridor, effectively integrating them into the broader regional ecosystem.

By maintaining the balance between different great powers, Astana avoids entanglement in anti-Chinese or anti-Russian coalitions, which would be inherently hazardous for a state positioned as a neutral actor. Instead, Kazakhstan focuses on its role as a systemic mediator working to transform contemporary global conflicts into opportunities for positive-sum regional cooperation and long-term stability. This can potentially turn Kazakhstan’s bet on regional connectivity into the foundation for a new, more resilient transport architecture for all of Central Eurasia.

Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s strategic course is focused on the consistent de-politicization of transport infrastructure. It is critically advantageous for Astana to avoid the use of military or sanctions rhetoric regarding the routes, steadily shifting international focus exclusively toward pragmatic issues of commerce and logistics. This approach allows the country to effectively maintain a balance of interests and prevent the monopolistic dominance of any external player, minimizing the likelihood of political pressure from great powers. In the long term, Kazakhstan strives to transform into an institutional hub for Eurasia, in which Kazakhstan acts not as a passive transit territory, but as one of its key architects and systemic moderators.

Potential Synergy of the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route as an Interest of Israel

The integration of the Middle Corridor and the Indo-Israeli connectivity project, known as the “Spice Route”, or India–Middle East–Europe Corridor, represents an effort to forge a qualitatively new “Eurasian arc of connectivity” linking East Asia, Central Eurasia, and the Mediterranean. Within this architecture, Israel is no longer perceived merely as a terminal destination but is transformed into a strategic crossroads for two of Eurasia’s largest logistical systems.

For Jerusalem, the development of the Middle Corridor carries a profound geopolitical dimension that extends far beyond mere logistics. Israel has a vital interest in strengthening and expanding relations with the neutral and relatively friendly states of the Turkic world that form the backbone of the trans-Caspian route.

This partnership gains particular significance from Kazakhstan’s stated support for the “Abraham Accords”, which could theoretically facilitate their logical expansion into the Central Asian region. Such a rapprochement would foster a fundamentally new international environment in Eurasia friendly to Israel, potentially creating a “belt of stability” stretching from the Caucasus to the borders of China. Strengthening ties with Turkic states along the Middle Corridor provides Israel with necessary strategic depth and allows it to diversify its foreign policy pillars beyond the traditionally conflict-prone Middle Eastern region.

Within the framework of Eurasian connectivity between the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route, Israel increasingly seeks to position itself as a technological hub and a key logistical gateway. The primary value of Israeli participation lies not necessarily in physical transit, but in its role as an “intellectual integrator” of the two corridors. Israeli expertise can address a critical challenge facing both the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route: management fragmentation and high administrative barriers.

Israel’s contribution to these systems could include:

• AI-driven logistics to optimize multimodal routes and reduce transit times;

• Supply chain cybersecurity to protect critical infrastructure from digital threats;

• “Smart Customs” and digital port management systems that integrate Indian, Central Asian, and European platforms into a single  network.

This agenda could be integrated into the future activities of the Negev Forum as a mechanism for the practical implementation of the Abraham Accords.

Potential Synergy between Israel and Kazakhstan: Aligning Two “Bridges” in the Context of the Abraham Accords Development

From a global geographical perspective, Kazakhstan and other countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus can be viewed as a natural northeastern extension of the Spice Route, connecting the Indo-Mediterranean axis with East Asian markets via the Caspian Sea. This creates a situation where Israel, on one side, and the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, on the other, do not compete for transport flows but jointly capitalize on their roles as “interest translators” between various power centers.

The interaction between Israel and Kazakhstan can be built on the principle of mutual complementarity of two “bridge states.” Kazakhstan, along with several other Central Asian and South Caucasian states, can serve as a Central Asian “entry point” for Israeli technology and investment. In turn, Israel can provide Kazakhstan with access to emerging Spice Route networks and the markets of India and the Persian Gulf countries. Due to the complex histories of their peoples, both countries are compelled to conduct sophisticated multi-vector diplomacy and organize complex international business schemes, making them natural partners in designing a new Eurasian architecture.

There is a certain degree of route variability and flexibility in this scheme of cooperation, as connection paths between the two routes can be utilized through Turkey, or bypassing Turkey — via Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. In this instance, the convergence of the two routes enhances transport stability and renders it independent of the complex relations between Israel and the Hellenic states (Greece and Cyprus) on one side, and Turkey on the other.

India, seeking strategic depth in its confrontation with Pakistan and China and therefore, striving for access to Central Eurasia, also acquires a stable bypass route. The latter will remain operational even if:

1. instability in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, the Kabul-Islamabad conflict, and the Indo-Pakistani conflict block India’s access to Central Asia through Afghanistan;

2. conflicts surrounding Iran disrupt the functioning of the North-South Corridor, jointly established by Russia, Iran, and India.

Thus, the emerging Indo-Israeli partnership will receive an additional stimulus. The development of such a model will also benefit the U.S. within the framework of its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The transport alignment of the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route could form a hypothetical model of a unified “Eurasian arc of connectivity.” A key difference between this geo-economic model and classical geopolitics is the transition from a struggle for route control to the creation of a network of interchangeable nodes. Such an arc does not require constant maintenance costs from an external hegemon (e.g., the U.S.), which is important in the context of modern American foreign policy’s drive toward cost minimization, and will be effective simply if its participants adhere to common standards of openness. The stability of this system directly depends on the resilience of key transit states, turning them into vital systemic actors in the global economy.

The main challenge for such a project remains the necessity of decoupling politics from logistics. Furthermore, a significant role could be played by making the project as inclusive as possible, ensuring that economic benefits are distributed among all players, regardless of their geopolitical disagreements.

Conclusion

Potential convergence of the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route may signal a fundamental paradigm shift in the governance of Eurasian trade. In this new landscape, the security of global supply chains would be no longer guaranteed by a single hegemon, but by a resilient network of interchangeable nodes, where the stability of transit states becomes a collective global interest.

The success of this “Eurasian arc of connectivity” rests upon the sophisticated strategic agency of regional actors. Kazakhstan, acting as a systemic mediator and “central gateway,” has demonstrated that a committed multi-vector policy can transform a transit territory into an institutional hub capable of local moderation of great-power interests.

Simultaneously, Israel’s role as an “intellectual integrator” can provide the necessary technological layer — through AI-driven logistics and digital security — to bridge the administrative and physical gaps between the Indo-Mediterranean and Trans-Caspian systems.

Ultimately, the primary challenge remains the consistent de-politicization of logistics. By decoupling trade infrastructure from ideological and military confrontations, the states of the “transit arc” can ensure that economic benefits are distributed across all global players. This  potential architecture offers more than just a logistical bypass; it provides a blueprint for a polycentric Eurasian order where cooperation is driven by pragmatic interdependence and mutual trade benefits.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 203 (May 15, 2026)

For more than two decades, U.S. policy in Central Asia and the Caspian region was closely linked to the military operation in Afghanistan. The region was viewed primarily as a logistical and political periphery of the Afghan campaign: supply routes ran through it, transit agreements were concluded, and counterterrorism cooperation was developed. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 marked not only the military end of the campaign, but also the end of an entire era of U.S. regional policy. The Afghan factor ceased to be the structural element of the American presence in Central Asia. A strategic vacuum emerged: whereas security had previously defined the agenda, after 2021 Washington no longer had an obvious new “anchor” for a systematic policy in the region. Under these circumstances, the key question is as follows: what will become the new driver of U.S. strategy in Central Asia and the Caspian region? In 2026, the United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019–2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity expired. Accordingly, a process is underway to formulate a new U.S. strategy. Below, I analyze the new trends that may form a strategy that has in fact been taking shape under the Trump administration in Central Asia and the Caspian region. Many elements of this new policy were already outlined in the 2019–2025 strategy and in the policy of the previous administration; however, the specific features of the Trump administration’s foreign policy have clearly accelerated the transition to a new model of relations. This model can be described as one based on business transactions and flexible diplomatic formats.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as the key Eurasian players in the Board of Peace

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan played the role of important participants at the inaugural summit of the Board of Peace on February 19, 2026. They were the only representatives of the post-Soviet space (along with Azerbaijan and Armenia). They also represented (together with Azerbaijan) a distinct Eurasian, Turkic and Former Soviet cluster of participants in this organization. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were the only Soviet countries that assumed certain financial, political, and even military commitments during this summit. Kazakhstan agreed to participate in the reconstruction of Gaza, undertook financial commitments, and expressed its readiness to send peacekeepers. Uzbekistan declared its readiness to take part in the construction of housing, hospitals, schools, and kindergartens.

In the context of the evolving relations between the Trump administration and these three countries, this carries strategic significance. The participation of the three states signals their willingness to deepen dialogue with the United States on terms that do not imply military-political confrontation with Russia or China — a matter of fundamental importance for the states of Central Asia. All of them pursue multi-vector foreign policies, seeking to maintain good relations simultaneously with the West, Russia, and China. The active participation of the regional countries in the inaugural summit of the Board of Peace demonstrates their readiness to work with Washington outside traditional multilateral frameworks — such as the UN. The emphasis of U.S. foreign policy under the current administration is shifting toward flexible diplomatic formats, business transactions, and infrastructure deals. The countries of Central Asia and the Caspian region are actively seeking to integrate into this model, adapting their multi-vector diplomacy to it.

The renewed interest of the current U.S. administration in Central Asia

It is important to emphasize that the Board of Peace summit continues and consolidates an already existing trend in U.S. relations with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as two regional leaders of Central Asia.

The most recent U.S.–Central Asia summit in the C5+1 format took place on November 6, 2025, in Washington under the chairmanship of President Donald Trump. It demonstrated a shift toward concrete economic deals. The emphasis was placed on critical minerals, energy, transport infrastructure, and supply chains.

Uzbekistan announced its intention to purchase American goods and services worth approximately $100 billion over the next decade and about $35 billion in the next three years. Kazakhstan presented a package of 29 agreements, including joint investments totaling nearly $17 billion.  At the same time, Kazakhstan announced its support for the Abraham Accords, which creates a favorable political and diplomatic backdrop for economic cooperation with the United States, as well as with Israel as Washington’s key Middle Eastern ally.

In December 2025, Donald Trump invited the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to participate as guests in the G20 summit in Miami in 2026, thereby elevating their international status.

The above-described line of the Trump administration toward flexible diplomacy based on business deals became even more evident during the visit of U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor to Kyrgyzstan and his participation in the B5+1 summit in Bishkek on February 4–5, 2026. “B5+1” is a two-day business forum that brought together representatives of business communities and government bodies from Central Asian countries and the United States. During the forum, discussions focused on the development of agriculture, tourism, the financial and banking sector, transport and logistics, e-commerce and information technology, as well as cooperation in the field of critical minerals.

Gor noted that the “B5+1” forum in Bishkek became a logical continuation of the “C5+1” summit in Washington. He also stated that the United States would strengthen its economic presence in the countries of Central Asia in the coming years. At the same time, the key instrument of engagement will be the private sector. The U.S. government intends to support American businesses operating in the region in order to reduce investment risks. Gor also emphasized the role of TRIPP and the Middle Corridor in enhancing the economic interconnection between the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Will the Middle Corridor Become “Western” Again Rather Than “Chinese” project?

The Middle Corridor (TITR – Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) connects China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe. In recent years, it has gained additional relevance for the countries of Central Asia surrounded by the conflicts in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan and the Middle East. In 2026, in particular, southern trade routes from Central Asia have become constrained due to the crisis surrounding Iran and internal instability in Afghanistan. Consequently, the importance of the Middle Corridor for the functioning of Central Asian economies has increased significantly.

From the perspective of geo-economic competition, it is important to note that although today the Middle Corridor is integrated into China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its institutional roots lie in the supported by the West TRACECA project, launched in the 1990s as a tool to ensure the economic independence of the newly independent states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This fundamental Western interest in the Middle Corridor persists today.

The intensification of U.S. policy in the South Caucasus (including the TRIPP project -Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) and Central Asia under current administration may restore the Western geo-economic dimension of the Middle Corridor and reduce the dominance of the Chinese aspect in the logic of this route. In this sense, the revitalization of the corridor can be seen as a kind of “return” of the Western agenda to Eurasian logistics, with significant geo-economic consequences.

Economic cooperation with the United States within the context of multi-vector foreign policy of Central Asian states

Cooperation with the United States in matters related to transport infrastructure not only serves economic interests but also aligns with the logic of the multi-vector foreign policies pursued by the countries of Central Asia. Through such cooperation, they do not enter into confrontation with China or Russia, while diversifying their foreign partnerships and strengthening their agency in the international arena.

China allows the states of Central Asia to pursue multi-vector foreign policies, provided that China itself remains one of their key vectors. The Middle Corridor — although ideologically and strategically not entirely favorable for Beijing — has significant practical economic importance for the Belt and Road project, particularly at a time when the war between Russia and Ukraine negatively affects the Northern Corridor, and the crisis surrounding Iran constrains the Southern route. Beijing would compete with Washington in Central Asia using geoeconomic instruments, which would be useful for the countries of the region.

Russia has traditionally viewed the Middle Corridor negatively, proposing the Northern route as an alternative. However, in the context of the war with Ukraine and the crisis in its relations with Europe, Russia cannot guarantee the uninterrupted functioning of the Northern route as a viable alternative for Central Asian economies. Moreover, Russia has traditionally anchored its position in Central Asia through military and security-based instruments, whereas China has projected its influence predominantly through economic penetration, infrastructure investment, and trade integration. Consequently, U.S. transaction-based engagement in the region increasingly places Washington in direct geoeconomic competition with China, not with Russia — not only over the development of the Middle Corridor, but also over the long-term configuration of Central Asia’s economic architecture.

Iran has historically taken the most negative stance toward any idea of transit across the Caspian Sea. This project competes with the North–South Corridor via Iran and also contributes to the distancing of the northern Eurasian neighbors from Iran. In the past Iran even attempted to block the division of the sea into national sectors for this purpose. However, under the current conditions of military crisis surrounding Iran, it will not be able to exert significant pressure on the countries of Central Asia. So, the degree of Iranian influence in Central Asia is much less than the influence of China or Russia. Therefore, Central Asian elites may afford serious disagreements with Iranian policy concerning cooperation with USA and Israel.

Conclusion. From a military logic to a logic of geoeconomic influence

If the Afghan era defined the nature of the American presence in Central Asia through security and military instruments, the geoeconomic model emerging under the current administration places strong emphasis on infrastructure, transit, resources, and flexible diplomacy. Formally embedding these three pillars in an articulated U.S. regional strategy would send a clear message to the Central Asian states that American engagement is not ad hoc or crisis-driven, but designed as a durable, long-term framework adapted to contemporary geopolitical realities.

The C5+1 summit in Washington on November 6, 2025, demonstrated the consolidation of the economic agenda as central to U.S. strategy. The focus on critical minerals, investment, and infrastructure became the core element of the dialogue. The Board of Peace (2025) further strengthened the trend toward flexible diplomatic engagement with the countries of the region.

For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states, it is fundamentally important today that engagement with the United States not be perceived as an anti-Russian or anti-Chinese geopolitical project. The geo-economic logic of cooperation with the United States and flexible engagement formats enables them to maintain balance within the framework of their multi-vector foreign policies. Thus, the demand of Central Asian states has aligned successfully with the new foreign policy emphases advanced by the Trump administration. The softer geoeconomic approach it proposes — compared to the period of the Afghan campaign — is the only politically acceptable format for the countries of Central Asia today.

At the same time, this policy allows for minimizing costs to American taxpayers while maximizing commercial benefits for U.S. investors. Moreover, it enables the United States to address many strategic objectives in a “containment-light” style. Washington is beginning to operate in Central Asia not through direct geostrategic containment of China, Iran, and Russia, as before, but through regionalization, trade, and infrastructure integration. At the same time, it is precisely in Central Asia and the Caspian region that Washington now has a realistic opportunity to engage China on symmetrical terms — through geoeconomic instruments capable of competing with Beijing’s model of outward economic expansion.

Paradoxically, despite the deep ideological differences between the Trump administration on the one hand and the overwhelming majority of European political elites on the other, the administration’s political style in several respects resembles European approaches to Central Asia. The European Union and individual European states operating in the region similarly prioritize pragmatic economic cooperation while avoiding large-scale geopolitical initiatives that could carry significant risks of conflict. That said, unlike the Trump administration, European policy in Central Asia also incorporates support for civil society and the promotion of European values.

For Israel, the Trump administration’s shift in Central Asia toward business-oriented initiatives and transactional diplomacy may prove broadly advantageous. Israel itself has pursued a comparable approach in the region. At present, Central Asian states are actively seeking to expand economic and diplomatic engagement with Israel. In this context, the administration’s operational style in the region can be seen as largely compatible with Israeli approaches.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 194 (April 4th, 2026)

Part 1

Epic Fury in the Social Networks: Anti-Israeli and Anti-American Discourses

In the situation described above, a wide range of anti-Israeli and anti-American stereotypes have spread widely across social media. Numerous videos portraying the alleged “successes” of Iranian strikes against Israel and American forces have circulated widely, particularly in the Tajik-language online environment. More broadly, Iranian propaganda describing supposedly massive losses suffered by the United States and Israel tends to resonate with certain groups within the Central Asian segment of the internet, especially since it is often amplified by channels associated with Islamic fundamentalism or with Russian media networks. At the same time, it should be noted that a significant number of Russian propagandists, who are well-known in Central Asia, have publicly distanced themselves from Iran and emphasize that the war is economically advantageous for Moscow.
Various conspiracy theories have also spread widely in the region and across the broader post-Soviet space. For example, many users claim that the Pakistani airstrikes against Afghanistan were in fact orchestrated by the United States and/or Israel. This interpretation has been particularly widespread in Russia but it has also gained traction in Central Asia.

Many mythologized conspiracy narratives have entered the Central Asian information space through Western media and social networks. In particular, discussions of the current war frequently refer to the so-called “Epstein files.” Several versions of this interpretation circulate online. One of them has an anti-Trump orientation and claims that the war is being used to distract public attention, in a manner reminiscent of the plot of the film Wag the Dog. Another version takes an anti-Israeli form, asserting that Israel allegedly controls American politics through such mechanisms — a narrative that structurally reproduces older conspiracy tropes associated with the infamous forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

In some comments, even broader generalizations appear that question the democratic character of the political systems of the United States and Israel. Within such conspiratorial interpretations, these states are portrayed as being controlled by corrupt elites acting in the interests of hidden backstage forces. Such arguments reproduce a typical narrative found in conspiracy discourse about the “secret governance” of political processes.

Critical assessments also frequently appear in the comments, reproducing arguments common in a number of Western media outlets, where the legality of military action against Iran is questioned from the standpoint of international law. Discussions also often include criticism of the Arab Gulf states that is typical of Islamist and more radical anti-Western narratives. For example, one commenter writes:

“They are direct accomplices in an act of aggression against a sovereign state. Iran repeatedly issued official warnings to all the countries where these traitors, lackeys of the USA (written in the original in lowercase), have allowed American military bases to be deployed. Such is the fate of such piglets — Tabaki jackals (a reference to Rudyard Kipling’s The Jungle book). This is the natural right of a defending state according to the norms of international law. A country that hosts the aggressor’s military bases — from which strikes are launched, and where command centers, communications systems, surveillance equipment, radars, air defense systems, etc. are located — automatically becomes an accomplice to aggression, and therefore military facilities located in those countries become legitimate targets”.

Such arguments reproduce a widely circulated claim found in a number of anti-Western political narratives — that states allowing the deployment of U.S. military bases on their territory automatically become parties to armed conflicts involving the United States.

It is also noteworthy that the comment uses expressions such as “piglets” (podsvinki in Russian) and “Tabaki”. These metaphors are less characteristic of Middle Eastern propaganda rhetoric than of the Russian information space, where similar language has been used in political polemics, including in public discourse—albeit usually in reference to conflicts in Eastern Europe. From Eastern Europe also comes the insulting practice of writing the names of rival states with lowercase letters, e.g. usa instead of USA.

Finally, one can encounter arguments framed in the spirit of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. For example, some users claim that “the conflict is acquiring civilizational dimensions and Pakistan should threaten to transfer nuclear weapons to Iran in order to force the United States and Israel to stop the war”.  This reflects the well-known notion circulating in the global information space about a common “Islamic nuclear bomb”.

Three Sources and Three Components of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in Central Asian Social Media

The examples discussed above illustrate that it is possible to distinguish three groups in Central Asia that express anti-Israeli and anti-American attitudes and that originate from fundamentally different external sources of influence. At the same time, these three informational influences often intersect and closely interact with one another.

These are: Islamist-fundamentalist discourse, Western left-radical discourse, and a Russian-language anti-Western discourse (which in some cases also carries anti-Semitic undertones).

Islamist-Fundamentalist Discourse. The first source of anti-American and anti-Israeli attitudes is connected with religious-political and Islamist narratives that circulate through Islamic media outlets, preaching networks, and social platforms. These narratives are frequently built around themes of solidarity within the Muslim world, support for Palestine, and criticism of Western intervention in the Middle East.

Studies of media discourse show that in Islamically oriented media, the Palestinian question is often interpreted through a religious and civilizational lens, which strengthens emotional mobilization among audiences and helps form durable political interpretations of the conflict.

Such narratives spread not only through traditional media but also through social networks and messaging platforms, which have become key channels for the circulation of politically and religiously framed information about conflicts in the Middle East. Research on digital communication shows that these platforms play an important role in forming transnational networks that support and disseminate political interpretations of international conflicts.

At the same time, within Central Asia the sources of such influence differ from country to country. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, these ideas tend to spread primarily through Arab and, especially, Turkish media, as well as through religious organizations and transnational Islamic online platforms. Erdogan-era Turkish political-Islamic media, for example, actively shape discourse around the Palestinian question, presenting it as a central element of broader political and religious solidarity within the Muslim world.

In Tajikistan, by contrast, Iranian informational and even direct political influence may be more visible due to linguistic and cultural proximity. This includes media platforms and cultural initiatives aimed at Persian-speaking audiences. In such cases, political and religious narratives spread through Persian-language information channels and religious networks, which distinguishes Tajikistan’s information environment from that of other Central Asian countries.

Western Pro-Iranian Discourse. A second source of such ideas is a Western pro-Iranian discourse that spreads through international activist networks, English-language social media, and global online platforms. This discourse takes different forms — here we focus primarily on its more radical interpretations, which draw on the concepts of anti-imperialism. In its most radical form, which also influences some anti-Western interpretations in Central Asia, these approaches portray Middle Eastern conflicts involving Iran as part of a broader struggle against “colonial” and “neo-colonial” structures of global power. Such arguments largely echo the official rhetoric of Iranian propaganda. According to some experts, the spread of this discourse is supported by covert Chinese financial backing.

These ideas circulate actively in English-language social media and are often absorbed by part of the younger audience in Central Asian countries, particularly among users oriented toward Western educational and cultural environments.

Russian Anti-Western Discourse. Another important source of the anti-Western narratives discussed above is the Russian information space, which continues to play a significant role in media consumption across Central Asia.

A large share of the region’s population regularly receives news and analytical commentary from Russian television channels, online outlets, and social media platforms. Within this discourse, the United States and Israel are frequently portrayed as key actors of the “collective West,” pursuing an aggressive foreign policy and seeking to preserve global hegemony. Consequently, international crises are often interpreted as the result of Western actions, while their opponents, Iran in this case, are presented as victims or participants in defensive struggles.

Such interpretations are actively disseminated through Russian-language media and the blogosphere and are easily transmitted into local debates in Central Asian societies. Despite the broad presence of Russian media in the region, however, I would rank Russian sources only third in terms of their influence on the formation of anti-Western and anti-Israeli discourse in Central Asia. Among Russian commentators, not only pro-Iranian positions are widespread but also a more moderate alternative perspective articulated by the press secretary of President Putin, Dmitry Peskov: “The war that is taking place is not our war… We must minimize the consequences of global upheavals for our economy and extract benefits where possible…”

The Intersection of Discourses. In the information space of Central Asian countries, where different informational influences intersect, these three types of narratives frequently overlap in practice. In the digital environment, users often reproduce arguments originating from different informational ecosystems simultaneously — for example, combining anti-Western interpretations from Russian media with rhetoric of Islamic solidarity and left-radical critiques of imperialism.

As a result, a hybrid information space is emerging in Central Asia in which ideas that originate in different geopolitical and ideological contexts mix together and are adapted to local political and cultural conditions.

Conclusion

The reaction of Central Asian states to the 2026 war between the United States, Israel, and Iran demonstrates a clear contrast between official diplomacy and the dynamics of public discourse. Governments across the region have adopted cautious neutrality, driven primarily by economic vulnerability, geopolitical constraints, and the long-standing tradition of multi-vector foreign policy. For Central Asian elites, maintaining balanced relations simultaneously with Russia, China, the West, and the Middle East remains a central strategic priority.

At the societal level, however, the situation is far more complex. Social media discussions reveal a fragmented public sphere in which different ideological, cultural, and geopolitical influences compete. Sympathy toward Iran is stronger in regions where Islamic identity or Persian cultural connections are more prominent, particularly in Tajikistan and parts of the Ferghana Valley, while societies shaped more strongly by the legacy of Eurasian nomadic culture tend to display weaker pro-Iranian sentiment. In most cases, however, these differences do not translate into open political confrontation between elites and society, unlike the deeper “elite–street” divide observed in parts of the Arab world.

The analysis also demonstrates that anti-Israeli and anti-American narratives circulating in Central Asian social media originate from three overlapping external information ecosystems: Islamist-fundamentalist discourse, Western radical pro-Iranian discourse, and Russian-language anti-Western (and sometimes simultaneously anti-Semitic) media narratives. Although these discourses differ in origin and ideological foundations, they frequently merge within the digital environment, producing hybrid interpretations of international conflicts. This fusion creates an informational landscape in which religious solidarity, geopolitical resentment, and conspiracy narratives reinforce one another.

Despite this active online environment, the political consequences of these narratives remain limited for now. In most Central Asian countries, strict state control over public demonstrations prevents the transformation of online discourse into mass political mobilization. Nevertheless, the continued spread of anti-Western narratives, especially when combined with Islamist ideological frameworks, carries potential long-term risks for regional security.

Overall, Central Asia’s response to the war reflects the region’s broader geopolitical condition: political neutrality at the level of states, but cultural and political pluralism — and sometimes polarization — within society. As global conflicts increasingly unfold in digital spaces, the interaction between external propaganda networks and local cultural contexts will likely play an increasingly important role in shaping political perceptions across the region.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 190 (March 17, 2026)

1. Official Position: Concerns and Neutrality

The military operation launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026 may create serious economic challenges for the countries of Central Asia, particularly in the sphere of transportation. The war has significantly disrupted the functioning of two key transport corridors: the International North–South Transport Corridor (Russia – Caspian sea – Iran – India) and the southern branch of the Eurasian East–West transport corridor passing through Iran. This is unfolding against the backdrop of ongoing hostilities in the Black Sea region, which have already had a negative impact on transport routes linking the region with Europe.

Shortly before that, on February 21–22, 2026, the long-simmering conflict between Kabul and Islamabad sharply escalated. This armed confrontation may effectively block the Central Asia-Afghanistan–Pakistan–India transport routes. The hostilities in Iran may also exacerbate instability in Afghanistan due to the close economic ties between the two countries. As a result, the countries of Central Asia may either be forced to increase their involvement in addressing Afghanistan’s internal problems or face growing instability along the Tajik–Afghan and Turkmen–Afghan borders.

If hostilities were to spread to Azerbaijan (a possibility suggested by the Iranian drone strike on Nakhichevan) all international transport routes of Central Asian states could effectively be reduced to the Chinese corridor.

Across the region, there are widespread concerns that the war, and especially the potential collapse of the Iranian regime, could push the Greater Middle East (and subsequently Central Asia) into a period of geopolitical turbulence and uncertainty. Similar references to “turbulence” in the region are also widely found in the Russian press. Among the specific risks mentioned by the Central Asian experts are the possible inflow of refugees from Iran and other Middle Eastern countries into Central Asia.

At the same time, rising oil prices have had a positive impact on Kazakhstan’s economy, partly due to the shortage of oil supplies to China that previously came from the Persian Gulf. A similar dynamic may also benefit Turkmenistan to some extent. For the other countries of the region, however, rising oil prices pose significant economic risks.

Under these circumstances, the states of the region have generally adopted a neutral stance. Such a position allows them greater flexibility in managing the risks outlined above. At the same time, it broadly corresponds to the tradition of the multi-vector foreign policy that has long characterized Central Asian diplomacy.

Kazakhstan has taken a formally neutral but in practice cautiously formulated position that leans toward the Arab Gulf states. Astana has called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict but in its official statements has emphasized the security concerns of the Gulf monarchies and expressed solidarity with their leaders, while simultaneously seeking to maintain good relations with the United States and Israel. President Tokayev sent messages of support to the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan and held phone conversations with several of them, including the Emir of Qatar and the President of the UAE. At the same time, Astana expressed condolences to Iran over civilian casualties and called for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict but did not issue a separate presidential condolence message regarding the death of Ayatollah Khamenei.

Kyrgyzstan has effectively distanced itself from the conflict, limiting its response to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing serious concern over the escalation, calling for restraint, and urging a peaceful settlement in accordance with international law.

Uzbekistan has likewise called for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev sent condolences to Iran over the death of Ayatollah Khamenei but did so in cautious terms, avoiding criticism of either the United States or Israel.

Tajikistan, which maintains the closest cultural and political ties with Iran in the region, also expressed concern over the escalation and called for an end to hostilities and a peaceful settlement. At the same time, President Emomali Rahmon was the first leader in the region to send an official telegram of condolences to the Iranian leadership and people following the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, emphasizing solidarity with the “friendly and brotherly” people of Iran. Nevertheless, Dushanbe also avoided direct criticism of the United States or Israel, seeking to maintain the balance characteristic of its multi-vector foreign policy.

Turkmenistan, following its long-standing policy of neutrality, responded in the usual restrained manner. Ashgabat described the escalation of the conflict as “regrettable” and called for a diplomatic resolution. 

2. Divided Societies: Regional Patterns in Public Perceptions of Iran and Its Opponents

An analysis of discussions on social media suggests that although Central Asian societies (like their political elites) generally prefer to maintain neutrality, in some cases one can observe something resembling the gap between elites and “the street” known from the Arab world in attitudes toward the United States and Israel. However, the scale of this divide remains far smaller than what is observed in the Middle East.

The depth of this division also varies significantly across the region due to Central Asia’s cultural heterogeneity. One can distinguish between the classical historical Turan — an Eurasian nomadic civilization encompassing most of Kazakhstan, northern Kyrgyzstan, and much of Turkmenistan — and regions shaped by a mixture of historical Turan and historical Iran, namely the sedentary agricultural areas that today largely belong to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Accordingly, public sympathy toward Iran tends to increase significantly in areas where the influence of fundamentalist Islam is strong (notably in the Uzbek-controlled part of the Ferghana Valley) and in regions where cultural, linguistic, and political-economic ties with Iran are particularly close (especially in Tajikistan). By contrast, in the countries of what may be called classical Turan — where the legacy of Eurasian nomadic culture remains strong and the social role of Islam is somewhat less pronounced (partly in Turkmenistan and especially in northern and central Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyzstan) — sympathy toward Iran is noticeably weaker. Consequently, the gap between elite positions and public opinion is also smaller in these areas.

This societal divide, together with the presence of certain pro-Iranian sympathies within the public sphere, acts as a constraint on Central Asian elites when it comes to cooperation with the United States and Israel. This situation is similar to the Arab nations.

These internal cultural and religious considerations operate alongside geopolitical constraints stemming from the need to maintain good relations with China and Russia. Given the regional cultural patterns described above, Kazakhstan’s leadership faces the least domestic pressure in terms of religiously motivated public sympathy toward Iran. At the same time, however, Kazakhstan is subject to a certain degree of Chinese influence and very substantial informational and cultural influence from Russia. Since both of these states support Iran, their positions inevitably shape public opinion within Kazakhstan as well. A similar combination of Chinese and Russian influence can also be observed in Kyrgyzstan.

Another important factor is the degree of state control over public expression. As early as the summer of 2025, the Uzbek authorities called on the population to exercise caution when commenting on the Iran–Israel conflict in order to prevent radicalization and potential threats to domestic security. As a result, most Uzbek media coverage limited itself to reporting factual developments and practical consequences for Uzbek citizens (for example, those evacuated from Persian Gulf countries). The same is largely true for Turkmenistan, where the authorities generally prohibit political expression on the Internet altogether.

Kazakh society, by contrast, enjoys a comparatively higher degree of freedom to discuss foreign policy issues than other Central Asian societies. For this reason, the relationship between public attitudes toward the war in Iran and broader political and identity-based orientations can be observed particularly clearly in Kazakhstan.

For Kazakhs, as for other Muslim peoples, it is significant that the hostilities coincided with the month of Ramadan. This inevitably heightens emotional reactions among fasting Muslims. At the same time, contemporary Kazakh society is highly pluralistic and characterized by a complex and multi-layered identity.

As noted above, the Kazakh people historically emerged from a Eurasian nomadic civilization that was not originally connected to the Islamized Middle East. Yet Kazakhstan has long been a crossroads of different cultural and religious traditions. As a result, several distinct influences coexist within the country today:

1. the relatively liberal Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence within traditional Sunni Islam, which predominates among Turkic peoples;

2. elements of the liberal-modernizing Jadidist Islamic tradition that spread among Turkic peoples in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries prior to the establishment of the Communist rule, and from which the contemporary liberal current sometimes described as “Euro-Islam” later developed (primarily among Turkic and Balkan Muslims);

3. the influence of conservative Sunni Islamic traditionalism that expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union and is often associated with Saudi Arabia, other Middle Eastern countries, and Pakistan;

4. a composite influence of fundamentalist propaganda originating in the Middle East (Arab countries, Turkey, and Iran), including both Sunni and Shiite components;

5. the legacy of the Soviet anti-religious tradition together with the growing influence of Western culture among younger generations following the economic reforms that began after the dissolution of the USSR.

Accordingly, under the influence of these different factors, very different assessments of the war can be heard both among the general public and among opinion leaders. Many Kazakh nationalists in the Kazakh-language segment of the internet supported the actions of the United States and Israel, a position that has been sharply criticized in the pro-Russian segment of the online space. Supporters of a more generalized form of Islamic fundamentalism that does not emphasize Sunni identity as in other parts of the world tend to express stronger support for Iran. Advocates of closer alignment with the “Global South” and with the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have likewise criticized the military operation against Iran.

Liberal groups that favor a pro-Western orientation, while showing a certain degree of sympathy toward the West and Israel, generally support Kazakhstan’s official policy of neutrality. Many centrist commentators similarly defend and justify the government’s neutral stance.

As a result, when the issue of Islamic solidarity arises — particularly during the month of Ramadan – it is interpreted very differently by various groups within society. For fundamentalists or supporters of the “Global South,” solidarity primarily means solidarity with Iran. For supporters of the official state position, it tends to mean solidarity first and foremost with the Arab Gulf states. For some nationalists or pro-Western groups, it may even take the form of sympathy for the Iranian opposition.

Social media activism can sometimes spill over into street-level activity. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, a pro-Iranian rally is reportedly expected to take place. In Kazakhstan, however, such public mobilization is currently unlikely because events in the Middle East are unfolding against the backdrop of more pressing domestic political developments, most notably a referendum on a new constitution on March 15. In the other Central Asian states, where political regimes are generally less liberal, authorities routinely prohibit uncontrolled public demonstrations. Nevertheless, the spread of anti-Israeli and anti-American narratives on social media, combined with the suppression of street-level protest that might otherwise release some of this pressure, may create potential security risks, including the possibility of terrorist acts by pro-Iranian activists.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 179 (January 22, 2026)

Since gaining independence, the Central Asian states have maintained a position of neutrality toward Israel. Following Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords on 6 November 2025, Israel may find itself presented with an opportunity to significantly expand its diplomatic presence in both Central Asia and the Caspian Basin (after Azerbaijan joined the “Central Asian Five” in 2025, the two spaces may reasonably be viewed as a single international region — a point that will be elaborated below). It is therefore worth examining how Israeli diplomacy has begun to make use of this emerging “window of opportunity” and what potential trajectories might exist for Israel’s foreign policy in this context.

1.  Israel’s diplomatic activity on the Kazakhstan track

On 10 January 2026, at Israel’s initiative, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a telephone conversation with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan. During the exchange, the two leaders reaffirmed the steady and long-term development of bilateral cooperation and discussed further ways to deepen engagement across a broad range of issues on the bilateral agenda. A central subject of discussion was Kazakhstan’s decision in 2025 to join the Abraham Accords. Netanyahu expressed deep appreciation to Tokayev for this decision and underscored its importance for strengthening peace and international dialogue.

Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords makes it the first Central Asian state to join the initiative and extends the geographical scope of the framework beyond the Middle East and North Africa. This significantly enhances Astana’s value for Israel—not only as a partner in bilateral economic projects but also as a key participant in multilateral peace initiatives.

The Netanyahu–Tokayev conversation took place one week before the expected visit of Israel’s foreign minister to Astana. Gideon Sa’ar plans to visit Kazakhstan immediately after his official visit to Azerbaijan on 26 January 2026. The preparation for this visit has been underway since November 2025, when — in the context of Kazakhstan’s decision to join the Abraham Accords — the foreign ministers of the two countries discussed prospects for cooperation in technology, water and agriculture, as well as the establishment of direct air transport links.

Several directions of dialogue can be reasonably anticipated during the visit:

• Discussion of a possible expansion of the political dialogue in the context of the expanding Abraham Accords. Such political dialogue corresponds well to Kazakhstan’s traditional multi-vector foreign policy, aimed at maintaining balanced and mutually beneficial relations with both Western and Eastern partners.

• Discussion of regional security issues in light of multiple ongoing conflicts worldwide, including in the Middle East. The conflict surrounding Iran has become particularly salient, given the possible reaction of the United States and Israel to the violent suppression of mass protests by the Iranian authorities (as well as Iran’s previous pursuit of a nuclear program and its “hybrid” confrontation with Israel and the United States in the Middle East). For Kazakhstan, it is of fundamental importance to minimize the negative spillover effects of existing conflicts — including the potential outbreak of a new war in Iran — on Central Asia.

• Further development of cooperation in energy, technology, and agriculture. This dimension is critical in the context of Kazakhstan’s current economic modernization agenda. Technologies related to artificial intelligence are of particular interest, as emphasized in Tokayev’s 2025 Presidential address to the nation. Israel holds substantial expertise in this field.

2.     Strengthening traditional ties with Azerbaijan

The forthcoming expansion of the Israeli–Kazakh dialogue will unfold against the background of the further consolidation of the Israeli–Azerbaijani partnership. As noted above, Sa’ar plans to visit Azerbaijan on 26 January 2026 for a one-day official visit prior to traveling on to Kazakhstan.

Information on the preparation of this visit had already begun to circulate in late 2025. The focus was on deepening bilateral cooperation in the fields of economics and security in connection with broader discussions on peace and stability in the Middle East and the South Caucasus — including Trump’s mediation on the Zangezur question, the situation in Gaza, and issues related to Iran.

Azerbaijan is of strategic importance to Israel at present for several reasons:

• The country maintains a long-standing structural conflict with Iran. Estimates suggest that between 6–7 million and up to 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis reside in Iran’s northwestern provinces — a range that is itself indicative of the opacity surrounding demographic data in the Islamic Republic. By contrast, the population of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan is roughly 10 million, making neighboring Azerbaijan a natural point of attraction for Iranian Azerbaijanis. During the 20th century, the USSR even sought to detach Southern Azerbaijan from Iran, although the effort ultimately failed due to firm resistance from the United States. Beyond the issue of Azerbaijani self-determination, Tehran and Baku have also experienced other disputes, including over the delimitation of the Caspian Sea. Added to this were longstanding ideological frictions between Azerbaijan’s secular post-Soviet regime under the Aliyev family and Iran’s fundamentalist religious leadership. In the event of a territorial fragmentation of Iran as a result of revolutionary upheaval, Azerbaijan — alongside Kurdish autonomous entities in Iraq and Syria and the Baloch movements in Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan — could play a highly consequential role.

• Israel has become a key supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan. Between 2016 and 2020, Israel accounted for roughly 69% of Azerbaijan’s arms imports. Deliveries included drones (such as the Searcher and Heron platforms), air-defense and missile-defense systems, as well as simulators, personnel training, and technical support. Baku has not hesitated to signal its strategic partnership with Israel to Iran, treating this as an element of deterrence. In recent years, open-source reporting has frequently pointed to a broader security relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan, including alleged intelligence cooperation. Officially, however, Azerbaijan maintains a position of neutrality vis-à-vis Iran.

• Azerbaijan occupies a unique position in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Basin as a transit corridor for the Central Asian states — and even for parts of East Asia — bypassing both Iran and Russia. The transit architecture has a major energy component, which has become especially relevant for Central Asian exporters after the Black Sea route became increasingly risky for hydrocarbon shipments due to the Russia–Ukraine conflict. This was particularly evident in 2025–2026 amid attacks on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium carrying Kazakh oil to the Russian port of Novorossiysk. As a result, Kazakhstan accelerated its reorientation toward Azerbaijani infrastructure. The long-standing idea of exporting Turkmen gas to Europe via Azerbaijan also remains on the table. Such projects could play a significant role in mitigating Europe’s ongoing energy crisis.

• After its victory in the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan’s regional role in the South Caucasus increased substantially — to the point where assessments began to describe Baku as a potential new regional hegemon. In 2025, Baku entered into a rather sharp confrontation with Russia, which also claims hegemonic status in the South Caucasus. At the same time, under Trump’s mediation, new prospects emerged for resolving the decades-long Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict, while Prime Minister Pashinyan intensified Armenia’s shift away from reliance on Russia and Iran.

• Finally, recent years have witnessed an expansion of economic cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan, particularly in technology, energy, and tourism. Sa’ar has emphasized, for example, that the flow of tourists from Israel to Azerbaijan increased sharply in 2025, and that sustaining this trend is considered a priority.
  

3.   Israeli diplomatic activity in the context of the regional system of international relations in Central Asia and the Caspian Basin

Let’s analyze Israel’s relations with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in a broader diplomatic context. It is clear that the degree of proximity between Israel and these two states is not the same. With Azerbaijan, Israel has developed close military, strategic, intelligence, and economic ties. With Kazakhstan, the relationship remains a form of “soft cooperation,” centered on multilateral diplomacy and economic engagement. Cooperation with Azerbaijan gives Israel an avenue for deeper participation in Caspian projects and for expanding its soft economic presence in Central Asia. At the same time, Kazakhstan — as the most economically developed country in the region and the source of more than half of Central Asia’s GDP — may serve as a key intermediary target for such gradual penetration. Israel and Kazakhstan have significant room for developing their economic partnership. Moreover, the evolution of this partnership may function as a positive precedent for other Central Asian states, all of which maintain normal diplomatic relations with Israel.

For Israel itself, such an opening would represent the next step in expanding diplomatic contacts across the Islamic world, following the recent recognition of Somaliland.

How might the deepening of Israeli–Azerbaijani and Israeli–Kazakh cooperation be perceived by the principal actors in the region?

From Washington’s perspective (because of US-Israel strategic partnership), the emerging configuration could serve as one of the mechanisms for compensating the deficit of U.S. influence in Eurasia that resulted from the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. Without such a compensatory strategy, it will be difficult for the United States to address a number of broader strategic challenges associated with its confrontation with China, Iran, and Russia simultaneously. For the United Kingdom and the European Union, the logic would be broadly similar, and in general they are likely to support any regional initiatives that reinforce Western diplomatic presence and connectivity in Central Asia, especially, in the forms of “soft power”.

Turkey’s position is more nuanced. In principle, Ankara has grown accustomed to the strategic alignment between Azerbaijan and Israel, as well as to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. For that reason, Turkey is unlikely to obstruct such cooperation directly. Moreover, Turkey has historically shown an ability to treat the foreign relations of other Turkic states as an additional diplomatic resource. A notable example is Kazakhstan’s role in facilitating the reduction of tensions between Turkey and Russia during the Syrian crisis through the “Astana Process”. However, given the current depth of Turkish–Israeli disagreements, President Erdoğan is not inclined to welcome a visible rapprochement between Israel and the Turkic world. The most realistic scenario is a policy of pragmatic tolerance: Ankara will neither endorse nor hinder such cooperation, while preserving room for maneuver and seeking to ensure that it does not alter the balance of influence within the Turkic political space.

For Russia, Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel — as well as Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy — are no longer surprising. While the situation is strategically disadvantageous for Moscow, it is unlikely to trigger a harsh response in the short term. Two factors explain this restraint. First, the Kremlin is currently preoccupied with its confrontation with Ukraine and the European Union and is therefore willing to engage in various forms of “geopolitical trade-offs”, as illustrated, for example, by its behavior in the Syrian theater. At this stage, Israel and the United States are seen as a lesser strategic challenge compared to the EU–Ukraine axis. Second, this posture is also shaped by the ideological profile of the current Russian leadership. With its pronounced ultra-conservative worldview, the Kremlin perceives figures such as Trump and Netanyahu — representatives of the Western right — as ideologically more proximate than the more left-liberal leadership in Europe.

China’s strategic focus in the region remains economic expansion. Beijing grants the Central Asian states a relatively wide margin of autonomy, particularly regarding multi-vector and pragmatically oriented external partnerships, as long as the Chinese vector remains among the central pillars of their foreign policies. If cooperation with other external actors contributes to the development of projects that align with China’s own interests — such as the trans-Caspian connectivity corridor — Beijing tends to view such engagement calmly, even if it simultaneously benefits Western actors.

The state most predisposed to react sharply to the expansion of Israeli influence near its northern borders is Iran. Baku’s foreign policy is perceived in Tehran as a direct strategic risk. The extension of the Abraham Accords beyond the Middle East has also generated significant irritation in Iran, as it undermines Tehran’s efforts to forge a unified “Global South” front against Israel and the United States. However, for the moment, Iran is deeply absorbed by its own internal challenges, including ongoing revolutionary upheavals and the severe weakening of its “Axis of Resistance” in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon and Syria. As a result, Tehran is unlikely to take meaningful action on this front in the near term.

Moreover, Kazakhstan has pursued a balanced diplomacy and complemented its multi-vector approach with gestures towards Iran. Notably, on 10–11 December 2025, President Masoud Pezeshkian paid an official visit to Astana, during which the sides discussed the expansion of regional cooperation in transportation and energy.

The Turkic states of Central Asia — and Uzbekistan in particular, as the region’s second political and economic center after Kazakhstan — are likely to take a cautiously positive view of the deepening partnership between their neighbors and Israel. In this context, Kazakhstan’s policy could become a useful precedent. Should Astana’s cautious engagement with Israel prove beneficial and unfold without major costs — including reputational ones — other Central Asian states may eventually line up to explore cooperation with Israel in a similar manner and within comparable formats.

4.   Most positive scenario: establishing a permanent consultative format between Israel, the Central Asian states, and Azerbaijan

If the scenario described above materializes, the question arises as to where Israel’s diplomacy could move next in its relations with the Central Asian region. One plausible direction would be for Israel to adopt, at a later stage, a version of the “Central Asia 5+1” mechanism currently independently employed by the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and India.

The defining characteristics of these formats are well known: they are non-institutional, do not impose binding bloc-type obligations, focus on concrete pragmatic projects, and remain largely depoliticized and demilitarized. In other words, they are optimally tailored to the multi-vector foreign policies pursued in different degrees by the Central Asian states.

The “core” regional format independent of external actors remains the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, often referred to as the “Central Asian Five.” A significant development in 2025—largely overlooked outside the post-Soviet space—was the expansion of this format from a five-party to a six-party framework. At the Consultative Meeting held in Tashkent in November 2025, Azerbaijan officially joined the format, thereby transforming the informal “Central Asian Five” into a regional “Six”.

In this sense, the traditional 5+1 format is becoming insufficient not only for regional actors but also for external partners. The emerging reality suggests that a 6+1 framework is already more relevant. For Israel, such a configuration would be particularly advantageous, as it simultaneously includes two key states with which Jerusalem has developed strong, sustainable relations: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan also maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. In the latter, Israel even opened a resident embassy in 2023 — an important symbolic and institutional step. None of these states espouse an official ideological anti-Zionism; their relations with Israel are better described as “latent” or “dormant” rather than adversarial. According to the dominant pattern of multivector foreign policies their political and administrative elites approach external partners through a pragmatic lens, focusing primarily on trade, investment, technology, and connectivity.

The most complex bilateral track for Israel is with Tajikistan (the only non-Turkic state of the region), largely due to Iran’s cultural and linguistic proximity and Tehran’s sustained influence in that country. Nevertheless, even Tajikistan maintains formal diplomatic relations with Israel, and Israel is represented in Dushanbe through its embassy in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), accredited concurrently to Tajikistan. Moreover, within its own multi-vector foreign policy, Tajikistan readily engages in multilateral, pragmatic, technically defined initiatives.

Under these conditions, the groundwork could be laid for the establishment of a non-binding diplomatic consultative format between Israel and the “Central Asian Six”, initially at the level of deputy foreign ministers and/or relevant sectoral ministries responsible for specific projects.

It is equally clear that such a format, especially in its initial phase, should remain modest and strictly pragmatic — though, over time, it could be conceptually linked to the broader ecosystem of the Abraham Accords. The platform could serve to facilitate discussions on economic and infrastructure development, agricultural modernization, water-management technologies, and a range of emerging technological fields (including digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence applications).

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 163 (November 10, 2025)

Kazakhstan’s decision to endorse the Abraham Accords declared on 6 November 2025 in connection with Kazakh president Tokayev’s visit to Washington fits neatly within Astana’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy, which seeks to balance the interests of major powers while maintaining the broadest possible network of partnerships. For Astana, supporting an initiative aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and a number of Muslim-majority states aligns with core principles of its external strategy: interfaith dialogue, peaceful coexistence, and a deliberate refusal to operate within rigid bloc politics. The move, however, has a clear pragmatic dimension — and it lies not in relations with Israel, but in relations with the Trump administration. By backing the Accords, Kazakhstan extended a meaningful political gesture toward President Donald Trump, for whom the Accords (and the broader idea of advancing peace in the Middle East) represent a signature foreign-policy achievement. Astana has been searching for credible points of engagement with Washington, and symbolic support for the Trump-backed initiative offered a convenient and low-risk way to build political rapport.

Crucially, this step does not contradict Kazakhstan’s overarching commitment to multi-vector foreign policy. On the contrary, it illustrates the flexibility of that doctrine: Astana remains firmly oriented toward cooperation with Russia, China, Turkey, and the wider Islamic world, yet is simultaneously identifying new ways to strengthen its U.S. track — in this case, through a gesture toward Israel. Kazakh policymakers calculated that endorsing the Abraham Accords would allow them to move closer to Trump without crossing any red lines for Moscow or Beijing, whose relations with Kazakhstan carry far greater strategic weight simply by virtue of geography.

Astana is, in fact, seeking a new framework for relations with Washington compared to earlier decades. In the early 2000s, cooperation centered largely on security, particularly on the fight against terrorism during the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. Once the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, that agenda lost its relevance. Under the Biden administration, the format of engagement was effectively exhausted, and by 2024–2025 the bilateral relationship required new substantive content.

Coordinating geopolitically against Russia or China is not an option for any Central Asian capital — Astana, Tashkent, and others expressly rule out participation in anti-Russian or anti-Chinese initiatives. This leaves only one viable basis for deepening ties between Kazakhstan and the United States: economic cooperation, technology, and investment. These areas do not carry the geopolitical risks that could undermine Kazakhstan’s delicate balancing act.

Yet a purely economic foundation was not enough. Kazakhstan’s geographic distance from the United States and the limited scale of bilateral trade meant that economics alone was unlikely to capture Trump’s attention. A political gesture was needed — and support for the Abraham Accords provided precisely that: a symbolic but strategically calibrated step that could anchor a renewed Kazakh-American dialogue without destabilizing Kazakhstan’s relations with its much closer neighbors.

In this context, Kazakhstan’s endorsement of the Abraham Accords becomes a significant political act. It introduces a symbolic layer into Kazakh-American relations that speaks directly to Donald Trump’s foreign-policy priorities. At the same time, Astana is confident that this gesture will not provoke serious irritation in Moscow or Beijing. Unlike any form of military or geopolitical cooperation with the United States, participation in a framework aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and Muslim-majority states can be interpreted in both capitals as a neutral diplomatic initiative, consistent with Kazakhstan’s established foreign-policy behavior.

Indeed, Kazakhstan has long positioned itself as a state that promotes dialogue and de-escalation. It initiated the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia; it launched the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA); it has invested heavily in global interfaith dialogue; and it has at various moments helped facilitate rapprochement between Russia and Turkey as well as between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Against this background, support for the Abraham Accords appears as another iteration of Kazakhstan’s familiar diplomatic toolkit rather than a departure from its established line.

The country that most strongly opposes to the Abraham Accords is Iran. But for Kazakhstan, this does not constitute a decisive constraint. Astana maintains cautious, functional relations with Tehran, and potential criticism from Iran does not rank among its major foreign-policy risks. This is precisely why the Abraham Accords emerged as an ideal vehicle: they allow Kazakhstan to signal goodwill to the Trump administration without disturbing the regional balance on which its multi-vector strategy depends.

Kazakhstan’s decision was not only politically calibrated but also carefully timed. Astana acted at a moment when the broader international environment allowed for a degree of maneuverability: tensions among major powers had eased slightly, and the diplomatic climate was more forgiving.

A key factor was the Gaza ceasefire of 10 October 2025, brokered with the involvement of the Trump administration. This de-escalation reshaped the context by making Kazakhstan’s support for the Accords appear as a contribution to peace rather than an alignment with one of the parties to the conflict.

A second important element of the broader context was the renewed engagement between the United States and China. The meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping on 30 October 2025 — after which both sides signaled a willingness to pursue a “pragmatic exchange” and reopen working-level communication channels — reduced the likelihood that Beijing would interpret Kazakhstan’s move as a shift toward the American camp. It is worth noting that, from China’s perspective, the economic dimension of Kazakhstan’s recent agreements with the United States is far more consequential. Beijing has repeatedly used its dominance in rare-earth minerals as leverage over Washington, while Kazakhstan has now agreed to expand cooperation with the United States precisely in this strategic sector. By comparison, the Abraham Accords do not touch the core lines of U.S.–China rivalry, which is why Beijing views Kazakhstan’s endorsement of the Accords without particular concern.

A third factor that eased political risks was the meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on 15 August 2025 in Alaska. Although the talks did not produce breakthroughs and, in fact, the two sides have since resumed trading hostile statements and actions, the meeting nonetheless demonstrated a basic willingness to keep communication open, as well as an element of personal rapport between the two leaders. This temporary softening of tone made it less likely that Moscow would read Kazakhstan’s outreach to Washington as a “geopolitical choice.” If anything, given the current dynamics, Moscow may see President Tokayev’s ability to maintain dialogue with multiple actors as a useful asset in its own search for a workable modus vivendi with Trump.

Finally, in this same vein, it is particularly significant that immediately after his visit to the United States, President Tokayev is scheduled to travel to Russia on 12 November 2025. This serves as an explicit signal to Moscow that Kazakhstan remains committed to the strategic character of the bilateral relationship and is not departing from its multi-vector course.

Kazakhstan’s announcement of support for the Abraham Accords was prompted by the C5+1 Summit in Washington (this diplomatic format includes five Central Asian states and USA). A central outcome of Tokayev’s visit to the summit — and one of strategic importance for the U.S. government — was the formal institutionalization of cooperation on critical and rare-earth minerals. Kazakhstan and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on collaboration in the field of strategic raw materials, laying the groundwork for technology exchange, support for processing facilities, American investment in value-added production chains within Kazakhstan, and the integration of the country into “clean” global supply networks for critical minerals.

Other areas of cooperation include logistics, transport, and advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence — the latter being particularly significant in light of the new domestic and economic priorities recently outlined by President Tokayev.

Kazakhstan’s decision to align itself with the Abraham Accords was, above all, a political gesture aimed at strengthening relations with the Trump administration; for Israel, its practical significance remains limited for now. President Tokayev effectively opened a “political door” toward Washington while preserving room to develop cooperation with Israel gradually and carefully, and strictly within areas that pose no geopolitical risks or tensions in Kazakhstan’s relationships with Russia, China, or its partners in the Muslim world.

For precisely this reason, an economic format is the only viable and natural avenue for Astana. Israel is a global leader in water management, agrotechnology, cybersecurity, medicine, and innovations — sectors in which cooperation offers Kazakhstan tangible benefits and fits squarely within its broader strategy of economic modernization. None of this carries the political weight that could upset regional balances, which makes economic engagement both safe and mutually advantageous.

One of the most promising platforms for such cooperation is the Negev Forum, a multilateral mechanism designed to turn the principles of the Abraham Accords into practical, sector-based collaboration.

It brings together working groups on water and food security, energy, logistics, healthcare, education, and interfaith dialogue. Kazakhstan’s participation in selected clusters would allow it to plug into the technological and investment networks of the Middle East and the United States without straying from its characteristically cautious foreign-policy posture. For the southern regions of Kazakhstan, which increasingly face water scarcity, cooperation on Israeli irrigation technologies, precision agriculture, and the management of arid lands would be particularly relevant.

A further avenue is bilateral cooperation with Israel, which Astana can expand independently of the Abraham Accords framework. Here, Kazakhstan has considerable freedom to choose the most pragmatic directions: joint projects in agrotechnology, energy, transport, innovation, and medical technology; educational partnerships; and new forms of IT collaboration. Israeli companies already have experience working in Central Asia, and Kazakhstan is well-positioned to scale up this engagement without taking steps that would be politically sensitive for its neighbors.

Kazakhstan’s support for the Abraham Accords also carries broader international significance. Astana became the first Muslim-majority country to take advantage of the opening created by the Gaza ceasefire to explore future cooperation with Israel. The move aligns with Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy, but it also establishes a new precedent within the Muslim world — particularly within the Turkic sphere.

Turkey’s stance is an important part of the picture. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has pursued an overtly anti-Israeli line in recent years. Yet the Turkic world is far from uniform: Azerbaijan has developed a markedly different model, building a strategic partnership with Israel. Kazakhstan’s endorsement of the Accords falls squarely within this second, more pragmatic trajectory.

By positioning itself in this way, Kazakhstan may serve as a reference point for other post-Soviet Turkic states. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan closely follow shifts in the region’s diplomatic architecture, and Kazakhstan’s ability to cultivate calm and mutually beneficial relations with Israel could lower the political costs for others to explore similar avenues. The step taken by Astana encourages a view of Israel grounded not in ideological or religious confrontation but in economic and technological opportunity.

For Israel, this is a strategically valuable signal. Kazakhstan’s support could mark the beginning of a transformation of the Abraham Accords from a primarily Middle Eastern initiative into a broader platform for cooperation between Israel and Muslim-majority states — one centered on technological development, infrastructure, energy, water management, and interfaith dialogue. In that sense, it offers Israel a chance to lay new foundations for its relations with the Islamic world in the post-war period — a period one hopes will eventually arrive.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 156 (September 29, 2025)

The core element in the foreign policy of post-Soviet countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is so-called multivectoralism: maintaining relations with multiple global actors without binding themselves exclusively to any single one. These states seek to balance ties with the China–Russia axis and the collective West (including the USA and the EU—although it should be noted that the internal fragility of this grouping has never been as evident as it is now). These actors, who claim global influence in the world politics, can be regarded as the first tier of influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. A second, regional tier consists of other regional neighbors, with Turkey (and, to a lesser extent, Iran) being the most prominent actors in this “regional league.”

Amid today’s global uncertainty and high risks, the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia are striving to diversify their foreign policies as much as possible, with the goal of strengthening their autonomy and agency. In Central Eurasia, where these countries are located, there is currently a clear weakening of the Western vector of influence. There are several reasons for that:

• The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the resulting loss of interest in adjacent post-Soviet regions.

• The war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, both of which have diminished the earlier geopolitical relevance of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

• The weakening of the West due to internal political conflicts and the confrontation between the Trump administration and the European political mainstream.

Nevertheless, preserving good relations with the West - and, in many cases, artificially “boosting” this vector of foreign policy despite limited reciprocal interest from the Western side — has become, within the framework of multivectoralism, a strategy of survival for the post-Soviet South. Otherwise, these states risk falling into complete dependence on the China–Russia bloc, which aspires to global influence, as well as on regional powers such as Turkey and Iran.

The above features of foreign policy were clearly visible in the policies of the several key states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in late summer and early autumn 2025. Two distinct diplomatic styles can be identified: a “soft” Central Asian one (most evident in the recent diplomatic moves of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), and a “hard” Caucasian one (best exemplified by the policies of Azerbaijan and Armenia). In both cases, however, there is a clear attempt to rebalance foreign policy so as to reduce dependence on immediate Central Eurasian neighbors by strengthening ties with the West - above all with the United States, as the leader of the Western world.

At the 80th session of the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2025, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev delivered a speech in which he called for reform of the UN (a logical position, given his earlier service as UN Deputy Secretary-General) and for strengthening the global role of the “middle powers.”

Tokayev stressed that middle powers such as Kazakhstan can contribute to global balance by acting as intermediaries between major powers. He also advocated for diplomatic solutions to armed conflicts, including the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East.

Amid the UN General Assembly, on 22 September 2025, Wabtec Corporation (USA) announced the signing of a $4.2 billion contract with Kazakhstan’s national railway company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, for the supply of 300 locomotives and their long-term maintenance. This agreement is considered the largest locomotive supply contract in Wabtec’s history. The contract goes beyond delivering locomotive kits, including servicing, technical support, and likely local assembly. The deal creates about 11,000 jobs in the United States across supply chains, manufacturing, and maintenance. Previously, Kazakhstan had procured locomotives from Russian manufacturers (Transmashholding).

Several analysts have also drawn attention to the strategic dimensions of the deal. Kazakhstan’s leadership is not only creating jobs in the United States -something the Trump administration welcomes — but also strengthening the Trans-Caspian route to Europe, bypassing Russia and Iran. It should be noted that the West has long supported this route for strategic reasons, while China has also traditionally favored it as part of its broader policy of diversifying continental transport corridors and assisting the development of Central Asian and South Caucasus states. Thus, although the move is unwelcome in Moscow and Tehran, it is well received in Brussels and Washington, and cannot be described as directed against Beijing. Overall, it can be seen as a subtle diplomatic maneuver within the framework of Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy. In June 2025, Kazakhstan awarded Russia a major contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant; the new U.S. locomotive contract serves to balance that move.

Russian experts paid even closer attention to the meeting that took place on 23 September 2025 on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York between President Tokayev and President Zelensky of Ukraine. Observers noted that the two leaders conversed in English, rather than Russian. For Tokayev – a career diplomat and polyglot - this was natural and carried little symbolic meaning. For Zelensky, however, the choice was more significant, as he consistently conducts his diplomatic communication either in English or in Ukrainian. During the meeting, Zelensky thanked Kazakhstan for supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Tokayev, in turn, emphasized that a final resolution of the conflict must be achieved through diplomacy. The two leaders also discussed economic and humanitarian cooperation. Afterward, Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan was ready to provide a venue for a meeting between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, should both sides express interest.

Kazakhstan had previously played a similar role in facilitating rapprochement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Russia and Turkey during a flare-up of tensions over Syria. At the same time, in the context of his visit to New York, Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev achieved a significant breakthrough in relations with the Trump administration. Like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan under its second president seeks to strengthen contacts with the West while avoiding rhetoric directly aimed against Russia or China. Unlike his predecessor Islam Karimov, Mirziyoyev generally avoids political framing in such cases, emphasizing instead the economic pragmatism of his actions.

On 23 September 2025 in New York, on the sidelines of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan met with Donald Trump. During the meeting, the two discussed issues of strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and the United States, expansion of economic cooperation, as well as projects in key sectors (aviation, infrastructure, technology). After the meeting, Trump publicly praised Mirziyoyev, calling him a “man of his word” in reference to the fulfillment of agreements.

Before meeting Trump, Mirziyoyev had held talks with representatives of more than 50 American companies and banks, discussing large-scale business deals. During his UN visit, Uzbekistan and Boeing signed a contract for the purchase of up to 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft, valued at more than $8 billion. The initial agreement provides for the delivery of 14 Boeing 787-9 aircraft, with an option for an additional 8 units. The deal is described as the largest of its kind in Central Asia. Deliveries are expected to begin in 2031, with the contract projected to support about 35,000 jobs in the United States.

The foreign policy content of Mirziyoyev’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2025 largely mirrored that of Tokayev’s address. He stressed the need to reform international institutions, especially by strengthening the role of developing countries and reshaping the composition of the UN Security Council to better reflect contemporary challenges. He also noted the growing number of conflicts in today’s world, voiced support for diplomatic efforts to resolve the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East and called for the development of regional transport corridors.

The similarity of the policies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as demonstrated by the September visits of their presidents, became quite clear. In both cases, the countries face growing geopolitical conflicts and global uncertainty, and they seek to strengthen their position through multivector diplomacy—particularly by deepening ties with the U.S. administration. In both cases, diplomacy is pursued through expanding economic cooperation with the United States and promoting transport corridors that enhance economic diversification and reduce dependence on Central Eurasian neighbors.

To strengthen the comparative dimension of the analysis, the diplomatic moves of the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan should be contrasted with the summer actions of the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

On 8 August 2025, a ceremony was held at the White House in Washington, where Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration. Trump acted as mediator, and the project was named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.”

Under the agreements, Armenia granted the American side a 99-year concession for development of the territory. The corridor will function under Armenian law (meaning Armenian jurisdiction remains in place), but the United States will receive exclusive rights to develop infrastructure — roads, railways, energy pipelines, communication lines, and more. The corridor is intended to provide transport connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia (Syunik/Zangezur). This transit corridor is a key element of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, aimed at normalizing communications and opening transport routes. Russia and Iran expressed concern over the agreement, viewing it as an expansion of U.S. influence in the South Caucasus and a potential weakening of Moscow’s and Tehran’s role in the region.

The agreements are important not only as a U.S.-backed solution to the previously tense diplomatic situation around Zangezur, which threatened to trigger a new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also from a geopolitical perspective. They represent a major strategic step in developing the same Middle Corridor via the Caspian Sea that bypasses Russia and Iran — a route which, as shown above, Central Asian countries have been developing in a more diplomatically cautious manner. It is also significant that Trump thereby signaled Washington’s claim to hegemony in the South Caucasus. Other actors who had previously played a key role in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan (for instance, France and Russia) were thus sidelined.

It should be noted that both Azerbaijan and Armenia have entered into open confrontation with Russia. In Azerbaijan’s case, this concerns the conflict over the Azerbaijani civilian airliner damaged over Chechnya on 25 December 2024, resulting in the deaths of most of its passengers, as well as the crisis surrounding the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia. Whereas earlier Azerbaijan, within the framework of its multivector foreign policy, sought to maintain a strategic partnership with Russia, this is now far less of a priority for Baku. Demonstrative elements may also be linked to recent developments in the Middle East: the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria and the rise of Turkey-friendly forces, as well as major Israeli strikes — supported by the United States — against the Iranian “axis of resistance.” These events appear to have led President Ilham Aliyev to conclude that Russia’s and Iran’s influence in the Middle East is weakening. At the same time, in the spirit of multivector diplomacy, Aliyev sought to “balance” his deepening contacts with the United States by making a working visit to China on 30 August 2025, during which he exchanged a handshake and brief conversation with then-present Russian President Putin. Thus, Aliyev is leaving open the option of engaging with the China–Russia axis if necessary.

In Armenia’s case, the issue lies in longstanding tensions between Russia’s leadership and Pashinyan’s government. The unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan had represented the sole obstacle preventing Armenia’s full reorientation toward the West. With Trump’s assistance, that obstacle is now beginning to disappear. Moreover, within Armenia’s multivector foreign policy, Yerevan may now have less need to use Tehran — already weakened by Israeli and U.S. actions — alongside the United States and France as a balancing partner in the security sphere. As a “safety net,” however, Armenia remains a member of the Russia-centered CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union, and it has not severed ties with Tehran completely.

Overall, an analysis of the policies of Armenia and Azerbaijan in late summer and early autumn 2025 reveals clear similarities with the strategies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan discussed above. In all the cases, the focus is on multivector foreign policy, on “boosting” the Western vector through engagement with the Trump administration, on economic diplomacy, and on the crucial role of the Trans-Caspian route. The only difference lies in diplomatic style: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while strengthening the American vector, seek to avoid conflict with other foreign policy vectors (above all Moscow), whereas Azerbaijan and Armenia act much more assertively — though still maintaining elements of a multivector “insurance policy” by preserving a certain level of relations with China, Russia, and, in Armenia’s case, Iran.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 143 (July 20, 2025)

On  July 3rd 2025, Russia officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, becoming the first permanent member of the UN Security Council to do so. The announcement was made by Russia’s Foreign Ministry after it formally accepted the credentials of Taliban-appointed ambassador. The Afghan flag used by the Taliban regime was also raised over the embassy in Moscow—a symbolic step that underscored the shift in Russia’s position from pragmatic engagement to formal recognition.According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, this move reflects “the de facto situation” in Afghanistan and is aimed at establishing a dialogue with the current authorities. Russian officials stressed that the Taliban had consolidated power across the country, which justifies official recognition.

Russia’s official recognition of the Taliban in the summer of 2025 was preceded by a series of gradual steps: since 2022, Moscow maintained diplomatic contacts, allowed the Taliban to manage the Afghan embassy, and included them in a number of cultural and economic forums, including those in Kazan and St. Petersburg. The Taliban appointed an official representative to Moscow in April 2022 and subsequently began to participate regularly in meetings of the “Moscow Format” of consultations on Afghanistan, although their invitations to these events were inconsistent, reflecting internal fluctuations in Russian policy. A notable indicator of these fluctuations was the Taliban’s absence from the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2022 and their exclusion from the “Moscow Format” in October 2022 due to unfulfilled commitments in combating terrorism and in the establishing an inclusive government.

The main obstacle to recognizing the Taliban was Russia’s own counterterrorism legislation. The organization had been designated as a terrorist group since 2003. In December 2024, President Putin signed a law allowing the Supreme Court to remove the Taliban from the list of banned organizations in Russia. In May 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice submitted a formal request to the president to delist the Taliban as a terrorist organization. Due to continued resistance from the security services involved in counterterrorism, the issue remained stalled during inter-agency coordination. It was only on March 31, 2025, that the Prosecutor General’s Office filed a petition with the Supreme Court requesting permission for the Taliban to operate legally in Russia. On April 17, 2025, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation suspended the ban on the Taliban’s activities on Russian territory.

An important motive behind Russia’s recognition of the Taliban was the Kremlin’s hope for cooperation with the group in countering the international terrorist organization ISIS-Khorasan, or ISIS-K (originally a branch of the Islamic State operating in Afghanistan and Central Asia), which has been attempting to expand into the post-Soviet space. In this context, ISIS-K carried out a terrorist attack in March 2024 at the Crocus City Hall near Moscow, resulting in 149 deaths. However, many Russian security experts on Afghan issues — including Andrei Serenko — question both the capability and, more importantly, the willingness of the Taliban to combat ISIS-K effectively (according to him some factions of Taliban are connected to ISIS-K).

Officially, the Russian authorities reject such arguments, but unofficially, these concerns are widespread among the security apparatus, including the military and intelligence services. It should be noted that the Taliban’s reputation as a potential ally in the fight against terrorism is viewed with skepticism in many post-Soviet countries due to the group’s ties to various terrorist organizations from Central Asia (for example, there is evidence of connections between the Taliban and the Tajik terrorist group Ansarullah) and the Caucasus. According to persistent reports circulating among Afghanistan experts, following the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, some militants affiliated with organizations such as the Caucasus Emirate — which had cooperated with ISIS — were relocated to Afghanistan, reportedly with informal assistance from certain Taliban factions)[1].

This has generated skepticism toward the Taliban among some pragmatically minded elements within Russia’s security establishment. Since 2021, such concerns have been actively voiced, particularly within the frameworks of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Ministry of Defense.  However, the Russian Foreign Ministry has consistently maintained the firm belief that genuine counterterrorism cooperation with the Taliban can be achieved. This viewpoint is reinforced by a broader pattern of state propaganda in contemporary Russia, which portrays the modern world in starkly dualistic terms: all threats to Russia are attributed to the secret services of United States and the United Kingdom, and increasingly to Ukrainian intelligence services (in a more conspiratorial version tailored to the Russian far right, Israel is also implicated). For instance, although international bodies—primarily the U.S. government—identified the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack as having been organized by ISIS-K, a group based in Afghanistan, and executed by ethnic Tajiks, the Russian government officially blamed Ukraine. Thus, Moscow appears to prioritize geopolitical and security calculations, particularly its desire to counter U.S. and NATO influence in Central and South Asia and to deepen its alignment with authoritarian regimes such as Iran and China.

From Israel’s perspective, the primary short-term concern arising from Russia’s policy toward the Taliban stems from the fact that ISIS-K’s likely priority targets in post-Soviet states — and in Russia in particular — may include locations associated with ethnic Jewish communities. Notably, the mentioned bloody terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall near Moscow was preceded by an attempted attack by ISIS-K on a synagogue in the city. This attempted attack was foiled, possibly due to intelligence provided to Russian authorities by Western security services.

Geopolitical aspects of the recognition potentially are even more important for Israel. Russia’s recognition comes amid broader attempts to project influence in Afghanistan through regional forums such as the “Moscow Format” talks, which have included China, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asian states.

Russia’s recognition of the Taliban should not be viewed in isolation but rather as part of a broader strategic effort to construct an alternative axis of states, united not only by shared interests but also by a common ideological rejection of the Western liberal order. In the Russian strategic imagination, this axis takes the form of a notional “authoritarian international,” comprising states such as:

• China – regarded as the leading power of an alternative bloc opposed to the United States;

• Iran – positioned as the principal anti-Western force in the Middle East, in confrontation with both the U.S. and its primary regional ally, Israel;

• Pakistan – the closest partner of China and an ambiguous broker in Afghan affairs;

• The Taliban – a radical but effectively controlling the territory of the country regime, viewed in Moscow today, first of all, as an “anti-Western force.”

For Russian diplomacy in the late-Putin era, the political utility of such regimes lies less in their economic or strategic weight and more in their rhetorical and symbolic value: they serve as proof of a supposedly “anti-Western world” that presents itself as multipolar and as “a defender of the Global South”. In practice, however, this vision often reproduces imperial and neocolonial dynamics — particularly, toward smaller states in Central Asia. The formation of such a bloc could pressure Central Asian states — currently wavering both in their approach to cooperation with the West in the context of the conflict in Ukraine and in their relations with Israel in the context of current Middle Eastern conflict — to adopt a firmer anti-Western and pro-authoritarian stance in favor of alignment with the Russia–China–Iran axis. Faced with a geopolitical environment increasingly polarized between liberal democracies and authoritarian powers, these states may be compelled to prioritize short-term security guarantees and economic dependencies over diversified foreign relations. This shift would not only undermine their emerging multi-vector diplomacy but could also weaken their independence. Potential terrorist threat from Taliban could contribute to this shift, so from this point of view Russia and CSTO can provide a security guarantee at the cost of independence.

In the medium- to long-term perspective, the formation of such a bloc could pose serious strategic challenges for both the United States and Israel by granting Iran greater strategic depth, thereby making it less vulnerable to aerial strikes and external military pressure. In the short term, the primary risk to Israel lies in a growing diplomatic isolation across Central Eurasia and South Asia, where shifting alliances could limit its regional engagement.

That said, this emerging authoritarian Eurasian bloc still remains largely hypothetical. It lacks institutional consolidation: neither BRICS, nor the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), nor the Moscow Format on Afghanistan constitutes a cohesive alliance. These platforms function more as discussion forums than unified geopolitical groupings. Moreover, deep internal contradictions persist among the bloc’s prospective members, particularly regarding each other and the Taliban:

• Iran and the Taliban are divided by entrenched sectarian hostility, representing radical Shi’a and Sunni Islamist regimes, respectively, and involving the issue of Afghanistan’s Shi’a Hazara minority.

• China, while engaged diplomatically, is cautious about publicly endorsing radical Islamist governments. This caution stems from its domestic concerns in Xinjiang, where the Uyghur Islamist movement has established links with certain Taliban factions, much like jihadist groups from Central Asia and the post-Soviet space[2].

• Pakistan maintains a precarious balance between its deepening dependency on China and its enduring need for Western support, particularly in economic and security domains. At the same time, serious tensions exist between Pakistan and Iran, especially along their shared border, where cross-border attacks and insurgent movements have fuelled mutual distrust. Pakistan also harbours grievances toward both Russia and Iran due to their growing strategic overtures toward India — Islamabad’s principal regional rival. Moreover, Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban is strained by the ongoing insurgency in the country’s northwest, where Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) continues its armed struggle against the Pakistani state. Although formally distinct from the Afghan Taliban, the two groups have maintained operational and ideological linkages, with reported cooperation involving Middle Eastern and post-Soviet jihadist networks[3]. Finally, the Afghan Taliban, like many Afghan political actors across the spectrum, rejects the legitimacy of the Durand Line — the colonial-era boundary drawn by the British in 1893 that divided the Pashtun population between Afghanistan and what was then British India. This enduring non-recognition fuels strategic mistrust and nationalist sensitivities in Pakistan, which regards the boundary as settled and inviolable.

Finally, it should be emphasized that, in the long term, the recognition of the Taliban challenges the very foundation of international law and, as such, is likely to undermine prospects for sustainable peace in Eurasia and the wider Middle East. By legitimizing a regime that came to power through force, lacks democratic legitimacy, commits serious violations against human rights (in particular, against women and girls) and continues to maintain ties with transnational terrorist groups, this move sets a precedent that weakens international norms regarding governance, human rights, and counterterrorism. In doing so, it risks deepening instability across already fragile region.

[1] Kazantsev A. International Networks of Jihadism: Central Asia, Caucasus, Middle East and Afghanistan, Moscow, MGIMO publishing house, 2019.

[2] Kazantsev A. International Networks of Jihadism: Central Asia, Caucasus, Middle East and Afghanistan, Moscow, MGIMO publishing house, 2019.

[3] Kazantsev A. International Networks of Jihadism: Central Asia, Caucasus, Middle East and Afghanistan, Moscow, MGIMO publishing house, 2019.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 141 (July 10, 2025)

None of the Muslim states bordering Iran to the northeast (they are usually called ‘stans’, from the Persian word “country”)—including Central Asian post-Soviet states (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), Pakistan and Afghanistan —are willing to become entangled in Tehran’s escalating confrontation with Israel or the West. This is especially clear in the case of the former Soviet Central Asian secular republics. The Central Asian states adhere to multi-vector foreign policies that balance between Russia, China, the West, and the Islamic world, carefully avoiding entanglements in ideological or military blocs. Even Iran’s most conservative immediate neighbor, Turkmenistan, has officially declared itself neutral.

This approach was also obvious in the recent Israeli-Iranian clash. According to observers, neither Israel nor Iran are key partners for the Central Asian countries in the political, military, economic, or security spheres, as well as – at least for the time being—in the foreign trade sphere. At the same time, they fear that a full-scale Iranian-Israeli conflict could negatively affect transport and communication projects aimed at providing Central Asian countries with access to Iran’s seaports in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea coast, which provide further access to the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Africa.

In addition, a tough confrontation between Israel and Iran could trigger the radicalization of Islamist circles that actively promote pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli narratives. Finally, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan fear that an escalation of the conflict between the US, Israel and Iran raises concerns not only because of the nuclear threat but also because of the possible collapse of governance in Iran, which would provoke a mass exodus of refugees to the east – through Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The regimes that employ militant Islamist ideologies—such as the Taliban in Afghanistan or the leadership in Pakistan —are unwilling to offer Iran more than occasional expressions of rhetorical solidarity or anti-Israeli sentiment. While these regimes may echo elements of Iran’s discourse for domestic or symbolic reasons, they have shown no inclination to become militarily involved in Tehran’s confrontation with Israel, and certainly not with the United States. Their priority remains regime survival and internal stability, not ideological adventurism on behalf of regional allies. The sectarian divide between Sunni and Shīʿa Muslims is important from this point of view, but pragmatic considerations are key determinants of foreign policy. The Taliban, despite their strict Islamist Sunni worldview, are primarily focused on consolidating power within Afghanistan and avoiding renewed international isolation in the condition of extreme economic crisis.

Strategically, the most important position is that of Pakistan, which possesses a powerful military and nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan, for its part, maintains a delicate balancing act between its Sunni Islamic ideological identity and its geostrategic interests, including its relations with Gulf countries, China, and the United States. For both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the costs of direct military confrontation with Israel and, especially, with the U.S., far outweigh any potential gains from aligning with Iran. Thus, Iran remains largely isolated in its most radical positions, able to extract only rhetorical sympathy—but no substantive backing—from even its most ostensibly ideologically aligned neighbors.

Ultimately, the most Iran can realistically expect from its post-Soviet and eastern Islamic neighbors is rhetorical sympathy or diplomatic hedging. Strategic alignment—especially on issues as sensitive as nuclear deterrence or military escalation—is a line none of them are prepared to cross. Since Pakistan’s position is strategically the most crucial, and in light of the spread of false claims that Islamabad pledged support to Iran with its nuclear arsenal, let us examine the current state of Iran–Pakistan relations. Later, we will also consider some tensions between Iran and the Taliban—in the context of general strategic relations between Tehran and Islamabad.

On June 16, 2025, a video appeared on social media and in some newspapers showing Iranian IRGC General and National Security Council member Mohsen Rezaei allegedly appealing to Pakistan for support. In this supposedly authentic footage, Rezaei, speaking on Iranian state television amid an intense missile exchange with Israel, stated: “Pakistan has assured us that if Israel uses nuclear missiles, Islamabad will also attack it with nuclear weapons.”

This statement, which appeared to invoke Pakistan’s nuclear capacity, was swiftly and categorically rejected by Islamabad. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar dismissed the claim outright as “fake, fabricated” based on analysis from fact-checkers like iVerify Pakistan that confirmed no credible Iranian source supported the claim. He also emphasized that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is reserved solely for defensive purposes against direct threats to its sovereignty—implicitly referring to its longstanding conflict with India. “This is irresponsible and false news,” said Dar. He added, “From our side, there has been no such statement. It was fabricated.” Dar said, “We have checked that it was an AI-generated clip and it was fake. He warned that Pakistan should be very careful, saying, “This is not a children’s matter. This is a serious war, like ours with India.”

“A second whisper campaign on X (formerly Twitter), citing an unverified report from Israel’s Channel 10, alleged Pakistan had warned Washington it would launch nuclear strikes on Israel to defend Iran”. This statement was also refuted in Pakistan as disinformation: Pakistani government has never told anything like that to Washington.

This reaction is particularly understandable given Pakistan’s own precarious security environment, especially its enduring rivalry with India. In early May 2025, following a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22 (claimed by Indian authorities to be perpetrated by Pakistan-linked militants), India launched a series of missile and airstrikes on Pakistani territory—code-named “Operation Sindoor”—on May 7 2025. Pakistan responded by launching a combination of drone and artillery strikes. These events marked the most significant military escalation between the two nuclear-armed rivals in decades, raising intense concerns of a potential slide toward nuclear confrontation. International diplomatic alarm was immediate. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President J.D. Vance intervened, mediating a ceasefire by May 10, 2025, after approximately four days of high-intensity conflict. The specter of nuclear escalation was not hypothetical; both nations had prepared their nuclear command systems for potential activation.

In this situation Islamabad must guard against rhetoric that could be interpreted as involvement in third-party disputes, thereby preserving its deterrence credibility and avoiding unnecessary diplomatic fallout. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine remains strictly defensive; any military entanglement—especially in foreign-driven escalatory scenarios—could inadvertently cross unwelcome nuclear thresholds. After nearly going to war with India, any participation—rhetorical or otherwise—in another state’s nuclear discourse would be highly destabilizing and strategically counterproductive.  Adding further complexity is the history of strained bilateral relations between Pakistan and Iran, particularly in the border region of Balochistan. Pakistan–Iran relations in Balochistan are governed by a fraught mix of counterinsurgency cooperation and repeated provocations. Frequent militant activity and military incursions reinforce mutual suspicion.

Since the 1980s, Iran’s Sistan–Balochistan and Pakistan’s Balochistan provinces have been epicenters of militant separatist insurgencies (Jaish al-Adl, Baloch Liberation Army). Both nations accuse each other of either harboring or failing to adequately suppress these groups. In 2014, Iranian border guards briefly occupied Nok Kundi (inside Pakistan) and launched rocket attacks that injured civilians, triggering Pakistani protests and diplomatic tension.  Iranian missile and drone strikes on January 16, 2024, targeted Jaish al-Adl positions in Panjgur, Pakistan, killing civilians, according to Pakistani reports. Between 2023 and early 2024, multiple Pakistani military patrols in Kech and Panjgur districts came under “terrorist” fire traced back to militants allegedly operating from across the Iranian border. Pakistan’s retaliatory Operation Marg Bar Sarmachar (January 18, 2024) saw air, drone, and artillery strikes on militants in Iran’s Sistan–Baluchestan—marking the first Pakistani strike on Iranian soil since the Iran–Iraq War. Both governments are expanding border infrastructure, including fencing projects and planned fortifications by Iran, aimed at curbing trafficking and militant infiltration.

Therefore, amid the Iran–Israel crisis, Pakistan sealed pedestrian crossings at Taftan, Gabd-Rimdan, Chedgi, Jirrak, and Rideeg Mand, citing security and refugee concerns in Balochistan Pakistan’s leadership is acutely aware that militant flare-ups in Balochistan not only threaten internal stability but also risk reigniting tensions with Iran—making regional escalation a constant concern. Despite episodic cooperation, Islamabad and Tehran remain wary, blaming each other for enabling hostile groups—a dynamic that amplifies the strategic significance of any cross-border incident. From this point of view, Pakistan’s refusal to join ideological alignments, such as the Iran’s anti-Israel rhetoric in nuclear sphere, is rooted in pragmatic self-interest—a precaution to avoid conflagration along its volatile western flank. Finally, Pakistan already faces considerable challenges from the protracted Afghan refugee crisis, and its capacity to absorb additional pressure along its western frontier is limited.

Also, there is an issue of mutual distrust between Pakistan and Iran, which is deeply rooted in sectarian geopolitics. Pakistan’s historic connections with Sunni, anti-Shīʿa Taliban in Afghanistan is seen by Iran as a direct threat to Hazārā Shīʿa communities and Shīʿa influence in the region. During Taliban rule in the late 1990s and the resurgence since 2021, Hazārā communities have faced severe persecution—forced conversions, massacres, and systemic marginalization . Iran has long championed the Hazārā minority in Afghanistan, supporting groups like Hezb-e Wahdat during the 1990s Afghan civil war to counterbalance Taliban influence and Pashtun dominance.

Iran’s protection of Hazārā and support for rival factions in Afghanistan deeply unsettles Pakistan, which perceives these moves as strategic counterweights to its own regional posture. The result is a nuanced strategic rivalry—marked not by overt hostility—but by proxy competition, border skirmishes, and sectarian undercurrents that profoundly shape bilateral interactions. Tehran continues its backing economically and cultural-religiously, with Hazārā populations seeing Iran as a protective patron amid Taliban ascendancy. This is a situation very similar to Iranian support for Shīʿa groups in the Arab world (in the countries like Lebanon, Syria or Iraq), however, this part of Iranian policy is not so well known in the wider world. Tehran’s proximity to Taliban-held zones and intermittent border skirmishes indicate strategic distrust: Iran supports post-Taliban security actors such as Hazārā militias to mitigate Taliban dominance. There is also the issue of growing sectarian tensions in Pakistan itself. Semi-autonomous North-Western regions of Pakistan like Kurram have seen deadly Sunni–Shīʿa violence—often exacerbated by extremist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which Pakistan-based Sunni militants (sometimes having good connections with Pakistani army) have funded and supported. Finally, Pakistan and Iran both accuse each other of harboring militant proxies—Pakistan blames Tehran for supporting Hazārā-linked groups, while Iran rhetorically accuses Pakistani military intelligence ISI (together with Israeli Mossad) of backing Taliban/al-Qaeda factions with anti-Shīʿa agendas.

In conclusion, Pakistan’s measured response to the nuclear aspects of war between Iran and Israel illustrates a calculated approach to regional security. Islamabad is distancing itself from escalatory rhetoric and maintaining a focus on its own strategic imperatives. This is logical, especially considering Pakistan’s own issues with Iran in Baluchistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan’s strategic rivalry with India. Islamabad is carefully avoiding symbolic commitments that could compromise national interests or entangle this state in new conflicts beyond its borders. The same principle can be applied also to the Taliban, which has its own disagreements with Tehran concerning sectarian agenda and Hazārā issue.

These considerations, at least at first glance, also dominate Islamabad’s policy towards the Central Asia. Since late 1990s-early 2000s, Islamabad, which was eager to show a higher profile than India in this region, tried to utilize the independence of the Central Asian republics from the USSR in order to bring to life Pakistan’s dream of strategic depth, believe Melissa Iqbal and Teresita Schaffer. According to them, for Pakistan developing political ties with the Central Asians and to serve as a bridge between them and the rest of the world has much more meaning than simply military space.  The same is true quarter centuries later, while economic cooperation especially in the field of energy with the Central Asia with their 46% of the world’s gas reserves, play even more important role than before. Hence, Islamabad also has to take seriously the Central Asian regimes’ concerns of the Israel-Iran conflict.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 114 (February 11, 2025)

In the ongoing geopolitical conflict between Iran and Israel, Iran’s relations with post-Soviet states—especially those with which it shares a direct border—play a crucial role. The tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan, coupled with Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel, are well-known to experts. Similarly, Iran’s close ties with Armenia are also widely acknowledged. However, a less frequently discussed yet highly significant aspect is the nature of Iran’s relationship with the third post-Soviet state with which it shares a border—Turkmenistan.

Officially, Turkmenistan maintains a policy of neutrality. However, the interpretation of this neutrality shifts in response to changing geopolitical realities. Currently, several factors indicate a gradual realignment of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy towards the Iran-Russia-China axis, a development that runs counter to Israeli interests. This article explores the domestic and international factors driving this shift.

Foreign Policy Factors: Declining U.S. Influence, Russia’s Growing Interest, and Chinese Debt Settlements

The foreign policy approach of Serdar Berdimuhamedow, who assumed the presidency in 2022, largely follows the path set by his father, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow. The elder Berdimuhamedow still wields significant influence over Turkmenistan’s policies, holding the titles of National Leader of the Turkmen People, Chairman of the People’s Council of Turkmenistan, and even the honorary title of Protector (Arkadag), a designation reminiscent of other authoritarian figures in Central Asia.

One of the key turning points in Turkmenistan’s geopolitical orientation occurred in June 2021, when the country completed the repayment of Chinese loans used to finance the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and the development of the Galkynysh gas field. The sale of gas through this pipeline remains the primary source of foreign currency revenue for Turkmenistan. However, prior to 2021, a significant portion of these earnings was directed toward repaying China, a financial arrangement many analysts likened to a form of neocolonial resource-extraction dependency.

While the precise amount of the repaid debt was never officially disclosed, earlier reports from Turkmen media suggested that China had extended loans amounting to $8.1 billion for Turkmen energy projects. Despite this repayment, Turkmenistan remains one of China’s largest natural gas suppliers. Bilateral trade between the two nations remains robust, reaching over $10.5 billion in 2023—a figure that vastly exceeds Turkmenistan’s trade volume with Russia or the European Union.

Turkmenistan’s ability to alleviate Chinese financial pressure was, in part, made possible by increasing cooperation with Russia, spanning trade, credit agreements, and even informal security guarantees against potential threats from Afghanistan. Historically, Ashgabat had sought to reduce its reliance on Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom by prioritizing gas exports to China. However, given the shifting geopolitical landscape, Russian energy dominance no longer poses the same threat to Turkmenistan’s economic independence. Consequently, in 2019, Turkmenistan resumed gas exports to Russia.

Following the unprecedented Western sanctions on Moscow in 2022, Russia has aggressively pursued deeper ties with Central Asian nations, including Turkmenistan. Gazprom has expressed interest in using Turkmenistan’s pipeline infrastructure to facilitate the transit of Russian gas exports to China. However, Ashgabat remains cautious, citing past experiences and emphasizing its sovereignty over its gas transit network.

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021 significantly reduced Western influence in Central Asia, limiting Turkmenistan’s ability to balance between major powers. Additionally, the scale of Turkmenistan’s economic engagement with China and Russia far outweighs its cooperation with Western nations.

The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 further reinforced Moscow’s scrutiny over the foreign policies of its regional neighbors, ensuring that they do not drift towards the West. However, despite the growing influence of Russia and China, Turkmenistan has attempted to maintain its neutral stance. For instance, Ashgabat continues to explore Western-backed energy projects, such as the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. Nonetheless, strong opposition from both Russia and Iran leaves the project’s future uncertain.

In July 2023, Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated—contradicting the positions of both Tehran and the Kremlin—that no legal or technical barriers exist to the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. The ministry emphasized the project’s economic viability and its potential contribution to Eurasian energy security. While this declaration signals Turkmenistan’s willingness to engage with Western partners, the geopolitical realities of Russian—and particularly Iranian—resistance present significant challenges. In March 2024, Turkmenistan renewed its proposal to transport natural gas to Turkey via the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, citing the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which permits the laying of pipelines along the seabed with the agreement of the coastal states.

Strengthening Authoritarianism and Ideological Convergence with Iran and Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan

Many experts initially speculated that Serdar Berdimuhamedow, following the example of his father, would adopt a strategy of relative liberalization to gain popular support before gradually tightening control. Additionally, reforms in neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—both of which have improved relations with Turkmenistan—gave some hope for moderate liberalization of the Turkmen regime.

However, these expectations proved mistaken. There has been no repetition of the “Turkmen thaw” that occurred during the early years of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s rule. Instead, following the ascension of the country’s third president, Turkmenistan has experienced a growing trend toward “state conservatism”—a trend that is widespread in contemporary Central Eurasia.

Under Serdar Berdimuhamedow, the government’s control over both public and private life has only intensified. Restrictions on women’s personal freedoms have expanded, including bans on cosmetics, eyelash extensions, hair dyeing, and other beauty treatments deemed inappropriate by state standards. Female government employees have been subjected to compliance inspections based on their appearance and social media posts. Women’s rights to wear clothing outside of the approved dress codes have also been curtailed. Additionally, obtaining permission to leave the country has become increasingly difficult, especially for women. The state has also tightened internet censorship, particularly targeting youth, and introduced more ideological content into schools and universities, including the mandatory study of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s works.

Although officially framed as a domestic nationalist policy, these measures also serve a foreign policy function. The trend toward “state conservatism” and the promotion of “traditional values” align with the ideological narratives of Turkmenistan’s key geopolitical partners—Russia and China—but resonate particularly well with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle and the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan.

This growing authoritarianism and social conservatism isolate Turkmenistan from the West, where issues of human rights and gender equality have always been major foreign policy priorities. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western influence in the region has diminished, prompting Turkmenistan to align its policies more closely with the values of its immediate neighbors.

From a foreign policy perspective, Turkmenistan’s domestic conservative policies under Serdar Berdimuhamedow are also driven by a desire to harmonize relations with Iran’s conservative elite and Afghanistan’s Taliban government. Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Turkmenistan quickly re-established ties with the group. Afghanistan remains an important partner in the TAPI gas pipeline project (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India) and in transport corridors connecting Central and South Asia.

Maintaining good relations with the Taliban is also crucial for Ashgabat due to Afghanistan’s demands for a larger share of water from the Amu Darya River. If Afghanistan were to succeed in securing greater water resources, it could significantly impact Turkmenistan and worsen the ecological crisis in the Aral Sea region, already affecting Uzbekistan. This water dispute is expected to escalate in the coming years.

Turkmenistan’s conservative social policies, particularly regarding women’s rights and public morality, may serve as a means of reducing cultural contradictions with the Taliban and building trust in bilateral relations. A similar logic may apply to Turkmenistan’s interactions with Iran.

However, despite Turkmenistan’s ideological alignment with Iran, characterized by the strengthening of authoritarian and even totalitarian tendencies, Ashgabat has not engaged in significant strategic cooperation with Tehran. The two nations lack the necessary economic and military potential for deep collaboration. For instance, Turkmen gas is only relevant to Iran for supplying its remote northern regions, which are far from Iran’s major gas fields. Additionally, Turkmenistan does not possess significant Soviet-era military infrastructure, making military cooperation with Iran unappealing.

For Tehran, however, Turkmenistan’s foreign policy neutrality remains highly valuable. Unlike Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan does not cooperate with Israel or the United States in the security sphere. Iran also fully supports Turkmenistan’s isolationist policies, as they help ensure Iran’s strategic security. Any security collaboration between Turkmenistan and Western powers—especially Israel—would intensify Iran’s geopolitical encirclement, significantly increasing pressure on Tehran. A situation similar to the U.S. military presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan in the past—which created a sense of encirclement for Iran—could reemerge if Turkmenistan were to align with anti-Iranian forces. However, it is worth mentioning that during the period of U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, the threat to Iran was mitigated due to certain unofficial agreements, particularly regarding Iraq.

Although Turkmenistan officially maintains a policy of neutrality, its geopolitical stance could theoretically change. During the peak of U.S. engagement in Central Asia, negotiations were held regarding the possibility of using the Mary-2 Soviet-era military airbase in Turkmenistan. Additionally, Turkmenistan once had active economic cooperation with Israel due to historical factors. Notably, the first president of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi), had personal ties to the Jewish community, as he was married to a Jewish woman. Moreover, a key behind-the-scenes figure in his administration, Alexander Zhadan, was an ethnic Jew who once served as Chief of Staff of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan.

Israeli businessman Joseph (Yossi) Maiman played a crucial role in Israeli-Turkmen economic relations. As the founder of the Merhav Group in 1975, Maiman led major projects in Turkmenistan, including the modernization of a refinery. He also served as Israel’s Special Ambassador to Turkmenistan, fostering diplomatic ties. Even after the death of Turkmenbashi, Maiman continued to play a significant role in relations with Turkmenistan. However, his passing in 2021 created a gap in Israel’s ability to engage with Turkmenistan effectively.

Future Prospects: Can the West Engage Turkmenistan?

While Turkmenistan officially adheres to a policy of neutrality, its recent foreign policy adjustments indicate a gradual tilt toward the Russia-Iran-China axis. Nonetheless, Turkmenistan still seeks to balance its relations by exploring Western energy projects such as the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, though significant obstacles remain. As Turkmenistan’s geopolitical stance continues to evolve, it will be crucial to monitor how far Ashgabat is willing to align with Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing—and whether it will continue to uphold its proclaimed neutrality.

Turkmenistan might engage with anti-Iranian forces and distance itself from the Moscow-Tehran-Beijing axis—but only if it receives significant strategic incentives in return. Ashgabat has repeatedly hinted that an attractive proposal could be the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. This project would undermine Russia’s and Iran’s ambitions in the European energy market while also limiting China’s ability to monopolize Central Asian gas supplies. Additionally, it would strengthen cooperation between Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, through which gas would be transported to Europe.

Recently, the EU, Turkey, and Azerbaijan have shown growing interest in advancing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, and Israel could strategically support the project to counter Iran’s influence. However, engaging with Turkmenistan carries significant reputational risks for Western actors, given its highly authoritarian domestic policies. Nevertheless, theoretically, under certain circumstances, the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline and engagement with Turkmenistan could become one of the priorities of a future Trump administration in Central Eurasia.

Thus, Turkmenistan remains at a geopolitical crossroads, maintaining formal neutrality while leaning toward an alliance with Russia, Iran, and China. However, if sufficiently incentivized, Ashgabat might reconsider its stance, presenting an opportunity for Western and Israeli diplomatic engagement.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 108 (Jan 5, 2025)

Faced with new challenges amid the war in Ukraine and increased pressure from Russia, Kazakhstan is taking a series of strategic measures to diversify its hydrocarbon trade and reduce dependence on the Russian route for transportation to Europe.

Traditionally, Kazakhstan has been heavily reliant on Russian transport infrastructure for exporting oil and gas. Given that Iran blocks Central Asian countries’ access to the Persian Gulf and considering the traditional supply routes to Europe established during the Soviet era, Russia’s territory appeared to be the most obvious path to Europe. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) route, via the Russian port of Novorossiysk, exported the majority of Kazakh oil. The CPC project was implemented with the participation of major international corporations at a time when relations between Russia and the West seemed stable, and thus, the potential risk of a “new Cold War” was not factored in. However, since 2022, this route has become highly vulnerable due to ongoing military actions in the Black Sea and Russia’s political pressure aimed at fully subordinating Kazakhstan to Russian priorities amid Moscow’s conflict with the West and Ukraine.

In response, Kazakhstan has intensified efforts in recent years to develop alternative routes, such as the Caspian Sea corridor. The Kazakh port of Aktau is becoming an important logistics hub for transporting oil and other goods to Europe via Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Overall, Kazakhstan is actively developing trade and economic relations with China, Turkey, the European Union, South Asia, and the Middle East. However, the main direction for diversifying Kazakh oil supplies to Europe—where the majority of oil from Caspian fields is exported—has become the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

The Trans-Caspian route has given rise to an intriguing geopolitical dynamic that diverges from the usual anti-Western Eurasian axis of Beijing-Moscow-Tehran. Iran has consistently and aggressively opposed any Trans-Caspian energy transportation projects, fearing competition with its own energy exports to Turkey and Europe. The large-scale supply of Caspian oil and gas to European markets would render Iranian exports economically unviable. This would enable Europe to support U.S. sanctions against Iran indefinitely without bearing significant economic costs. Conversely, in the absence of alternative supplies, Europe has historically hesitated to fully embrace such sanctions due to the economic harm they inflict—especially now, with Russian energy supplies largely blocked.

In this context, supporting energy deliveries via the Trans-Caspian route is a direct national interest for Israel, though this is rarely discussed in Israeli expert and political circles. Such support not only undermines Iran’s economic interests but also strengthens Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan, an informal strategic partner, and with Central Asian countries that maintain a neutral stance in Middle Eastern conflicts.

It is evident that supporting the construction of Trans-Caspian energy transportation routes—for both Kazakh oil and natural gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan—aligns with the interests of the EU and the broader Western coalition. These routes bolster the EU’s energy security amid its conflict with Russia, enhance the independence of Central Asian countries from both Russia and China, and encourage greater economic alignment of the South Caucasus with the West. Moreover, they tie Turkey more closely to its Western policy vector, reducing Ankara’s incentives to engage with Moscow. For the Turkish government, transforming Turkey into an energy hub is a critical strategy for overcoming its prolonged economic crisis. This goal becomes even more appealing when it involves the resale of energy resources from friendly Turkic nations.

Russia supports Iran’s stance against the construction of Trans-Caspian pipelines as such projects weaken Moscow’s leverage over Europe through energy pressure and create competition for Russian oil and gas. Additionally, Moscow fears that advancing Turkic integration projects through pipelines could undermine its influence in the southern post-Soviet region. Finally, the development of Trans-Caspian routes would further enhance the economic independence of Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan, and Georgia from Russia.

However, China’s interests in this case are opposite to those of Russia and Iran. For China, the Trans-Caspian routes represent the middle corridor of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), where the establishment of routes through Kazakhstan to Europe plays a crucial role. Due to the conflict in Ukraine, the northern corridor of the BRI through Russia to Europe has been blocked, while the southern corridor faces obstacles from conflicts involving Iran and the broader Middle East. Consequently, the middle corridor through the Caspian Sea becomes important for China. Thus, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries receive support for Trans-Caspian routes not only from the collective West but also from Beijing. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan garners backing from Turkey and other Turkic nations, which serve as significant partners in energy, logistics, and security.

Over the past five years, the export of Kazakh oil via various routes has undergone significant changes. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) through Russia remains the primary export route for Kazakh oil, accounting for about 80% of total shipments.

In 2019, 55.6 million tons of oil were exported through the CPC, accounting for 77% of Kazakhstan’s total oil exports. In 2020, exports via the CPC decreased to 51.8 million tons (75.6% of the total), driven by a general reduction in production and exports due to the pandemic. In 2021, exports through the CPC rose to 53.2 million tons (78.7% of the total). However, in 2022, exports via the CPC declined to 52.0 million tons (80.8% of the total). This decrease occurred despite a favorable post-pandemic recovery, which, under normal circumstances, would have led to a substantial increase in shipments. Russia’s pressure and Kazakhstan’s efforts to diversify supply routes were the reasons for the decline.

In 2023, 56.5 million tons of oil were transported through the CPC (80% of the total), an 8% increase compared to 2022. In 2023, Kazakhstan also significantly increased oil exports, bypassing Russian ports, doubling volumes to 3.73 million tons (primarily via the Caspian Sea) compared to 1.91 million tons in 2022. Shipments through the port of Aktau to Azerbaijan alone rose to 1.5 million tons from 0.3 million tons in 2022. Exports via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline increased to 1.4 million tons.

Thus, despite the dominant role of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) in exporting Kazakh oil, recent years have seen a trend toward increasing shipments through alternative routes, such as the Trans-Caspian route via Azerbaijan and Turkey. This shift reflects Kazakhstan’s desire to diversify export pathways and reduce dependency on the Russian route, particularly amid the ongoing war.

A significant factor in this development has been Russian political pressure, driven by the Kremlin’s discontent with Kazakhstan’s continuation of its multi-vector foreign policy during the conflict. In 2022, Russia repeatedly suspended Kazakh oil exports through the port of Novorossiysk, citing various reasons.

The alleged discovery of World War II-era mines in the port’s waters halted oil shipments through Novorossiysk in June 2022. The port area was fully closed for demining, leading to a suspension of exports. Demining operations were scheduled for June 20 and were expected to last until the end of the month.

In July 2022, Russia again blocked the operation of the pipeline transporting Kazakh oil through Novorossiysk. This occurred shortly after Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev publicly declared, in Putin’s presence, Kazakhstan’s non-recognition of the self-proclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine.

In August 2022, the CPC announced a reduction in oil flow through Novorossiysk due to defects discovered in the floating storage tank systems.

In 2023 and 2024, further suspensions of Kazakh oil shipments through the CPC to Novorossiysk occurred, including in December 2023 and April 2024. However, experts believe these suspensions were not politically motivated.

In light of the risks that emerged after 2022, Kazakhstan has formulated ambitious plans to expand oil shipments across the Caspian Sea, bypassing Russia.

Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy, Almasadam Satkaliyev, announced in November 2024 the country’s intention to increase oil shipments via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to 20 million tons per year. However, he did not specify a timeline for implementing these plans. In total, Kazakhstan is set to export 68.8 million tons of oil in 2024, including 55.4 million tons through the CPC pipeline via Novorossiysk, 8.6 million tons via the Atyrau-Samara pipeline also through Russia, 3.6 million tons across the Caspian Sea, and 1.1 million tons via the pipeline to China.

To support the growth of exports across the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are negotiating port modernization and increasing the capacity of maritime oil transport. Discussions are also ongoing regarding the potential construction of a Trans-Caspian oil pipeline, which could significantly shift the regional landscape. However, this project remains far from realization at present.

Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have also long expressed interest in building a Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline to Azerbaijan. However, this initiative faces technical, financial, and political challenges, including pressure from Russia and Iran. Nevertheless, the gas reserves of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are sufficient to address the European Union’s energy concerns arising from its conflict with Russia, should the project be completed.

Kazakhstan also wields leverage over Russia in the oil and gas sector, allowing it to continue exporting hydrocarbons to Europe through Russian territory. Russia has begun redirecting a small portion of its gas and oil, previously destined for Europe, via Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan. Additionally, Russia has unsuccessfully sought access to Turkmenistan’s gas transport network, which passes through Kazakhstan to China. Between 2022 and 2024, the transit of Russian oil through Kazakhstan’s pipeline system to China significantly increased. These shipments occur via a pipeline that transports oil from Siberia through Kazakhstan’s Priirtyshsk and Atasu to Alashankou in China. In 2023, the transit volume reached approximately 9.14 million tons, and this figure is expected to approach 10 million tons by the end of 2024. Thus, Kazakhstan exports oil to Europe via Russian territory, while Russia exports oil to China via Kazakh territory. This situation exemplifies classic mutual interdependence.

Plans are also underway to increase the export of Russian natural gas through a proposed pipeline from Russia via Kazakhstan to China. Unlike the stalled pipeline project between Mongolia and China, this route has not faced significant obstacles. The projected capacity of the pipeline is 45 billion cubic meters per year, with 10 billion cubic meters earmarked for gasifying various regions in Kazakhstan.

In addition to its energy role, Kazakhstan plays a crucial part in facilitating Russia’s foreign trade amid international sanctions. This includes the practices of Russian companies in the sphere of bypassing international sanctions. However, official Astana, in coordination with the U.S. and the EU, has taken significant steps to combat sanctions evasion. Despite these efforts, completely resolving this issue is nearly impossible due to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which creates an integrated economic space between Russia and Kazakhstan modeled after the EU.

Overall, Kazakhstan, alongside its diversification strategy, possesses certain tools that compel the Russian government to negotiate. Certain compromises between Astana and Moscow, particularly in oil and gas trade, are inevitable. These two countries share the world’s longest land border and have a high degree of economic interdependence, formally institutionalized through the EAEU.

Even if Kazakhstan successfully increases oil shipments to Azerbaijan to 20 million tons—although no specific timeline has been provided—this will still represent a small share compared to the 50-60 million tons of oil exported to Europe via the Russian port of Novorossiysk. The situation in oil supplies could be dramatically altered by constructing a Trans-Caspian oil pipeline, while the gas supply landscape could shift with the development of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. However, these projects would require significant political decisions from multiple international actors to overcome pressure from Iran and Russia, as well as substantial investments.

The collective West and Israel could have vested interests in supporting such initiatives. This could lead to the creation of a powerful regional coalition of post-Soviet states, Turkey, the West, and Israel against Iran and Russia, with China likely adopting a neutral stance. The development of Trans-Caspian energy routes, alongside the trade corridor from India to Europe via Arab countries and Israel, could contribute to a complete restructuring of the Greater Middle East. In essence, such a system of new transportation routes would encircle and isolate Iran entirely.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 99 (Nov 26, 2024)

Kazakhstan refuses to join BRICS, an organization that Russia (and to some extent China) sees as an alternative to the Western-centric world order. Clearly, such a decision inevitably invites retaliatory pressure from Russia. To offset this to some extent, and for a number of other pragmatic reasons, Kazakhstan continues to actively participate in BRICS+ activities (the organization’s interaction with the Global South). This was evidenced by President Tokayev’s participation in the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, which took place October 22–24, 2024. Prior to the summit, Astana received an invitation from Russia to join BRICS, but declined.

What does this position mean in the context of Kazakhstan’s relations with the two key BRICS members, Russia and China? This is a natural manifestation of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. This policy is a strategic approach aimed at balancing relationships with leading world powers, including Russia, while preserving sovereignty and advancing national interests. While maintaining close ties with Russia based on economic dependence, cultural and historical bonds, and security cooperation, Kazakhstan is making efforts to avoid excessive reliance on Moscow. Kazakhstan is developing relations with China, the European Union, the United States, and Turkey. This diversification reduces vulnerability to Russian dominance. Kazakhstan has taken a balanced approach to key international issues related to Russia, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia in the context of the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict reflect a delicate balancing act driven by Kazakhstan’s commitment to its sovereignty, regional stability, and balanced multi-vector foreign policy. The war has put the bilateral relationship to the test as Kazakhstan seeks to distance itself from Russia’s actions while maintaining critical ties stemming from shared history, geography, and economic interdependence. Through initiatives such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, Kazakhstan seeks to bypass Russian-controlled trade routes.

Kazakhstan’s relations with China are yet another critical component of its foreign policy. Kazakhstan’s ties with China are driven by economic pragmatism, regional cooperation and efforts to create a counterweight to Russian dominance, while carefully managing public concerns about China’s growing influence. As a result, Kazakhstan remains vigilant in balancing Chinese influence and partnerships with other countries to safeguard its sovereignty and maintain a diversified foreign policy approach.

Kazakhstan’s engagement with BRICS reflects its foreign policy approach, which aims to diversify partnerships with leading global and regional powers while maintaining balanced and pragmatic relations. Although Kazakhstan is not a member of BRICS, it views this grouping as an important platform for fostering economic cooperation, multilateralism and collaboration on global issues.

Kazakhstan’s interest in BRICS is aligned with its desire to reduce its dependence on any single power, such as Russia or China, and to expand international partnerships. Kazakhstan has strong economic ties with BRICS members, especially China and Russia, and also with India. Kazakhstan can also use its participation in regional platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which China, Russia and India are also members, to align with BRICS-related initiatives.

Although Astana is not currently interested in full membership in BRICS, Kazakhstan may qualify for observer status or limited participation in BRICS+ initiatives.

Kazakhstan’s decision not to join BRICS, while President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attended the BRICS summit in Kazan, reflects a calculated move consistent with the country’s multi-vector foreign policy. By refraining from joining BRICS, Kazakhstan maintains a neutral position in the global power dynamics. Joining BRICS could be perceived as aligning too closely with the organization’s dominant members, China and Russia, which could alienate Kazakhstan’s Western partners and other allies. Kazakhstan values its sovereignty and avoids being drawn into the political agenda of any bloc, especially one like BRICS, which often positions itself (mainly due to Moscow’s position) as a counterweight to Western-led institutions.

There are many other reasons for this decision. It allows the country to benefit from partnerships with BRICS countries, such as trade and investment opportunities, without being bound by its policies or decisions. Besides, Kazakhstan already cooperates with BRICS members such as Russia, China and India through organizations like the Eurasian Economic Union (with Russia) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with Russia, China and India). This reduces the need for formal membership in BRICS. In recent years, Kazakhstan has also prioritized strengthening regional cooperation in Central Asia, working closely with neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Joining BRICS could shift the focus away from these regional goals. While BRICS membership may expand trade opportunities, Kazakhstan seeks to diversify its economy by engaging with a wider range of partners, including Western countries, South Korea and Japan, as well as BRICS countries. Public opinion in Kazakhstan is cautious about deepening ties with Russia and China, the two dominant players in BRICS. Joining BRICS, of which Russia is a key member, could undermine Kazakhstan’s neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Tokayev’s attendance at Kazan summit reflects Kazakhstan’s interest in exploring partnerships within the BRICS+ framework, which permits non-members to engage in specific initiatives. This pragmatic approach allows Kazakhstan to selectively participate in economic and development projects without full membership. Tokayev’s visit underscores Kazakhstan’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy and its role as a bridge between different geopolitical blocs.

Since the decision of Kazakhstan’s leadership was perceived by the Russian authorities as yet another refusal to follow Moscow’s lead, Russia responded by intensifying the trade war that is slowly being waged between the member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. On October 17, 2024, Moscow imposed restrictions on import of tomatoes, peppers, fresh melons, wheat, flax seeds and lentils from Kazakhstan. Earlier, on October 2, Russia suspended the transit and import of grain from Kazakhstan. The Russian measures were a response to Kazakhstan’s August 2024 ban on wheat imports, including from Eurasian Economic Union member states. Kazakhstan justified this decision by the need to sell off its own grain stocks, which were not in demand due to cheaper competition from Russian producers.

It is worth noting that since 2022 Russia has been applying various forms of economic pressure on Kazakhstan. Russia has repeatedly interrupted the transit of Kazakh oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). These disruptions occurred in mid-2022 and early 2023, affecting Kazakhstan’s oil exports to Europe. Russian control over key energy transit routes has allowed Moscow to exert pressure on Kazakhstan’s plans to increase oil exports to Germany as an alternative to Russian supplies.

This pressure from the Kremlin emphasizes that Kazakhstan has to balance preserving its sovereignty with its multi-vector foreign policy while maintaining deep economic and political ties with Russia.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 97 (Nov 05, 2024)

The Power Struggle Among Criminal Groups in Russian Prisons and the Growing Role of Islamist Groups

Russian prisons have long been battlegrounds for influence among various criminal factions, each striving for control over the prison’s internal economy and hierarchies. Traditionally, the power in Russian penitentiaries has been held by groups following the thieves-in-law (“vor v zakone”) code. However, the prison landscape in Russia has been changing. As more individuals from Russia’s North Caucasus and Central Asia regions, many of whom follow Islam, are incarcerated, Islamist influence in prisons has grown. Some of these inmates, including those with ties to radical groups, have started to organize within the prison system, creating alliances based on religious beliefs rather than traditional criminal codes. This has shifted the balance of power, introducing new dynamics into the established prison hierarchy.

Islamist groups within Russian prisons often prioritize religious solidarity over traditional criminal loyalty, uniting along lines of faith and ethnicity. This religious affiliation offers a powerful alternative to the thieves-in-law code. These groups offer a strict, disciplined structure, sometimes enforcing adherence to Islamic practices and framing their activities as part of a broader religious struggle. 

As these Islamist groups gain ground, a new trend has been observed: the emergence of so-called “green zones.” In contrast to the “black zones” and the “red zones”, green zones are areas within prisons where Islamist groups hold significant influence. In green zones, the leadership is largely driven by religious principles, and adherence to Islamic practices is encouraged or even enforced among inmates. Here, power structures revolve around religious loyalty rather than the thieves-in-law code, creating a unique social order within the prison.

The rise of green zones and Islamist influence has introduced new tensions and conflicts within the prison system. Traditional criminal groups and Islamist factions often find themselves in direct competition for power and control over resources within the prison. The two groups have fundamentally different worldviews, and their conflicting codes make cooperation difficult. Islamist groups may view the secular stance of thieves-in-law as incompatible with their religious beliefs, leading to conflicts and violence between factions. Conversely, thieves-in-law see Islamist influence as a threat to their long-established dominance and fear that religious factions might undermine their power base.Russian and Central Asian authorities are deeply concerned about the growth of Islamist influence in the prison system, as it not only disrupts the traditional criminal balance but also increases the risk of religious radicalization. The spread of green zones has heightened concerns about prisons serving as recruitment centers for extremist organizations. In response, prison authorities have introduced stricter controls, particularly over inmates who show signs of extremist affiliation, and increased monitoring of religious practices within prisons. However, the ideological strength of Islamist groups makes this issue particularly difficult to address, as radical beliefs offer followers a powerful sense of identity and community, especially in an environment as isolating as prison.

There is one important factor that makes Islamist groups more competitive than traditional criminal groups in Russian prisons. Traditional Russian prison culture, heavily influenced by the “thieves-in-law” ideology, operates on a rigid hierarchical structure. Within this system, inmates are divided into strata, each with specific roles, rights, and expectations. At the top of the hierarchy are the thieves-in-law themselves, respected as leaders who enforce the criminal code and manage conflicts. Below them are “blatnye” (seasoned criminals who support the thieves’ code), and further down are lower groups who lack influence, including outcasts relegated to the lowest “untouchable” status, often doing undesirable work and serving the needs of higher-ranking prisoners.

However, the rise of Islamism in Russian prisons has disrupted this traditional structure. Islamist ideology, by contrast, places less emphasis on criminal hierarchy and is more democratic in its appeal, focusing on shared religious identity over strict social stratification. This egalitarian nature allows Islamist groups to recruit widely, reaching across strata and even drawing in lower-ranking prisoners who previously held little power. Some of these recruits come from non-Muslim backgrounds but are drawn by the promise of protection, community, and status under a new, religiously driven order. Islamism offers them a chance to rise within an alternative structure that values loyalty to faith over criminal reputation and physical strength.

This inclusiveness gives Islamist groups a strategic advantage over the thieves-in-law hierarchy, which is exclusive and rigidly traditional. Islamist networks provide a sense of purpose and solidarity that transcends the traditional criminal code, attracting those who feel weak, oppressed and excluded from the thieves’ culture. By creating alliances with prisoners across different strata, Islamist groups have been able to build a broader base of influence, further challenging the authority of traditional prison leaders and reshaping the power dynamics within Russia’s prisons.

Prison Islam and Scenarios of Potential Growth of Radical Islamist Influence in Russia: Potential Repercussions for Israel and Europe

Scenario 1. Inertial development, moderate threats. 

The most favorable scenario, both for Russia and for its neighbors in Europe and Asia, would be to follow an inertial path from the point of view of influence of prison Islam. Let’s call it Scenario 1. According to this scenario, the growing influence of radical Islam in prisons would remain under government control. Issues arising from the convergence of crime and jihadism would increase but remain a purely Russian problem (though neighboring Central Asian countries would continue to face similar challenges).

Scenario 2. Growth and trans-nationalization of radical Islamist networks based on prison Islam.

A more dangerous outcome for Russia itself and for many countries worldwide, including Israel, would be the realization of Scenario 2 “Growth and trans-nationalization of radical Islamist networks based on prison Islam” in Russia, Central Asia and the Wider Middle East. 

Let’s describe the tendencies that may lead to realization of this scenario. The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and the economic strain from Western sanctions have intensified Russia’s socioeconomic challenges, creating a volatile environment that could facilitate the rise of radical Islamist groups. With the Russian economy under increasing pressure, unemployment and poverty rates have grown, particularly affecting marginalized communities, including ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslims. The economic instability may drive disenfranchised youth and individuals from impoverished backgrounds towards radical movements, where promises of solidarity and purpose could provide an appealing alternative to dismal economic prospects.

The situation is further complicated by a demographic shift caused by the war.  Mass emigration of middle-class Russians, particularly young professionals, has altered the demographic balance, increasing the proportion of economically and socially vulnerable populations, including migrant communities. This shift is occurring against the backdrop of a long-term trend of demographic growth of national minorities in Russia, driven by differences in birth rate patterns between the ethnic Russian population of Central Russia and the population of the North Caucasus, as well as by large-scale labor migration from Central Asia.

These trends, coupled with rising interethnic tensions and widespread racist practices by Russian authorities, especially, against Central Asian ethnic groups, has created fertile ground for Islamist groups to gain influence. As violence and crime escalate amid the social disorganization of wartime Russia, radical groups may find it easier to recruit, using religious solidarity as a tool to address grievances and perceived injustices.

Moreover, the strained resources of Russian law enforcement, currently focused on internal security challenges and the demands of war, limit their ability to monitor and counter radical groups effectively. This vulnerability creates an opening for radical Islamist organizations to expand their networks and activities.

The likelihood of transnational connections between Russian- and Central Asian -based radical Islamist groups and Middle Eastern organizations is also growing. As Islamist groups gain influence in Russia and Central Asia, they may establish stronger ties with larger networks across the Wider Middle East, accessing funding, ideological support, and strategic resources. This transnational element could enable Russian Islamist groups to solidify their influence domestically while extending their reach, posing a complex and multifaceted security challenge to Russia and other nations.

Additionally, the growth of ties between Russian criminal-Islamist groups and similar groups in the Middle East would create an added threat of terrorist attacks. In particular, some experts, such as Russian Afghanistan specialist Andrey Serenko, claim that ISIS-Khorasan is attempting to use criminal infrastructure (including drug trafficking networks) to organize terrorist attacks in Russia. In this context, one can recall the mass attack at Crocus City Hall near Moscow in March 2024, which was preceded by an attempt by ISIS-Khorasan to organize the bombing of a synagogue. 

Through such networks, not only are terrorist attacks organized, but also the recruitment of fighters for the war in the Middle East (for example, in ISIS and groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, such as al-Nusra in Syria). In this context, it is worth recalling the phenomenon of mass recruitment into ISIS and other Sunni Islamist groups based in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, a trend that has already been characteristic of Russia and Central Asian states over the past decade. So, such groups can organize terrorist acts or attacks affecting even the territory of Israel. 

From the perspective of Israel’s interests, in this context, the threat of a recurrence of anti-Semitic pogroms, similar to those that took place in the fall of 2023 in the North Caucasus, would also probably sharply increase. In the specific context of the above-mentioned pogrom in the North Caucasus in the fall of 2023, networks of wrestler-athletes were utilized. However, in a number of other interethnic pogroms, such as the Uzbek pogrom in Osh, Kyrgyzstan (2010), the mobilization of rioters occurred through criminal youth groups, albeit not Islamist in nature. The first instance of mobilization for mass pogroms through criminal-Islamist groups (connected to the relatives and associates of former President Nazarbayev, who controlled Kazakh secret police) occurred in January 2022 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. In connection with this case the former head of Kazakh National security committee (KNB) and former prime minister Karim Masimov and some other generals were sentenced for high treason.  Overall, given the trends outlined above, the possibility of mobilizing criminal-Islamist groups to organize pogroms, including those with an anti-Semitic component, is entirely feasible.

Scenario 3. The incorporation of elements of Islamic radicalism from criminal subcultures into the country’s political system

The most dangerous scenario for Russia and other countries would be Scenario 3 that foresees the incorporation of elements of Islamic radicalism from criminal subcultures into the country’s political system. Among the trends suggesting the possibility of such a scenario are the following. Since the 1990s, there has been an evident link between Russia’s political and business elite and criminal circles. Currently, there is a notable trend toward the division of key assets among criminal-political groups, particularly those of North Caucasian origin.  

The trend toward state conservatism as part of Russia’s modern ideology is leading to de-secularization and strengthening of the connection between Islamic ideology and regional political systems in Russia’s autonomous republics of the North Caucasus. The power structure established in Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov, based on political Islam (of a conservative-Sufi nature), is the first example of a stable Islamist regime in the post-Soviet space (experiments with the introduction of Sharia laws in independent Chechnya between the First and Second Chechen Wars lasted a significantly shorter time).

Already, there is a noticeable link between the spread of radical Islam in prisons and among criminal groups, driven by the growing popularity of radical Islam among young people from certain Russian regions and among the most vulnerable migrant groups. Some experts say that there is also growing tendency towards introduction of radical Islamism as the ideology of different criminal groups in Russia and Central Asia. Added to this is the rise in the use of political Islam as a mechanism for integration among power groups at the regional regime level, alongside a trend toward overall instability in Russia.

As a result of all these trends, a situation may quickly emerge, when regional political systems in the North Caucasus, amid a weakening federal center, will begin to rely on support of criminal-Islamist groups. This is logical since the leaders of these groups already use criminal gangs (sometimes with elements of radical Islamic ideology) in the conflicts over property, as the Wildberries case demonstrates. 

To understand the reality of such a scenario, one only needs to recall that elements of criminal-Islamist groups were integrated into the official structures of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (specifically, its Armed Forces) between the two Chechen wars. Elements of the practices that developed at that time (including the combination of formal work in security structures with informal criminal activity, particularly informal protection activities) have persisted in a modified form in today’s Chechen Republic. In modern Dagestan and several other national autonomous republics of the North Caucasus, similar processes can be observed along two lines, or trends.

The first trend is the connection between regional elites and organized crime. In this context, two officially documented cases can be mentioned. From 2016 to 2019, Rauf Arashukov was a member of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. He was delegated there by the executive authority of Karachay-Cherkessia, a national republic in the North Caucasus. He had also previously served as the head of a district and as the first deputy head of the republic’s government. In 2022, he was convicted of organizing a criminal community and for murder. Another, no less high-profile case is the story of the former mayor of Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, Said Amirov, who was convicted in 2014 on similar charges.  It is evident that this is only the tip of the iceberg, revealing the connections between regional political systems in the North Caucasus and criminal groups. Based on this, it can be assumed that, in some cases, gangs act as informal (and sometimes even formalized when integrated into official law enforcement agencies) forces relied upon by certain regional elites.

The second trend indicating the real possibility of Scenario 3 is the increasing official Islamic religiosity of regional elites, including within the framework of the conservative ideology that currently dominates in Russia. 

Accordingly, it is entirely plausible to hypothetically assume a further convergence of these two developmental trends described above, meaning that regional elites could merge with criminal-Islamist groups.

An example of the merging of the trends described above is the terrorist attack in Dagestan on June 23, 2024. During the attack, a synagogue, two Orthodox churches, and a traffic police checkpoint in Makhachkala and Derbent were targeted. Twenty-one people lost their lives—16 police officers and five civilians, including a 66-year-old Orthodox priest in Derbent—and more than 20 others were injured. It was discovered that three relatives of Magomed Omarov, the head of the Sergokala district in Dagestan, were involved in the attack, including his own son. 

Consequently, the influence of radical Islam, with its anti-Western and anti-Semitic tendencies, could expand across all of Russia and may start influence the policy of the federal government. This situation could pose significant threats to Europe and Israel.

The facts described above highlight the need to deepen the study of the links between Jihadism and criminal activity, as well as the study of prison Islam (which, of course, is not solely limited to Islamic radicalism but can also represent prisoners’ legitimate search for meaning, justice and social integration). Two obstacles stand in the way of this endeavor.

One obstacle lies in the politicization of the issue. As a result, experts leaning toward a right-wing discourse tend to focus primarily on counterterrorism and criminal behavior, while academics inclined toward a left-wing discourse may emphasize prisoner rights and religious freedom violations in post-Soviet countries. An accurate assessment of the situation requires a comprehensive approach that integrates both aspects of the issue mentioned above. Today, there are many interesting theoretical and comparative scholarly studies of convergence between criminal and terrorist activities, this approach can be applied also to the case of prison Islam and convergence between criminal and religious extremist activity in Russia and Central Asia. 

The second obstacle is the difficulty of accessing both underground criminal-Islamist groups at large (who are not inclined to disseminate information about themselves) and prisoners (since authorities in many post-Soviet countries are not interested in exposing prison conditions due to serious human rights violations within these institutions).

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 96 (Nov 07, 2024)

Islamist-led uprisings in Russian prisons

On June 16, 2024, a hostage situation occurred in Detention Center No. 1 in Rostov-on-Don, southern Russia, orchestrated by Islamic terrorists acting on behalf of the “Islamic State.” The incident took place in the morning. To free the hostages, special forces conducted an assault on the detention center, during which five terrorists were killed, and one fell into a coma after being shot in the head. On August 23, 2024, in Russian Correctional Colony No. 19 in the city of Surovikino, Volgograd Region (Volga region), four radical Islamist inmates armed with knives attacked prison staff and other inmates, taking some of them hostage. All four rioters were killed a few hours later during the hostage rescue operation. In addition to the rioters, four other people lost their lives.

Clashes connected to prison Islam are not limited to the incidents mentioned above. Last years, a series of Islamist-led uprisings in Russian prisons underscored the growing influence of radical Islam within the penal system and presented serious challenges for prison authorities. These uprisings, involving groups of inmates aligned with Islamist ideologies, were marked by organized protests, violence, and confrontations with prison staff. The unrest reflects the increasing influence of Islamist groups in Russian prisons, a trend that has disrupted the traditional criminal hierarchy and threatened prison stability. 

The Islamist-led uprisings have often been ignited by conflicts over prison conditions and alleged mistreatment by guards, which Islamist leaders have used as rallying points. These leaders, drawing on religious motivations, present their actions as part of a broader “struggle” against an oppressive system. The uprisings have included organized sit-ins, hunger strikes, and, in more severe cases, violent clashes with guards. In some cases, Islamist groups have taken control of sections of the prison, barricading themselves and demanding better conditions or the transfer of specific inmates.

One notable aspect of these uprisings is their level of coordination, which has sometimes extended across multiple prisons. Using covert communication channels, including encrypted messaging and coded messages relayed by visitors or other prisoners, Islamist groups have been able to plan simultaneous protests and organize resistance efforts that catch prison authorities off-guard. This level of organization demonstrates both the ideological commitment and strategic planning capabilities of Islamist groups within the prison system.

As a result, the spread of radical Islam in Russian prisons, previously known only to a small circle of specialists, has become a topic of discussion in both the official press and opposition media. Let us analyze how an out-of-control situation with the spread of radical Islam in Russian prisons could impact Russian society and politics. It is particularly important to consider whether the growing influence of Islam in criminal and socially marginalized circles, as well as in prisons, can interact with the increasing activity of bureaucratic-criminal groups, especially in the North Caucasus. 

Thieves’ Traditions in the USSR and Russia

In the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia, a unique criminal culture developed within the prison system, known for its strict code of behavior and internal hierarchy. One of the most significant aspects of this culture is the institution of the “Thief-in-Law” (“Vor v zakone”), a high-ranking criminal with authority among inmates. This concept, which emerged in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, encompasses a set of traditions, rules, and structures that govern behavior, respect, and order within the criminal world.

Thieves-in-law operate under a strict code that forbids cooperation with authorities, mandates loyalty to criminal “brothers,” and promotes a strict anti-establishment ideology. The roots of these traditions can be traced back to the Gulag system, where inmates formed their own hierarchies and organized structures to survive. A Thief-in-Law is someone who has proven their loyalty to this lifestyle and is “crowned” by other high-ranking members. This title brings significant influence in prison and on the streets, but it requires total dedication to the criminal code, including rejecting family life and abstaining from legal work. Thieves-in-law are respected arbiters of disputes, organizers, and leaders who maintain the values of the criminal underworld.

One important division in the Russian prison system is between “black” and “red” zones. Black zones are prisons controlled by inmates who follow the Thief-in-Law code, rejecting cooperation with prison authorities and maintaining internal order based on criminal rules. Thieves-in-law often hold power in these zones, and the prison management exerts minimal influence over inmates. Red zones, in contrast, are prisons where authorities maintain strict control, often with the help of informants or inmates who act on behalf of the administration. In these zones, the influence of thieves-in-law is limited, and inmates who try to uphold criminal values often face retaliation from authorities or “red” inmates.

The distinction between black and red zones is a fundamental aspect of life in Russian prisons, impacting prisoners’ experiences and the stability of criminal hierarchies. Black zones are seen as places where prisoners can adhere to the Thief-in-Law code, while red zones represent a more oppressive environment with little tolerance for criminal traditions. This division has persisted into modern Russian penal institutions, even as the authority of thieves-in-law has been challenged by changing laws and government policies.  

It should be noted that in the 1990s and 2000s, Russia witnessed two opposing trends. On one hand, there was an ongoing expansion of traditional criminal culture into youth subcultures (it is called AUE in Russian), which faced increased resistance from the state (Russian government even introduced the law banning criminal subculture among young people under the pretext that it is a “criminal and extremist movement”, which caused serious criticism because criminalization of subculture is legal nonsense). On the other hand, there was a crisis of traditional groups associated with criminal ideology, which were partially pushed aside by groups of athletes and ethnic criminal organizations, including Islamist ones. Process of expansion of ethnic criminal groups pushing aside traditional criminal groups started even before the dissolution of the USSR, it was noticeable already from the 1980-s, and, in some cases, even from the 1970-s.  

The Rise of Radical Islamism in Criminal Subcultures in Central Asia and the North Caucasus

In recent years, radical Islamism has increasingly influenced criminal subcultures in Central Asia and the North Caucasus. To a certain degree a rise of radical Islamism (in the 1990-s old Soviet Islamic clerics called it “Vahhabism”) was a response towards multifaceted socio-cultural crisis that accompanied the collapse of the USSR.  Central Asia and the North Caucasus have long histories of strong local identities (including significant Muslim element) and, more recently, socio-political instability, which has created fertile ground for the merging of extremist religious ideologies with criminal activities. This trend is especially pronounced among youth and ethnic criminal groups who are often drawn to radical movements as a form of rebellion, identity, or economic opportunity.

Ethnic criminal networks often provide a sense of belonging and protection, which is sometimes intertwined with a shared religious identity. For these groups, radical Islamism can serve both as a moral justification for criminal actions and as a unifying ideology that reinforces group loyalty. These young people, often disillusioned with traditional social structures, find empowerment in a combination of religious and criminal identity. This alignment of faith and crime not only fosters loyalty but also justifies activities such as extortion, smuggling, and trafficking as part of a “holy war” against perceived enemies.

This fusion of radical Islamism with criminality has allowed some extremist groups to finance their operations through illicit means, including drug trafficking, arms trading, and human trafficking. Radicalized criminal groups operate under the guise of jihad, often justifying violent crimes against the state and rival factions as religiously motivated. These groups may claim adherence to strict Islamic principles, but their operations are fundamentally profit-driven, using ideology as a tool to recruit and maintain loyalty within their ranks. The blending of crime and radical ideology poses significant challenges to regional stability, as these groups often resist government intervention and view law enforcement as an enemy.  

In sum, the intertwining of radical Islamism with criminal subcultures in Central Asia and the North Caucasus represents a complex and evolving issue. It highlights the power of ideology to transcend traditional criminal codes, merging extremist beliefs with organized crime. This hybridization not only destabilizes these regions but also complicates efforts to address criminality and extremism independently, as they become inseparably linked in the eyes of many young, disillusioned recruits.

The northern drug trafficking route from Afghanistan to Russia is a key path for heroin and opium smuggling, with significant impacts on regional security and public health. Afghanistan, as one of the world’s largest producers of opiates, supplies much of the narcotics that flow northward through Central Asia and ultimately reach Russia and parts of Europe. This route, often running through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, is heavily utilized by organized criminal networks and increasingly by groups affiliated with radical Islamism.

Radical Islamist and jihadist groups have exploited this lucrative trade to fund their operations. Although drug trafficking is generally condemned in Islamic teachings, these groups often justify their involvement by framing it as a means to harm Western or non-Muslim societies, which they see as enemies. This ideological rationalization provides a “higher purpose” for their criminal activities, portraying it as a form of economic jihad. The profits from drug trafficking are substantial, allowing these groups to finance recruitment, purchase weapons, and expand their influence across Central Asia and into Russia.