Posts by Alexander Shpunt

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 235 (September 30, 2026)

by Alexander Shpunt

Preamble

The formation of the State Duma of the ninth convocation following the elections of September 18–20, 2026, was accompanied not only by an updating of the personal composition of the chamber, but also by a redistribution of leadership positions within parliamentary factions, committees, and standing commissions. The assessments presented in analytical materials permit examination of this process through several interrelated aspects: the correlation of party forces, continuity of leadership, personnel movements, changes in the organizational structure of committees, and mechanisms for coordinating key appointments.

In preparing this report, we consciously concentrated exclusively on the indisputable results of these elections – the new composition of the lower house of parliament and new leaders of the State Duma at the level of committees and commissions. This decision was not arbitrary.

To our considerable regret, the political confrontation between supporters and opponents of the current authorities in Russia has affected the analytical community as well. Academic rigor has given way to political partisanship. These destructive processes for academic analysis have penetrated even those analytical centers that for decades served as models of objective political science analysis. Ultimately, political preferences have triumphed over academic objectivity.

Without attempting to condemn anyone, we have chosen a different path – in our analysis to rely solely on facts that are not disputed by any of the sides of the ideological conflict. We offer an analysis of these uncontested facts in this text.

Knowing that the materials of the Begin-Sadat Center have a substantial readership, including from Russia, we consciously imposed one additional restriction on our report. The authors, so as not to create a difficult position for our Russian audience, refrained from using texts from those analytical centers and sources that are officially recognized in Russia as undesirable, extremist, or possessing the status of foreign agent. In this we see a sign of respect toward our audience from Russia.

Party Configuration of the New Composition of the State Duma

The final results of the elections, officially announced on September 25, 2026, determined the new factional configuration of the State Duma. “United Russia” obtained 349 of 450 parliamentary mandates, including 140 mandates from the federal list and 209 from single-mandate districts. The KPRF obtained 37 mandates, the LDPR – 23, “New People” – 19, “Fair Russia – For Truth” – 17, “Rodina” – one mandate, and four additional mandates were obtained by independent candidates.

Such a distribution of seats determined the institutional context for the subsequent formation of the chamber’s leadership and the distribution of committee positions. Analysts regarded the correlation of faction size simultaneously as the quantitative basis for distributing offices and as one of the factors determining parties’ negotiating possibilities in forming governing bodies.

Special attention in the brief was given to the circumstance that 46 elected deputies were participants in the conflict in the southeastern part of Russia and Ukraine. According to data from the Central Election Commission, 41 of them were elected from “United Russia.” Reuters characterized the representation of veterans among deputies as record-breaking for the entire period of existence of modern Russian statehood – approximately 10 percent of the total number. At the same time, the theme of the entry into parliament of participants in the conflict in southeastern Russia and Ukraine in the studied materials was examined by analytical sources as one element of a broader process of personnel renewal and does not exhaust its substance.

Preservation of the Speaker and Formation of the Chamber’s Leadership Configuration

The key personnel decision preceding the first session of the new convocation was the nomination of Vyacheslav Volodin for the position of chairman of the State Duma. Volodin has held the position of chairman of the State Duma since 2016 and was again elected as a deputy from a single-mandate district in Saratov Oblast.

The party communication of “United Russia” characterized Volodin’s nomination as a decision made “in coordination with Vladimir Putin,” although such coordination is not legally required. Simultaneously, the party presented the advancement of Irina Yarova to the position of first deputy chairman of the Duma as elements of the proposed leadership configuration of the Duma of the ninth convocation. The proposed leadership structure provided for two first deputy chairs and nine deputy chairs, totaling eleven leadership positions.

At the same time, on September 29, the KPRF faction supported the candidacy of Dmitry Novikov as an alternative candidate for the position of chairman of the State Duma, while simultaneously confirming Gennady Zyuganov as leader of the faction. Thus, the materials record a combination of coordination of the distribution of leadership positions between factions with the preservation of the permissibility of separate factional nomination of an alternative candidacy for a key parliamentary position, which is not regarded by the country’s political leadership as party disloyalty.

A distinctive feature of the proposed leadership composition was the high degree of parliamentary experience of several candidates for deputy chair positions. “Vedomosti” noted that the candidates proposed for these positions in the ninth convocation possessed substantially more extensive parliamentary experience compared to the average indicator for the deputy corps.  Mikhail Vinogradov, president of the “Petersburg Politics” Foundation, interpreted the preservation of the current leadership as a factor of continuity and stability, while simultaneously characterizing the speaker-oriented model as an institutional feature of the current convocation. Evgeny Minchenko of “Minchenko Consulting” drew attention to the possible increase in substantive conflict due to greater differentiation of the Duma, but also noted the manageability associated with a constitutional majority. In his assessment, the number of deputy chairs acquired special significance as a resource of institutional influence. Thus, in the presented Russian assessments, the preservation of the chairman and a significant part of the leadership corps is examined primarily through the categories of continuity, organizational stability, and the distribution of institutional resources.

Distribution of Committee Chairmanships Between Factions

On September 29, “United Russia” formally nominated twenty candidates for the positions of committee chairs. The candidacies were unanimously supported by the faction. Thus, the number of committee chairs proposed by “United Russia” increased from 17 in the eighth convocation to 20 in the ninth. At the same time, the party itself reported unanimous support for all twenty candidacies within the faction. Analysts characterized such a configuration as a continuation of the established practice of distributing committee leadership among parliamentary forces. The source emphasized that the main organizational shift was associated with the appearance of additional committees, whereas a substantial portion of the sitting chairs maintained their specialized areas.

The oldest Russian business outlet “Kommersant” specifically highlighted new appointments of Vladislav Golovin to the committee on youth policy, Oleg Matytsin to the committee on physical culture and sport, Vladimir Kasatonov to the committee on defense, and Yuri Petrov to the committee on criminal and administrative legislation, while simultaneously noting the preservation of Andrey Makarov, Vladimir Gutenev, and Vasily Piskarev in their respective committees.

Meanwhile, Pavel Sklyanchuk of the Russian Center for Current Politics linked committee chair positions to the possibility of centralized management of the parliamentary agenda and their significance for lobbying activity.

Personnel Continuity in Committees

One of the most notable characteristics of the proposed composition of committees was a high degree of personnel continuity – twelve deputies previously held committee chair positions three times. Among such leaders were representatives of “United Russia,” the KPRF, the LDPR, and “Fair Russia.” Thus, continuity extended not only to the largest parliamentary faction but also to representatives of various party groups. Taken together, the presented data permit registration of a combination of two personnel processes: the preservation of a substantial portion of experienced leaders and targeted movements of individual deputies to new areas. In the presented sources, precisely this combination is regarded as one of the distinctive characteristics of the formation of the ninth convocation.

Redistribution of the International Committee Chairmanship

A separate personnel change was the redistribution of leadership of the committee on international affairs. In the eighth convocation, it was chaired by LDPR chairman Leonid Slutsky. In the ninth convocation, the committee was proposed to be transferred to Petr Tolstoy.

Leading publications already in August reported that “United Russia” was considering the possibility of returning one of the major committees and named Petr Tolstoy as the main candidate. On September 24, “Interfax” confirmed his formal nomination.

Tolstoy’s transition from the position of deputy chairman of the State Duma to the leadership of a committee signified a change in institutional function within the chamber’s leadership corps while preserving his position in the parliamentary elite. Simultaneously, a change in party affiliation of the committee’s leadership occurred: from the LDPR to “United Russia.”

In the context of intra-elite processes, this case differs from simple personnel rotation: the change affected simultaneously the official position of a specific deputy and the inter-factional distribution of one of the most prominent specialized areas.

Division of the Committee on State Construction and the Creation of New Specialized Areas

Another significant structural change was the division of the previous committee on state construction and legislation. Pavel Krasheninnikov was proposed to lead the direction of constitutional, civil legislation, and the judicial system, whereas Yuri Petrov – the former head of Rosimushchestvo – was considered as chair of the new separate committee on criminal and administrative legislation. Analysts noted that the previous unified committee dealt with approximately one-quarter of the legislative work of the State Duma and interacted with Kremlin lawyers in the preparation of significant bills.

Thus, the division of competencies had not only an organizational but also a functional aspect: two large groups of legislative questions received independent committee structures. At the same time, one of the most experienced chamber leaders retained a key legislative direction. In parallel, a new committee on digital development and artificial intelligence was created. Aleksandr Sidyakin was proposed as its chair. His competence was to include artificial intelligence, electronic commerce, the development of unmanned systems, and marketplaces – areas previously distributed among several committees.

Sidyakin was a deputy to the State Duma for three convocations and from 2021 had chaired the Central Executive Committee of “United Russia.” Analytical publications characterized the new digital committee as a mechanism for concentrating legislative work related to technological development and areas classified as the “new economy.” In an analytical publication of September 24, the creation of the committee was also regarded as a concentration of responsibility for technological development, marketplaces, unmanned systems, and artificial intelligence.

Taken together, the division of the legislative committee and the creation of the digital committee formed the two most notable examples of changes in organizational architecture recorded in materials about preparation for the first session.

Positions of the KPRF and Other Factions in Committee Distribution

The KPRF preserved Gennady Zyuganov as leader of the faction and proposed five candidacies for committee chair positions: Vladimir Kashin, Leonid Kalashnikov, Nikolay Kharitonov, Nina Ostanina, and Sergey Gavrilov. In materials from the preparatory period, it was expected that Kashin, Kalashnikov, and Ostanina would preserve respectively the areas of agriculture, CIS affairs, and family protection. In the studied materials of analytical centers and publications, a change in the position of “Fair Russia” is separately noted. In the ninth convocation, the party received 17 mandates as opposed to 27 in the eighth. The reduction in size was regarded in preliminary publications as a factor diminishing the party’s negotiating possibilities in the distribution of chair positions.

The materials also noted that sitting committee chairs from “Fair Russia” – Anatoly Aksakov, Valery Gartung, and Sergey Kabyshev – were reelected as deputies and were considered candidates for preserving their respective areas. The reduction in “Fair Russia’s” representation in the brief is directly linked to the operating mechanism of package agreement, whereby the distribution of leadership positions in committees is correlated with the size of factions. “New People,” by contrast, increased their representation in committee leadership. Having obtained 19 mandates, the party announced three candidates for chair positions: Timur Kankov – for the committee on tourism and tourism infrastructure, Stanislav Druzhinin – for the committee on small and medium entrepreneurship, and Elena Panova – for the committee on ecology, natural resources, and environmental protection.

Thus, the number of committee chairs associated with “New People” increased from two in the eighth convocation to three in the ninth.

In the presented materials, the distribution of committee positions is characterized as a package inter-factional agreement, whereby approximately half of the chair positions fall to “United Russia,” while the remainder are distributed among other parliamentary forces taking their size into account.

Personnel Movements in the Leadership of Specialized Committees

A special place among personnel movements was occupied by the nomination of Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov for the position of committee chair on defense in place of Andrey Kartapolov. In the materials, Kasatonov is characterized as the former chief of the General Staff of the Navy and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy.

Another notable personnel movement was the nomination of Vladislav Golovin for the position of committee chair on youth policy. He is characterized as a notable representative of deputies connected with participants in the conflict in southeastern Russia and Ukraine, and simultaneously as a candidate included in the upper portion of the federal list of “United Russia.”

Preparation of the Committee Configuration Before the First Session

Formation of the committees began before the formal session of the new convocation. “Vedomosti” reported that sources close to the Presidential Administration and the State Duma discussed in September the future configuration of committees, the distribution of chair positions, and possible structural changes. This material supplements reports about a temporary working group created to prepare the first session. Thus, the organizational configuration of the new Duma was formed in several consecutive stages: preliminary discussion of structure and candidacies, party coordination, formal nomination of candidates, and subsequent parliamentary approval.

In this context, the distribution of committees functioned simultaneously as a personnel and an organizational process. The change in the number of committees created new leadership positions, whereas the redistribution of already existing committees among factions changed the institutional roles of individual parties and deputies.

Assessments of Veteran Representation in Analytical Centers

International analytical centers regarded the participation of former military personnel and other individuals connected with the conflict in southeastern Russia and Ukraine primarily in the context of renewal of the political-administrative personnel corps.

The Finnish Institute of International Relations (FIIA) in an analysis by Jussi Lassila and Margarita Zavadskaya of September 23 reported that Russian authorities abandoned earlier plans to bring approximately one hundred representatives of this category into the State Duma, and the final number, according to the authors’ estimate, should have consisted of approximately fifty persons. The material noted that many candidates regarded in the Duma as conflict participants already had experience working in state structures or politics.

The FIIA authors interpreted this circumstance as evidence that membership in the corresponding category itself did not determine parliamentary recruitment. Among additional characteristics mentioned were already existing political or administrative experience and inclusion in operating institutional structures.

In February 2026, the Polish OSW in a study titled “The Kremlin’s Loyal Praetorians” also questioned the expectation of approximately one hundred representatives of this category appearing in the Duma. The study noted caution regarding the formation of an independent political group capable of acquiring its own organizational autonomy. Simultaneously, the inclusion of new personnel was regarded as a mechanism for elite renewal and as a separate task of managing personnel integration.

Thus, in the presented foreign analysis, the veteran component is not reduced to a quantitative indicator. It is placed in the broader context of personnel recruitment, the combination of new and already institutionalized political figures, and the formation of mechanisms for integrating new groups into the existing system.

Changes in Requirements for the Personal Composition of the Deputy Corps

Russian analytical assessments also addressed changes in the characteristics of the deputy corps. Political scientist Konstantin Kalachev in commentary to “Vedomosti” in May 2026 noted a decline in demand for deputies oriented primarily toward media activity, since greater significance, according to his assessment, was acquired by faction discipline and manageability. Konstantin Kostin of the RPA also linked the peculiarities of the 2026 campaign to a departure from the previous model, in which politicians with sharp or radical public statements played a notable role. In his assessment, emphasis was shifting from media prominence and provocative rhetoric toward faction discipline and manageability.

At the same time, Kostin noted that a change in public sentiment might again increase the demand for politicians employing more pronounced populist rhetoric. In the same RPA publication, mention was made in connection with the assessment of the political character of the organizational question of committee distribution and the necessity to maintain balance between factions. Thus, personnel parameters of the deputy corps and the organizational configuration of committees were regarded in a unified context of managing parliamentary interaction. 

The Eighth Convocation as an Institutional Point of Departure

The German SWP cited data presented by Vyacheslav Volodin at the concluding plenary session: 26 percent of successful legislative initiatives were submitted on a cross-factional basis, and 68.5 percent of laws received support from all parliamentary groups. In the SWP analytical construction, these indicators were used to characterize a combination of formal parliamentary pluralism with a high degree of political agreement. Thus, personnel changes in the ninth convocation were examined against the background of the institutional practice of the previous composition, rather than in isolation from it.

Parliamentary Structure as a Space for Intra-Elite Interaction

In the presented aggregate of materials, committee structure functions as an independent level of intra-elite processes. Chair positions are simultaneously connected with legislative specialization, organizational control over specialized work, and the possibility of influencing the formation of the parliamentary agenda.

Pavel SklyanChuk from the Russian Center for Current Politics directly linked committee chair positions to their significance for managing the agenda and lobbying activity.

In this connection, the redistribution of positions between factions has several dimensions. First, it reflects the numerical correlation of deputy groups. Second, it determines the party affiliation of leaders of individual areas. Third, it affects the personal distribution of institutional experience among deputies.

This third aspect is especially notable in comparing preserved and newly created committees. A substantial portion of experienced chairs preserved their areas, while simultaneously several deputies moved to new specialized positions, and a number of organizational functions acquired independent institutional form.

Conclusion

Overall, the studied analytical sources permit registration of several processes simultaneously, to which researchers in Russia and in other countries drew attention: preservation of key parliamentary leadership, reproduction of a substantial portion of the experienced committee leadership corps, redistribution of individual specialized positions between factions, creation of new specialized structures, and the inclusion of new personnel in the already existing parliamentary-party system.

Thus, in the available aggregate of materials, the formation of the Duma of the ninth convocation appears as a combination of institutional continuity and limited, but structurally notable, personnel and organizational renewal.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 221 (July 28, 2026)

The key word in this issue of our monitoring, analyzing scientific publications and reports from June 2026, is «war». News reports have taught us that war is no longer a crisis, a brief storm between periods of peace, but the new norm. There is less and less research on war itself; more and more research on how war changes and transforms the everyday fabric of life. Israelis have known this for a long time, since the founding of our country. Now the rest of the world is feeling it along with us.

The article Political and social analysis of the impact of national identity and gender roles on national stability (in the context of Kazakhstan), authored by Nursulu Nurpeissova, Zhengisbek Tolen, Serikkhan Zhuzeyev, Makhpal Syzdykova, and Aigul Abdiramanova, represents a collaborative effort from Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Turan University, and Korkyt Ata Kyzylorda University. Published  in Frontiers in Sociology in June 2026, this study offers a timely empirical investigation into the intertwined effects of national identity and gender roles on state stability in Kazakhstan. The central research question examines how the strengthening of national identity, alongside the conflict between traditional and modern gender roles, influences national stability in a post-Soviet context. The study’s scope is defined by a mixed-methods approach, integrating quantitative surveys with qualitative focus groups to capture both the statistical relationships and the nuanced social perceptions underlying them.

The theoretical framework of the research is grounded in the constructivist paradigm of nation-building, drawing on the foundational works of Anderson, Hobsbawm, and Gellner, while also engaging with the ethno-symbolic approach of Smith. The authors situate Kazakhstan within the broader discourse on civic versus ethnic nationalism, emphasizing that post-Soviet identity formation is shaped by state policies aimed at reviving historical memory and promoting inter-ethnic harmony. The study explicitly critiques the traditional dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism, aligning with scholars who argue that these forms are deeply interconnected in transitional societies. Methodologically, the research employs a sequential mixed-method design. The quantitative phase surveyed 284 respondents, predominantly urban youth, using a structured questionnaire with scales measuring national identity, attitudes toward gender equality, national stability, and a combined construct of «uniqueness and gender integration». Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation, multiple linear regression, and factor analysis. The qualitative phase consisted of three focus group interviews with participants from diverse social backgrounds, which served to contextualize and explain the statistical findings. This methodological integration allows the authors to move beyond mere correlation and explore the latent social mechanisms at play.

The principal findings of the study reveal a complex and non-linear relationship between the variables. The strongest predictor of national stability was the variable «uniqueness and gender integration». which demonstrated a significant positive effect. National identity itself also exhibited a positive and statistically significant influence on stability. However, the variable measuring attitudes toward gender roles in isolation did not show a direct statistically significant effect. The Pearson correlation analysis confirmed this pattern, indicating no significant direct relationship between gender role attitudes and national stability. Qualitative data from focus groups provide a compelling explanation for this phenomenon. Participants expressed that gender equality, when perceived as a foreign or imposed discourse, is seen as separate from national stability, which is more closely tied to national unity and traditional values. There is a societal rejection of pure egalitarian modernization as a guarantee of state security, coupled with a latent resistance to Western gender discourses that are isolated from the national context. The factor analysis further supports this interpretation, demonstrating that national identity and gender integration form a single latent construct, while gender roles alone constitute a separate dimension. The authors interpret these findings as evidence that political stability in Kazakhstan is not achieved through the simple imposition of gender equality, but rather through its organic integration as a natural part of the national historical code.

The scholarly contribution of this publication lies in its empirical bridge between two often disparate fields: the study of national identity and the analysis of gender roles. The research addresses a significant gap in the literature by demonstrating that the intersection of these factors, rather than their isolated effects, is decisive for state stability in transitional societies. The article advances the theoretical discourse by challenging both conservative neo-traditionalism and uncontextualized Western modernization, proposing that a hybrid model of social cohesion is more effective. The study’s novelty is underscored by its empirical evidence that the integration of gender equality into the national narrative serves as a more powerful predictor of stability than national identity alone. For an Israeli academic readership interested in post-Soviet affairs, this study offers valuable insights into the complexities of nation-building in a multi-ethnic, transitional state. It highlights the delicate balance that post-Soviet regimes must strike between preserving cultural heritage and adapting to global egalitarian norms, a challenge that resonates with broader studies of nationalism, identity politics, and state legitimacy. The findings are particularly relevant for scholars examining the role of ideology, the politics of memory, and the social dimensions of security in the post-Soviet space. The study’s emphasis on a communication paradigm that integrates gender equality into the national narrative provides a concrete framework for understanding how ideological policies can be crafted to enhance social wellbeing and national security without provoking societal polarization.

We presented the policy paper “Between Russia and Europe, between War and Peace? What is at Stake in Armenia’s Upcoming Election?” by Mikayel Zolyan, published by the French Institute of International Relations on June 5, 2026. Zolyan, a former member of the Armenian Parliament, offers a detailed examination of the pivotal parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7, 2026, framing them not as a routine political event but as a critical referendum on the foreign and security policy trajectory set by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The study’s core focus is the contest between the incumbent government’s strategy of diversifying Armenia’s foreign policy away from Russia and a pro-Russian opposition seeking to restore the traditional alliance with Moscow. The primary research question explores which orientation will prevail and what the implications are for the fragile peace in the South Caucasus and Armenia’s internal political development.

The author adopts a political analysis framework, grounding his assessment in an interpretation of Armenia’s recent geopolitical shifts, domestic political dynamics, and public opinion trends. The analytical approach is largely descriptive and predictive, combining a review of the key contenders, their platforms, and the external pressures shaping the electoral environment. Zolyan’s conceptual assumptions rest on the idea that Armenia is at a crossroads, with its foreign policy no longer being a settled matter of Russian allegiance but a subject of intense national debate. The methodology is implicit, drawing on available opinion polls, political observations, and an insider’s understanding of the political landscape to project plausible post-election scenarios. The central argument posits that the election results will be decisive for the future of Pashinyan’s «peace agenda» with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which is contingent upon his policy of «diversification» and reducing dependence on Moscow.

The paper’s principal findings detail a highly polarized electorate and a fragile lead for Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, which is currently polling at around 32 percent. The analysis underscores the three main pro-Russian opposition forces: Samvel Karapetyan’s «Strong Armenia». Robert Kocharyan’s «Armenia alliance». and Gagik Tsarukyan’s «Prosperous Armenia». Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire with Kremlin support, emerges as the primary challenger. The empirical evidence Zolyan presents includes poll results, the history of Moscow’s passivity during crises for Armenia, and the specific elements of Pashinyan’s policy platform, such as the recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and the downplaying of the Genocide recognition issue in foreign policy. He notes that this pragmatic approach, while fueling economic growth, has also provoked a strong emotional backlash from those who see it as a betrayal of national identity. The author concludes that the most likely outcome is another term for Pashinyan, which would see a continuation of his delicate balancing act—moving closer to Europe and the United States while attempting to avoid a complete rupture with Russia. A victory for the pro-Russian opposition, though deemed unlikely, is presented as a scenario that could undermine the Washington Accords and the broader peace process, potentially leading to a return to conflict with Azerbaijan.

The paper’s originality is evident in its detailed portrayal of the actors involved, particularly the role of Kremlin-linked businessmen in opposition politics, and its assessment of the fragile state of Armenia’s democratic institutions. For an Israeli academic audience, this publication is significant for several reasons. It provides a case study in the complex navigation of regional conflicts by small states caught between rival powers, a theme with clear parallels to Israel’s own strategic environment. The analysis of how memory politics and identity shape foreign policy choices is relevant to understanding nationalist movements and irredentist claims in the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, the paper’s focus on the stability of the South Caucasus, a region of strategic importance, offers insights into broader Eurasian security dynamics and the potential for external interference to alter the trajectory of regional peace, which is of interest to scholars of security studies and international relations.

Zhanat Zakiyeva (National Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan in Almaty), explores the dynamics of female participation in academic and policy-oriented research in her article “The role of women of central asia in political science: the case of Kazakhstan”, published  in the International Journal of Research in Education Humanities and Commerce, Volume 07, Issue 03, May-June 2026. The study centers on the “female presence” in political science within research institutes and think tanks across Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, comparing the late Soviet period from 1980 to 1992 with the era of independence. Zakiyeva addresses the origins and consequences of the third wave of feminization in Soviet science, persistent gender asymmetry especially in senior positions, and the barriers and prospects for advancing women researchers in shaping regional scientific and policy discourses.

The author adopts a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodology grounded in comparative analysis of the five Central Asian states, supplemented by content analysis of official documents, government publications, and media materials, alongside case studies of women’s engagement on international platforms such as the UN and UNESCO. This framework draws on legal documents, national and international statistics including UN Women, OSCE, and ADB reports, academic scholarship, interviews, and public speeches, combining historical, systemic, institutional, statistical, and analytical approaches without relying on new primary fieldwork.

Zakiyeva argues that Soviet policies enabled substantial female involvement in science, with women reaching parity or surpassing men in overall researcher numbers by the 1980s, particularly in humanities, social sciences, biology, and medicine, though political science, security, and economics remained male-dominated. Post-independence, patriarchal attitudes, institutional barriers, family responsibilities, and reduced scientific funding led to sharp declines in women’s leadership roles across the region, with women occupying only 10 to 20 percent of senior positions by 2025. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan show relatively higher representation—54 percent and 52 percent of scientists respectively, with targeted gender strategies—while Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan lag significantly, with women at 31 percent or lower in scientific workforces and minimal leadership presence. The text emphasizes that women researchers contribute soft power potential as mediators and experts in areas like sustainable development and water diplomacy, yet remain underrepresented as authors, panelists, and decision-makers in political science due to stereotypes, limited mentoring, and professional networks. Positive trends include gradual increases in educational attainment and state initiatives in Kazakhstan such as Bolashak and Nazarbayev University programs, alongside symbolic appointments like a woman heading the National Academy of Sciences. The study concludes that while gender empowering shows advancement, cultural and structural obstacles persist, recommending national strategies for STEM and political science education, expanded international cooperation, monitoring mechanisms, transparent recruitment, and integration of gender lenses into policy to foster inclusive scientific communities.

This publication contributes to regional scholarship by offering a comparative overview of women in Central Asian political science that highlights both Soviet legacies and post-Soviet divergences, filling noted gaps in empirical focus on this specific sphere and aligning with broader UN Sustainable Development Goals on gender equality. For Israeli scholars examining post-Soviet political development, ethnicity, nationalism, and international relations in Central Asia, the analysis illuminates institutional evolutions in think tanks and expert communities that influence foreign policy formation, regional cooperation, and responses to geopolitical pressures, providing a gender-informed lens on human capital and soft power dynamics in neighboring post-Soviet states.

The article “The Concept and Legal Framework of Local Public Administration Powers in the Republic of Moldova: Foundations and Practical Challenges,”  published in Public Policies.bg, Volume 17, Number 3 (June 2026), is authored by Sergey Dimitrioglo, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Public Administration at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski.” The study examines the legal and conceptual foundations of local public administration powers in the Republic of Moldova and situates this issue within the broader context of post-Soviet democratic transformation, decentralization, and European integration. The author seeks to clarify how local government competences have been defined, institutionalized, and implemented since the adoption of the Moldovan Constitution of 1994, while also identifying structural weaknesses that continue to affect the functioning of local self-government.

The article is grounded in doctrinal legal analysis supplemented by limited comparative analysis. Its primary sources include constitutional provisions, legislation regulating local public administration and administrative decentralization, legal acts concerning the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, and relevant international norms, especially the European Charter of Local Self-Government. Rather than focusing on empirical outcomes, the study concentrates on the conceptual content and normative architecture of local authority powers. Comparative references to Romania, Georgia, and Ukraine are employed to place the Moldovan experience within a wider regional framework of post-communist administrative reform.

A central argument of the article is that Moldova possesses a formally developed legal framework for local autonomy that broadly reflects European standards, yet significant tensions persist between constitutional guarantees and practical implementation. The author traces the evolution of the concept of local public administration and demonstrates that Moldovan law combines a commitment to local autonomy with a system in which competences remain heavily dependent on statutory regulation. Particular attention is devoted to the distinction between competences and powers. Competence is defined as the overall sphere of authority assigned to a public body, whereas powers constitute the specific rights and duties through which that authority is exercised. According to the author, inconsistent use of these concepts in legislation has contributed to interpretive uncertainty and administrative difficulties.

The study analyzes the two-tier structure of local governance established by the key decentralization laws adopted in 2006. First-level authorities are entrusted with functions relating to local property, taxation, infrastructure, social services, environmental management, and local regulation, while second-level authorities perform coordinating and strategic functions. The author emphasizes the legal distinction between own, shared, and delegated competences, arguing that the absence of sufficiently precise criteria for delimiting these categories remains one of the principal weaknesses of the existing framework. This ambiguity, in the author’s assessment, often enables central authorities to retain substantial influence over areas formally assigned to local government.

A major theme of the article is the gap between normative commitments and institutional realities. Although Moldovan legislation requires delegated responsibilities to be accompanied by adequate financial resources, the author argues that this principle has not been consistently implemented. Fiscal dependence on transfers from the central government limits the effective exercise of local autonomy and weakens the practical significance of formally assigned competences. The discussion of subsidiarity further reinforces this point. While subsidiarity is embedded in both European and national policy frameworks, the transfer of meaningful decision-making authority has remained incomplete, partly because of concerns regarding the limited administrative and financial capacities of many local units.

The article devotes special attention to Gagauzia, whose autonomous status introduces an additional layer of complexity into Moldova’s territorial organization. The coexistence of a general local government regime and a special autonomy regime creates legal ambiguities concerning competence allocation and institutional authority. The author argues that Gagauzia’s broader self-governing powers, distinct budgetary arrangements, and legislative prerogatives require a separate analytical framework and continue to generate unresolved jurisdictional questions.

The study’s contribution lies in its systematic synthesis of the conceptual and legal dimensions of local public administration powers in Moldova. By connecting constitutional principles, legislative provisions, and broader debates on decentralization, it highlights the relationship between legal design and democratic governance. The article concludes that meaningful local autonomy requires not only clearer legislation but also stronger fiscal foundations, improved administrative capacity, and greater commitment to the principle of subsidiarity. For Israeli scholars interested in post-Soviet political development, governance reform, regional autonomy, and state-building, the study offers a detailed examination of how decentralization and territorial diversity shape institutional development in a transitional state.

“Conscription, Scaling-up and Regional Defence: Perspectives from the Baltic Sea States”  is a policy-oriented report prepared by Fredrik Weibull of the Hanken School of Economics in Helsinki and Karl Ydén of the Swedish Armed Forces for the Geopolitics and Security Studies Center (GSSC) in Vilnius and published on 19 May 2026. The study examines how Lithuania, Sweden, Finland, Poland, and Germany are responding to changing security conditions in Europe through reforms of military manpower systems, with particular attention to compulsory military service and the challenge of expanding defence capabilities.

The report is driven by a central research question: which models of conscript training can be adapted by European states seeking to increase the volume of trained personnel. Rather than offering a comprehensive survey of regional security, the authors focus on regional defence understood as the practical organization and management of military capabilities. Their approach combines historical analysis, comparative policy examination, and institutional assessment. Particular emphasis is placed on Sweden and Finland, whose experiences provide the richest empirical material and contrasting examples of military recruitment systems. The study employs a selective comparative framework that investigates military service policies, recruitment structures, training systems, reserve forces, demographic constraints, and political-cultural factors shaping defence reforms.

A significant part of the report situates contemporary debates within a broader historical and conceptual context. The authors trace the evolution of conscription from early modern European state-building and the “reason of state” tradition through the rise and decline of mass armies in the twentieth century. They argue that the post-Cold War predominance of all-volunteer forces reflected changing geopolitical conditions, technological developments, and market-oriented approaches to military recruitment. In their interpretation, recent developments in Europe have revived interest in conscription and national service as states reconsider the relationship between sovereignty, territorial defence, and military preparedness.

The country studies reveal distinct trajectories. Lithuania reintroduced conscription in 2015 and is gradually expanding a system that combines volunteers with lottery-based selection. Sweden reinstated conscription in 2017 after a period of reliance on an all-volunteer force but continues to face limitations related to infrastructure, equipment, and training capacity. Finland stands out as the most consistent example of a large-scale mobilization model, having maintained conscription throughout the post-Cold War period while continuously adapting training methods and reserve structures. Poland has pursued rapid military expansion through voluntary service and reserve-building rather than renewed conscription. Germany, meanwhile, is engaged in an ongoing debate over the future of military service as it confronts recruitment difficulties and broader questions regarding defence policy.

The principal conclusion of the report is that the Finnish system offers the most useful model for states seeking to expand military manpower efficiently. The authors highlight Finland’s ability to process large cohorts, maintain extensive reserves, and organize overlapping training cycles that maximize personnel throughput. Building on this example, they recommend shorter and more focused training periods, greater use of reservists and non-regular personnel as instructors, increased training intensity, and closer cooperation between military institutions and technological education. The report also examines gender-neutral conscription, demographic decline, casualty sensitivity, technological specialization, and the future of mass armies, arguing that contemporary defence systems increasingly require highly skilled personnel rather than merely large numbers of recruits.

The study’s contribution lies in linking historical debates about conscription with current policy challenges in the Baltic Sea region. By comparing diverse national experiences and focusing on practical mechanisms of military expansion, it provides a framework for understanding how states can adapt manpower systems under conditions of strategic uncertainty. For an Israeli academic audience interested in security studies, military sociology, state capacity, and comparative defence policy, the report offers a detailed examination of how European states balance recruitment, training, reserves, and societal legitimacy while attempting to strengthen territorial defence in a changing regional environment.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 221 (July 28, 2026)

The key word in this issue of our monitoring, analyzing scientific publications and reports from June 2026, is «war». News reports have taught us that war is no longer a crisis, a brief storm between periods of peace, but the new norm. There is less and less research on war itself; more and more research on how war changes and transforms the everyday fabric of life. Israelis have known this for a long time, since the founding of our country. Now the rest of the world is feeling it along with us.

The article Political and social analysis of the impact of national identity and gender roles on national stability (in the context of Kazakhstan), authored by Nursulu Nurpeissova, Zhengisbek Tolen, Serikkhan Zhuzeyev, Makhpal Syzdykova, and Aigul Abdiramanova, represents a collaborative effort from Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Turan University, and Korkyt Ata Kyzylorda University. Published  in Frontiers in Sociology in June 2026, this study offers a timely empirical investigation into the intertwined effects of national identity and gender roles on state stability in Kazakhstan. The central research question examines how the strengthening of national identity, alongside the conflict between traditional and modern gender roles, influences national stability in a post-Soviet context. The study’s scope is defined by a mixed-methods approach, integrating quantitative surveys with qualitative focus groups to capture both the statistical relationships and the nuanced social perceptions underlying them.

The theoretical framework of the research is grounded in the constructivist paradigm of nation-building, drawing on the foundational works of Anderson, Hobsbawm, and Gellner, while also engaging with the ethno-symbolic approach of Smith. The authors situate Kazakhstan within the broader discourse on civic versus ethnic nationalism, emphasizing that post-Soviet identity formation is shaped by state policies aimed at reviving historical memory and promoting inter-ethnic harmony. The study explicitly critiques the traditional dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism, aligning with scholars who argue that these forms are deeply interconnected in transitional societies. Methodologically, the research employs a sequential mixed-method design. The quantitative phase surveyed 284 respondents, predominantly urban youth, using a structured questionnaire with scales measuring national identity, attitudes toward gender equality, national stability, and a combined construct of «uniqueness and gender integration». Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation, multiple linear regression, and factor analysis. The qualitative phase consisted of three focus group interviews with participants from diverse social backgrounds, which served to contextualize and explain the statistical findings. This methodological integration allows the authors to move beyond mere correlation and explore the latent social mechanisms at play.

The principal findings of the study reveal a complex and non-linear relationship between the variables. The strongest predictor of national stability was the variable «uniqueness and gender integration». which demonstrated a significant positive effect. National identity itself also exhibited a positive and statistically significant influence on stability. However, the variable measuring attitudes toward gender roles in isolation did not show a direct statistically significant effect. The Pearson correlation analysis confirmed this pattern, indicating no significant direct relationship between gender role attitudes and national stability. Qualitative data from focus groups provide a compelling explanation for this phenomenon. Participants expressed that gender equality, when perceived as a foreign or imposed discourse, is seen as separate from national stability, which is more closely tied to national unity and traditional values. There is a societal rejection of pure egalitarian modernization as a guarantee of state security, coupled with a latent resistance to Western gender discourses that are isolated from the national context. The factor analysis further supports this interpretation, demonstrating that national identity and gender integration form a single latent construct, while gender roles alone constitute a separate dimension. The authors interpret these findings as evidence that political stability in Kazakhstan is not achieved through the simple imposition of gender equality, but rather through its organic integration as a natural part of the national historical code.

The scholarly contribution of this publication lies in its empirical bridge between two often disparate fields: the study of national identity and the analysis of gender roles. The research addresses a significant gap in the literature by demonstrating that the intersection of these factors, rather than their isolated effects, is decisive for state stability in transitional societies. The article advances the theoretical discourse by challenging both conservative neo-traditionalism and uncontextualized Western modernization, proposing that a hybrid model of social cohesion is more effective. The study’s novelty is underscored by its empirical evidence that the integration of gender equality into the national narrative serves as a more powerful predictor of stability than national identity alone. For an Israeli academic readership interested in post-Soviet affairs, this study offers valuable insights into the complexities of nation-building in a multi-ethnic, transitional state. It highlights the delicate balance that post-Soviet regimes must strike between preserving cultural heritage and adapting to global egalitarian norms, a challenge that resonates with broader studies of nationalism, identity politics, and state legitimacy. The findings are particularly relevant for scholars examining the role of ideology, the politics of memory, and the social dimensions of security in the post-Soviet space. The study’s emphasis on a communication paradigm that integrates gender equality into the national narrative provides a concrete framework for understanding how ideological policies can be crafted to enhance social wellbeing and national security without provoking societal polarization.

We presented the policy paper “Between Russia and Europe, between War and Peace? What is at Stake in Armenia’s Upcoming Election?” by Mikayel Zolyan, published by the French Institute of International Relations on June 5, 2026. Zolyan, a former member of the Armenian Parliament, offers a detailed examination of the pivotal parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7, 2026, framing them not as a routine political event but as a critical referendum on the foreign and security policy trajectory set by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The study’s core focus is the contest between the incumbent government’s strategy of diversifying Armenia’s foreign policy away from Russia and a pro-Russian opposition seeking to restore the traditional alliance with Moscow. The primary research question explores which orientation will prevail and what the implications are for the fragile peace in the South Caucasus and Armenia’s internal political development.

The author adopts a political analysis framework, grounding his assessment in an interpretation of Armenia’s recent geopolitical shifts, domestic political dynamics, and public opinion trends. The analytical approach is largely descriptive and predictive, combining a review of the key contenders, their platforms, and the external pressures shaping the electoral environment. Zolyan’s conceptual assumptions rest on the idea that Armenia is at a crossroads, with its foreign policy no longer being a settled matter of Russian allegiance but a subject of intense national debate. The methodology is implicit, drawing on available opinion polls, political observations, and an insider’s understanding of the political landscape to project plausible post-election scenarios. The central argument posits that the election results will be decisive for the future of Pashinyan’s «peace agenda» with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which is contingent upon his policy of «diversification» and reducing dependence on Moscow.

The paper’s principal findings detail a highly polarized electorate and a fragile lead for Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, which is currently polling at around 32 percent. The analysis underscores the three main pro-Russian opposition forces: Samvel Karapetyan’s «Strong Armenia». Robert Kocharyan’s «Armenia alliance». and Gagik Tsarukyan’s «Prosperous Armenia». Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire with Kremlin support, emerges as the primary challenger. The empirical evidence Zolyan presents includes poll results, the history of Moscow’s passivity during crises for Armenia, and the specific elements of Pashinyan’s policy platform, such as the recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and the downplaying of the Genocide recognition issue in foreign policy. He notes that this pragmatic approach, while fueling economic growth, has also provoked a strong emotional backlash from those who see it as a betrayal of national identity. The author concludes that the most likely outcome is another term for Pashinyan, which would see a continuation of his delicate balancing act—moving closer to Europe and the United States while attempting to avoid a complete rupture with Russia. A victory for the pro-Russian opposition, though deemed unlikely, is presented as a scenario that could undermine the Washington Accords and the broader peace process, potentially leading to a return to conflict with Azerbaijan.

The paper’s originality is evident in its detailed portrayal of the actors involved, particularly the role of Kremlin-linked businessmen in opposition politics, and its assessment of the fragile state of Armenia’s democratic institutions. For an Israeli academic audience, this publication is significant for several reasons. It provides a case study in the complex navigation of regional conflicts by small states caught between rival powers, a theme with clear parallels to Israel’s own strategic environment. The analysis of how memory politics and identity shape foreign policy choices is relevant to understanding nationalist movements and irredentist claims in the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, the paper’s focus on the stability of the South Caucasus, a region of strategic importance, offers insights into broader Eurasian security dynamics and the potential for external interference to alter the trajectory of regional peace, which is of interest to scholars of security studies and international relations.

Zhanat Zakiyeva (National Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan in Almaty), explores the dynamics of female participation in academic and policy-oriented research in her article “The role of women of central asia in political science: the case of Kazakhstan”, published  in the International Journal of Research in Education Humanities and Commerce, Volume 07, Issue 03, May-June 2026. The study centers on the “female presence” in political science within research institutes and think tanks across Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, comparing the late Soviet period from 1980 to 1992 with the era of independence. Zakiyeva addresses the origins and consequences of the third wave of feminization in Soviet science, persistent gender asymmetry especially in senior positions, and the barriers and prospects for advancing women researchers in shaping regional scientific and policy discourses.

The author adopts a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodology grounded in comparative analysis of the five Central Asian states, supplemented by content analysis of official documents, government publications, and media materials, alongside case studies of women’s engagement on international platforms such as the UN and UNESCO. This framework draws on legal documents, national and international statistics including UN Women, OSCE, and ADB reports, academic scholarship, interviews, and public speeches, combining historical, systemic, institutional, statistical, and analytical approaches without relying on new primary fieldwork.

Zakiyeva argues that Soviet policies enabled substantial female involvement in science, with women reaching parity or surpassing men in overall researcher numbers by the 1980s, particularly in humanities, social sciences, biology, and medicine, though political science, security, and economics remained male-dominated. Post-independence, patriarchal attitudes, institutional barriers, family responsibilities, and reduced scientific funding led to sharp declines in women’s leadership roles across the region, with women occupying only 10 to 20 percent of senior positions by 2025. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan show relatively higher representation—54 percent and 52 percent of scientists respectively, with targeted gender strategies—while Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan lag significantly, with women at 31 percent or lower in scientific workforces and minimal leadership presence. The text emphasizes that women researchers contribute soft power potential as mediators and experts in areas like sustainable development and water diplomacy, yet remain underrepresented as authors, panelists, and decision-makers in political science due to stereotypes, limited mentoring, and professional networks. Positive trends include gradual increases in educational attainment and state initiatives in Kazakhstan such as Bolashak and Nazarbayev University programs, alongside symbolic appointments like a woman heading the National Academy of Sciences. The study concludes that while gender empowering shows advancement, cultural and structural obstacles persist, recommending national strategies for STEM and political science education, expanded international cooperation, monitoring mechanisms, transparent recruitment, and integration of gender lenses into policy to foster inclusive scientific communities.

This publication contributes to regional scholarship by offering a comparative overview of women in Central Asian political science that highlights both Soviet legacies and post-Soviet divergences, filling noted gaps in empirical focus on this specific sphere and aligning with broader UN Sustainable Development Goals on gender equality. For Israeli scholars examining post-Soviet political development, ethnicity, nationalism, and international relations in Central Asia, the analysis illuminates institutional evolutions in think tanks and expert communities that influence foreign policy formation, regional cooperation, and responses to geopolitical pressures, providing a gender-informed lens on human capital and soft power dynamics in neighboring post-Soviet states.

The article “The Concept and Legal Framework of Local Public Administration Powers in the Republic of Moldova: Foundations and Practical Challenges,”  published in Public Policies.bg, Volume 17, Number 3 (June 2026), is authored by Sergey Dimitrioglo, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Public Administration at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski.” The study examines the legal and conceptual foundations of local public administration powers in the Republic of Moldova and situates this issue within the broader context of post-Soviet democratic transformation, decentralization, and European integration. The author seeks to clarify how local government competences have been defined, institutionalized, and implemented since the adoption of the Moldovan Constitution of 1994, while also identifying structural weaknesses that continue to affect the functioning of local self-government.

The article is grounded in doctrinal legal analysis supplemented by limited comparative analysis. Its primary sources include constitutional provisions, legislation regulating local public administration and administrative decentralization, legal acts concerning the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, and relevant international norms, especially the European Charter of Local Self-Government. Rather than focusing on empirical outcomes, the study concentrates on the conceptual content and normative architecture of local authority powers. Comparative references to Romania, Georgia, and Ukraine are employed to place the Moldovan experience within a wider regional framework of post-communist administrative reform.

A central argument of the article is that Moldova possesses a formally developed legal framework for local autonomy that broadly reflects European standards, yet significant tensions persist between constitutional guarantees and practical implementation. The author traces the evolution of the concept of local public administration and demonstrates that Moldovan law combines a commitment to local autonomy with a system in which competences remain heavily dependent on statutory regulation. Particular attention is devoted to the distinction between competences and powers. Competence is defined as the overall sphere of authority assigned to a public body, whereas powers constitute the specific rights and duties through which that authority is exercised. According to the author, inconsistent use of these concepts in legislation has contributed to interpretive uncertainty and administrative difficulties.

The study analyzes the two-tier structure of local governance established by the key decentralization laws adopted in 2006. First-level authorities are entrusted with functions relating to local property, taxation, infrastructure, social services, environmental management, and local regulation, while second-level authorities perform coordinating and strategic functions. The author emphasizes the legal distinction between own, shared, and delegated competences, arguing that the absence of sufficiently precise criteria for delimiting these categories remains one of the principal weaknesses of the existing framework. This ambiguity, in the author’s assessment, often enables central authorities to retain substantial influence over areas formally assigned to local government.

A major theme of the article is the gap between normative commitments and institutional realities. Although Moldovan legislation requires delegated responsibilities to be accompanied by adequate financial resources, the author argues that this principle has not been consistently implemented. Fiscal dependence on transfers from the central government limits the effective exercise of local autonomy and weakens the practical significance of formally assigned competences. The discussion of subsidiarity further reinforces this point. While subsidiarity is embedded in both European and national policy frameworks, the transfer of meaningful decision-making authority has remained incomplete, partly because of concerns regarding the limited administrative and financial capacities of many local units.

The article devotes special attention to Gagauzia, whose autonomous status introduces an additional layer of complexity into Moldova’s territorial organization. The coexistence of a general local government regime and a special autonomy regime creates legal ambiguities concerning competence allocation and institutional authority. The author argues that Gagauzia’s broader self-governing powers, distinct budgetary arrangements, and legislative prerogatives require a separate analytical framework and continue to generate unresolved jurisdictional questions.

The study’s contribution lies in its systematic synthesis of the conceptual and legal dimensions of local public administration powers in Moldova. By connecting constitutional principles, legislative provisions, and broader debates on decentralization, it highlights the relationship between legal design and democratic governance. The article concludes that meaningful local autonomy requires not only clearer legislation but also stronger fiscal foundations, improved administrative capacity, and greater commitment to the principle of subsidiarity. For Israeli scholars interested in post-Soviet political development, governance reform, regional autonomy, and state-building, the study offers a detailed examination of how decentralization and territorial diversity shape institutional development in a transitional state.

“Conscription, Scaling-up and Regional Defence: Perspectives from the Baltic Sea States”  is a policy-oriented report prepared by Fredrik Weibull of the Hanken School of Economics in Helsinki and Karl Ydén of the Swedish Armed Forces for the Geopolitics and Security Studies Center (GSSC) in Vilnius and published on 19 May 2026. The study examines how Lithuania, Sweden, Finland, Poland, and Germany are responding to changing security conditions in Europe through reforms of military manpower systems, with particular attention to compulsory military service and the challenge of expanding defence capabilities.

The report is driven by a central research question: which models of conscript training can be adapted by European states seeking to increase the volume of trained personnel. Rather than offering a comprehensive survey of regional security, the authors focus on regional defence understood as the practical organization and management of military capabilities. Their approach combines historical analysis, comparative policy examination, and institutional assessment. Particular emphasis is placed on Sweden and Finland, whose experiences provide the richest empirical material and contrasting examples of military recruitment systems. The study employs a selective comparative framework that investigates military service policies, recruitment structures, training systems, reserve forces, demographic constraints, and political-cultural factors shaping defence reforms.

A significant part of the report situates contemporary debates within a broader historical and conceptual context. The authors trace the evolution of conscription from early modern European state-building and the “reason of state” tradition through the rise and decline of mass armies in the twentieth century. They argue that the post-Cold War predominance of all-volunteer forces reflected changing geopolitical conditions, technological developments, and market-oriented approaches to military recruitment. In their interpretation, recent developments in Europe have revived interest in conscription and national service as states reconsider the relationship between sovereignty, territorial defence, and military preparedness.

The country studies reveal distinct trajectories. Lithuania reintroduced conscription in 2015 and is gradually expanding a system that combines volunteers with lottery-based selection. Sweden reinstated conscription in 2017 after a period of reliance on an all-volunteer force but continues to face limitations related to infrastructure, equipment, and training capacity. Finland stands out as the most consistent example of a large-scale mobilization model, having maintained conscription throughout the post-Cold War period while continuously adapting training methods and reserve structures. Poland has pursued rapid military expansion through voluntary service and reserve-building rather than renewed conscription. Germany, meanwhile, is engaged in an ongoing debate over the future of military service as it confronts recruitment difficulties and broader questions regarding defence policy.

The principal conclusion of the report is that the Finnish system offers the most useful model for states seeking to expand military manpower efficiently. The authors highlight Finland’s ability to process large cohorts, maintain extensive reserves, and organize overlapping training cycles that maximize personnel throughput. Building on this example, they recommend shorter and more focused training periods, greater use of reservists and non-regular personnel as instructors, increased training intensity, and closer cooperation between military institutions and technological education. The report also examines gender-neutral conscription, demographic decline, casualty sensitivity, technological specialization, and the future of mass armies, arguing that contemporary defence systems increasingly require highly skilled personnel rather than merely large numbers of recruits.

The study’s contribution lies in linking historical debates about conscription with current policy challenges in the Baltic Sea region. By comparing diverse national experiences and focusing on practical mechanisms of military expansion, it provides a framework for understanding how states can adapt manpower systems under conditions of strategic uncertainty. For an Israeli academic audience interested in security studies, military sociology, state capacity, and comparative defence policy, the report offers a detailed examination of how European states balance recruitment, training, reserves, and societal legitimacy while attempting to strengthen territorial defence in a changing regional environment.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 220 (July 25, 2026)

Introduction

The institution of indigenous small-numbered peoples (ISNP) in the Russian Federation represents a unique legal phenomenon, combining constitutional guarantees, special federal and regional legislation, and a system of preferences designed to compensate for the vulnerability of ethnic groups numbering fewer than 50,000 persons. However, as an analysis of public information for 2025–2026 demonstrates, the very status of ISNP, which presupposes the granting of special rights and benefits, generates multiple conflicts of various natures. These conflicts are not a consequence of ill‑intentioned policy but constitute a systemic effect inevitably arising when a differentiated legal regime is introduced for certain categories of the population under conditions of a complex balance of interests – between traditional nature use and industrial development of territories, between federal and regional norm‑setting, and between formal criteria of belonging to ISNP and citizens’ self‑identification.

This article proposes a typology of conflicts arising around benefits and preferences for ISNP, based on empirical material published in open sources in 2025–2026.

Theoretical Foundations and Review of Previous Research

In academic literature, the problem of preferential regimes for ethnic minorities has traditionally been examined within several theoretical approaches. Multiculturalism theory (W. Kymlicka, C. Taylor) justifies the necessity of differentiated rights for ethno‑cultural groups as a means of preserving cultural diversity and compensating for historical injustice. The institutional approach (D. North, E. Ostrom) emphasises that any preferential regimes create new institutional traps – situations in which the legislator’s good intentions come into contradiction with enforcement practices and generate unexpected conflict effects.

With respect to Russian ISNP, previous studies (see, for example, the works of S.A. Fundament, S.N. Kharyuchi, as well as the annual reports of the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs – IWGIA) have focused primarily on the problems of implementing ISNP rights in the spheres of land use and traditional nature use. However, a systematic typology of conflicts generated by the institution of benefits and preferences themselves has remained insufficiently developed. The present study fills this gap by proposing a classification of conflicts according to their source and mechanism of occurrence.

Research Methodology

The research based on a content analysis of public information published between 1 January 2025 and July 2026. The sources included official internet portals of judicial bodies (the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, arbitrazh courts, courts of general jurisdiction), official legal information portals (GARANT, ConsultantPlus), official websites of state authorities (the Government of the Russian Federation, the Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs), as well as materials from independent news agencies and analytical centres. In total, more than 30 sources containing information on judicial disputes, legislative changes, administrative practices, and socially significant events related to ISNP were analysed.

Typology of Conflicts

The analysis of empirical material allows us to identify five main types of conflicts arising around the status of ISNP and the associated benefits and preferences.

 Type One: Conflicts over Normative Uncertainty of Compensation Mechanisms

The most illustrative example is the administrative claim brought by the family (clan) communities “Kunnoir” and “Madra” against the Government of the Russian Federation seeking to invalidate Government Resolution No. 1488 of 18 September 2020, which approved the Regulation on the Procedure for Compensation of Losses Caused to Indigenous Small‑Numbered Peoples as a Result of Damage to Their Traditional Habitat by Economic Activities. On 18 February 2026, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed the claim; appellate proceedings (Case No. APL26‑133) are scheduled for 7 July 2026 (Source). This conflict has a normative nature: the plaintiffs challenged not a specific law‑enforcement decision but the very procedure for calculating losses, claiming it insufficiently protected the interests of ISNP. The dismissal by the court of first instance demonstrates that even with special legislation in place, implementation mechanisms remain the subject of acute normative disputes. As the Interregional Public Movement “KMNSOYUZ” notes, “in December 2025, representatives of the Kunnoir and Madra communities appealed to the Supreme Court with a claim to declare Government Resolution No. 1488 invalid, believing that this resolution violates the rights of communities by excluding them from the decision‑making process” (Source). This position of the plaintiffs reflects a fundamental problem: even with a formal compensation mechanism in place, its normative design may exclude key stakeholders from decision‑making, thereby generating a legitimacy conflict.

 Type Two: Conflicts over the Interpretation of Liability for Environmental Damage

The Arbitrazh Court of the North‑Western Circuit, in its ruling of 3 July 2026, recorded the recovery from the territorial‑neighbourhood Saami community “Kola” of RUB 3,198,000 as compensation for damage caused to soils (Source). The community insisted that it should not bear responsibility for unauthorised waste disposal because it does not conduct economic activities. The conflict here arises at the intersection of two legal regimes: on the one hand, the community as an ISNP subject enjoys a special status and preferences; on the other hand, it acts as the owner or user of a land plot and bears general civil liability for its condition. The court sided with Rosprirodnadzor, thereby confirming that preferential status does not exempt from obligations arising from environmental legislation. In the context of similar environmental incidents in the Murmansk Region, Rosprirodnadzor stated: “Exceedances of the maximum permissible concentration for the pollutant ‘petroleum products’ by a factor of 400 have been established”. Although this statement relates to a different case, it illustrates the supervisory authority’s general approach to assessing environmental damage, under which ISNP status is not regarded as a ground for exemption from liability for the state of the environment in the territories under their use.

 Type Three: Conflicts over Recognition of Territories of Traditional Nature Use (TTNU)

The family community “Ayakta” (Kets) challenged the refusal of the Turukhansk District Council of Deputies of Krasnoyarsk Krai to establish a locally significant TTNU of 290,980 hectares. The Eighth Cassation Court of General Jurisdiction dismissed the complaint on 18 June 2025 (Source). In another case, the Arbitrazh Court of Krasnoyarsk Krai considered a claim by PJSC “Surgutneftegaz” for the compulsory seizure for state needs of land plots belonging to the community “Nya tansa” (Nganasans).

In a generalised form, as noted in the analytical review by Arctida, in the Yamalo‑Nenets Autonomous Okrug, applications for the establishment of TTNU may be rejected if the proposed territory overlaps with land already used by a legal entity for activities unrelated to traditional nature use, or includes subsoil plots of federal significance. In Krasnoyarsk Krai, legislation imposes restrictions that prevent the creation of large TTNU where existing production facilities or licensed subsoil plots are already located (Source). Conflicts of this type represent a classic clash between two models of land use: territorial (traditional nature use by ISNP) and sectoral (industrial development). At the same time, as practice shows, the establishment of TTNU in a number of cases becomes possible only after a cassation court decision.

The Chairman of the Council of Representatives of Indigenous Small‑Numbered Peoples of Krasnoyarsk Krai, Grigory Dyukarev, states: “the region still lacks a stable practice of creating such territories at the federal and regional levels. Basically, only TTNU of local significance are in operation – in Evenkia there are already 31 of them” (Source). This assessment confirms that even in regions with a relatively developed institutional infrastructure, the status of TTNU remains predominantly local, which limits communities’ access to the full range of preferences provided for by federal legislation.

 Type Four: Conflicts over Identity and Criteria of Belonging to ISNP

The Moscow City Court, in its appellate ruling of 25 March 2026, upheld the decision of the Presnensky District Court dismissing a citizen’s claim for inclusion in the “list of persons belonging to indigenous small‑numbered peoples of the Russian Federation.” The Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs (FADN) justified its refusal on the grounds that the people “Russians” are not included in the Unified List of ISNP approved by Government Resolution No. 255 of 24 March 2000 (Source). This conflict exposes a fundamental problem of any preferential regime based on ethnic affiliation: the criteria for inclusion in a privileged category are inevitably formal and cannot encompass the entire diversity of self‑identifications. The citizen, who relied on a regional normative act recognising Russians as an indigenous small‑numbered people at the subject‑of‑federation level, encountered a hierarchy of legal acts in which the federal list takes precedence.

Deputy Head of the FADN Anna Kotova, commenting on the problems of registering persons belonging to ISNP, noted: “currently, representatives of indigenous peoples, when applying to the Pension Fund for early retirement, must provide various documents, and sometimes even confirm their ethnic affiliation in court”. This admission by a high‑ranking official confirms that administrative barriers associated with the formal verification of ISNP status create additional conflict situations that require judicial resolution even in cases concerning socially significant preferences.

As the IWGIA report “The Indigenous World 2025” notes, the Russian legal system is built around the category of “indigenous small‑numbered peoples,” which narrows the group of indigenous peoples to those recognised by the state as “small‑numbered.” Some indigenous peoples – for example, the Arctic Sakha, the Komi, or the Karelians – do not receive protection within this system because they formally do not meet the ISNP criterion. Since 2020, an additional barrier has been the register of persons belonging to ISNP, maintained by the FADN. This register, designed to simplify accounting, in practice creates additional administrative barriers to access to preferences (Source).

 Type Five: Conflicts over Access to Preferences and Administrative Barriers

According to a TASS report of 25 April 2025, more than 100,000 persons are included in the federal register/list of ISNP persons (Source). However, administrative practices for inclusion in the register require the submission of documents, including court decisions establishing belonging in the absence of other evidence. As noted in the IWGIA report, in 2025 new requirements were introduced for obtaining social and economic benefits by ISNP persons, including mandatory inclusion in the list, which complicates access (Source).

Also indicative is the conflict recorded in the Republic of Dagestan: the FADN proposed to deprive the republic of its unique powers to independently form its list of indigenous peoples and to unify the procedure (Source). Here two approaches clash: the regional one, taking into account local specificity, and the federal one, striving for uniformity of registration procedures.

Institutional Root Causes of Conflicts

The conducted analysis allows us to identify several systemic causes that generate conflicts around the status of ISNP.

First cause: multiplicity and multi‑level nature of legal regulation. The status of ISNP is regulated by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, three special federal laws, more than 20 federal laws containing separate provisions on ISNP, as well as regional legislation. Such multiplicity inevitably creates collisions and gaps.

 Second cause: the gap between declaratory norms and law enforcement practice. As noted in the analytical review by Arctida, the legal framework for protecting ISNP rights “has been generally created,” but in practice it works selectively – sometimes only after judicial proceedings or when it is already too late. A project may obtain a licence for resource development before the indigenous community learns of its consequences (Source).

 Third cause: competition between two models of territorial development. In the territories of traditional residence of ISNP, the interests of industrial development (oil and gas extraction, gold mining, logging) and traditional nature use (reindeer herding, fishing, hunting) collide. At the same time, as practice shows, the establishment of TTNU often becomes possible only after a court decision.

 Fourth cause: bureaucratisation of access to preferences. The introduction of the register of ISNP persons, designed to simplify accounting, has in practice created an additional administrative filter, and exclusion from the list on the person’s own initiative requires consideration of the application within 30 days.

Social and Demographic Aspects of the Conflict Field

Beyond judicial and legal conflicts, the analysis of public information reveals conflicts related to demographic risks and social vulnerability of ISNP. Since 2022, according to human rights activists, there has been a disproportionate mobilisation of men from ISNP. From the Nanai village of Dada (population about 400), 40 men were conscripted. The Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North of Khabarovsk Krai appealed to the President of the Russian Federation with a request to halt mobilisation in indigenous settlements, pointing out that the conscription of “the last Orochs, Udege and Nanais” could lead to the extinction of the peoples. The Far Eastern Federal District ranks first in Russia in the number of confirmed military losses per capita, a significant part of which falls on ISNP (Source).

This conflict has a particular nature: it arises not from contradictions in legislation on ISNP, but from the clash of a universal state obligation (mobilisation) with the special status of ISNP, which presupposes additional protective measures due to demographic vulnerability.

In the context of increasing pressure on indigenous organisations, the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) qualified the arrest of Daria Egereva as a “grave case of intimidation and reprisal against an Indigenous leader in direct connection with her participation in the UNFCCC process.” The organisation stressed that “this legal construction is fabricated: the ‘Anti‑Russian Separatist Movement’ does not exist as a real organisation, and CSIPN has never engaged in or advocated violence or any conduct that could be characterised as terrorism under international law” (Source). A similar assessment was given by Amnesty International: “Daria Egereva is a representative of the Selkups, one of the small indigenous peoples of Western Siberia (Russia). … All this suggests an increasing pressure on civil society of indigenous peoples” (Source). These assessments by independent international human rights organisations indicate that conflicts around the status of ISNP extend beyond purely legal disputes and acquire a dimension related to the implementation of fundamental human rights.

The International Dimension of Conflicts

Conflicts around the status of ISNP in Russia receive international resonance. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its Concluding Observations on the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation (2025), expressed concern about reprisals against human rights defenders, including defenders of ISNP rights, and recommended that efforts be stepped up to ensure the right of indigenous peoples to own, use and manage lands and resources, to conduct systematic prior consultations to obtain free, prior and informed consent before issuing licences for economic activities, to ensure access to health care, education and other services, and to consider ratifying ILO Convention No. 169 (Source). The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova, in her 2025 report noted that Russia’s indigenous peoples remain among the most vulnerable groups (Source).

The international context exacerbates conflicts because it creates an additional dimension – the relationship between national legislation and international obligations. Russia has not ratified ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which is a subject of criticism by international bodies.

In the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), which is the only subject of the Russian Federation where a regional law on ethnological expertise has been adopted, deputy Sakhamin Afanasyev noted that “the Law ‘On Ethnological Expertise’ obliges subsoil users, before commencing economic activities, to conduct a scientific study of the impact of changes in the traditional habitat of small‑numbered peoples on the development of ethnic groups and to compensate for damage caused to the traditional habitat” (Source). However, as practice shows, even the existence of such a law does not exclude judicial disputes between communities and industrial companies, confirming the universal nature of conflicts generated by preferential regimes.

Conclusion: The Universal Lesson of Preferential Regimes

The conducted analysis allows us to formulate a conclusion that has significance not only for understanding the situation with ISNP in Russia, but also for comprehending the nature of preferential regimes in general. The attempt to create a system of benefits and preferences for any group of the population – even from the best intentions, guided by principles of social justice and preservation of cultural diversity – inevitably gives rise to systemic and diverse conflicts.

These conflicts have an objective nature: they arise from the need to define the boundaries of the privileged category (who exactly is entitled to preferences?), from competition between the preferential and general legal regimes (what is the scope of exceptions from general legislation?), from clashes of interests of different groups of users of natural resources, from bureaucratic procedures for access to benefits, from the gap between declared goals and practical implementation mechanisms.

The head of the Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs, Igor Barinov, formulated the target guideline of state policy in this sphere: “The Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs pays great attention to the sustainable development of indigenous small‑numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East, because due to their way of life they are very vulnerable”. However, as the analysis shows, even with such declared attention, systemic conflicts persist and multiply, which testifies to the institutional nature of these contradictions.

This conclusion is directly relevant to the situation in Israel, where the system of preferences and special rights for various categories of the population – including Haredim (ultra‑Orthodox Jews) and the Arab population – also generates multiple conflicts: around military service, around access to education and employment, around land relations, around the status of religious institutions. As in the case of ISNP in Russia, these conflicts are not evidence of ill intention on the part of the legislator, but constitute a systemic effect of any differentiated legal regime. The more complex and diverse the system of preferences, the more potential conflict points it creates. Awareness of this regularity is a necessary condition for developing a balanced policy in the sphere of benefits and preferences – a policy that would take into account not only good intentions, but also the inevitable institutional consequences.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 213 (June 24, 2026)

Perhaps for the first time since our monitoring program began, we encountered a situation where two publications, both worthy of the quality of their research and scientific integrity, were not included in our review. This is because the authors chose the topic of these materials to add fuel to the fire of a specific conflict in the post-Soviet space. Scientists are also ordinary people. They suffer from the full range of aspects that conflicts bring, just like their neighbors: bakers, bus drivers, or musicians. And their desire to somehow help their side of the conflict through their work is also understandable.

We sympathize with them, but we cannot allow our work to worsen conflicts instead of mitigating them.

***

Published by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) in May 2026, the “Regional Strategic Roadmap: Central Asia 2024–2030”  is an institutional strategy document designed to translate IWMI’s global Strategy 2024–2030 into a region-specific framework for Central Asia. Although not presented as a conventional academic study, the roadmap combines analytical assessment, policy review, stakeholder consultation, and organizational planning to identify priority areas for future intervention. The document reflects IWMI’s long-standing engagement in Central Asia since 2001 and is framed by a foreword from the organization’s Regional Representative for Central Asia, Dr. Barbara Janusz-Pawletta. Its central concern is the relationship between water security, climate change, regional cooperation, and sustainable development in one of the world’s most water-stressed regions.

The roadmap is built upon a research-for-development approach that treats scientific evidence, policy engagement, and practical implementation as mutually reinforcing processes. Methodologically, it relies on regional diagnostics, country-level policy analysis, expert consultations, stakeholder engagement, and a review of IWMI’s own activities and publications. The document explicitly emphasizes evidence-based prioritization and a theory of change according to which improved water security emerges when data, analysis, and scientific knowledge are translated into institutional reform, public policy, and operational action. A consultative co-design process involving IWMI researchers, regional experts, national stakeholders, and international partners serves as the foundation for the strategic framework.

The authors portray Central Asia as a region shaped by arid conditions, dependence on transboundary river systems, Soviet-era legacies of water-intensive development, and mounting climate pressures. Particular attention is devoted to glacier retreat, declining river flows, droughts, floods, deteriorating water quality, growing demand for water, and the continuing significance of the Aral Sea crisis. At the same time, the roadmap stresses the emergence of new opportunities arising from improved regional relations, expanding dialogue, digital technologies, and growing interest in climate-resilient solutions. A notable argument advanced throughout the document is that water should be understood not as a source of conflict but as a platform for cooperation, trust-building, and shared development.

The roadmap identifies five interconnected strategic priorities: climate change and water security; transboundary water cooperation; water productivity and sustainable agriculture; digitalization and data-driven water management; and ecosystems, WASH, and inclusive water services. These priorities are linked to concrete intervention pathways, expected outcomes, partnerships, and implementation timelines extending to 2030. The publication’s principal contribution lies in its synthesis of regional water challenges into an integrated strategic agenda that combines environmental, institutional, technological, and socio-economic dimensions.

For Israeli scholars interested in post-Soviet affairs, the document is particularly relevant because it illuminates how resource management, regional cooperation, climate adaptation, and governance interact in Central Asia, a region where transboundary water issues are closely connected to questions of stability, development, and interstate relations.

***

Tianyu Fan of Yale University’s Department of Economics presents in this working paper, dated 20 May 2026, an ambitious attempt to integrate geopolitical relations into the study of long-run economic development. Entitled “Measuring Geopolitical Alignment and Economic Growth”, the study asks whether a country’s geopolitical alignment with major powers constitutes an independent determinant of economic growth and, if so, through which mechanisms such effects operate. The paper addresses a gap in the growth literature, which has traditionally emphasized domestic factors such as institutions, human capital, geography, and technology while paying comparatively limited attention to the external political environment.

The central contribution is the construction of a new event-based measure of bilateral geopolitical alignment. Using large language models with web-search capabilities, Fan compiles a dataset of 373,020 geopolitical events involving 193 UN member states and 24 major powers between 1960 and 2024. Events are classified through the CAMEO framework and assigned Goldstein scores reflecting degrees of cooperation or conflict. These bilateral relationships are then aggregated into a country-level geopolitical alignment index weighted by the global economic importance of major states. The author argues that this approach captures temporal and relational dynamics that are obscured by conventional indicators such as UN General Assembly voting similarity, sanctions, or alliance membership.

Methodologically, the study combines large-scale data construction with local projection techniques and country fixed-effects models. Identification relies on within-country variation over time, supplemented by robustness checks, placebo exercises, alternative specifications, component decompositions, and two instrumental-variable strategies. Fan consistently seeks to demonstrate that the observed relationship between geopolitical alignment and economic performance is not reducible to trade patterns, institutional quality, domestic instability, or other familiar explanations.

The principal finding is that improvements in geopolitical alignment generate substantial and persistent gains in GDP per capita. A one-standard-deviation permanent improvement in the index is associated with roughly a ten percent increase in GDP per capita over twenty-five years. The paper links these gains to enhanced domestic stability, investment, productivity growth, trade expansion, and human-capital accumulation. It further argues that diplomatic, economic, and security dimensions of international relations each contribute independently to growth outcomes. The analysis also suggests that democracy and geopolitical alignment function as complementary but distinct channels of development.

Beyond its empirical results, the paper contributes to emerging debates on geoeconomics and the measurement of international political relations. For readers interested in post-Soviet and broader Eurasian affairs, the study is particularly relevant because it examines long-term consequences of geopolitical realignments, international fragmentation, and changing relations among major powers. Its framework offers a systematic way to assess how shifts in the international environment may influence development trajectories, making it a useful contribution to discussions of security, international order, and economic transformation.

***

Emzar Kakhidze, Professor at the Faculty of Humanities of Batumi State University, published “On the National Identity of Georgians” in the 2026 inaugural issue of ARU Journal of Art History Studies. The article addresses the historical formation of Georgian national and civilizational identity and seeks to explain the long-term cultural, political, and geopolitical factors that shaped Georgia’s development from antiquity to the present. Rather than employing a formal empirical research design, the study adopts a broad historical-civilizational approach, combining historical interpretation, geopolitical reflection, and a longue durée reading of Georgian statehood. The author explicitly proposes a review of key turning points in Georgian history as a means of understanding contemporary tensions and future prospects.

The central argument is that Georgian identity emerged through continuous interaction with several major civilizational spheres without becoming fully absorbed by any of them. According to Kakhidze, early Georgian culture was influenced by the Oriental world while avoiding the essential characteristics of Asian despotism. Contacts with the Classical world likewise remained significant but did not fundamentally transform the underlying cultural matrix of the eastern Black Sea region. At the same time, relations with Rome and especially Byzantium contributed decisively to Christianization and to a civilizational choice that enabled the rise of the unified Georgian kingdom and its medieval political achievements. The author presents the Byzantine model as a crucial foundation of Georgia’s most successful period of statehood, while also emphasizing the balancing role played by Persia and later the Caliphate.

The article interprets subsequent decline through the combined effects of invasions, fragmentation, feudal conflict, and the loss of the broader Byzantine framework after 1453. Russian expansion is presented as both a unifying force and a source of ambiguity: it restored territorial cohesion and introduced a channel for Western influences, yet failed to generate a renewed Georgian statehood comparable to the earlier Byzantine-inspired experience. Kakhidze further argues that contemporary Georgia remains marked by post-Soviet political and cultural patterns. In his view, Georgian elites often misunderstand the enduring significance of historical ties with the Middle East, religion, communal organization, and traditional social practices. The article concludes that successful modernization requires confidence in indigenous capacities and adaptation of external models to local realities.

For scholars of the post-Soviet space, the study is noteworthy as a concise statement of a civilizational interpretation of Georgian history linking identity formation, geopolitical orientation, religion, empire, and modernization. Its relevance for Israeli readers lies in its discussion of the interaction between regional powers, historical memory, state-building, and competing civilizational influences in the South Caucasus.

***

Compiled by Joseph Schechla, coordinator of the HIC-HLRN, this briefing note was issued by the Housing and Land Rights Network of the Habitat International Coalition on the occasion of the 13th World Urban Forum and surveys housing and land rights issues in Azerbaijan from 2000 to 2026. The text “Housing and Land Rights Issues in Azerbaijan”  is framed as a review of forced evictions and dispossession that compares documented incidents with the HLRN Violation Database, while also measuring state practice against Azerbaijan’s constitutional guarantees and human rights treaty obligations.

The report’s central argument is that post-Soviet transition, oil-fueled urban redevelopment, and increasingly coercive state spatial planning have produced a long-term pattern of displacement. It traces a shift from early “beautification” campaigns in Baku to later infrastructure-driven clearances, extractive-industries dispossession, and the 2023 mass expulsion of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh. Across these cases, the author presents forced eviction not as isolated administrative excess but as a systemic instrument of governance, demographic management, and image-building.

Analytically, the note rests on a legal and human-rights framework rather than on a formal social-scientific theory. It contrasts constitutional property protections and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights with what it describes as an absent independent judiciary, broad administrative discretion, and weak remedies. The report repeatedly stresses the gap between law and practice, especially where occupancy vouchers, “public interest,” and redevelopment designations are used to dilute tenure security and reduce compensation. Its methodology is documentary and comparative: it assembles reported cases, draws on treaty-body findings and European Court jurisprudence, and maps them against the HLRN database.

The empirical core is a sequence of cases that includes Baku White City, Winter Boulevard, the National Flag Square and Crystal Hall clearances, Sulutəpə, Sovetsky, Söyüdlü, the Baku green corridors, and the Karabakh mass displacement. The report emphasizes violence, utility cutoffs, inadequate notice, below-market compensation, and retaliation against journalists and housing-rights defenders. It also highlights an intergenerational displacement cycle, in which people displaced in the 1990s are again pressured to move under the “Great Return” program and related resettlement schemes. The database table lists 14 instances affecting 346,560 persons, while the narrative warns that repression and data suppression create an “information black hole.”

For an Israeli academic readership, the publication is useful because it links housing, conflict, ethnicity, and state-building in a post-Soviet setting, while also speaking to debates on urban governance, forced migration, restitution, and the human-rights costs of geopolitical restructuring. It is especially relevant to scholarship on how spatial policy can become a tool of coercion in conflict-affected societies.

***

Donatas Brandišauskas, affiliated with the Lithuanian Institute of History, published preprint article “Paths Made Together: Human–Reindeer Caravans in the Siberian Taiga” in 2026 through the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). Drawing on long-term ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2004 and 2020 across the Zabaikal Region, Buriatiia, South Yakutiia, and the Amur Region of the Russian Federation, Brandišauskas examines Evenki reindeer herding with particular attention to caravan formation as a site of sustained interspecies learning and mutual attunement. The central research question challenges a prevailing claim in North Asian pastoral studies, namely the argument advanced by scholars such as Charles Stépanoff and David G. Anderson that Soviet collectivization fundamentally disrupted Indigenous human-reindeer relations by rendering animals quasi-autonomous and stripping them of social personhood, producing what Anderson termed Rangifer sovieticus.

The study is framed within a multispecies ethnographic approach integrating phenomenological, ethnoarchaeological, and cognitive anthropological perspectives. Brandišauskas draws on contributions concerning embodied enskilment, joint attention, and corporeal synchrony, engaging Tomasello on shared intentionality, Argent on kinesthetic empathy in human-animal riding, and Zeder on domestication as a relational and coevolutionary process. The methodological basis is long-term participatory fieldwork yielding detailed empirical knowledge of Evenki herding techniques, vocabulary, and relations with individual animals.

The article argues that Soviet collectivization did not fundamentally alter human-reindeer relations among the Evenki communities studied. Contrary to the autonomy thesis, Brandišauskas documents that herding continues to rely on close interpersonal engagement through riding, cargo transport, milking, and systematic training. Reindeer are recognized as social partners with distinct temperaments, names, and behavioral repertoires. Caravan assembly, termed elgenga, is a deliberate compositional practice in which animals occupying differentiated positional roles, such as the lead riding animal uchak, the steadily paced dakhaptuk, the fast-running daraki, and the sluggish tanchaki, are arranged according to individual character to ensure coordinated movement across demanding taiga terrain. Hobbling devices, bells, wooden collars, and tethering arrangements function not as simple restraints but as communicative interfaces cultivating responsiveness and shared expectations, a process the Evenki conceptualize through the term dogovoritsa, meaning mutual agreement.

Mutual trust is built through what Brandišauskas calls embodied synchrony, whereby reindeer perceive the skill and emotional state of riders through what informants describe as reading with their muscles. Well-trained animals remain calm under extreme conditions, navigate return routes independently, and transmit caravan behavior to younger animals through entrainment. The paper also addresses archaeology, arguing that material residues of Evenki herding, including tethering features, trampled vegetation, reused river crossings, and hearth deposits, constitute multi-agent imprints of interspecies cooperation rather than incidental traces.

The scholarly contribution lies in its empirically grounded challenge to the autonomy paradigm dominant in North Asian pastoral anthropology, and in its integration of multispecies ethnography with ethnoarchaeological frameworks to reframe domestication as ongoing relational labor rather than a completed historical event. For researchers engaged with post-Soviet indigenous communities, ethnicity, and the legacies of Soviet collectivization in Siberia, the article provides a corrective to assumptions of cultural discontinuity. It is equally relevant for scholars of human-environment relations, mobility studies, and embodied knowledge in post-Soviet regional contexts.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 207 (May 31, 2026)

Just as in the previous issue of our monitoring, readers saw many studies of Central Asia, the April issue contains a significant amount of material on the western flank of the post-Soviet space. As with last month, this wasn’t some kind of editorial tactic—it’s clear that sometimes coincidences drive the logic of a piece more powerfully than the intended message.

However, it wasn’t geography, but worldview and ideology, that took center stage in the April issue of our monitoring. We tried to cover these topics sparingly—they are too sensitive and complex for unbiased analysis.

But, clearly, the global shortage of worldview narratives and megaconcepts that each of us observes makes the demand for new ideologies so powerful that researchers simply can’t ignore it.

In the Ethiopian International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research (Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2026), Muahammadqodir Sheraliyev and Senior Lecturer Farrukh Ganiev of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan present a policy-oriented analysis titled “Improvement of the Preventive Inspector’s Mechanism for Early Prevention of Offenses in Improving the Criminogenic Situation in the Regions“.

The article examines the evolving role of prevention inspectors – local police officers responsible for community-level crime prevention – in Uzbekistan’s mahallas (neighborhood communities), particularly in areas designated with a complex “red” criminogenic status. Drawing on recent presidential decrees (PP-1 and PP-253 of 2025), the authors analyze how these officers can shift from reactive law enforcement to proactive, data-driven early intervention. The study addresses core questions about the causes of regional crime spikes, the limitations of fragmented information systems, and the potential of enhanced inter-agency cooperation, digital tools, and community structures like the “mahalla seven” to stabilize high-risk environments.

Methodologically, the work combines descriptive policy review with practical recommendations. It references official statistics from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, pilot project outcomes from Tashkent districts, and selected academic literature while proposing concrete institutional innovations. Rather than empirical fieldwork, the piece functions as an applied criminological brief advocating systemic modernization aligned with Uzbekistan’s “New Uzbekistan” development strategy.

The central argument is that prevention inspectors must become coordinators of targeted early prevention rather than mere registrars of offenses. Key proposals include creating a unified digital platform (“Mahalla-Prevention 2.0”) integrating databases from multiple ministries, implementing AI-supported risk mapping and patrol optimization, adopting CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) principles, and strengthening the inspector’s leadership over multidisciplinary teams addressing unemployment, family conflicts, youth issues, and social rehabilitation. The authors cite pilot data showing significant reductions in repeat offenses and project broader crime rate declines if these mechanisms are scaled nationwide by 2026–2030.

This research contributes to post-Soviet criminology by illustrating how Central Asian states are adapting Soviet-era administrative structures to contemporary challenges of urbanization, migration, and socio-economic transition. For Israeli readers, the article offers comparative insights relevant to managing security and social cohesion in multi-ethnic, multi-confessional societies facing similar issues of localized crime, radicalization risks, and community policing. Uzbekistan’s emphasis on mahalla-level prevention resonates with Israeli discussions on neighborhood resilience and early intervention against emerging threats, while the focus on digital governance and inter-agency coordination holds lessons for hybrid security models in volatile regional environments. As Central Asia remains strategically significant for Israel – due to its position between major powers and shared concerns over extremism and instability – this Uzbek case study enriches scholarly thought on how post-Soviet states are reconfiguring internal security architectures in the 21st century.

Daria Blinova and colleagues from the University of Delaware and University of Pennsylvania introduce a major new resource for the study of authoritarian political communication in their arXiv preprint  (2605.15886v1, 15 May 2026).

The team, led by Benjamin E. Bagozzi as corresponding author, has assembled an ambitious dataset of interlinked multimodal materials drawn from official Russian government sources. It encompasses two large corpora: speeches and associated images from the Kremlin website spanning late 1999 to September 2025, and materials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mid.ru) covering 2004 to October 2025. In total, the collection includes over 15,600 English-language and 19,300 Russian-language speeches, paired with tens of thousands of images, harmonized metadata (dates, speakers, geolocations, official tags), and cross-lingual identifiers that link parallel Russian and English versions of the same communications.

The researchers employed systematic webscraping of the official sites, careful data cleaning, and a human-in-the-loop multimodal topic modeling approach using BERTopic. A Russian politics expert then refined and grouped the resulting latent topics into higher-level categories, with validation against official Kremlin tags and expert review. This methodology enables precise linkage between texts and visuals while preserving original language variations, allowing analysts to examine not only content but also deliberate differences in messaging across domestic and international audiences.

The resulting resource offers rich insights into the evolution of Russian elite rhetoric on domestic and foreign policy priorities. By facilitating comparisons between Kremlin and Foreign Ministry outputs, as well as Russian versus English versions of speeches, the dataset illuminates strategies of audience differentiation, framing, and legitimation in an authoritarian context. Its multimodal and multilingual character addresses critical gaps in existing text- or image-only collections, providing a testbed for temporal, spatial, and cross-lingual analyses of signaling and propaganda.

This work makes a valuable contribution to computational social science and the study of authoritarian politics by supplying analysis-ready, transparently documented data with validated topical annotations. For Israeli academic readers, the dataset holds particular relevance amid ongoing regional dynamics involving Russia – from the conflict in Ukraine and its ripple effects on global energy and security, to Moscow’s posture in Syria and the broader Middle East. Understanding the nuances of Russian official discourse, including how it tailors narratives for different audiences, equips scholars to better assess Moscow’s strategic intentions, hybrid influence operations, and implications for Israel’s national security environment in the post-Soviet space. The resource promises to enrich empirical research on conflict rhetoric and great-power competition in ways directly pertinent to Israeli strategic studies.

Karsten Brüggemann’s text “Doing It the ‘Baltic Way’: Internationalism and the Soviet Roots of the Singing Revolution”, published in “Ethnic Relations in the Baltic Reconsidered” (Central European University Press, 2026), offers a nuanced reinterpretation of the late Soviet era in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Brüggemann, Professor of Estonian and General History at Tallinn University and President of the Baltische Historische Kommission, draws on extensive secondary literature, archival sources, and studies of cultural practices to challenge the dominant national memory narrative of straightforward anti-Soviet resistance. Instead, he examines how Soviet nationalities policy – particularly the ideology of “friendship of peoples” and internationalism – paradoxically sustained and even cultivated national identities in the Baltic SSRs.

The study addresses a central paradox: how a supposedly denationalizing regime enabled the mobilization that culminated in the 1989 Baltic Way human chain. Brüggemann demonstrates that everyday “banal nationalism” (invoking Michael Billig) flourished within Soviet institutions through song festivals, professional trilateral networks, folklore events like the Baltica festival, and cultural initiatives that blended socialist form with national content. These structures, originally designed to integrate the Baltic republics into Sovetskaia Pribaltika, created personal and institutional ties among elites that proved crucial during perestroika. Popular fronts drew heavily on members of the Soviet creative and scientific intelligentsia who had learned to operate effectively within the system.

A key argument is that Soviet internationalism did not erase national particularity but provided material support and legitimate frameworks for its expression, ultimately facilitating the transition from reformist support for perestroika to demands for sovereignty and independence. The chapter highlights how local elites used official channels – such as inter-republican conferences, student festivals, and cultural exchanges – to build transnational Baltic solidarity that transcended, yet emerged from, the Soviet context.

This work makes a valuable contribution to post-Soviet studies by moving beyond binary resistance-collaboration frameworks toward a more sophisticated understanding of hybrid identities and institutional legacies in late socialism. For Israeli academic readers, Brüggemann’s analysis holds particular relevance amid ongoing debates about ethnic relations, nation-building, and minority policies in multi-ethnic states. It illuminates mechanisms through which imperial structures can inadvertently foster national consciousness – insights pertinent to understanding dynamics in Russia’s near abroad, frozen conflicts, and the complex interplay between central authority and peripheral identities in the post-Soviet space. By historicizing the Baltic path to independence, the chapter enriches scholarly discourse on how cultural and network capital can transform seemingly stable multinational entities.

“The Geopoliticisation of Domestic Issues in the Baltic Sea Region and Central and Eastern Europe” by Joakim Ekman, Thomas Sedelius, and Kjetil Duvold, published online on 20 May 2026 in “East European Politics”, serves as the introduction to a timely special issue examining how conflict Russia and Ukraine has reshaped political life in post-Soviet and neighbouring spaces.

The authors, affiliated with Södertörn University and Dalarna University in Sweden, conceptualise “geopoliticisation” as the process by which domestic conflicts, preferences, and debates are reframed through the lens of geopolitical rivalries – particularly the value-based divide between the West/EU and Russia. Drawing on Cadier’s earlier work, they trace how an initially non-geopolitical EU Eastern Partnership evolved into a site of contestation after 2014, accelerating dramatically with the 2022 full-scale invasion. The introduction synthesises contributions analysing party strategies, public opinion, elite dynamics, and electoral behaviour across multiple national contexts, addressing three core questions: how domestic issues are interpreted geopolitically, which actors drive these processes, and what implications arise for democracy and political competition.

Key insights reveal the pervasive embedding of geopolitical orientations in everyday politics. Examples include the Sweden Democrats’ strategic shift toward NATO support ahead of elections, public attitudes toward strongman rule in semi-presidential systems, the Georgian Dream government’s use of “declarative Europeanisation” alongside affective geopolitics to sustain power, sharply polarised elite alignments in Belarus, and the pro-EU referendum victory in Moldova despite Russian interference. The authors highlight regional variations – strong pro-Ukrainian stances in the Baltic states and Poland versus more ambiguous positions further south – rooted in historical legacies and contemporary domestic incentives.

This special issue makes a valuable contribution by bridging the gap between international geopolitics and domestic political analysis, demonstrating that geopolitical frames increasingly co-constitute internal conflicts rather than merely overlaying them. For Israeli readers, the research holds particular resonance amid Israel’s own navigation of great-power rivalries and hybrid threats in the post-Soviet space. Patterns of autocratisation in hybrid regimes, elite manipulation of geopolitical narratives, and the resilience (or fragility) of democratic attitudes offer analytical parallels relevant to understanding Russian influence operations, energy dependencies, and the interplay between external alignments and internal stability – dynamics that continue to shape strategic calculations in Israel and beyond.

“Negotiating Traditional and Western Values in Social Media: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Kazakhstani Influencers’ Content” by Zhaskairat Burkitbayev and Zhomart Simtikov of Abai Kazakh National Pedagogical University in Almaty, Kazakhstan, together with Ayhan Kaya of Istanbul Bilgi University, Türkiye, was published in “Frontiers in Political Science” in April 2026.

The study examines how Kazakhstani social media influencers navigate tensions between traditional Kazakh norms – rooted in nomadic heritage, Islamic ethics, and Soviet legacies – and Western liberal values such as individualism, consumerism, gender egalitarianism, and secularism. Focusing on Instagram and TikTok, the authors ask what discursive strategies influencers employ, in which domains (particularly gender roles, sexuality, consumption, and religiosity) conflicts emerge most sharply, and how audiences respond. Employing critical discourse analysis, they scrutinize 500 posts and 3,000 comments from 50 influencers active between 2023 and 2024, combining linguistic, visual, and multimodal examination with attention to platform affordances and broader political-economic contexts.

The analysis identifies four main strategies: selective Westernization, neotraditionalist discourse (often commodifying ethnicity as “brand capital”), cosmopolitan-liberal advocacy, and ambivalent positioning that openly acknowledges unresolved tensions. Rather than achieving coherent synthesis, influencers frequently produce what the authors term “strategic incoherence” – the simultaneous maintenance of partially incompatible value positions through mechanisms like semantic reframing, temporal compartmentalization (e.g., religious content during Ramadan alongside secular lifestyle posts), and contextual maneuvering across platforms. Gender emerges as the central arena of contention, with female influencers crafting postfeminist articulations that blend empowerment narratives with reassurances to traditional expectations. Audience comments cluster into conservative-oppositional, liberal-supportive, and conciliatory positions, reflecting generational, educational, and urban-rural divides.

This research makes a valuable contribution to scholarship on value transformation and digital culture in under-studied post-Soviet Central Asian contexts. By linking local discursive agency to the structuring forces of platform capitalism and global cultural hierarchies, it illuminates processes of hybridization that defy simple narratives of Westernization or tradition preservation. For Israeli academic readers and strategic analysts, the study holds particular relevance amid Israel’s engagement with post-Soviet states and the broader Eurasian space. Kazakhstan and its neighbors represent a complex arena where Russian, Chinese, Islamic, and Western influences intersect; understanding how digital platforms mediate cultural and value conflicts offers insights into societal resilience, identity politics, and soft-power dynamics that shape regional stability and potential partnerships in an era of shifting global alignments.

“Infrastructure Failure in Times of Development as Derisking: Is Failing Early the Best We Can Hope For?”  by Lela Rekhviashvili (Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig) and Evelina Gambino (University of Cambridge), published online on 18 May 2026 in “New Political Economy”.

In this timely article, Rekhviashvili and Gambino examine the intersection of renewable energy infrastructure, financial derisking mechanisms, and project failure through the lens of the cancelled Namakhvani hydropower plant (HPP) in Georgia’s Rioni Valley. The authors interrogate what failure signifies in an era of “development as derisking,” where states assume substantial risks to attract private investment in green infrastructure, while questioning whether early project cancellation might limit long-term extraction and harm.

Drawing on extensive participant observation with the Rioni Valley Movement (RVM), interviews with activists and experts, analysis of leaked project agreements, and NGO legal assessments, the study blends activist scholarship with political economy. The researchers demonstrate how the 2019 agreement between the Georgian state and the Turkish-Norwegian consortium Enka Renewables exemplified derisking: the state provided land, water resources, tax exemptions, power purchase guarantees, and compensation for political and force majeure events, while imposing minimal obligations on the investor regarding local employment, environmental safeguards, or energy security benefits.

The central argument is twofold. First, derisking actively contributes to failure by socializing risks onto public budgets and local communities, weakening state oversight, and fueling social resistance. Second, and more provocatively, derisking enables investors to extract value even from failed projects – evidenced by Enka’s successful arbitration claim of approximately USD 383 million for a project barely underway. The authors highlight how the RVM came to view early cancellation as a relative success, protecting the valley from deeper socio-ecological devastation while exposing the extractivist logic underlying green transition financing in peripheral economies.

This research advances debates on infrastructure-led development and the Wall Street Consensus by showing that failure itself becomes a site of accumulation under derisking regimes. It enriches post-Soviet studies by linking contemporary green infrastructure pushes to longer histories of uneven transition, privatization, and dependency in Georgia.

For Israeli readers, the article offers valuable insights into the political economy of energy infrastructure in the post-Soviet space. Georgia’s struggles with hydropower megaprojects, foreign investment arbitration, and authoritarian responses to environmental protest resonate with broader regional dynamics involving energy security, great-power competition, and the tensions between climate goals and local sovereignty – issues that intersect with Israel’s strategic interests in Caucasian stability, diversified energy routes, and understanding resistance patterns in contested development contexts.

Dmitry Didenko’s article “The Evolution of Well-Being in Russia/USSR (19th–21st Centuries)” , published in «Social Evolution & History» (Vol. 25 No. 1, March 2026, pp. 63–91), offers a multidisciplinary historical analysis of Russian societal development through the lens of augmented well-being concepts drawn from welfare and happiness economics.

Affiliated with the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in Moscow, Didenko bridges history, economics, and sociology to examine how material and non-material dimensions of well-being evolved across the late Imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods. The study addresses core questions about the continuity and non-linearity of modernization processes, the limitations of GDP-centric metrics, and whether the Easterlin paradox—where happiness plateaus despite rising income—manifests in the Russian context.

Methodologically, Didenko combines conventional quantitative indicators, such as Historical Human Development Index (HIHD) estimates from Prados de la Escosura and Mironov, life expectancy series, educational enrollment and attainment data, and homicide rates as a proxy for personal security, with innovative content analysis of digitized Russian-language Google Books. This allows him to track public interest in environmental quality and construct a Happiness Index based on the relative frequency of positive versus negative sentiment terms.

The article’s central argument is that Russia achieved remarkable catch-up in human development during key phases (particularly the late 19th century, 1920s–1950s, and post-2000s recovery), yet progress remained uneven and vulnerable to systemic shocks. Education showed the most sustained gains, while health improvements stagnated after the 1960s and personal security fluctuated sharply with state capacity, peaking during periods of institutional breakdown (1917, 1990s). Environmental concerns rose with industrialization but declined amid post-Soviet deindustrialization. Happiness indices reveal cyclical patterns tied to major historical events, ultimately supporting the Easterlin paradox in Russia, where subjective well-being decoupled from further material growth at a relatively low threshold.

Didenko highlights non-linear “wave-like” dynamics across the three historical periods, with transitions often triggering downturns in well-being measures. This nuanced, data-rich portrait enriches the modernization paradigm by incorporating subjective and institutional factors.

For Israeli readers, the study holds particular relevance amid ongoing strategic interest in the post-Soviet space. Understanding the internal social and perceptual dynamics shaping Russian state resilience, public sentiment, and long-term stability offers valuable context for analyzing Moscow’s foreign policy behavior, energy politics, and influence across Eurasia—factors that intersect directly with Israel’s security environment and regional diplomacy.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 204 (May 20, 2026)

by Alexander Shpunt

This text was prepared with a deliberate restriction on the sources of information consulted. The author set an exceptionally demanding methodological objective: to abstain entirely from drawing on sources that are opposed to the Kremlin, and even from publications issued by foreign analytical centers. Regrettably, the degree of politicization that has come to pervade the analytical discourse surrounding electoral politics in Russia has resulted in the complete devaluation of these centers – undeniably authoritative on other matters – as credible sources of knowledge regarding the Kremlin’s electoral strategy and the conduct of Russia’s parliamentary parties.

We have resolved to rely exclusively on information openly published within Russia through registered outlets. These, too, are not without their political biases; their assessments and conclusions have likewise become instruments of ideological contestation, no less so than the analyses produced by opposition commentators.

We have nonetheless selected them as our primary source for one straightforward reason: if something said about the presidential administration  has been published within Russia, then at the very minimum, the Kremlin’s own political managers do not object to having their actions and decisions characterized in precisely that manner, in precisely those terms, and in the public domain.

This approach has not, to our knowledge, been employed in any prior study – which made it a challenging, yet intellectually rewarding, line of inquiry to pursue.

Before proceeding to the substantive analysis of Russia’s electoral landscape, the author wishes to address one additional factor separately.

The role of the political leadership of Russia’s presidential administration in electoral processes is, regrettably, treated in a superficial manner in the overwhelming majority of existing works. Some studies mythologize this role, attributing to the Kremlin the function of a “political Gosplan” – a central planning authority regulating every electoral development across the country. Other studies categorically deny the presidential administration any role whatsoever in electoral processes and simply disregard its political managers altogether.

Viewed without prejudice, there is nothing exceptional about the electoral influence exercised by Russia’s presidential administration. Across the post-Soviet space, there is not a single country – including the Baltic states, which are members of the European Union – in which the political managers of the ruling executive are not directly and actively integrated into electoral processes. This pattern is observable everywhere: from Lithuania to Central Asia, from Moldova to Armenia. The instruments employed do not differ substantially either.

Moreover, if one surveys the global electoral landscape, it becomes evident that the orchestration of electoral processes is by no means a feature exclusive to the post-Soviet space. The Arab world’s nascent democratic experiments, the post-authoritarian regimes of Southeast Asia, the countries of Latin America with their entrenched “military” component in the electoral model, and, of course, the entirety of sub-Saharan Africa – in all of these contexts, the political managers of the governing establishment exercise varying degrees of control over electoral procedures. And this does not render such polities “less democratic” in the estimation of the international community.

Against this backdrop, the mythologization of the presidential administration ’s role in political research is attributable to one factor alone: Russia’s outsized significance in global economic and political processes.

A New Game Under New Rules

The reduction of “quotas” allocated to the systemic parliamentary opposition for agreed-upon single-member constituencies in the run-up to the 2026 State Duma elections is described as an amendment to the informal rules of engagement, driven by the presidential administration ’s political bloc under the direction of Sergei Kirienko. According to data cited in analytical commentary, the number of such “cleared” single-member constituencies is expected to stand at approximately 10–13, compared with roughly 20 in both 2016 and 2021. Analysts characterize this as a narrowing of the guaranteed passage corridor for candidates from the parliamentary parties – the so-called “systemic opposition,” comprising the CPRF, the LDPR, A Just Russia – For Truth, and the New People party – and as a reconfiguration of the administrative arrangements underpinning that access.

As early as 21 April 2025, Russia’s presidential administration , acting in concert with United Russia, commenced preparations for the 2026 Duma elections. Incumbent deputies are being assessed through a “traffic light” system drawing on regional-level data. Those who lack the support of local constituencies are being encouraged to identify prospective replacements. The presidential administration  takes into account whether a deputy maintains a stable base of committed supporters, while United Russia’s party managers evaluate the legislative activity, policy initiatives, and standing of their membership.

«United Russia»: Preempting Electoral Risk

No serious, authoritative analytical centers – either within Russia or abroad – regards as probable a scenario in which United Russia fails to secure a parliamentary majority. However, assessments of the electoral quality and scale of that majority vary considerably.

Party leadership is fully cognizant of this reality, and has taken pre-emptive steps to ensure the party’s readiness for a vigorous electoral campaign.

In the course of preparations for the elections, the leadership of United Russia underwent substantial restructuring  in 2025 – at both the federal and regional levels. Party governance has been rendered more compact and centralized. Under Vladimir Yakushev, who assumed the position of General Council Secretary in 2024, the General Council Presidium was reduced from 35 to 14 members, and the number of deputy secretaries was cut from six to one.

United Russia’s internal primary system has undergone a substantive transformation since its inception. The most significant development has been the near-complete transition to online voting via the Gosuslugi (Public Services) digital platform. This shift has enabled a substantial increase in the number of rank-and-file party members participating in candidate selection, thereby enhancing the sociological representativeness of the process. Analysts from the Expert Institute of Social Research (EISI) – one of United Russia’s key think tanks – have positioned  the transition to the Gosuslugi platform as a safeguard against external interference and a mechanism for purging the electorate of so-called “bots.

Observers note that the substantive weight attached to the primaries within United Russia has grown considerably. Whereas previously this procedure – particularly at the regional level – served primarily as a legitimizing formality for candidates already selected through administrative channels, it now functions as a genuine instrument for identifying those whose electoral standing exceeds the prescribed threshold parameters.

The Communists: A Forced Departure from the Comfort Zone

Relations between the presidential administration ’s political bloc and the CPRF in the context of the 2026 State Duma elections are described as more contentious and less predictable than those with any other “systemic” party, and as more conflictual than in previous electoral cycles. Several key factors account for this.

Chief among these is the risk of losing “second place” and the intensifying competition with New People and the LDPR. Within the presidential administration , analysts note, the surge in New People’s popularity – combined with the Liberal Democrats’ full recovery following their change of political leadership – is being viewed as a lever for displacing the CPRF from its status as the “second political force” in the country.

Since 2003, the Communists have traditionally occupied second place, and their position as the “default choice” for any protest-minded voter has become a source of concern for the Kremlin. A scenario in which the CPRF loses its lead within the parliamentary opposition segment – ceding second place to another party, whether New People or the LDPR – serves the Kremlin’s interests, not least because the Communists’ strength rests on genuinely effective regional and local party branches, an organisational capacity that no other opposition party can match.

Analysts observe that in this context the CPRF has been compelled to engage in direct confrontations with the Kremlin’s political managers, including public broadsides against Sergei Kirienko. A specific instance is cited: Gennady Zyuganov’s statement in January 2026, in which he publicly criticized multi-day voting and what he characterized as the “uncontrolled” nature of vote-counting procedures.

Observers note that this represents a genuinely new phenomenon. For decades, the CPRF directed its criticism at the authorities “in general,” without personalizing its critique or formulating precise political grievances. It should be noted, of course, that even now there is no question of crossing over into the non-systemic opposition – the dynamic is rather one of signaling to local activists: adopt a harder line at elections, show less deference in preserving working relationships with regional political authorities. The stakes of this particular electoral cycle for the CPRF are simply too high to do otherwise.

In response to these departures from the established rules of engagement by Zyuganov, the authorities have also demonstrated their capacity for coercive pressure. Analysts have recorded a significant intensification of pressure on regional CPRF branches – a development likewise absent for decades. In the Altai Krai, for instance – one of the party’s key stronghold regions – a wave of detentions and arrests of party members was reported in late 2025 and early 2026. CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov directly accused the authorities of conducting a deliberate campaign to weaken the party in advance of the elections.

A second factor is the party’s need to demonstrate to its electorate an “ideological distance from the authorities.” Unlike the LDPR or A Just Russia, which project an almost complete consensus with the ruling establishment, the CPRF has maintained, in its “Program of Victory” (April 2026), a trenchant critique of the government’s socio-economic policy. This renders the CPRF’s campaign less predictable and more adversarial from the perspective of the presidential administration ’s political technologists – particularly at the regional and local levels, where oversight is extremely difficult to maintain.

That said, for both parties this remains a familiar script, one in which each side has long since rehearsed its assigned role.

The Liberal Democratic Party: Competing for Silver

According to polling data for March 2026, more than half of Russians regard the LDPR and the CPRF as the principal contenders for second place, though the Communists’ prospects are subjectively rated somewhat higher.

The figures indicate that 29% of respondents believe the CPRF will finish second in the September 2026 State Duma elections, while 25% favors the LDPR in the contest for “silver,” with the remaining parties trailing markedly. The nationwide telephone survey of 1,600 respondents was conducted by Russian Field between 20 and 27 January 2026.

Political analysts in Russia’s regions observe that under the leadership of Leonid Slutsky, the party has undergone a stylistic transformation, moving away from eccentric personalize populism towards a more systematic and institutionalized variant. The LDPR’s programmatic commitments elaborate this trajectory:

• The Russian Question: The central campaign slogan for 2026 is “Let us restore greatness to the Russian people!” The LDPR places primary emphasis on the defense of the traditions, culture, and interests of the Russian people, both domestically and abroad.

• Social Priorities: The party’s program is built on “direct citizen demands” gathered during regional tours. Key themes include migration policy, demography, support for veterans of the special military operation, and the development of small towns.

• Economic Policy: The party advocates for a more accommodating taxation regime and moderate economic protectionism.

Some political analysts, however, suggest that New People may mount a serious challenge to the LDPR in the competition for leadership of the “alternative” (non-pro-governmental) political space.

A Just Russia Party: Demonstrating the Right to Survive

The future of A Just Russia – For Truth within the configuration of the 2026 State Duma is described as a matter subject to determination in the Kremlin. Loyalist analytical commentary states explicitly that whether or not the party secures representation in the next Duma, and the degree of support it receives from the presidential administration ’s political bloc, will determine not merely its electoral performance on this occasion – but the very continued existence of the political project itself.

The party is currently in the grip of a profound structural crisis. At its annual congress on 25 October 2025, A Just Russia – For Truth reverted to its former name, A Just Russia. Among the reasons cited for this rebranding, analysts note the effective departure from the party’s leadership of the former heads of Patriots of Russia and For Truth in recent years: Gennady Semigin resigned in 2024, while Zakhar Prilepin had by that point been largely absent from the party’s management structures. The position of co-chair, established in 2021 for Semigin and Prilepin, was abolished, as were their respective roles as chairman of the Central Council and secretary.

In the assessment of observers, the party has traditionally served in the Kremlin’s eyes as an instrument for “absorbing protest voters” – that is, attracting the votes of those unwilling to support the CPRF or the LDPR, but who do not regard United Russia as sufficiently socially oriented. Its defining red line is to avoid siphoning votes from United Russia. Its continued presence in the State Duma therefore depends, in large measure, on its ability to fulfil this traditional function within the existing political configuration.

Konstantin Kalachev, head of the Political Expert Group – an influential Russian think tank – identifies the party’s target constituency – one broadly acceptable to both the party itself and the presidential administration ’s domestic political bloc – as “angry patriots.” He argues that targeting this electorate will allow A Just Russia to simultaneously satisfy the boundary conditions described above: “Since fervent patriots typically gravitate toward United Russia, and ‘kvass patriots’ tend toward outright monarchism, the ‘angry patriots’ are really the only segment worth contesting. And that contest will be conducted under very specific conditions. Much will depend on the pace of ongoing developments – specifically, whether the situation can be held together until 2026 and whether an inertial scenario can be realized. For the presidential administration , the optimal outcome is, of course, a ‘rally around the flag’ effect, version 2.0.”

New People: Projected Twofold Growth

In the State Duma elections scheduled for autumn 2026, the New People party is positioning itself as the principal systemic alternative to the “old” political forces. The central question is whether the party can achieve a substantial increase in its parliamentary representation – with some projections targeting second place by seat count – an ambition that has already prompted a far-reaching reconfiguration of Russia’s party landscape.

According to a VTSIOM poll conducted between 13 and 19 April 2026, the electoral rating of the New People party reached 13.4%, placing it second among all parliamentary parties – ahead of the CPRF at 10.9% and the LDPR at 10.1%. In and of themselves, such ratings do not guarantee a second-place finish: the Communists and the Liberal Democrats both possess far more experienced and organizationally robust regional structures than New People, and an active pre-election campaign will alter these figures – but the bid for second place has been staked, and the party’s rivals have taken note.

Several converging factors have contributed to this improvement in the party’s electoral standing.

“The Party of No Prohibitions”: In its electoral campaign, the party has centered its messaging on the dismantling of excessive restrictions, internet blocking, and the regulation of VPN services. Party leader Alexei Nechayev has proposed designating 2026 as “the year without prohibitions.”

Merger with the Party of Growth: The legal amalgamation with Boris Titov’s Party of Growth has been completed, strengthening the party’s presence among business constituencies and urban liberals. Moreover, Boris Titov is a figure of considerable weight in Russian establishment politics, having served for many years as Business Ombudsman – and in that capacity a direct interlocutor of President Putin and the presidential administration.

Beyond the political dimension, Titov has also brought substantial business resources to the merged party: his agro-industrial holding, Abrau-Dyurso, is not only the country’s largest wine producer but also one of the largest landowners in the fertile south of Russia, with a diversified agricultural portfolio.

New People are currently regarded by political observers as the most dynamically ascendant parliamentary faction, with a campaign built on “rapid information responsiveness.”

The party presents itself as the vehicle of choice for those who seek change but remain within the bounds of the law. It has pursued an active presence in protest-prone regions (Primorsky Krai, Khabarovsk Krai) and has conducted open candidate recruitment drives.

Its new program, “12 Steps Toward a Country Worth Living In,” draws explicitly on the rights and freedoms provisions of the 1993 Constitution. According to analysts operating within Russia, this is expected to attract upwards of 10% of the “syslib” – the systemic liberal – electorate.

SVO Veterans: An Alloying Element Among Loyalists in These Elections

On the subject of veterans of the special military operation in Russia’s south-east and Ukraine entering the political arena, we have published a separate, detailed analysis.

Here we wish to focus specifically on the forthcoming elections this autumn.

Beyond the obvious resource they represent for the authorities, the co-optation of SVO veterans into political life carries, in the view of analysts, significant intra-elite institutional tensions within the processes of “elite renewal” in advance of the State Duma elections.

The primary concern relates to risks for political manageability: accustomed as they are to direct political action in its most uncompromising form – the battlefield, where the world is divided into “friend” and ‟enemy” – SVO veterans are not naturally disposed toward the political compromises expected of those they regard not merely as electoral opponents, but as political adversaries.

The CPRF’s principal think tank, the Centre for Research into Russia’s Political Culture, in its report dated 7 May 2026, identifies a growing popular demand for the “purification” of the political system.

Communist party analysts identify two constituent elements of this demand:

• Uncompromising posture: The patriotic milieu, and veterans of the SVO above all, has ceased debating details and has begun to question the current system’s capacity to reach any accommodation with its “internal enemies” – defined as the corrupt and the liberal wing of the establishment.

• Direct action: Veterans anticipate not political bargaining but decisive measures, interpreting any concession to opponents as weakness or betrayal of those still serving at the front.

It is to be expected that, as SVO veterans accumulate political and administrative experience upon their return to civilian life, this uncompromising orientation will soften, and they will come to appreciate the value of compromise; but to anticipate such a development in time for the autumn elections would be, in the view of analysts working in loyalist think tanks in Russia, unrealistic. What is needed is time – time that will forge political experience. The reader may find a more detailed treatment of this subject in the academic article “The Utilization of the Political Potential of Special Military Operation Participants within Russia’s State System,” by Dina Sikorskaya of Ryazan State University, recently published in the peer-reviewed Russian journal Caspian Region: Politics, Economics, Culture.

Russia’s autumn 2026 elections cannot be characterized as routine. In many respects, they will constitute a plebiscite on the very survival of the “systemic opposition” model – a model that has endured without fundamental change for two decades.

Even the Kremlin’s opponents do not dispute United Russia’s commanding electoral advantage. What remains in question is the architecture of the internal-systemic opposition to the party of power – an architecture that, by all indications, will look markedly different from the present one.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 202 (May 12, 2026)

by Alexander Shpunt

Introduction

By May 2026, the confrontation between the civil authorities of the Republic of Armenia, headed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) has become, according to a number of global analytical centers and researchers, into the deepest gap between secular and spiritual power in the entire period of the country’s independence.

The conflict is multi-layered: it affects the constitutional and legal status of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the post-revolutionary redistribution of political power following the 2018 Velvet Revolution, competing versions of national identity (“Historical” and “Real” Armenia), as well as Yerevan’s geopolitical pivot away from Russia toward cooperation with Western partners and the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Historical And Legal Context

Constitutional and legal status of the Armenian Apostolic Church

The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia recognizes the special role of the Armenian Apostolic Church. As amended after the 2005 constitutional reform, Article 18 stipulates that the Republic of Armenia recognizes the “exclusive historical mission” of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church. At the same time, the Constitution simultaneously enshrines the principles of secularism and the separation of religious organizations from the state, which creates dual legal regime: the AAC has a recognized exclusive mission, but remains formally separate from the state and is not endowed with state powers.

Researchers from the Armenian Regional Center for Democracy and Security (RCDS) note, that academic discussion about the real separation of powers has been absent for a long time, and attempts to bring legislation into line with the standards of the ECHR have increased the politicization of the topic and provoked resistance from church and national-patriotic circles.

 The Role of the Church in Post-Soviet Politics until 2018

After the restoration of independence in 1991, the AAC quickly came to be perceived as one of the pillars of the new statehood and the moral legitimation of power. Academic research by A.B. Krylov (IMEMO RAS)  shows that in the 1990s–2010s, the AAC effectively regained its quasi-state status: only this church received the right to teach the fundamentals of religion in state schools, its representatives participated in state ceremonies, and significant amounts of property confiscated during the Soviet period were returned to it.

Under Presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan (1998–2018), a “theocratic-political symbiotic ” model emerged: the government provided the church with material and institutional privileges, while the church leadership de facto supported the regime and participated in its legitimization.

Root Causes Of Conflict

Think tanks and researchers identify several complementary interpretations of the root causes of the conflict, none of which has absolute priority over the others.

Interpretation 1: Dismantling the symbiosis of the Church and the former elites

A number of analysts view the confrontation as a direct consequence of the post-revolutionary dismantling of the long-standing alliance between the Church and the ruling elites formed before 2018. The Central Asian-Caucasus Institute (CACI) points out in an analytical article from 2025, that the current government and the AAC “have never been allies”: from the first days after the 2018 revolution, Pashinyan criticized the church hierarchy for its ties to the “former criminal regime.”

Interpretation 2: Ideological confrontation between “Historical” and “Real” Armenia

Another set of analyses interprets the confrontation as an expression of a deeper ideological conflict between the traditional national-religious paradigm, in which the Church is the guardian of “Historical Armenia,” and the secular project of “Real Armenia,” oriented toward state pragmatism and Western values. The Yorktown Institute analysts interpret confrontation as “competition between two visions of Armenia.”

Interpretation 3: Geopolitical Dimension – The Church as a Channel of External Influence

Much of the research emphasizes the foreign policy context: attempts at normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey and the associated change in the role of the AAC.

Eurasianet and CACI define a joint publication in 2026 the geopolitical dimension as key: the escalation of the conflict should be seen both as an intra-institutional dispute and as a manifestation of a broader geopolitical transformation.

The geopolitical context became especially clear and even symbolic after 2022: Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II received a Russian state award from President Putin; Archbishop Yezras (Nersisyan), head of the Russian Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church and brother of Garegin II, publicly blessed the Arbat Battalion in 2023—a militarized unit associated with actions on the Russian side in the conflict in southeastern Russia and Ukraine. Security records: The Armenian Apostolic Church is a key participant in the electoral standoff, and the Kremlin has simultaneously fueled this conflict and exploited it for its own purposes.

Interpretation 4: Electoral context

Jamestown Foundation emphasizes political dimension: Many suspect that Pashinyan is seeking to silence critical voices ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026. According to an MPG/ Gallup International Association poll, in January 2025, support for the ruling Civil Contract party was only 11 percent. According to the CRRC Caucasus Barometer (July–October 2024, 1,561 respondents), approximately 79 percent of Armenians expressed trust in the Armenian Apostolic Church—the highest figure among all public institutions in the country.

Chronology Of The Conflict

December 6, 2015: Constitutional referendum

A referendum approved a new version of the Constitution, legally enshrining the exclusive mission of the Church while formally maintaining the principle of separation of spheres. The combination of these two provisions forms the legal basis for future conflicts.

Spring 2018: The Velvet Revolution and the First Signs of Tension

Pashinyan to power . The government initiated an audit of tax and property benefits for religious organizations. In late 2018, the civic initiative movement “New Armenia, New Catholicos” began to form, demanding the resignation of Garegin II and accusing him of abuses and ties to criminal and oligarchic networks.

November 2020: War, defeat, and the AAC’s transition to open opposition

Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War (a 44-day conflict ended by a tripartite agreement brokered by Russia) was a watershed. On November 16, 2020, the Supreme Spiritual Council publicly questioned the political responsibility of the country’s leadership. Since then, research centers have assessed that relations have been irreversibly undermined.

September 2023: Complete loss of Nagorno-Karabakh

Baku fully recaptured Karabakh in a lightning offensive, forcing over 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee their homes. Church leaders openly defended the rights of displaced persons and criticized Pashinyan’s actions , seeing them as a failure to protect Armenian Christians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

February 19, 2025: Proclamation of the “Real Armenia” ideology

Prime Minister Pashinyan publicly presented the concept of “Real Armenia,” contrasting it with the concept of “Historical Armenia.” Pashinyan argued that focusing on historical lands outside the current republic creates geopolitical vulnerability and opens the door to Russian intervention. Carnegie Politics regards this as an attempt to displace traditional national-historical narratives sponsored by the Church.

April–November 2024: Tavush for the Motherland movement

Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan led a civil disobedience campaign, the Tavush to the Motherland (Sacred Struggle) movement . On May 4, 2024, thousands of people marched from Tavush to Yerevan; on May 9, a large rally took place in Republic Square. In November 2024, the Investigative Committee of Armenia charged Archbishop Galstanyan was accused of plotting a violent coup. This accusation marked the transition of the conflict into an open criminal phase.

June-October 2025: Escalation, public accusations and mass arrests

On May 29, 2025, Prime Minister Pashinyan , speaking at a government meeting, remarked that “our churches have been cluttered”—that is, turned into storage rooms. Beginning in June 2025, the Armenian government imprisoned four bishops and one priest, along with dozens of others, including church workers, lawyers for the arrested clergy, family members of the clergy, and public supporters of the Church.  On May 26, 2025, Archbishop Galstanyan announced his readiness to run for the post of prime minister.

January 5, 2026: A Roadmap for Church Reforms

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan officially presented a plan for reforming the Armenian Apostolic Church, announcing the announcement at his residence in the presence of 10 senior clerics calling for the resignation of the Catholicos. The document outlined a plan to remove the current Catholicos and create a Coordination Council under Pashinyan’s leadership .

The See of Holy Etchmiadzin responded: “Issues of regulating and reforming the Church do not fall within the purview of the self-proclaimed council. These matters fall within the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of the Armenian Apostolic Church and its highest bodies.”

April 2026: Election Platform

The ruling party published an election platform calling for the removal of the current Catholicos and the restructuring of the church amid ongoing arrests and travel restrictions for church leaders.

Key Participants And Stakeholders

The Government of Armenia and the Civil Contract Party

The Armenian government, headed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is the leading instigator of the conflict with church structures. The government claims to be fighting corruption and entrenched business interests within the Church. Specifically, the Church, which is legally exempt from property taxes, is accused of using this benefit for enrichment. However, no official court ruling or independent investigation has yet confirmed these allegations.

The Armenian Apostolic Church and Catholicos Garegin II

The Supreme Spiritual Council consistently accuses the authorities of an “anti-church campaign” and demands an end to the criminal prosecution of clergy (statements of November 16, 2020, June 2, 2025, January 31, 2026, March 13, 2026). The interests of the Church lie in maintaining influence, independence from state control, and fulfilling its constitutional mission .

Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan

Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan , the head of the Tavush Diocese, became the leader of the “Tavush for the Motherland” movement (also known as “Sacred Struggle”) , which united thousands of people in a march from Tavush to Yerevan (May 4, 2024) and a large rally in Republic Square (May 9, 2024). Galstanyan for the first time explicitly declared his readiness to lead an “interim government” and hold early elections, which turned him into a political figure of national significance. On May 26, 2025, he announced his readiness to run for prime minister. Galstanyan was subsequently arrested on charges of organizing a coup d’état and attempting to seize power.

Samvel Karapetyan

Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, owner of the Tashir Group and an energy grid company in Armenia who has been an outspoken critic of Pashinyan, was arrested in June 2025 on charges of advocating for the government’s ouster, which he denied. CACI Analyst and Yorktown Institute notes that Karapetyan has long been considered a key pro-Russian business partner in Armenia and a major donor to church and opposition projects; his arrest and subsequent government moves to nationalize his power grid are interpreted as part of a crackdown on Russian pressure channels.

Russia as an external participant

Russian authorities have allowed Armenian Diaspora communities to publicly speak out about disputes between the Armenian government and church leadership and openly criticize Pashinyan’s actions , demonstrating tacit approval of the Russian authorities.

Russian and Armenian participants of the seventh meeting of the International Russian-Armenian Lazarev Club, held on April 28, 2026, in Moscow, unanimously condemned the unprecedented persecution of the Armenian Apostolic Church by the Armenian authorities and demanded an end to repression against the political opposition, expressing doubt that the elections in June 2026 can be recognized as fair and legitimate.

Armenian Diaspora

An estimated 3 million Armenians reside within the Republic of Armenia, while the vast majority of the estimated 10 million Armenians live in the Diaspora, with more than one million in the United States. On February 12, 2026, several prominent Diaspora figures issued a public statement characterizing the attacks on Church leadership as a direct threat to all Armenians worldwide. Professor Gerard Libaridian , a historian and diplomat, in an interview in February 2026 expressed a different point of view: this statement by the diaspora leaders is political in nature, since the Church itself is politicized.

The European Union and the Council of Europe

The EU and the Council of Europe act as indirect stakeholders: their human rights commitments on religious freedom provide the normative framework to which both the government (regarding secular reforms) and the Church (regarding the protection of autonomy) appeal. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) interprets the standoff as a test for the Armenian model of secularism.

Azerbaijan, Turkey and regional actors

Turkey’s AVIM Center criticizes the Church’s interference in the discussion of normalizing relations between Yerevan, Baku, and Ankara, interpreting it as a factor hindering the implementation of new regional transport and economic projects. The Azerbaijani think tank BakuNetwork describes the Armenian Apostolic Church as an institution that “fuels nationalism and conflict” through militaristic rhetoric. Yorktown analysis The Institute also describes the supposed role of Iran, which views the AAC as a “social security actor ” and a potential channel of influence.

 Articular Scenarios For Conflict Development

 Scenario 1: Further escalation and institutional polarization

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI) warns: Further deterioration of church-state relations could lead to civil conflict within the country and pose a threat to the re-election of the current authorities in the upcoming parliamentary elections of 2026, which could undermine efforts to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The HRWF ( CaspianAlpine ) Center sees the deepening standoff as a risk of escalating into a “structural crisis of statehood,” especially if the confrontation is accompanied by the growing influence of radical nationalist groups associated with some of the clergy.

Scenario 2: Canonical schism within the Church

The International Center for Law and Religious Studies (ICLRS) (author – Isabella Sargsyan ) formulates a specific risk: the church now risks facing a canonical schism that threatens the integrity of its internal structures. Khar Center also emphasizes that a radical change in church leadership under direct pressure from the state, even if it leads to a more reform- minded elite, may be perceived by a significant part of society and the diaspora as a “usurpation of spiritual authority.”

Scenario 3: Institutional Cold War and Frozen Conflict

AGBU in the article “Confrontation” and Crisis”  formulates a scenario for a protracted “institutional cold war,” in which neither the state nor the Church manages to gain the upper hand: the parties avoid direct dialogue, hold parallel ceremonies, and society remains split between secular and ecclesiastical legitimacy.

Scenario 4: Reform of state-church relations and peaceful de-escalation

AGBU analysts are considering a scenario of “negotiated de-escalation ” mediated by diaspora figures, which could lead to an agreement on preserving canonical autonomy while simultaneously reaffirming the principle of the Church’s separation from party politics. However, as of late 2025, there were no signs of readiness for such compromises on the part of either the government or the Church leadership.

 Conclusion

Analytical and academic sources agree that the conflict between the Armenian civil authorities and the Armenian Apostolic Church is multifaceted and cannot be reduced to a purely religious, political, or foreign policy dimension. Research centers estimate that the task of developing a sustainable model of church-state relations in Armenia will remain one of the central challenges for the Armenian political system, at least in the medium term—especially against the backdrop of ongoing foreign policy reorientation, post-war trauma, and preparations for the June 2026 parliamentary elections.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 200 (April 30, 2026)

Our monitoring of March's academic publications, which touched on the post-Soviet space in one context or another, unexpectedly focused on the Central Asian region. This wasn't the editor's choice; it's simply that interest in this part of the post-Soviet space is growing exponentially among researchers worldwide. In our view, each of the five works we present to our readers deserves not only a place in the monitoring, but also a thoughtful reading. 

1. The article "Regional security collaboration between Central Asia and China: contemporary challenges and future prospects"  was authored by a team of Kazakh scholars: Mura Sarybayev from the Department of World History at Abai Kazakh National Pedagogical University in Almaty; Duman Zhekenov, Dean of the Faculty of International Relations at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty, with Bekzhan D. Kossalbayev, an associate professor affiliated with both the Faculty of International Relations at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and the Institute of Geology and Oil-Gas Business at Satbayev University in Almaty; along with co-authors Kamshat Rustem and Akaidar Kurmanbek. It appeared in the open-access journal Frontiers in Political Science in March 2026 (volume 8, article 1670875), following peer review and revisions completed earlier that year.

The study employs a mixed-methods approach combining qualitative systematic analysis, statistical examination of trade, economic, and defense indicators (processed via tools like Microsoft Excel), generalization of empirical data, and scenario-based forecasting. The authors draw on a broad range of sources, including official documents, trade statistics, reports on joint exercises and agreements, and existing scholarship on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI/OBOR), and post-2021 regional developments such as the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Their analysis focuses particularly on Kazakhstan as a detailed case while incorporating region-wide patterns from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Security is conceptualized multidimensionally—encompassing state/regime stability, transnational threats like terrorism and extremism, and economic/infrastructural protection—within the framework of regional security complexes.

The main findings portray China's security engagement in Central Asia as evolving from primarily economic and confidence-building measures in the 1990s–2000s to a more structured, multidimensional role post-2013 BRI launch and especially after 2021. Key components include bilateral and multilateral (via SCO and the newer C+C5 format) cooperation in border management, counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises (often focused on Xinjiang-adjacent areas and scenarios like border breaches or hostage situations), training programs for law enforcement, equipment donations, and surveillance technology transfers. The authors highlight drivers such as shared threats from Afghanistan, protection of Chinese investments in energy pipelines, transport corridors, and strategic minerals, alongside mutual interests in regime stability and connectivity. They identify challenges including uneven resource distribution, sovereignty concerns among Central Asian elites and publics, public ambivalence toward Chinese influence (with declining favorable views in some surveys), potential overdependence, and competition with Russian, Western, Turkish, and other actors. Three future scenarios are outlined: a continuation of business-as-usual incremental cooperation, a more security-centric framework, and a holistic model integrating economic, environmental, and social dimensions. Overall, the study concludes that China has become an important but not dominant security actor, operating through a mix of bilateral flexibility and SCO multilateralism, while Central Asian states use these ties to diversify partnerships and bolster internal stability without fully displacing Russian influence. The "development-security" nexus—where infrastructure investments are framed as foundations for peace—underpins Beijing's approach but faces limits due to local perceptions and mismatched priorities.

As a monitoring effort focused on conflicts and political dynamics in post-Soviet spaces, the BESA Center's work at Bar-Ilan University tracks great-power competition, regional instability, and spillover risks that could affect broader Eurasian security architectures. Central Asia's role as a transit hub for energy, minerals, and logistics intersects with global supply chains relevant to Israel's economic resilience, while instability emanating from Afghanistan or shifts in Russian influence could exacerbate radicalization, migration pressures, or proxy dynamics with implications for Middle Eastern security environments. China's expanding security footprint—through surveillance technologies, military training, and infrastructure protection—offers lessons on authoritarian regime-stabilization strategies, hybrid threat management, and the interplay between economic dependence and political leverage, all of which parallel dynamics Israel observes in its own neighborhood and with major powers. Understanding these evolving alignments helps contextualize potential disruptions to energy markets, the hedging behaviors of smaller states, and opportunities or risks for third-party engagement in a region where Israel maintains diplomatic and economic ties. In an era of multipolarity accelerated by events like the Ukraine war, such analysis sharpens insights into how distant regional security complexes might indirectly influence Israel's threat environment, alliance considerations, and long-term strategic planning.

2. The preprint "Sustainability of Irrigated Agriculture in Central Asia: Historical Development, Policy Transitions, and Future Challenges Under Climate Change" was authored by Zhanar Tulindinova, Bakhtiyor Pulatov, Ainura Batykova, Albina Prniyazova, Khizer Zakir, Sanat Kushkumbayev, and Ben Jarihani (corresponding author). The team represents a diverse international collaboration: Tulindinova and Prniyazova are affiliated with Kazakh institutions (L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University and the Academy of Public Administration under the President of Kazakhstan in Astana); Pulatov and Jarihani with the Central Asian University of Environmental and Climate Change Studies in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and James Cook University in Australia; Batykova with the Kyrgyz National Agrarian University in Bishkek; Zakir with the University of Salzburg in Austria; and Kushkumbayev with the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies. This multidisciplinary group combines expertise in regional studies, ecology, land and water management, geoinformatics, and strategic analysis.

The article was posted on 21 April 2026 on Preprints.org (doi: 10.20944/preprints202604.1442.v1) as a non-peer-reviewed version. It offers a comprehensive review synthesizing historical policy analysis with Earth observation (EO)-based assessments of land use, vegetation dynamics, evapotranspiration, and hydroclimatic trends in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya river basins.

The study integrates qualitative historical and policy review with quantitative insights derived from satellite data (including Landsat, MODIS, and other EO products for mapping irrigated areas, NDVI vegetation indices, and actual evapotranspiration). It examines the evolution of irrigation from pre-Soviet traditional systems through massive Soviet-era expansion (which increased irrigated land by ~60% between 1962 and 2002, primarily for cotton and wheat monoculture) to post-1991 national reforms involving Water User Associations, IWRM principles, and limited modernization. The analysis highlights persistent challenges such as ageing infrastructure, low irrigation efficiency (often below 40-50%, with only ~46% of diverted water reaching crops), widespread soil salinization, waterlogging, and the dramatic shrinkage of the Aral Sea (74% surface area and 90% volume lost since 1960). Satellite evidence shows that irrigated agriculture has remained stable or even intensified in many areas rather than contracting, with sustained or slightly increasing consumptive water use despite policy efforts. Hydroclimatic trends reveal warming exceeding global averages (projected +2–6°C by 2100), earlier snowmelt, glacier retreat, shifting runoff patterns (more spring, less summer flow), and increasing variability, all of which heighten irrigation demand while reducing reliable water supply during peak growing seasons. The authors discuss emerging opportunities from remote sensing, digital tools, GIS, AI for crop mapping and water accounting, and the need for stronger transboundary cooperation via institutions like the ICWC and IFAS.

The main conclusions emphasize that irrigated agriculture continues to dominate water use (75-90%+ of withdrawals) and remains vital for food security and livelihoods across Central Asia, yet its sustainability is threatened by inefficient systems, environmental degradation, and accelerating climate impacts. High consumptive water use persists due to intensification offsetting efficiency gains. Long-term viability requires integrated reforms: basin-scale water accounting supported by EO technologies, infrastructure modernization (canal lining, drip/sprinkler systems, better drainage), cropping diversification away from water-intensive monocultures, improved institutional coordination at national and regional levels, and enhanced transboundary data sharing and governance to manage the water-energy-food nexus amid upstream hydropower versus downstream irrigation tensions.

This study holds clear significance for Israel and its strategic interests. Israel, as a global leader in arid-zone agriculture, drip irrigation, precision water management, and climate-resilient farming technologies, possesses extensive expertise directly relevant to Central Asia’s challenges. Water scarcity, salinization, and efficient irrigation are core issues Israel has successfully addressed for decades in its own arid environment. Central Asia’s instability—exacerbated by potential food insecurity, rural discontent, water-related tensions, or migration pressures from failing agriculture and the Aral Sea crisis—could ripple into broader regional geopolitics, affecting energy routes, great-power competition (Russia, China, Turkey, Iran), and stability along peripheries of the post-Soviet space. For Israel, monitoring and understanding these dynamics supports situational awareness in conflict and security studies, particularly regarding hybrid threats, resource-driven conflicts, or opportunities for Israeli agricultural technology exports and diplomatic engagement in water diplomacy. Israeli innovations in remote sensing for irrigation monitoring, desalination-adjacent efficiency tools, and policy frameworks for transboundary water (drawing from the Jordan River basin experience) could contribute to stabilization efforts. In the context of the Begin-Sadat Center’s focus on conflict in post-Soviet countries, this preprint illuminates a critical “slow-burn” driver of potential instability—agricultural and environmental stress under climate change—that complements analyses of more acute political or military conflicts, offering insights into long-term resilience factors in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

3. The article under review is authored by Burkhanova Mamura, affiliated with Navoi State University in Navoiy, Samarqand viloyati, Uzbekistan. It bears the exact title “Concept of ‘Uzbek Intelligentsia’  in historical-cultural and socio-philosophical discourse” and was published in the Journal of Multidisciplinary Academic and Practice Studies, Volume 2, Number 3, 2025, pages 163–171. The study employs a qualitative, multi-layered methodology that combines cultural-historical analysis, conceptual mapping, and critical discourse analysis. Primary sources examined include Jadid-era publications, Soviet documents, and post-independence media. The author utilized NVivo software for coding discourse markers and conducted comparative analysis with Russian and Kazakh contexts to situate the Uzbek experience within broader post-Soviet trajectories. The research is structured around three chronological phases: Jadidist reformism (1870–1920), Soviet ideological structuring (1920–1991), and post-independence reconfiguration (1991–2025), with particular attention to the “New Uzbekistan” reforms initiated under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev since 2016.

Burkhanova’s main findings portray the Uzbek intelligentsia not as a fixed social class but as a fluid, adaptive, and dialectical process continuously redefined by historical contingencies. In the Jadidist period, intellectuals acted as enlighteners (marifatchi) promoting Islamic enlightenment, educational reform, and cultural modernization while respecting religious values. During the Soviet era, they embodied a paradox of cultural preservation alongside enforced ideological conformity, creating a “double consciousness” between national authenticity and socialist realism. In the post-independence and especially the digital age, the intelligentsia has diversified significantly, with new actors emerging through blogs, Telegram channels, YouTube, and other digital platforms as civic influencers, digital educators, and online commentators. Recurring conceptual nodes such as marifatchi (enlightener) and xalqparvarlik (people-centeredness) demonstrate continuity in the moral-intellectual responsibility of this group across epochs. The author concludes that the intelligentsia functions as both a product of and a contributor to national transformation, serving as a mediator between tradition and modernity while addressing society’s “questions of existence” in each historical phase.

This study holds particular significance for Israel and its strategic interests in Central Asia. Uzbekistan represents one of the most populous and geopolitically important states in the region, with growing economic ties to Israel in areas such as agriculture, water management, technology, and security cooperation. Understanding the evolving role of the Uzbek intellectual elite is crucial because the intelligentsia shapes national identity, public discourse, and attitudes toward modernization, secularism, religious revival (particularly moderate Islamic currents), and external partnerships. In the context of “New Uzbekistan,” the diversification of intellectual voices—including digital actors—may influence future orientations toward Israel, the broader Middle East, and global powers. For Israeli policymakers and analysts monitoring post-Soviet spaces, the article provides valuable insight into how historical legacies of Jadidism, Soviet experience, and contemporary digital transformation interact to form a pragmatic, state-integrated yet ethically grounded intellectual class. This dynamic can affect Uzbekistan’s foreign policy stability, openness to Western and Israeli partnerships, and resilience against radical ideologies—factors directly relevant to Israel’s interests in regional security, countering Iranian or other external influences, and fostering constructive bilateral relations in a strategically sensitive area.

4. The research paper titled “Contesting the liberal international order from within: Illiberal networks and the crisis of liberal democracy”  was authored by Sanna Salo, a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) specializing in the European Union and strategic competition; Ville Sinkkonen, a Leading Researcher at FIIA focusing on global security and governance; Maria Lindén, a Research Fellow at FIIA in the area of global security and governance; Sinikukka Saari, a Leading Researcher at FIIA covering Finland and Northern European security; and Juha Jokela, Programme Director at FIIA for the European Union and strategic competition program. The study was published in March 2026 as FIIA Research Paper 4 by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, an independent research organization based in Helsinki that provides analysis on international affairs relevant to Finnish foreign policy and broader European security.

The authors develop their analysis through a qualitative, interpretive approach rooted in norms research and international relations theory. They examine the diffusion of illiberal strategies across three case studies—Russia as an influential outsider pioneering an “illiberal playbook,” Hungary under Viktor Orbán as a challenger operating from within the European Union, and the United States under the second Trump administration as the former hegemon turning against the order it once championed. The framework identifies four strategic tools of norm entrepreneurship and contestation: brokerage (building coalitions and networks), wedging (exacerbating divisions through hybrid means), persuasion (discursive reframing of norms), and coercion (including threats and economic pressure). The study traces how these tools, initially refined in authoritarian or hybrid contexts, have been adapted and scaled up by actors within liberal democratic systems, drawing on secondary literature, public statements, policy documents, and observed political practices without relying on original fieldwork or quantitative data.

The main findings emphasize that the contemporary crisis of the liberal international order (LIO) is increasingly endogenous rather than purely exogenous. Illiberal actors empowered by democratic mechanisms—elections, open societies, and institutional access—are actively delegitimizing the liberal elements of democracy (constitutional checks, minority rights, multilateral institutions) while preserving formal democratic facades. Russia provided early templates of manipulative “political technologies,” hybrid interference, and “sovereign democracy” rhetoric that resonated with populist forces. Orbán’s Hungary demonstrates how an insider can dismantle domestic checks and balances, then use brokerage (via new groupings like Patriots for Europe) and wedging (vetoes and blackmail in EU decision-making) to obstruct the Union from within, often framing it as a defense of national sovereignty against liberal overreach. The second Trump administration exemplifies this shift at the systemic level: through rhetorical attacks on allies, elevation of European illiberal figures, transactional coercion (such as threats over Greenland or linking security guarantees to EU policies), and active wedging in European elections and societies, the US has blurred the insider-outsider distinction and accelerated the “merger of discontents” across transnational illiberal networks. The authors argue that domestic backsliding often precedes and enables international contestation, with experiences of humiliation or perceived weakness (post-Soviet decline for Russia, financial crisis for Hungary, relative decline and cultural grievances for the US) serving as tipping points. They conclude that rigid inside/outside dichotomies in IR scholarship miss these fluid networks, and that legitimate contestation of norms could ultimately strengthen resilience if managed constructively.

As a small democracy navigating a hostile regional environment, Israel has long relied on the stability and normative consistency of the liberal international order, including strong transatlantic alliances, multilateral institutions (despite their frequent biases), and shared democratic values that underpin support from the United States and parts of Europe. The paper’s analysis of endogenous erosion—especially the US pivot toward transactionalism, civilizational framing, and skepticism of multilateralism—highlights risks to the reliability of American leadership and potential fractures in Western unity, which could complicate Israel’s security partnerships, intelligence cooperation, and diplomatic maneuvering against Iran and its proxies. The diffusion of illiberal playbooks, including hybrid interference, disinformation, and wedging tactics pioneered by Russia and emulated elsewhere, directly echoes challenges Israel faces from state and non-state actors seeking to exploit domestic divisions or international forums. Moreover, the rise of sovereignty-focused, anti-globalist networks may create new openings for pragmatic bilateral ties (as seen in some European right-wing shifts toward Israel) but also risks amplifying isolationist or “America First” tendencies that prioritize short-term deals over long-term strategic solidarity. For Israeli policymakers and analysts monitoring post-Soviet conflicts, the study offers a useful lens on how authoritarian influences spread into democratic spaces, informing assessments of hybrid threats, norm contestation in international organizations, and the evolving balance between liberal universalism and particularist sovereignty claims that affect everything from UN votes to sanctions regimes relevant to the Middle East.

5. Rico Isaacs, affiliated with the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Lincoln in the United Kingdom, is the author of the article titled "Whose Nation Is It Anyway? Towards Methodological Cosmopolitanism in Studies of Nationalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan".  The piece was published in the journal Nations and Nationalism (volume 2026, issue 01, pages 1–11), an open-access article under the Creative Commons Attribution License.

The study is primarily a theoretical and meta-analytical intervention rather than an empirical fieldwork-based investigation. Isaacs conducts a critical review of existing scholarship on nationalism and nation-building in Kazakhstan over the past three decades. He identifies a dominant social constructivist approach in the literature that repeatedly frames analysis through the classic civic-ethnic dichotomy (or its proxy categories), even in works that claim to transcend it. Drawing on concepts from Homi K. Bhabha, Ulrich Beck, and others, the author proposes shifting to a methodological cosmopolitanism grounded in "vernacular cosmopolitanism." This framework emphasizes hybridity, mobility, multilingual practices, translocal identities, and everyday negotiations of belonging in sites such as workplaces, schools, markets, and urban-rural interactions. The analysis incorporates insights from existing ethnographic and sociolinguistic studies on Kazakhstan and Central Asia (e.g., works by Abashin, Marsden, Jašina-Schäfer, and others) to illustrate potential applications, while outlining general criteria and historical/social intervening conditions (Soviet nationality policy legacies, sociolinguistic environment, urban-rural divide, migration and mobility, location and timing) for applying this approach. No new primary data collection is described; the method is conceptual critique combined with synthesis of prior qualitative research.

The author's main conclusions are that the persistent reliance on the civic-ethnic binary in Kazakhstan studies constitutes a form of "methodological constructivist nationalism." This not only essentializes and misrepresents the fluid, plural, and multivocal nature of lived identities in the country but also inadvertently reinforces the authoritarian regime's legitimation strategies, which have historically deployed both civic (interethnic harmony, Kazakhstani citizenship) and ethnic (Kazakhification, historical myths tied to leadership) narratives under Nazarbayev and now Tokayev. By reducing complex, hybrid realities to opposing categories, scholarship fails to capture how ordinary citizens negotiate belonging through mundane practices, code-switching, and translocal connections. Isaacs argues for an ontological and methodological shift toward vernacular cosmopolitanism, which better accounts for "cosmopolitanism from below" in a multi-ethnic, post-Soviet context marked by Soviet legacies, globalization, and authoritarian power. This offers a roadmap for future research that foregrounds everyday sites of interaction and avoids entangling analysis with regime categories of practice. Ultimately, the article asks "whose nation is it anyway?" to highlight how dominant scholarly frames limit understanding and serve power structures.

Israel maintains strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan, a key Central Asian state with substantial economic ties (energy, agriculture, and technology); a notable Jewish community (including many who emigrated to Israel), and a complex multi-ethnic fabric involving Russian speakers, Muslims, and other groups. Understanding nation-building dynamics in Kazakhstan is relevant to assessing regional stability, potential ethnic tensions or migrations that could affect diaspora communities, and the broader post-Soviet space where hybrid identities and authoritarian legitimation play out. For Israeli policymakers and analysts monitoring conflicts and identity politics in former Soviet republics, the article's critique of binary ethnic-civic models and its emphasis on hybrid, translocal belongings provide a more nuanced lens for evaluating risks of instability, the role of language policies, migration flows, and regime resilience—factors that intersect with Israel's security concerns regarding radicalism, great-power competition (Russia, China), and opportunities for bilateral cooperation. In the context of decolonial and postcolonial debates, it also invites reflection on how external scholarship engages with non-Western nation-building processes without imposing simplifying frameworks, which aligns with Israel's own experiences navigating diverse identities and narratives in a contested region.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 193 (March 24, 2026)

In February, a number of the works we review below were devoted to the analysis of post-communist countries, the study of the concept of “socialist heritage,” and the discourse of leaders during crises.

Jelena Džankić, Eleanor Knott & Szabolcs Pogonyi. “Citizenship in the global struggles for democracy.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (March 2026)
This introductory article to a special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies  presents the results and structure of a long-term research project (CITDEM) examining the relationship between citizenship regimes and democratic backsliding, with particular attention to post-communist and post-colonial contexts.

The authors—affiliated with the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (European University Institute, Florence, Italy); the Department of Methodology (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK); and the Department of Philosophy (Central European University, Vienna, Austria)—develop a three-component analytical model organized around three factors shaping the relationship between citizenship and democracy: identity politics, political projects, and economic interests, corresponding respectively to the formation, instrumentalization, and exploitation of citizenship regimes.

The authors begin from a seemingly paradoxical empirical observation derived from a systematic analysis of citizenship legislation in 20 post-communist countries between 1990 and 2021: citizenship regimes tend to remain stable during periods of democratization, but, paradoxically, become more open—rather than more restrictive—during periods of democratic backsliding. This pattern challenges the prevailing assumption in the citizenship and migration literature that more inclusive membership policies inherently signal democratic progress.

The central argument is that illiberal and autocratizing regimes may deliberately expand access to citizenship—granting it to diaspora populations, ethnic kin abroad, or wealthy investors—not to deepen democratic participation, but to manipulate electorates, consolidate political power, project geopolitical influence, or generate revenue. Conversely, restrictions on citizenship do not necessarily indicate democratic decline. The relationship between citizenship and democracy is thus characterized as complex, non-linear, and highly context-dependent.

A number of case studies directly concern the post-Soviet space, making this special issue particularly relevant for analysts of regional security and political dynamics—although the brevity of this monitoring report allows us only to recommend that readers examine these sections independently.

The article situates post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav cases within the global context of democratic decline. The authors cite Lührmann and Lindberg’s estimate that more than one-third of the world’s population currently lives under conditions of deteriorating civil liberties and political rights. In this context, citizenship is positioned as both a barometer and a mechanism of democratic health: its manipulation reflects the weakening of formal democratic institutions while simultaneously accelerating that process.

The mechanisms described—passportization, extraterritorial ethnic citizenship, and citizenship-by-investment—have direct relevance for strategic analysis in Israel.

More broadly, the question of how citizenship regimes interact with disputes over sovereignty and minority protection frameworks has direct implications for Israel’s own legal and diplomatic environment, including ongoing international pressure regarding residency, citizenship, and the political rights of the Arab population. The article’s analytical framework—distinguishing between the formation, instrumentalization, and exploitation of citizenship—offers a universal vocabulary for comparative assessment of such dynamics.

Xidong Ma, Yukun Zhang, Yan Li & Runheng Hu. “Formation and development of the socialist heritage concept: a chronological and thematic theoretical review.” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (2026, forthcoming). DOI: 10.1057/s41599-026-06774-3
The article, published in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (Springer Nature), presents a systematic review of sources tracing the emergence and consolidation of the concept of “socialist heritage” (SH) as both an academic and political category. Drawing on 29 official documents from major international heritage organizations—including ICOMOS, DOCOMOMO, UNESCO, and UIA—as well as 137 multilingual theoretical sources, the authors reconstruct the conceptual trajectory of SH from the early 1990s to the present.

The methodological rigor of the study is notable: it follows the PRISMA methodology and employs thematic synthesis rather than simplified automated bibliometric analysis, which the authors justify in terms of interpretive accuracy.

The authors define socialist heritage as “the remnants of the material outcomes of large-scale socialist construction carried out in socialist countries,” including architecture, urban planning, monuments, green spaces, infrastructure, and landscapes. A key contribution of the study is its tracing of the concept’s evolution from its formal articulation at an ICOMOS expert meeting in Warsaw in 2013, where ICOMOS member Natalia Dushkina introduced the umbrella term “socialist heritage” to encompass structures ranging from socialist realism and socialist modernism to pre-Soviet avant-garde movements across the former socialist bloc.

This positioning has important analytical implications for the study of post-Soviet conflicts: it treats landmark architectural objects not merely as artifacts, but as politically encoded spatial instruments whose post-regime fate becomes a focal point of identity संघर्ष.

The article identifies three stages in the development of the concept (referred to as the “social seam”), each corresponding to broader political dynamics in the post-Soviet space.

The first stage (early 1990s–early 2010s) is characterized as a period of field research and value assessment, concentrated primarily in Russia and Germany. Throughout this phase, no unified conceptual term existed, and scholarly activity remained fragmented by period and geography.

The second stage (early–mid 2010s) marked formal conceptualization and institutional recognition. The April 2013 Warsaw meeting became a key milestone, producing both Dushkina’s definition and the establishment of the ICOMOS ISC20C “Socialist Heritage Initiative.”

The third stage (late 2010s–present) involves the development of practical preservation methodologies. ICOMOS has progressively expanded early warning mechanisms for endangered heritage sites. The 2020 “Historic Thematic Framework of the 20th Century,” prepared by ICOMOS ISC20C and the Getty Conservation Institute, provided a structured tool for integrating historical heritage into broader cultural heritage assessments.

Several aspects of this study are particularly relevant for analysts tracking conflicts and political processes across the former Soviet Union. The article systematically demonstrates—using source-based examples—how the demolition, preservation, or repurposing of Soviet-era monuments and infrastructure has served as a field of political contestation in Ukraine, the Baltic states, Georgia, and Belarus, across both active and latent conflict zones.

From the perspective of Israel’s analytical interests, the issues discussed intersect with several related challenges. The instrumentalization of archaeological heritage—materialized historical memory—in struggles over identity and territorial legitimacy is directly relevant to Israel. The article’s concept of “dissonant heritage”—structures recognized as historically significant but politically contested—provides a comparative framework applicable to similar debates in Israel.

GEOpolitics (Issue No. 28, March 2026)
In this section, we depart slightly from the usual format of our monitoring and present not just a single work, but a publication by our colleagues—a periodic analytical journal.

GEOpolitics is a Tbilisi-based analytical journal focused on Georgia’s foreign policy, security dynamics in the South Caucasus, and the broader geopolitical landscape of the post-Soviet period. The journal positions itself as committed to Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and democratization. Its contributors include former Georgian ambassadors, deputy ministers, and scholars affiliated with Georgian and European institutions.

The best way to present the journal is through an example, and we have selected Tornike Gordadze’s article “Iran’s Uncertain Future and the Fragile Geopolitics of the South Caucasus.”

Gordadze takes as his starting point the coordinated U.S.–Israeli air and missile strikes of February 28, 2026, targeting Iranian military infrastructure and political leadership, including reports of the elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior figures. The article constructs a scenario-based model with three trajectories—orderly pragmatic transition, chaotic state collapse, and hard authoritarian succession—and assesses their implications for actors in the South Caucasus.

He begins with a methodological caution, drawing on Robert Malley’s observation that Western policymakers have historically misjudged both the resilience and fragility of Middle Eastern regimes, citing the U.S. miscalculation of Assad’s trajectory in Syria as a structurally analogous case. This serves as a warning against deterministic confidence in any of the three scenarios.

Under an orderly transition scenario, Russia would lose a partner for sanctions evasion; Iran’s reintegration into global energy markets would depress oil prices and indirectly weaken Russia’s war economy; and Georgia could re-anchor itself within Western frameworks, losing its intermediary role in sanctions “gray zones.” Armenia would benefit most, gaining a normalized southern border and increased strategic autonomy. Azerbaijan would benefit from reduced ideological hostility from Tehran, although Iranian opposition to extraterritorial corridor projects would likely persist even under a reformist government.

In the collapse scenario, Armenia is identified as the most vulnerable actor, losing its main non-hostile southern border and facing increased coercive pressure from the Azerbaijani–Turkish axis. Azerbaijan faces a paradox of short-term tactical gains offset by risks of ethnic resistance from the large Azerbaijani population in Iran and broader regional destabilization. Georgia would face migration pressure, increased organized crime, and heightened Western scrutiny of its role as a sanctions-evasion platform.

In the authoritarian succession scenario, Gordadze argues that Russia retains a tactical partner without significant strategic gains, while Georgia risks entrenchment within an authoritarian axis linking Russia, China, and nationalist Iran—regardless of Georgian societal preferences.

The study explicitly links the Iranian question to Russia’s war economy, noting that any escalation or transition in Tehran will affect Eurasian transit corridors, energy markets, and the resilience of Russian military logistics. It concludes with a recommendation that U.S. and European policymakers treat Iran not as a self-contained regional issue, but as a structural variable within the Eurasian order.

For the Begin-Sadat Center, the article provides a direct analytical assessment of the consequences of Israeli military actions in the South Caucasus—an aspect rarely addressed in the region’s strategic literature. Its geographic focus adds a layer of analysis often absent in Israeli and American assessments of strikes on Iran: namely, the secondary effects on post-Soviet conflict geography, Russia’s strategic positioning, and the interconnection frameworks embedding both Western and Israeli interests. The analysis of Georgia’s evolving rapprochement with Iran—including public expressions of solidarity with Tehran by Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister following Israeli strikes—documents a diplomatic posture that warrants close monitoring from the standpoint of strategic interests.

The GEOpolitics journal is published monthly .

Tsvetkova, N. “Historical analogies as markers of decisions: an LLM-assisted analysis in foreign policy.” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (2026, forthcoming). DOI: 10.1057/s41599-026-06930-9

The article, forthcoming in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, makes what we consider a genuinely groundbreaking methodological and conceptual contribution to the study of foreign policy decision-making. It argues that historical analogies function not merely as cognitive or rhetorical tools, but as observable markers of already-forming political decisions.

The author contends that the repeated appearance of specific historical analogies in leaders’ discourse during crises reflects the consolidation of a policy course before it becomes visible in official statements or overt actions.

The study analyzes 1,100 official documents—499 from the Clinton presidency, 375 from Putin’s presidency, and 226 from Xi Jinping’s presidency—using an OpenAI GPT-based procedure to identify potential analogies, which were then manually verified and coded as cognitive, rhetorical, or signaling.

The operational definition treats a historical analogy as a comparison between a past event and a current political situation, excluding purely descriptive references and metaphors lacking explicit policy relevance. The three-part coding scheme distinguishes: cognitive use (diagnosing a situation and structuring options), rhetorical use (justifying decisions ex post or mobilizing support), and signaling use (articulated before a decision and subsequently repeated, serving as a correlational marker of an emerging choice).

All runs were conducted using GPT-4.0 via the ChatGPT web interface in August 2024, with key prompts repeated two to three times and all extracted data manually validated. As a reliability check, prompts were re-run on a newer model (GPT-5 “Thinking,” October 2025), yielding identical results.

The article situates itself within two established traditions of foreign policy analysis. The cognitive tradition (Hong, 1992; Jervis, 2017) argues that historical analogies help leaders make decisions under pressure by providing ready-made frameworks, albeit with risks of misapplication. The rhetorical tradition sees analogies as tools for mobilization and legitimation, shaping public opinion for external audiences.

Building on these, the study proposes a third perspective: when leaders draw an analogy—linking a current crisis to a specific past event—it indicates that the analogy has already structured their decision-making process to such an extent that they have, consciously or not, committed to acting in accordance with that historical precedent.

While the article provides extensive illustrative material, the brevity of this review allows us only to recommend that readers explore it independently.

The study offers a methodologically reproducible and conceptually grounded tool for analyzing leadership intent in foreign policy based on open-source information. More broadly, the idea that recurring historical analogies may serve as observable correlates of settled political decisions provides a potentially valuable additional instrument for analytical institutions engaged in early warning assessment of state behavior in conflict regions, including the post-Soviet space—and, of course, the broader Middle East.

Calderwood, E., Bell, T. R., Bone, J., & Lundberg, G. H. (2025). “Why Russian? Language choice and enrollment in U.S. universities.” Russian Language Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2

This study—whose fieldwork was conducted at Brigham Young University and six other U.S. universities during the Fall 2024 semester—appeared in print late last year but has only now become available online, and is therefore included in our February monitoring.

The report examines motivational and deterrent factors influencing American students’ decisions to study Russian in the current geopolitical context. While primarily pedagogical and sociolinguistic, its findings bear on a broader strategic question: whether the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict—now in its fourth year—is reshaping Western societies’ investment in Russian-language human capital, a resource directly relevant to intelligence, diplomacy, conflict analysis, and civil society engagement in the post-Soviet space.

Data were collected using two custom-designed Qualtrics surveys conducted in Fall 2024, combining structured multiple-choice questions with opportunities for open-ended responses. Analysis included descriptive quantitative data and thematic coding of qualitative responses.

The study formulates two research questions: which factors facilitate or hinder enrollment in Russian language courses, and what measurable impact, if any, the Russia–Ukraine war has had on student engagement.

Across both groups, the dominant motivational cluster was integrative rather than instrumental: students cited cultural curiosity, desire to communicate with Russian speakers, interest in travel to Russian-speaking countries, and prior language-learning experience as primary drivers. Career-oriented motivations, while present, were secondary. The authors note this represents a measurable shift from the pre-conflict baseline (Merrill, 2013), where career advancement ranked first—indicating that the current cohort is primarily driven by affective and interpersonal, rather than strategic and professional, incentives.

Among students who considered but ultimately rejected studying Russian, the main deterrent was preference for another language rather than active rejection of Russian itself. Secondary deterrents included scheduling constraints, perceived grammatical difficulty, and uncertainty about professional utility. The war in Ukraine was not cited as a primary reason for отказ.

Only 14% of current Russian learners reported mixed feelings about studying the language; just three respondents expressed concern about using Russian in public. One of the most operationally significant findings is that 88.2% of active learners intend to continue their studies regardless of political developments.

From the perspective of a research center focused on the post-Soviet space, the study offers several analytically significant insights. Chief among them is the dual motivational response to the conflict: while a minority of students reported increased motivation to study Russian as a critical language, the majority experienced primarily logistical rather than ideological effects. This suggests that American civil society has not developed a “language embargo” against Russian comparable to, for example, the suppression of German language instruction in the United States during World War I.

Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 185 (February 24, 2026)

January turned out to be a positive surprise: the speed of global transformations, the emergence of new configurations of interests, and new roles for seemingly traditional actors were fully on display across the post-Soviet space.
And researchers felt it too, clearly revising their plans in favor of greater topicality and a demand for a strategic look from the standpoint of today and the near future.

The study “The Internationalization of Armed Intrastate Conflict: A Systematic Assessment of the State of Research, Data, and Explanations” was prepared in the working-paper format for the research center “Transformations of Political Violence” (TraCe) in cooperation with Goethe University Frankfurt.

The authors—Frederik Schissler, Felix Bethke, Hanna Pfeifer, Constantin Ruhe, Regine Schwab, and Jonas Wolff—assessed trends in the internationalization of armed intrastate conflicts, combining quantitative data analysis with bibliometric research since the early 2000s and theoretical innovations—an approach that makes the work especially relevant for studying the transformation of conflicts in the republics of the former USSR.

Using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), they show that internationalized intrastate conflicts—defined as conflicts involving the troops of foreign governments—rose markedly after 2008, reaching an unprecedented level by 2020, when twenty-seven such conflicts occurred worldwide. This trend is not merely a statistical fluctuation but a fundamental shift in conflict patterns: internationalized conflicts account for the majority of battle-related deaths in intrastate conflicts from 2004 to 2022. The authors distinguish between direct support (troop deployments) and indirect support (arming, training, intelligence, financing), demonstrating that while direct military intervention draws attention, indirect support has historically been more widespread. UCDP External Support Data (ESD) for 1975–2017 show that indirect state support—particularly arms supplies, training, and the provision of intelligence—was the predominant form of external involvement.

This distinction is important for understanding post-Soviet conflicts, where Russian intervention has often relied on hybrid approaches that combine a limited direct military presence with extensive indirect support. The Transnistria conflict (1992), the Georgian conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (2008), and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine illustrate this model, in which direct troop involvement is officially denied or constrained, while indirect support—including weapons, advisers, and intelligence—proves decisive.

There is also a specific regional pattern in the post-Soviet space. For example, Russia’s support is often directed at unrecognized proto-state entities challenging recognized governments (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova), whereas Western support typically reinforces incumbent governments against Russia-backed challengers. This produces a characteristic regional model in which great-power competition generates competing interventions in support of opposing sides.

The authors’ network-analytic model is especially helpful for looking at how post-Soviet conflicts have spread to other countries. By treating conflicts as unfolding within networks that include the primary conflict parties and external actors with different ties and attributes, the model captures the multi-level character of post-Soviet conflicts, where historical legacies, ethnic linkages, economic dependency, and geopolitical rivalry intersect.

This framework identifies three potential drivers of internationalization: (1) changes in the characteristics of actors; (2) changes in ties between actors; and (3) changes in structural context that alter the salience of existing characteristics and ties. Each dimension highlights aspects of post-Soviet conflict dynamics.

With regard to actor characteristics, the authors emphasize the growing prevalence of Islamist insurgent groups as a core feature driving internationalization. While this factor primarily explains trends in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa—regions that account for 82 percent of internationalized conflicts since 2010—it is directly relevant to part of the post-Soviet conflict landscape, including the two Chechen wars in the North Caucasus and instability in Central Asia.

The dimension of ties between actors is even more applicable to post-Soviet conflict analysis. The authors point to links (ethnic, religious, ideological), historical relationships (especially colonial legacies), geographic proximity, and interstate rivalry as key factors shaping external intervention. Post-Soviet conflicts display strong ethnic-kin dynamics—Russian support for Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltic states; Armenian-Azerbaijani rivalry extending into Nagorno-Karabakh—that fit squarely within this analytical framework. The historical legacy of Soviet-era political and economic integration created durable connections that are activated in post-independence conflicts, with Russia claiming a special responsibility to protect Russian-speaking populations and to maintain influence in what it calls the “near abroad.”

In our view, the most significant analytical takeaway from the study is its treatment of conflicts as a mode of great-power rivalry. The authors argue that this is central to conflict internationalization in the post-Soviet period. They note that during the Cold War, superpower rivalry produced proxy wars in which “the enemy of my enemy may become my friend.” In the post-Soviet space, this dynamic is re-emerging—not as a simple replay of the Cold War, but as a complex regional and global competition. NATO enlargement, EU enlargement, Russia’s claims to a sphere of influence, and, more recently, economic engagement with China create intersecting structures of rivalry in which conflicts in Georgia, Ukraine, and possibly Central Asia become arenas for competing external powers.

The network model proposed in the study points to promising research directions for scholars of the post-Soviet period. Systematic comparison of patterns of external support in post-Soviet conflicts could show how intervention strategies have evolved, whether external support is reactive or follows established criteria, and how regional powers (Turkey, Iran, China) are developing their roles in interventionist activity. The model’s attention to non-state supporters is especially relevant in post-Soviet contexts, where private military companies, militias, and transnational political networks provide support that state actors cannot or do not want to provide.

In addition, the authors’ emphasis on coalition-based support suggests studying how multilateral organizations operate in post-Soviet conflicts. The limited and selective activity of the CSTO, OSCE monitoring missions, and informal Western coordination mechanisms represent coalition dynamics distinct from UN or NATO peace operations examined in much of the internationalization literature. Understanding why some post-Soviet conflicts attract multilateral involvement while others remain bilateral or trilateral could shed light on the conditions that facilitate—or constrain—the escalation of internationalization.

The gaps in knowledge identified by the study—especially regarding non-state supporters, mechanisms of indirect support, and temporal dynamics—point to critical needs in the study of post-Soviet conflicts. Since the region remains a key arena in which the transformation of the global order manifests itself in violent conflicts, a careful, systematic analysis of internationalization patterns, drivers, and consequences becomes necessary both for academic understanding and for policymaking aimed at limiting conflicts and ultimately resolving them.

As is well known, Israel is one of three countries in the world—alongside Libya and Sierra Leone—that has no monarch and, at the same time, no constitution.

That is precisely why the topic of constitutional conventions, which have become a substantial part of Israeli political practice, is far from merely theoretical for us as Israeli researchers.

Constitutional conventions—generally unwritten rules grounded in actual practice that define, guide, and constrain the actions of constitutional actors—have long been regarded as an integral part of constitutional architecture in common-law countries. The British legal system, in particular, relies heavily on such conventions to bridge the gap between formal legal norms and political practice. Civil-law traditions, however—dominant in continental Europe and transplanted into the Soviet sphere—have historically resisted incorporating unwritten law into their constitutional frameworks.

The post-communist experience created a distinct environment and deepened this resistance—this is precisely the focus of the article “Exploring Constitutional Conventions in Central Europe and Their Relevance to the Comparative Debate”, prepared by David Kosař and Attila Vincze for The American Journal of Comparative Law.

The authors identify two layers of legal formalism that “strangled” the debate on constitutional conventions in post-Soviet Europe (the Warsaw Pact countries and the former Soviet republics): first, the German/Austrian legal tradition, which emphasizes codification, closed systems of legal sources, and legal certainty; and second, the Soviet legal legacy, marked by “vulgar Marxism,” which viewed law as an instrument of elite domination. This dual inheritance produced a constitutional culture deeply suspicious of unwritten norms—norms associated either with legal uncertainty (in the German tradition) or with arbitrariness (in the Soviet tradition). The research question, therefore, is as follows: can constitutional conventions emerge and function meaningfully in post-communist civil-law systems—and if so, under what conditions?

The authors analyze four models of constitutional-convention development.

Czech Republic: The Judiciary and Political Struggle
Among the Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic offers the most favorable environment for constitutional conventions. The Czech Constitutional Court has repeatedly recognized constitutional conventions as binding sources of law and has even treated them as justiciable. Notable cases include disputes over the president’s power to appoint the Governor of the Czech National Bank (2001) and judges (2008).

In the landmark Langer case, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that a constitutional convention had formed requiring the president either to appoint judicial candidates recommended by the government or to issue reasoned individual decisions explaining any refusal on statutory grounds. This amounted to a significant judicial constraint on presidential discretion through recognition of unwritten constitutional norms.

However, this judicial recognition triggered fierce political disputes. President Miloš Zeman, as is well known, openly refused to abide by unwritten rules. This resistance culminated in Zeman’s deliberate non-compliance with judicial decisions—he never appointed Mr. Langer to the judicial post despite the court’s ruling, although some compensation was ultimately paid.

Isn’t this an experience so familiar to Israeli researchers?…

Thus, the Czech case reveals both the potential and the limits of constitutional conventions under post-communist conditions. Courts may recognize such conventions and attempt to enforce them, but their effectiveness ultimately depends on political actors’ willingness to comply—a willingness that cannot be guaranteed in systems with weak traditions of constitutional self-restraint.

Hungary: Theoretical Rejection and Practical Erosion
Hungary represents the opposite trajectory. As early as 1991, the Hungarian Constitutional Court explicitly rejected constitutional conventions, ruling that no conventions, customs, or memoranda could regulate politics, since that would contradict the very purpose of a written constitution. The Court adhered to what the authors call a naïve view: that the constitution is a “closed and complete system of rules,” to be interpreted exclusively by the Constitutional Court.

This rejection had profound consequences for the development of Hungarian constitutional law. First, it officially excluded customary or generally accepted norms from constitutional scholarship and from the sources of law. Second, it established a model in which the Constitutional Court was expected to resolve every political conflict through abstract constitutional interpretation—what Kim Lane Scheppele termed “juristocracy.”

All the more curious, the authors note, is that informal practices inevitably emerged in Hungarian constitutional life, especially regarding presidential powers, parliamentary procedures, and appointments to constitutional offices. Yet these practices remained theoretically underdeveloped and vulnerable to political manipulation.

Viktor Orbán’s consolidation of power since 2010 has effectively eliminated any limited role constitutional conventions might have played. With a two-thirds parliamentary majority enabling constitutional amendments at will, Orbán’s government demonstrated an instrumental approach to law that left no room for unwritten constitutional constraints. Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law clearly enumerates the sources of law and denies conventions any legal status, entrenching formalism while paradoxically enabling abuses of constitutional rights.

A telling example concerns the appointment of the Chief Justice. Although a long-established tradition required prior experience within the national judiciary, in 2019 this requirement was ignored to facilitate the appointment of András Varga, a political ally who lacked general judicial experience. The government justified this breach through strict textualism, arguing that no such requirement existed in formal legislation—demonstrating how a formalist legal culture can serve authoritarian ends.

Poland: Systematic Exclusion and the Rule of Recognition
Poland displays perhaps the most theoretically consistent rejection of constitutional conventions among the Visegrad countries. Article 87(1) of Poland’s 1997 Constitution explicitly lists the sources of universally binding law: “the Constitution, statutes, ratified international agreements, and regulations.” This explicit “rule of recognition” effectively closes the Polish legal system to unwritten sources of constitutional law.

This clear codification of legal sources reflected lessons drawn from the arbitrariness of the communist era. Under communist rule, loopholes in the sources of law were deliberately exploited, and post-1989 reformers sought to eliminate such ambiguity. Building mechanisms of constitutional review required clear constitutional norms, making the notion of constitutional custom too vague to serve as a legal basis for judicial decisions.

Nevertheless, some informal practices have formed, including the principle of discontinuity of parliamentary work, which requires that all matters not completed by parliament be closed at the end of a parliamentary term, despite the absence of any basis in written law. In addition, Polish presidents developed a practice of refusing to appoint judges in certain circumstances and of exercising sovereignty over the armed forces in ways not expressly authorized by the constitutional text.

However, these practices remain theoretically unrecognized and politically contested.

Slovakia: Scholarly Activity without Judicial Recognition
Slovakia occupies an intermediate position. Unlike Poland and Hungary, Slovakia’s constitution contains no explicit list of legal sources, which in theory leaves room for constitutional conventions. Slovak constitutional scholarship has increasingly turned to this concept, especially since the late 2010s, often drawing both on common-law literature and on Czech developments.

Yet this scholarly interest has not been reflected in judicial practice. Slovakia’s Constitutional Court has at times referred to “established practice” or “constitutional traditions” in interpreting constitutional provisions, but it has not engaged in an in-depth treatment of constitutional conventions or offered any systematic conceptualization of them. Slovakia’s ordinary courts have not addressed conventions at all.

Differences in approaches to constitutional conventions across the Visegrad countries present an analytical puzzle. All four countries share similar historical trajectories: before 1918 they were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; after World War II they lived under communist rule; they transitioned to democracy roughly in 1989–1993; and they joined the European Union in 2004. All inherited the formalism of the German legal tradition and the instrumental approach to law characteristic of the Soviet legacy. Nevertheless, their approaches to constitutional conventions differ substantially.

The authors propose four preliminary explanatory factors:

1. Constitutional rules of recognition
The presence or absence of explicit constitutional provisions enumerating the sources of law appears to be a decisive factor. Poland and Hungary, where permissible sources of law are explicitly listed (excluding conventions), display greater hostility toward unwritten constitutional norms. Article 87(1) of the Polish Constitution and Article T(1) of Hungary’s Fundamental Law create formal barriers to recognizing constitutional conventions as legally binding.

By contrast, the Czech and Slovak constitutions contain no such provisions, making their legal systems more open to unwritten sources. This openness has had side effects—particularly in the Czech Republic, where the 2013 Civil Code explicitly incorporates conventions and customs into civil and commercial law, potentially normalizing unwritten law more broadly within Czech legal culture.

2. Levels of majoritarianism
The degree of majoritarianism—that is, the extent to which a parliamentary majority can act without institutional constraints—significantly influences the development of constitutional conventions. Constitutional conventions tend to arise where political actors are required to cooperate and compromise, creating incentives to establish predictable rules of interaction.

3. Constitutional and political stability
The formation of constitutional conventions requires time and repeated practice. It also requires sufficient political stability for patterns of behavior to become entrenched and recognized as normatively binding.

The Czech Constitution of 1993 has remained virtually unchanged, apart from the introduction of direct presidential elections in 2013. This stability has allowed constitutional norms to solidify as accepted practice. Despite frequent changes of coalition governments, the political environment has preserved the fundamental democratic rules of the game.

By contrast, Hungary adopted an entirely new constitution in 2011, explicitly emphasizing a break with the previous regime. Poland adopted a new constitution in 1997 and experienced a constitutional collapse during the rule of the Law and Justice party (2015–2023). Slovakia amended its constitution twenty-four times, many of the amendments substantially altering the structure of government; it experienced semi-authoritarianism under Vladimír Mečiar in the 1990s and, more recently, democratic backsliding under Fico.

4. Individual actors and intellectual networks
The authors stress that “people may matter even more” than institutions. The education and intellectual orientations of influential constitutional scholars and judges shaped each country’s receptiveness to constitutional conventions.

Although this study focuses on one part of the post-Soviet space—Central European countries that were part of the former Soviet bloc—its conclusions have broader implications for understanding constitutional development across the entire post-Soviet region, including the states that emerged from the former Soviet republics.

The experience of the Visegrad Group demonstrates that constitutional conventions can play a meaningful role in democratic consolidation—but only under specific conditions. Where political systems require cooperation among multiple actors (low levels of majoritarianism), where constitutional and political stability allow practices to become entrenched, where legal systems remain open to unwritten norms, and where influential legal elites support such norms, constitutional conventions may become genuine constraints on power.

For post-Soviet democracies facing similar challenges—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Central Asian republics—this analysis leads to sobering conclusions. Constitutional conventions are unlikely to serve as reliable safeguards against democratic backsliding. They may function as useful adaptive mechanisms in relatively stable democratic settings, but they cannot substitute for strong formal constitutional provisions, independent institutions, and a political culture committed to constitutional restraint.

The article “Connectivity and Competition in the South Caucasus: Geography as a Source of Power”, published by The International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS, Estonia), addresses a topic broad enough to serve as the theme of a major multi-day academic conference. Nevertheless, Koen Claessen of the University of Glasgow succeeds in avoiding a superficial approach.

Koen Claessen’s January 2026 analysis of transport connectivity in the South Caucasus appears at a moment when infrastructure has become inseparable from geopolitics. The study examines two major transport initiatives—the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—demonstrating how geography has been transformed from passive territory into an active instrument of statecraft for the three South Caucasus republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

The armed conflict in southeastern Russia and Ukraine that began in February 2022 fundamentally altered the balance of power in Eurasia. Disruptions to the Northern Corridor through Russia, combined with instability along maritime routes through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, transformed the South Caucasus from a peripheral transit zone into a strategically significant node of global trade.

The Middle Corridor constitutes a multimodal network linking China’s eastern seaboard with Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. As the article notes, the institutional structure of the route reflects a complex intersection of national, regional, and great-power interests. The establishment of the International Association of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route in 2017, followed by a quadrilateral declaration by Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Kazakhstan in March 2022, demonstrates attempts at multilateral governance. However, as the author observes, coordination remains “fragmented and insufficient,” while competing national priorities continually undermine collective efficiency.

Before February 2022, the Middle Corridor occupied a peripheral position within Eurasia’s transport system. With a capacity of only 100,000–120,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units), compared to 1.5 million TEU for the Northern Corridor, it was primarily used for urgent, high-value cargo destined for Southeastern Europe. Transit times ranged from 16 to 20 days, and costs from $3,500 to $4,500 per forty-foot container, placing it between the faster but more expensive Northern Corridor (14–18 days, $2,800–3,200) and the slower but cheaper maritime route (28–40 days, $1,500–2,000).

The conflict in southeastern Europe prompted a strategic reassessment. The Northern Corridor experienced at least a 35 percent reduction in east–west shipments, as companies faced rising costs, insurance premiums, and political risks, including potential sabotage of railway infrastructure in Russia and Belarus. Demand for the Middle Corridor rose by 65 percent in 2023. Yet this growth paradoxically undermined the route’s competitive advantage: transit times increased from 16–20 days to over 40 days due to capacity constraints, eliminating its time advantage over maritime alternatives while maintaining higher costs.

This apparent contradiction—rising demand accompanied by declining competitiveness—illustrates the transformation of the Middle Corridor from an economic project into a geopolitical one, which is undoubtedly the study’s central analytical conclusion.

The route’s significance is now defined not by optimal cost-benefit ratios but by its role as the “most stable and important land connection between Europe and Asia” in an era of geopolitical instability. The author convincingly argues that recent disruptions—the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on ports, the 2021 obstruction of the Suez Canal, and ongoing Houthi attacks that forced 90 percent of vessels to reroute around Africa (adding roughly ten days)—have exposed the vulnerability of maritime transport, positioning the Middle Corridor as a critical strategic reserve rather than merely one of three options.

At the same time, the route’s dependence on rail, road, and maritime transport across several sovereign jurisdictions creates exceptional coordination demands that participating states have not met. The system suffers from railway capacity limitations: tracks remain non-electrified and lack double-track infrastructure; Kazakhstan’s infrastructure requires modernization; and shortages of rolling stock further constrain capacity.

Regulatory fragmentation presents equally serious obstacles. The absence of synchronized customs procedures, border services, and transnational standards reflects the prioritization of national interests over collective efficiency. This is particularly evident at key transshipment points such as the Khorgos Gateway dry port and the Caspian Sea crossing between Aktau/Kuryk and Baku/Alat. The duopoly of the Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company (ASCO) and KazMorTransFlot (KMTF) fails to generate competitive pressure for improvement.

The “Middle Corridor,” Koen Claessen notes, has become an arena of intensifying competition between the European Union and China, both of which recognize infrastructure as an instrument of influence. The EU has increased funding under its “Global Gateway” initiative: in January 2024 it pledged up to €10 billion for sustainable transport and energy connections in Central Asia, and in April 2025 the EU–Central Asia summit allocated €3 billion, launching a new strategic partnership. European officials explicitly state that this engagement offers “a different approach” from China and Russia, emphasizing local value creation rather than resource extraction.

China’s response underscores the strategic value of infrastructure. Despite significant overlap between Belt and Road components—specifically the China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor (CCAWEC)—Beijing seeks integration rather than competition, signing a Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey in 2015 and including Chinese logistics organizations as associate members of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

This infrastructure competition reflects broader geopolitical realignments in the post-Soviet space. Azerbaijan’s balancing of EU and Chinese financing provides Baku with additional leverage while preserving strategic autonomy—a model that mirrors broader regional efforts to avoid excessive dependence on any single external actor.

Koen Claessen demonstrates how infrastructure in contested regions remains hostage to broader geopolitical currents, and how small states’ attempts to leverage geography for autonomy confront the reality that their transit value depends on conflicts and rivalries beyond their control.

Above all, the study highlights the limits of geographic determinism in international relations. While geographic location may offer potential leverage, translating it into sustained influence requires infrastructure development, multilateral coordination, and a stable geopolitical environment—conditions that remain difficult to achieve in the South Caucasus. States in the region may occupy strategic positions between Europe and Asia, but their ability to capitalize on that geography ultimately depends on the competing interests of external powers rather than on autonomous regional agency. In this sense, connectivity politics in the South Caucasus reveals both the opportunities and the constraints facing small states in the contemporary international system.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 181 (February 09, 2026)

On January 31, 2026, Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Commission published the first official draft of a new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This is not merely a set of amendments but a thoroughly revised version of the Basic Law, with changes affecting roughly 84% of the text (about 77 out of roughly 101 articles in the current version).

The draft was prepared by the Constitutional Commission chaired by Constitutional Court Chair Elvira Azimova, based on thousands of proposals from citizens, political parties, NGOs, experts, and discussions at the National Kurultai.

Over six months, as the authorities state, large-scale public debates on constitutional reform were conducted. More than 2,000 citizen initiatives were received through electronic platforms from citizens, lawyers, experts, attorneys, political parties, NGOs, and professional and business circles.

Substance of the Reform

According to Deputy Chair of the Constitutional Court Bakyt Nurmukhanov, the draft constitutional reform includes a preamble, 11 sections, and 104 articles.

Two new sections are proposed: “People’s Council” and “The Process of Amending the Constitution.” In addition, it is proposed to rename four existing constitutional sections: “General Provisions” to “Foundations of the Constitutional System,” “Person and Citizen” to “Fundamental Rights, Freedoms, and Duties,” “Parliament” to “Kurultai,” and “Courts and Justice, Prosecutor’s Office, Commissioner for Human Rights” to “Justice, Prosecutor’s Office, Human Rights Mechanisms.” Nurmukhanov stated that amendments are proposed to 77 constitutional articles, comprising 84% of the text.

A transition to a unicameral parliament is proposed: the Kurultai of the Republic of Kazakhstan would consist of 145 deputies elected by proportional party-list system for a five-year term.

Kazakhstan’s representative to the OSCE, Kairat Malaev, noted that parliament will consist of 145 deputies elected on party lists under proportional representation for a five-year term. The 30% quota for youth, women, and persons with disabilities on party lists, as well as the 5% electoral threshold, will remain in force. Meanwhile, the People’s Council will consist of 126 deputies representing ethno-cultural associations, major public organizations, local representative bodies, and regional public councils—reflecting the broad diversity of Kazakhstani society.

The post of State Secretary is being abolished, and, following a referendum, an institute of Vice President of the Republic of Kazakhstan will be created. Tokayev noted that the president himself will appoint the vice president, with the Kurultai’s consent, by a simple majority vote.

Speaking at the 5th session of the Ulttyk Kurultai (National Assembly) on January 20, 2026, the president proposed establishing a vice-presidency with constitutional status. This initiative is presented as the logical conclusion of a political architecture gradually built in recent years and intended to enhance governability and institutional resilience.

The Constitutional Court will be empowered to assess whether the implementation of decisions by international organizations and their bodies complies with the Constitution. On such matters, petitions to the Constitutional Court may be filed by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Chair of the Kurultai, at least one-fifth of the total number of Kurultai deputies, the Prime Minister, and the Prosecutor General.

Another key reform will be the creation of “Halyk Kenesi”—a high-level consultative body intended to represent the interests of Kazakhstan’s citizens. It is expected to include representatives of ethno-cultural associations, civil society organizations, and regional public councils. “Halyk Kenesi” will be empowered to develop and submit recommendations on domestic policy priorities, promote national values, and formally submit draft proposals for consideration by state institutions. Its legal foundations, composition, and operating procedures will be defined by a separate constitutional law.

Four Years Back

On June 5, 2022, Kazakhstan held a constitutional referendum. This was the third referendum since independence in 1991 and the first since the 1995 referendum that adopted the current constitution.

The amendments were introduced after fierce civil unrest in early January, triggered by worsening economic conditions and subsequent calls for rapid political reforms. The referendum changed 33 of the document’s 98 articles.

The amendments covered a wide range of issues, including, among other things, abolition of the death penalty, a ban on senior officials joining political parties, a ban on the president’s relatives holding government posts, and new operating principles for the Constitutional Court. Under these amendments, the president would appoint only 10 senators instead of 15, five of whom would be recommended by a political body called the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.

The Central Election Commission announced that 77.18% voted in favor of the amendments, which, among other things, stripped former president Nursultan Nazarbayev of the status of “national leader.” Turnout was 68.06%.

The constitutional reform of June 2022 enabled Tokayev to run for a new seven-year term, which he secured triumphantly in early elections in November 2022. The final term—unless new reforms are undertaken.

Tokayev’s Fall–Winter Collection

On September 8, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev delivered his annual State of the Nation address in front of Kazakhstan’s parliament building. In a wide-ranging speech Tokayev touched on topics as diverse as artificial intelligence, electric scooters, inflation, nuclear power development, scandalous behavior by women, and the need to transition to a unicameral parliament via a future constitutional referendum. He also proposed holding, in 2027, a national referendum on transitioning Kazakhstan to a unicameral legislature—thus abolishing the Senate, the upper chamber.

Shortly thereafter, on October 8, the president signed a decree establishing a working group on parliamentary reform in line with his key proposal to move to a unicameral parliament as set out in his September 8 address. The group was tasked with developing proposals to strengthen parliamentary institutions and ensure a more efficient legislative process. According to the presidential decree, the head of the group is State Counsellor Erlan Karin. Its members include representatives of the Mazhilis (lower house), the Senate (upper house), the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, and leaders of parliamentary party factions in the Mazhilis.

Two months later, on December 1, 2025, Tokayev announced that the planned transition to a unicameral parliament would abolish the president’s quota for appointing members of the legislature. At that time, Kazakhstan’s parliament had two chambers: the Mazhilis, with 98 deputies elected under a mixed electoral system, and the Senate, with 50 members—some elected by regional maslikhats (local representative bodies), others appointed by the president. Under the current system, the head of state appoints 10 senators, half of whom are nominated by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.

Political “Security” for the Reform—As Understood in the Post-Soviet Space

As is customary across the post-Soviet space, prior to undertaking institutional reforms, the political leader—President Tokayev—consistently secured his power by judicially removing the leaders of the legal opposition from the political scene. The illegal opposition in a country where the forceful suppression of protests has a decades-long history is not a serious threat to presidential power.

In the snap elections of March 2023, Tokayev’s party, Amanat, won 62 seats in the Mazhilis. Auyl won 8, Respublika and Ak Zhol won 6 each, the People’s Party of Kazakhstan won 5, the National Social Democratic Party won 4, and independent candidates won 7. Although more parties entered the lower chamber than in the previous term, none of them in practice represented any serious opposition to Tokayev.

In this piece, we will omit the critical assessments by Freedom House and other international observers — they were fairly moderate; it was emphasized that technical violations existed, but they could not decisively affect the election results.

Half a year after the elections—in order to ensure that a judicial crackdown on the opposition would not appear to be an attempt to obtain an electoral outcome and thereby cast doubt on it—Kazakhstani authorities stepped up efforts to suppress opposition political activity. Following the conviction in November 2023 of opposition leader Marat Zhylandbayev, sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment on charges of “financing extremist activity” and “participation in the activities of a banned extremist organization,” the authorities jailed two more government critics on the same charges. Several months later, on August 2 and 16, 2024, Kazakhstani courts sentenced Duman Mukhammedkarim, an independent journalist and activist, and Asylbek Zhamuratov, another public activist, to seven years’ imprisonment each; they also banned Mukhammedkarim from public activity for three years and Zhamuratov from political activity for five years.

In June 2024, Kazakhstan adopted a new media law that threatens freedom of speech and the right to information. The law expands the definition of mass media to include online publications, requiring their registration and a physical presence in Kazakhstan, and grants the government broad powers to deny accreditation to foreign media representatives if their materials contain unspecified “propaganda of extremism.”

The new law was not directly repressive. Rather, it introduced long-awaited regulation into the country’s new networked communications space, which had been marked by anarchy, lack of oversight, and legal vacuum—while simultaneously creating mechanisms for the authorities’ manual control over the content of online communications and the composition of their participants.

These actions created tools of total governmental control over actors’ presence in both the political sphere and the media sphere.

A telling example: Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Justice has refused to register the opposition group “Alga, Kazakhstan”—the successor to the party “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan,” designated an extremist organization in 2012—no fewer than 24 times, most recently in April 2024. In late November, the group submitted a registration application for the 25th time. As of November 2025, the chair of the party’s organizing committee, Amangeldy Dzhakhin, has been arrested and is charged with participation in an “extremist organization” and “financing extremism.”

The “security” of implementing a radical reform—understood as it is in the post-Soviet space—can be considered ensured.

Transition or Rebranding?

The proposed change in Kazakhstan’s parliamentary system will likely accelerate lawmaking and could be economically advantageous. But above all, it signifies a shift in the model of power transition.

In Kazakhstan today, the line of succession in the event of the president’s absence or incapacity is as follows: Speaker of the Senate, then Chair of the Mazhilis, then the Prime Minister. A unicameral parliament would reduce this pool.

Formerly known as Otan and then Nur Otan, the party was long associated with Nazarbayev. Although Tokayev officially left the party in 2022, Amanat retained its dominant position, quickly adapting to the new political reality. Erlan Koshanov, an experienced civil servant and the current Chair of the Mazhilis, has earned a reputation as a loyal operative—precisely that—of President Tokayev. Before becoming speaker, he headed the Presidential Administration.

Ultimately, Tokayev’s proposed reform is unlikely to significantly alter the party balance. Amanat remains dominant and, barring unexpected events, will likely continue to shape the legislative agenda. The real question is whether Erlan Koshanov will remain at the helm of the new parliament—or whether Tokayev has in mind a more strategically advantageous candidate.

For example, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

Given that Tokayev’s presidential mandate expires in 2029—and there is no possibility of reelection under the 2022 constitutional changes—the proposed reform takes on added significance, raising questions about planning for the retention of real power in Tokayev’s hands and about the political landscape of the post-presidency era.

Russia’s Influence

On the second day of 2022, January 2, Kazakhstan experienced its largest unrest since the sudden doubling of liquefied gas prices.

The protests began in the gas-producing city of Zhanaozen in western Kazakhstan, but on January 3–4 spread to Almaty and other cities. Protesters shifted from economic demands to political ones, including the government’s resignation and the withdrawal from politics of the country’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. By January 4–5, protests in Almaty escalated into mass riots, including arson attacks on government buildings and looting, and the authorities lost control of the city. The former presidential residence and the akimat (city hall) were burned down, and protesters seized Almaty airport.

The next day, the CSTO Collective Security Council decided to deploy a peacekeeping contingent to Kazakhstan. This decision was a response to an official request by President Tokayev to CSTO leaders to “assist in neutralizing the terrorist threat.” Russia’s peacekeeping contingent within the CSTO in Kazakhstan included units from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, the 98th Airborne Division, and the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade—Russia’s most combat-capable airmobile units at the time. CSTO communications stated that units from Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan also formed part of the CSTO forces sent to Kazakhstan in January 2022, but there is no reliable information about their actual numbers—or even confirmed evidence of their presence in Kazakhstan at that time. Russian paratroopers saved Tokayev in January 2022. They remain his primary political fear.

The China Factor

Tokayev is seeking to resolve this dilemma by shifting his reliance from a political alliance with Russia to a political alliance with China.

As one of Kazakhstan’s largest trading partners and investors, China, according to observers, prioritizes economic relations rather than political loyalty and “the shared Soviet past.” At the same time, given instability in Afghanistan and the growing securitization of Xinjiang, China is increasingly interested in ensuring security in Central Asia—something it can obtain from the leader of the region’s strongest country: Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev. This increases Tokayev’s value in Beijing’s eyes.

Kazakhstan, notes the U.S. Congressional Research Service, is viewed as a key country in the overland Silk Road Economic Belt—one of the main corridors of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative—and has received significant financing from Chinese companies for the construction of transport and energy infrastructure.

The Council on Foreign Relations, on December 2, 2024, noted that Kazakhstan skillfully balances the competing influence of Russia and China by diversifying trade partnerships, fostering economic growth, and using its strategic position to protect its sovereignty and autonomy.

Change Shoes in the Air

It should be noted that, according to analysts, Tokayev must pursue policy amid complex internal dynamics among economic actors.

This includes the residual influence of elements of the Nazarbayev-era “old guard” and the dissatisfaction of “new champions,” especially regarding the aggressive expansion of Chinese competitors—curbed to a much lesser extent by Tokayev for political reasons than during Nazarbayev’s rule and that of his clan. Meanwhile, Russia continues to pressure Kazakhstan to limit its independent foreign policy, possessing an extensive toolkit for doing so. Moscow’s leverage includes much of Kazakhstan’s business sector, whose commercial interests pass through Moscow to a disproportionately greater extent than through Washington, Brussels, or Beijing. This Kazakh business has become one of the world’s main beneficiaries of the “Iron Curtain” around Russia’s economy, and the Kremlin’s favorable attitude toward Kazakh schemes and routes is critically important to it.

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, in one of its texts, writes: “We may be witnessing the restoration of a personalist regime, now headed by the second president rather than the first, leaving little chance for democratic transition in the near or medium term….. By positioning himself against the negative image of the first president Nazarbayev and abolishing Nazarbayev’s constitutional privileges, Tokayev managed to preserve all presidential power and reinforce his legitimacy through the referendum.”

Tokayev would not be the first Central Asian president to change the rules in order to reset presidential term limits on his own terms.

In comments, Kazakh political scientist Dimash Alzhanov suggested that this is precisely the trick. “The constitutional amendments will most likely pursue the goal of renewing presidential terms… We still do not know the full list [of planned] changes. But under the pretext of amending the Constitution to create a unicameral parliament, they can quietly push through more important changes, such as resetting the presidential term or introducing the post of vice president,” he said.

The Atlantic Council (February 2025) notes another vector of turbulence in Kazakhstan’s political landscape: “Rising social conservatism accompanying an Islamic revival could pose a serious challenge over the next ten years.”

As we can see, there are many uncertainty factors in the future of the constitutional reform initiated and driven by President Tokayev. And the main one is Tokayev himself: a Soviet diplomat, Deputy Secretary-General of the UN and Director-General of the UN Office in Geneva, long-time chair of Kazakhstan’s Senate under President Nazarbayev, also Nazarbayev’s prime minister—and, at the same time, the initiator of stripping Nazarbayev of his status privileges….

There is no shortage of scenarios for Kazakhstan’s future. But all scenarios converge on one point: the keys to the republic’s political future are in the hands of one—and only one—person.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 178 (January 17, 2026)

The task of regulating legal labor migration by the end of the first quarter of the new century has turned into one of the most powerful configurators of domestic political processes for all countries of the so-called “golden billion,” including Russia. So far, researchers can only state that none of the countries whose experience serves as a reference point for all of “old Europe”—neither the United States, nor Germany, nor the United Kingdom or France—has an effective answer to what is undoubtedly the key domestic political challenge: how to resolve the problem of shrinking labor resources in an aging Western civilization while at the same time preserving Western identity in the face of a wave of labor migrants carrying an entirely different ethical, religious, and cultural code.

Russia, too, is searching for such an answer. The vast post-Soviet space creates a particular specificity for this political process. The Russian authorities are well aware of the negative experience of France, which failed to cope with regulating the flow of migrants from francophone countries of North, Central, and West Africa that poured into the metropole after dozens of states gained independence—irreversibly altering the domestic political, social, and cultural landscape of the Fifth Republic.

Observing this “erosion of Frenchness,” Russia is tightening the rules of legal labor migration. In October 2025, President Vladimir Putin approved a new Concept of Russia’s Migration Policy for 2026–2030, which consolidated these disparate measures as part of state policy. However, tightening the rules of legal labor migration deprives moving to Russia for work of its attractiveness for potential workers. By 2025, the labor shortage is estimated by the Analytical Center under the Government of the Russian Federation at 3.8–4 million people. At the same time, structural imbalances in the labor market are already leading to a paradoxical situation: unemployment coexists with an acute shortage of personnel. According to the Ministry of Labor, the number of vacancies exceeds the number of officially registered unemployed by a factor of 1.7, as follows from the Accounts Chamber’s report on execution of the federal budget for January–June. This gap continues to widen.

A new and somewhat unexpected trend in rule-making on this issue is a return to the practice of attracting labor migrants from countries of the “far abroad,” a term traditionally used in Russia to denote Asian and African countries outside the borders of the former USSR. In this context, a detailed feature in the government-run Rossiyskaya Gazeta is of interest, which we invite readers to review on their own. And these are not merely plans. According to Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2024 more than 170,000 work permits were issued to foreigners from visa-required countries.

The main argument of proponents of recruiting foreign labor from the “far abroad” is that, in the view of this group of parliamentary deputies and government officials, such migrants “will work and then leave.” The wager is placed on the assumption that migrants from these states do not share with Russian residents common Soviet social skills—language, everyday consumer culture, behavioral norms. As supporters of this policy in government circles and the expert community point out, such migrants will find it harder to entrench themselves in Russia as a permanent population, which, in turn, will help protect Russian identity from erosion.

With this study, we would like to remind advocates of attracting labor resources from the “far abroad” that Russia has already had such an experience—and it led to exactly the opposite result. The country has formed the largest permanent diaspora of citizens whose ethnic group never lived either on the territory of the USSR or on that of the Russian Empire: Russian Vietnamese.

Like any tectonic social phenomenon, the emergence of “Russian Vietnam” has both positive and negative consequences, which we will attempt to demonstrate in this study.

The Vietnamese diaspora in Russia represents a unique phenomenon of the post-Soviet space, emerging at the intersection of political alliances, economic needs, and migration strategies. As part of the broader context of socialist cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), this diaspora evolved from temporary educational and labor flows into a stable ethnic community. An analysis of its formation sheds light on the mechanisms by which organized migration transforms into permanent settlement, the role of intergovernmental agreements, and the impact of economic crises. Drawing on a synthesis of data from academic sources, official documents, and international reports, this brief study reconstructs the stages of the diaspora’s emergence, its size, settlement patterns, and socio-economic profile. Within the limits of a concise format, we will also attempt to show the systemic conflicts that have formed around the “Russian Vietnamese” and how they project onto Russian society as a whole.

First stage: educational migration (mid-1950s – late 1970s)

The history of Vietnamese migration to the USSR/Russia begins in the mid-1950s, when the USSR started receiving a limited number of students—primarily war orphans and children of the communist nomenklatura—for higher education and vocational training. In the 1960s and 1970s, the educational flow expanded, but the number of Vietnamese residing in the USSR remained small until the early 1980s, since the primary purpose of these programs was to train personnel “for Vietnam,” not resettlement. During the Soviet period, thousands of Vietnamese received higher professional education in regions of Russia, and many graduates who returned later occupied leading positions in the state apparatus and economy of the SRV.

Some Vietnamese graduates remained in the USSR—through continued study, academic careers, or employment—forming small but stable community nuclei in major university and industrial centers.
These “student” and “engineering” colonies became the first social footholds for subsequent mass labor migration and diaspora building. Overall, from the 1950s until 1991, around 30,000 (by other estimates, approximately 50,000) Vietnamese citizens studied at Soviet universities, technical schools, and vocational colleges. By the early 1970s, more than 7,000 Vietnamese young men and women had been sent to the USSR for education and advanced training.

Despite this substantial pool of graduates, there was virtually no permanent Vietnamese population in the USSR during this period: students, as a rule, had no right to permanent residence and were required to return home after graduation. Student migration was strictly organized, elite, and temporary in nature; most graduates returned to Vietnam and took positions in the state apparatus, education, and industry of the SRV.

After the reunification of Vietnam (1975), the country definitively oriented itself toward the USSR as its main political and economic partner; in 1978, the SRV joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), thereby institutionalizing its integration into the socialist economic space under Soviet leadership. In November 1978, the Soviet Union and Vietnam concluded a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which provided not only for military, but also for broad economic and personnel cooperation.

By the end of the 1970s, three interrelated preconditions had emerged for the start of large-scale organized export of labor from Vietnam to the USSR and Eastern European countries:

1. a chronic labor shortage in a number of sectors of the Soviet economy;

2. postwar economic crisis and unemployment in Vietnam, exacerbated by the consequences of war, collectivization, and external blockade;

3. CMEA policies that stimulated division of labor and the involvement of “junior” socialist partners in the supply of both resources and labor.

Second stage: organized export of labor (1981–1991)

The transition to organized labor recruitment was marked by the signing, on April 2, 1981, in Moscow, of an intergovernmental Agreement on the dispatch and reception of SRV citizens for the purpose of vocational training and employment at enterprises of the USSR. The goals of the agreement were twofold: to cover labor shortages at Soviet enterprises in a number of regions and, simultaneously, to deepen the USSR’s political and economic influence over the Vietnamese authorities.

An analysis of the agreement’s text and archival materials indicates that SRV citizens aged 18–35 were admitted for work, and those aged 17–35 for training, subject to medical fitness. Up to 20% of the earnings of Vietnamese workers under the agreement were transferred to support families and to “participate in the construction of socialism and the defense of the Motherland” in Vietnam, giving the agreement a clearly politico-ideological character.

The USSR assumed a significant share of expenses: medical examinations (including dispatch of Soviet doctors to Vietnam), centralized transportation, Russian-language training, and accommodation in dormitories; the migrants themselves paid for food and local transportation. Registration with internal affairs bodies at the place of residence was to be completed within three days upon petition by the enterprise administration; individual appearances by each worker were not required, as documents were submitted by the group leader. Movement beyond the locality of residence was restricted and controlled by internal affairs bodies. These provisions effectively закрепляли standards of the Soviet “organized recruitment” practice, whose main element was a high degree of migrants’ dependence on the internal leadership of the quasi-community and on both states—the Soviet and the Vietnamese.

By the end of 1990, more than 100,000 Vietnamese workers were already employed in Russia (the RSFSR). In 1989, the newspaper Arguments and Facts reported that Vietnamese were working at 910 enterprises in 70 regions of the USSR, confirming the wide geography of settlement and employment. The main sectors of employment included construction, mechanization, textiles and garment production, light industry, agriculture, healthcare, and education.

Within Vietnam, labor migration was regarded as a privilege for people from “priority” categories: families of the fallen and war veterans, war invalids, former servicemen, representatives of ethnic minorities, and cadre workers with good references. Thus, by the late 1980s, a hundred-thousand-strong body of Vietnamese contract workers had formed in the USSR, distributed across dozens of regions and sectors, with a clearly institutionalized but tightly controlled status.

At the same time, it is important to note that the stay of Vietnamese citizens was formalized as “vocational training” and work under fixed-term labor contracts, after which they were obliged to return home.
This is precisely the principle that today’s Russian practices of attracting labor resources from the “far abroad” declare.

Already in the early 1980s, some Vietnamese workers, using access to sewing equipment and market shortages, organized semi-underground production of denim clothing that competed in price with imported jeans; these products were sold through the Soviet fartsovka (illegal trading and distribution networks), often with the tacit consent of local authorities, although such practices were formally illegal. These practices laid the foundation for the subsequent entrepreneurial specialization of Vietnamese in Russia — primarily in light industry and clothing trade — and shifted “Russian Vietnamese” from the social role of almost rightless hired workers to that of rooted entrepreneurs, albeit in the semi-legal or even illegal sector.

A decisive motive emerged for Vietnamese arrivals to build their future in Russia. It was precisely this change in social roles that became the bifurcation point that completely altered the vector of Vietnamese presence in Russia.

Transitional stage: the collapse of the USSR and the fate of contract workers (late 1980s – first half of the 1990s)

The collapse of the socialist bloc and the transition to a market economy led to the winding down of state programs for importing Vietnamese labor in all Eastern European countries, including the USSR/Russia.

Reports in international and Soviet press of the late 1980s–early 1990s (including Associated Press and the L.A. Times) recorded plans by the authorities of the USSR and Eastern European countries to prematurely terminate contracts and massively abandon the labor of tens of thousands of Vietnamese workers amid economic difficulties, from a compilation with references to international and Soviet press reports.

At the same time, a significant share of students and workers did not return—either remaining in the USSR/Russia and other Eastern European countries, or soon returning there again after encountering unemployment and low living standards in Vietnam during the initial phase of the Doi Moi reforms. This group of those who stayed and those who returned formed the basis of Vietnamese diaspora networks in Eastern Europe and Russia, which were subsequently reproduced through chain migration from the same regions of Vietnam (primarily northern and north-central provinces).

Thus, by the early 1990s, a significant portion of the approximately 100,000 Vietnamese contract workers who had worked in the RSFSR transformed from temporary labor into the embryo of permanent ethnic communities—through refusal of repatriation, repeat migration, and family consolidation.

The destruction of late-Soviet state mechanisms made the process of naturalization of such Vietnamese as permanent residents of the Soviet Union relatively simple from a bureaucratic standpoint. An important factor was the interest of all parties: local authorities found diligent and skilled Vietnamese workers convenient; the “gray” Vietnamese business sector needed support from compatriots; the emerging Soviet organized crime world sought access to contacts in Southeast Asia.

The last organized groups of Vietnamese workers arrived in the USSR as late as 1989; by 1994, recruitment under the old agreements had been completely terminated; by early 1996, the contracts of the last “wave” of Vietnamese workers expired.

After 1991, the mass of former industrial workers flowed into small entrepreneurship and market trade: shuttle trading (chelnoki), transportation of goods between Russia, Vietnam, and third countries; opening of mini-ateliers and sewing workshops producing clothing, footwear, soft toys, etc.; trading at spontaneous and later organized markets (in Moscow—Cherkizovsky, “Sadovod,” and others).

Such forms of employment—semi-criminal or criminal in essence, though outside the sphere of serious crimes—combined with the semi-legal legal status of “Russian Vietnamese” in Russia, formed a trend toward the overall criminalization of this social group.

Post-Soviet legal framework and the third stage: spontaneous and irregular migration (1990s–2000s)

On August 14, 2003, an Agreement on the temporary labor activity of citizens of the Russian Federation in the SRV and citizens of the SRV in the Russian Federation was signed. It made it possible to legalize a significant portion of Vietnamese who had arrived under the 1981 agreement, recognizing their stay as lawful provided that documents were оформлены, and for the first time enshrined the right of Vietnamese to independently choose an employer in the Russian Federation.
At the same time, all agreements in the sphere of labor migration were based on the short-term nature of employment (work permits were usually issued for one year with annual renewal), which made a short legal cycle economically disadvantageous and pushed some migrants toward settling “in the shadows.” By this point, most “Russian Vietnamese” had already developed a way of life and employment in Russia—either through legalization as citizens of the Russian Federation or within the shadow sector. Agreement No. 2008079 was a forced response to an already formed legal vacuum, although it was presented as having purely economic significance.

Field research in Moscow’s Vietnamese migrant environment (2013–2016) shows that after 1990 new migrants—while the community was rapidly growing, drawing in relatives and neighbors—mostly entered Russia on tourist or student visas and then remained, transitioning to irregular status; legalization was carried out through paid intermediary networks.

Overall, the foregoing shows that the foundation of the Vietnamese diaspora in Russia in the new century consisted of three groups:

1. former contract workers who did not return to Vietnam and “retrained” as traders, seamstresses, and small entrepreneurs;

2. graduates of Soviet/Russian universities who remained in the country after their studies, often also turning to entrepreneurship or becoming translators, intermediaries, or specialists in joint ventures;

3. new migrants of the 1990s–2000s who arrived in post-Soviet Russia mainly via illegal or semi-legal routes.
   These groups were closely interconnected through hometown and family networks, which determined subsequent chain migration from specific Vietnamese provinces to particular Russian cities and regions.

Studies of post-Soviet urban markets record the presence of “Vietnamese markets” as stable urban objects/local economies (for example, the case of Magnitogorsk — historical dynamics, boundaries, infrastructure).
This corresponds to descriptions in works on Vietnamese migration to the Russian Federation, where trade (including market trade) appears as an important adaptation strategy in the context of the collapse of previous labor contracts and weak institutional support.

Taken together, this entrenched them as a long-term resident but legally vulnerable community—a typical feature of a “diaspora without citizenship” in migration studies terminology.

Size and settlement of the diaspora

Estimates for the Soviet and early post-Soviet period indicate that by the end of 1990 about 100,000 Vietnamese workers were employed in Russia (the RSFSR) under organized programs. However, even then the number of Vietnamese permanently residing in Russia was 32,200 people in 1990, significantly less than the number of contract workers, but clearly indicating the process of consolidation of the Vietnamese population of Russia as permanent. This is especially noteworthy given that the very character of the intergovernmental agreement of April 2, 1981 was explicitly and precisely directed against granting “Russian Vietnamese” the status of a permanent resident group.

In this regard, the discrepancies between Russian and Vietnamese official statistics are very illustrative.

The 2002 All-Russian Population Census recorded 26,205 people who indicated their nationality as “Vietnamese” (the 72nd largest ethnic group). The 2010 census produced an even lower figure—13,954 people identifying as Vietnamese (0.01% of the population that declared nationality); the largest concentrations were in Moscow, Bashkortostan, Moscow and Tula regions, and Khabarovsk and Stavropol territories.

At the same time, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007 estimated the number of Vietnamese citizens in Russia at 80,000–100,000 people, while a 2008 report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 69,076 Vietnamese in Russia (excluding irregular migrants and shuttle traders).

The discrepancy is explained quite simply. Population censuses register declared affiliation with “Vietnamese,” which, under conditions of legal uncertainty of the community, only one in ten of its members can afford. Data from the Vietnamese ministry reflect the fact of the passport holder’s presence in Russia, which has a precise procedural context.

Thus, we can say that only one in ten members of the community can openly classify themselves as “Russian Vietnamese.” This is an important conclusion that largely explains why a mass and economically influential community, including in criminal business, does not seek political representation.

A respected Russian scholar, V. M. Mazyrin, gives an even higher estimate. Based on IOM expert assessments in 2004, Mazyrin estimated the total size of the Vietnamese community in Russia at up to 150,000 people, emphasizing that official statistics do not cover those residing illegally or semi-legally. Mazyrin’s figures are used in many publications by scholars in Russia, the West, and Israel.

Social profile and current state of the diaspora

Origin and age structure. The overwhelming majority of Vietnamese in Russia originate from the northern and north-central provinces of Vietnam, where overpopulation and limited employment opportunities are traditionally high; this is a legacy of Soviet selection practices and subsequent chain migration. About 90% of Vietnamese migrants in Russia are of working age, with men accounting for around 63%, which is typical for labor migration.

Key factors of diaspora resilience. The social capital of graduates of Soviet universities: networks of engineer-translators facilitated the adaptation of workers in the 1980s and remain a human-resource base for joint projects (oil, machine-building, energy). Later, the diaspora also formed institutional mechanisms: the effective work of SRV diplomatic structures (embassy, business associations) during market crises—for example, the creation of a relief headquarters after the closure of the Cherkizovsky market in 2009.

In the 1990s–2000s, public organizations of Vietnamese citizens were established in many regions (for example, regional societies in Primorsky Krai, Bashkortostan, and others), often interacting with the Society of Friendship with Vietnam and regional societies of Russian-Vietnamese friendship. At the federal level, structures began to emerge claiming the role of all-Russian representation of the Vietnamese diaspora, participating in contacts with the SRV embassy and Russian authorities (they are mentioned in academic literature, although their personal composition and institutional landscape are still forming).

Today’s map of integration and conflict

The above is not merely a historical excursus. By the beginning of the second quarter of the 21st century, “Russian Vietnam” has turned into a unique social mechanism within Russia.

Mass scale: a hundred-thousand-strong population group, nine out of ten of whose members are in the politically active working-age bracket—the largest diaspora in Russia among ethnic groups that historically never lived in the Russian Empire (Chinese lived in the Far East—ed.).

Entrepreneurial: forced by circumstances, “Russian Vietnam” is far more involved in business activity (especially at the level of small and medium-sized enterprises) than any other Russian diaspora.

Oriented beyond the USSR framework: only Vietnamese and Chinese, in their communications—both personal and business—go beyond the framework of the former Soviet Union.

Positively perceived at the local level: the reasons for the fact that, unlike attitudes toward Caucasians, migrants from Central Asia, and Chinese, the level of xenophobic sentiment toward Vietnamese recorded by sociologists is noticeably lower require a separate study.

At the same time, “Russian Vietnam” is by no means a quiet harbor.

The academic study by L. A. Hoang, Vietnamese Migrants in Russia: Mobility in Times of Uncertainty (2020) documents the existence of “black” workshops (xưởng may đen) with round-the-clock labor, hidden dormitories, and monthly payments of “tribute” to corrupt inspectors.

“Vietnamese migrants, as natives of a backward agrarian country, have a corresponding mindset, harmful habits, and mores characteristic of small-scale handicraft production. They found themselves in Russia—a more civilized, industrially developed country that has undergone a change of political system. Here, after the collapse of the USSR during the period of perestroika, social differentiation grew and other social contradictions intensified,” writes Nguyen Canh Toan of the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, and we concur with his conclusions.

Ryazantsev et al. (2022) note that the economic position of Vietnamese migrants in Russia is characterized by cyclical “booms and busts” driven by sharp changes in migration and trade regulation, anti-immigrant campaigns, and the overall level of corruption. Life in the shadows (“shadow economy”) limits migrants’ social activity and makes them dependent on “exploitative market regimes” and “opportunistic criminals” confident in their impunity due to the illegal status of Vietnamese migrants.

It is too early to draw final conclusions in the history of “Russian Vietnam.” The elevation of the issue of attracting labor migrants from the “far abroad” to the list of priorities of the Russian authorities makes Vietnam an extremely attractive source of a new migration flow that has not yet manifested itself. This new flow will enter into resonant relations with the already established diaspora of “Russian Vietnamese.”

At present, it would be wrong to make any definitive forecasts. But we will attempt one. Namely, the idea that new Vietnamese migrants, after working in Russia, will all return to Vietnam—the half-century-long history of the creation and strengthening of the Russian Vietnamese diaspora demonstrates the opposite trend.

Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 176 (January 11, 2026)

Not only the events and news of the newly begun year have their roots in 2025. The research and academic publications from December that we present to our readers in the January monitoring issue are also grounded in the past—but have a clear projection into the future.
As usual, this issue offers readers unexpected research methods, new academic centers, authors whose work we have not previously covered, and other substantive discoveries.

In preparing our monitoring, we always pay special attention to unconventional methodologies used by scholars to generate humanitarian knowledge in political science. The article “Enhancing Cultural Identity through Music following Independence: The Case of Kazakhstani Musicians” by Meruyet Mukhsiynova, Abdullah Akat, Zulfiya Kassimova, and Gulmira Mussagulova (Zhurgenov Kazakh National Academy of Arts and Kurmangazy Kazakh National Conservatory, Kazakhstan, and Istanbul University State Conservatory, Türkiye) fits squarely within this category.

This truly unique analysis of the construction of cultural identity through the sphere of musical production, published in Musicologist 9(2):404–417 (Dec. 2025), focuses on the Republic of Kazakhstan, where, following the attainment of independence in 1991, the challenge of overcoming the legacy of Soviet cultural policy and forming a sovereign cultural code came sharply to the fore. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s theory of cultural identity, the authors examine how professional musicians, acting as agents of cultural memory, employ elements of traditional Kazakh music within the pop industry to revitalize national self-awareness and resist the lingering postcolonial influence.

The study is based on a qualitative methodology that includes interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), aimed at exploring personal experience and meaning-making in a social context. Observation and case-study methods were also applied, allowing for an in-depth examination of musicians’ practices. The theoretical framework incorporates concepts of cultural memory (Jan Assmann), cultural capital (Pierre Bourdieu), as well as the critical theory of the “culture industry” (Theodor Adorno), applied to the analysis of the Soviet phenomenon of estrada.

The authors emphasize the profound traumatization of the Kazakh cultural field during the Soviet period. Collectivization, the repressions of the 1930s (including those against the national intelligentsia and epic storytellers—the zhyrau), demographic catastrophe, and nuclear testing led to the marginalization of traditional art. Soviet cultural policy, centrally managed from Moscow, according to the authors, pursued a course of unification and the creation of a “new Soviet person.” This was embodied in the estrada system—an instrument of propaganda in which music was subject to strict regulation, while improvisation, a key element of Kazakh tradition, was effectively banned. As a result, traditional culture was not merely suppressed but systematically displaced from the public sphere, creating a long-term deficit of cultural continuity.

With the attainment of independence, a process of cultural revival began. Pop music, as a mass and accessible genre, became an important cultural aggregator for rethinking the past and engaging in dialogue with tradition. The authors note that despite formal sovereignty, Kazakhstan continues to face challenges to national identity: the dominance of the Russian language in the media sphere, economic difficulties, and the need for mental decolonization. Under these conditions, music becomes a field of symbolic struggle for consciousness—a means of “restoring” a historical line of development interrupted by colonial intervention.

The study, in particular, provides a detailed description of a three-stage methodology for teaching traditional songs in educational institutions:

1. historical and intonational immersion;

2. textual analysis with an emphasis on allegory;

3. performance with attention to diction and structure.
   Special importance is attached to mastering improvisation skills, which become possible only after a full understanding of the rhythmic, melodic, and dynamic foundations of a song. This approach demonstrates institutional efforts to transmit the cultural code and to cultivate “cultural competence” (Bourdieu) among new generations of musicians.

The research situates musical practices within a broader socio-political context:
• Cultural memory: Music functions as an institution linking different historical periods through symbols and sound codes, actualizing the past within the contemporary cultural field (Assmann).
• Cultural capital: Mastery of the language of traditional music and the ability to decode it become forms of cultural capital associated with education and access to national heritage.
• Identity formation: The use of traditional elements is interpreted as an attempt to respond to the Soviet past and to construct a desired future, fully consistent with Hall’s dialectic of cultural identity.

The authors conclude that the integration of traditional Kazakh music into the pop industry represents a complex, multi-layered system that contributes to the strengthening of cultural identity. This process includes:

1. the preservation of oral singing techniques;

2. the adaptation of global pop genres to the local context through rhythms and vocal techniques;

3. a deep synthesis of traditional techniques with contemporary genres (jazz, rock, fusion).

The fundamental criteria for the successful preservation and reinforcement of identity within the global musical landscape are identified as: the use of the state (Kazakh) language, the incorporation of folklore, the preservation of cultural and spiritual values, and the purposeful cultivation of cultural memory through artistic practices.

The presented study is relevant not only for cultural studies but also for the political analysis of post-Soviet societies. Using a concrete case, it demonstrates how culture becomes an arena for the soft yet persistent assertion of national sovereignty, the overcoming of colonial trauma, and the formation of a competitive national brand under conditions of globalization. Kazakhstan’s experience, as shown in the article, forms part of a broader trend observed in many post-Soviet countries, where music has become one of the key instruments for the reconfiguration of collective identity.

The next work selected for the December monitoring issue offers readers a theoretically grounded perspective on Iran’s relations with the countries of Central Asia in the context of transformations in Eurasian geopolitics, using a realist–constructivist theoretical approach that combines material interests and ideational factors. The article “Iran and Central Asia: Eurasian Geopolitics in a Changing World Order” (The International Spectator, 2025, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp. 138–155) demonstrates that Central Asia has occupied an important place in Iran’s regional and international policy since the collapse of the USSR. In a changing world order characterized by the strategic reorientation of many states toward the “East,” the conflict in Ukraine, and the rise of China, the Eurasian space is acquiring critical importance. For Iran, long subject to international isolation, Central Asia and cooperation with leading Eurasian powers (Russia, China, India) become strategic resources for overcoming this isolation and realizing its potential as a Eurasian power.

The authors’ main research question (Aigerim Altynbek, Edward Wastnidge, and Adilbek Yermekbayev of al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, and the Open University, Milton Keynes) concerns how to decompose Iran’s approach to Central Asia and how the evolution of Eurasian geopolitics affects these relations.

As an analytical framework, the authors propose a realist–constructivist synthesis. This approach allows them to overcome the binary logic of traditional international relations theories. In their methodology, realism explains Iran’s engagement in Central Asia through material interests—securing energy routes, developing economic ties, and creating counterbalances to the influence of other powers (Russia, China, the United States)—while constructivism emphasizes the role of immaterial factors: shared cultural-historical, and to a limited extent religious, ties that shape Iran’s geopolitical imagination and identity.

The authors argue that in the case of Iran–Central Asia relations, material and ideational factors are interconnected and jointly construct policy. Iran uses narratives of shared history and culture to advance concrete material interests such as infrastructure projects and market access.

Key events of the 21st century (the September 11 attacks, the war on terror, the rise of China, the creation of BRICS) contributed to the institutionalization of Eurasian cooperation and the transition from unipolarity to an emerging multipolarity. For Iran, the study notes, this shift created opportunities for alliances with other “anti-hegemonic” actors (Russia, China) that share its desire to challenge Western—particularly U.S.—dominance. The tightening and globalization of sanctions mechanisms further brought Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran closer together.

However, the authors note that, contrary to expectations, the religious factor (Shi‘ism) did not become the foundation of Iran’s policy in the region, given the secular and predominantly Sunni character of Central Asian states, which are largely unreceptive to Iran-style political Islam. Instead, Tehran emphasizes shared cultural heritage (the Persian language, literature, the celebration of Nowruz) to develop relations. These efforts are implemented through cultural initiatives, exchanges, and institutions such as the ECO Cultural Institute in Tehran. At the same time, Iran faces serious competition in the sphere of “soft power” from Russia (the Russian language) and Turkey (Turkic linguistic and cultural kinship, the Organization of Turkic States).

To consolidate its positions, the study shows, Iran actively uses new Eurasian institutions, reflecting both material and ideational interests.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): Full membership obtained in 2023 became Iran’s most significant diplomatic achievement in reducing its isolation. The SCO is viewed as an anti-Western alliance and a platform for promoting multipolarity. Iran is already proposing initiatives within the SCO, such as the creation of a common settlement currency and a regional electricity market. Membership has contributed to the growth of Iran’s non-oil trade with SCO countries.

Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU): Although Iran is not a member, the signing of a free trade agreement with the EAEU in 2023 (entering into force in 2025) opens access to a market of nearly 200 million people. The agreement is expected to potentially triple trade turnover, especially with Kazakhstan. This serves Iran’s material interests as a transit hub and export market.

Bilateral mechanisms: Iran is also developing ties with other regional states: a visa-free regime with Tajikistan has been introduced, a joint investment committee with Kyrgyzstan established, and major agreements signed with Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is regarded as a key partner due to its EAEU membership.

A key conclusion of the authors—one that primarily convinced us to single out this study—is the convergence of material infrastructure projects and anti-hegemonic ideology.

International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC): A joint project of Russia, Iran, and India, enabling Russia to gain access to the Indian Ocean bypassing Suez, and allowing Iran to strengthen its logistical role. The project gained renewed momentum after the 2022 sanctions.

Port of Chabahar: India’s strategic project in Iran, providing access to Central Asian markets while bypassing Pakistan. It competes with the Chinese–Pakistani port of Gwadar. India received an exemption from U.S. sanctions for investments in Chabahar.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Iran and Central Asian states seek to integrate into China’s mega-project. China, in turn, is interested in Iran as a partner, as evidenced by the 25-year cooperation agreement and its mediation in the normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

These projects are reinforced by ideological solidarity on issues of sovereignty and non-interference. Russia, China, and Iran mutually support each other in the UN, rejecting criticism related to internal conflicts and human rights violations, reflecting a shared rejection of Western liberal interventionism.

Relations between Iran and Central Asia serve as a productive example for applying the realist–constructivist approach. It shows how material interests (transit, trade, security) intertwine with ideational factors (historical-cultural narratives, anti-Western rhetoric, the concept of multipolarity) in shaping foreign policy.

Iran’s policy in Central Asia is predominantly pragmatic in nature, despite the ideological foundation of the regime. Cultural and historical ties are used as instruments to achieve concrete material and strategic goals. For Iran, Central Asia is a key space for overcoming international isolation and realizing its ambition to become a Eurasian power. Membership in the SCO and the FTA with the EAEU are important steps along this path.

Central Asia remains a region where the interests of major powers (Russia, China, India, Iran) intersect. The countries of the region, in turn, use this competition and convergence of interests to diversify their foreign ties and attract infrastructure investment. The authors argue that the “Look East” policy and the deepening of ties with Eurasian partners are likely to remain stable directions of Iran’s foreign policy amid high confrontation with the United States and Israel in the Middle East. Infrastructure projects and institutions alternative to Western ones (SCO, BRICS, EAEU) will play an increasingly important role in Eurasian geopolitics.

The transformation of Kazakhstan–Russia relations after the events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan and the outbreak of the conflict in southeastern Russia and Ukraine is the subject of the article “Kazakhstan–Russia Relations After 2022: Sources of Contention, Points of Pressure” by Nargis Kassenova (Director of the Program on Central Asia at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies), published in The Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst.

Until 2022, Kassenova notes, relations between Kazakhstan and Russia were characterized by stability based on Astana’s multi-vector foreign policy, which combined deepening ties with Moscow and diversification of partnerships. However, the events of January 2022 (“Qantar”) and the Russia–Ukraine conflict fundamentally altered the status quo. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s government has been forced to balance between strengthening global ties and preserving relations with Russia, requiring constant recalibration and difficult compromises.

The existence of a long (4,000 km) and effectively undefended border, as well as a significant Russian-speaking population (15% in 2024), creates potential risks to territorial integrity. At the same time, Russia remains Kazakhstan’s leading trading partner (a record trade turnover of $28 billion in 2024). The economies are closely integrated within the EAEU, making Kazakhstan vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks originating in Russia. Western sanctions against Russia have complicated the use of northern transport routes for exporting Kazakh oil, uranium, and grain, stimulating accelerated development of the Middle Corridor, which, however, cannot yet serve as a full-fledged alternative.

The weakening of the influence of former president Nursultan Nazarbayev and his entourage (the “family-clan system”) has created a new point of pressure. The split of elites into a conditional “old” and “new” Kazakhstan potentially opens space for Moscow’s interference in domestic politics. Despite the decisive role of Russian assistance through the CSTO in suppressing the January 2022 unrest, Tokayev later adopted an independent position on Ukraine, provoking sharp criticism in Russia. At the same time, close personal ties between segments of the Kazakh elite (for example, Imangali Tasmagambetov) and Moscow remain, which can be instrumentalized to influence intra-elite competition.

Kazakhstan’s decision to build its first nuclear power plant, approved by a 2024 referendum, became a new area of pressure. Despite significant risks (increased dependence on Russian technology, Rosatom’s problems due to sanctions, negative public opinion), the contract was awarded to the Russian state corporation. This decision was accompanied not only by the economic advantages of the offer but also by the implicit threat of a serious deterioration in relations in the event of refusal. A historical precedent—the 2009 arrest of the head of Kazatomprom, Mukhtar Dzhakishev, who linked it to his resistance to expanding Russian control over Kazakhstan’s uranium assets—illustrates the long-standing nature of this confrontation. At the same time, Astana seeks diversification by developing cooperation with China (a joint uranium enrichment venture) and leaving open the possibility of building a second nuclear power plant with the participation of China’s CNNC.

Kazakhstan’s active efforts to rethink its own history, including the rehabilitation of victims of political repression (the State Commission completed its work in 2023) and the creation of new national historical narratives, have come into conflict with Russia’s official historical policy. Russia, which is revising rehabilitation decisions of the 1990s–2000s and glorifying the Stalinist period, perceives Kazakh initiatives as “Russophobic” and threatening to its national security. This has led to restrictions on Kazakh researchers’ access to Russian archives on “sensitive” topics (collectivization, famine, repression). Under pressure, Kazakh authorities were forced to curtail the activities of the State Commission and issue recommendations to scholars to avoid discussing colonial themes and repression in the media.

The events of 2022 marked the end of the “Nazarbayev era” and the post-Soviet order in relations. Kazakhstan and Russia are moving along diverging trajectories: Kazakhstan seeks to strengthen national identity and sovereignty and diversify its ties, including cooperation with the West, while Russia is becoming increasingly anti-Western, autarkic, and imperial-revisionist. A “security dilemma” emerges, in which Moscow’s assertiveness pushes Astana toward greater distancing, which in turn intensifies irritation on the Russian side. Tokayev’s administration’s approach consists of maximum possible adaptation to Russian interests while simultaneously defending its own sovereignty—requiring constant, complex, and risk-laden balancing. The three areas examined—intra-elite relations, nuclear energy, and historical policy—are the most representative examples of this new, more tense dynamic.

Comparative analysis between post-Soviet processes and those in “old” Europe remains extremely rare.


The article by Georgian–German researcher Kristine Margvelashvili (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Göttingen, Germany), “Contested national and digital space, the Orthodox Church, and the new forms of religious engagement: comparative insights from Georgia and Greece” published on 18 December 2025 in Frontiers in Political Science, Sec. Politics of Technology, Volume 7 – 2025, belongs to this rare category.

In the context of revisiting the secularization thesis and the growth of desecularization processes in Orthodox societies, the article focuses on the role of Orthodox Churches in shaping national identity and using digital space for religious–political mobilization.

The empirical analysis centers on Georgia and Greece—two countries where Orthodoxy is closely intertwined with national self-consciousness, but where institutional and political contexts differ significantly. The aim of the study is to identify how the digitalization of religious discourse transforms church–society–state interaction practices, and how Orthodox Churches participate in discursive struggles over defining national identity in conditions of a contested national space.

The study draws on concepts of desecularization (P. Berger) and the post-secular society (J. Habermas), as well as theories of religious nationalism linking national identity to a specific religious tradition. The key theoretical tool is critical discourse analysis (N. Fairclough), applied to examine how church and political elites construct narratives of national belonging (“Georgianness” and “Greekness”).

The methodology includes qualitative discourse analysis of social media (Facebook, X, YouTube) and official church resources for the period 2024–2025. The author also uses in-depth semi-structured interviews (28 interviews) with political and religious elites and experts in Georgia and Greece (2021–2022). This dataset forms the basis for a comparative analysis of the two cases, with an emphasis on differences in institutional memory, state capacity, and the degree of church involvement in politics.

The Georgian case is presented as one of digital mobilization and religious nationalism. The Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) is the most trusted institution in the country (CRRC data, 2021), possessing significant cultural capital (P. Bourdieu). The study shows high religious self-identification with low levels of practice: 99% believe in God, but only 17% regularly attend services. At the same time, 81% consider Orthodoxy the most important marker of national identity. Margvelashvili notes the active use of Facebook (≈95% population coverage) to mobilize and promote a narrative of the inseparability of Orthodoxy and “Georgianness.”

The canonization of secular national figures (Ilia Chavchavadze) to sacralize the national narrative and the promotion of the triad “Homeland, Language, Faith” as the basis of national identity are examined as successful strategies of the Georgian Orthodox Church, though not deeply internalized. In 2024, young protesters against the “foreign agents law” transformed it into “Homeland, Language, Unity,” provoking resistance from both church and state.

At the same time, cooperation between the church and right-wing populist and ultraconservative groups (“Alliance of Patriots,” “Alt-Info,” “Georgian March”), which use religious discourse for legitimation and mobilization, is presented by the author as an example of a strategically unsuccessful line of activity.

The author highlights the unique political role of the Georgian Orthodox Church: it acts as a veto player, influencing electoral processes (support for the “Georgian Dream” party in 2012) and blocking liberal reforms (e.g., anti-discrimination legislation). At the same time, Margvelashvili notes that many GOC hierarchs were educated in Russia, and discourse on “traditional values” often coincides with Russian narratives.

The Greek Orthodox Church (GOCr) holds the status of a state religion and is deeply integrated into the political system. Greece is also characterized by high levels of religiosity: 92% believe in God, 76% associate Orthodoxy with national identity, but only 16% regularly attend services.

There are, however, notable differences compared to Georgia. For example, the use of social media is more limited: only 65% of the population are active on Facebook, and official church accounts are minimally involved in political debates.

The discursive strategies of the Greek Orthodox Church focus on promoting ethno-religious nationalism (“Greekness” = Orthodoxy) through historical narratives about the church’s role in preserving identity during Ottoman rule. At the same time, the church avoids direct political debates, concentrating on religious issues. Its mobilizational potential becomes visible in crisis situations (e.g., protests against the removal of the “religion” field from identity cards in the 2000s).

The political role of the Greek Orthodox Church is shaped by close ties with the ruling New Democracy party and far-right forces (“Greek Solution,” historically—“Golden Dawn”). The church’s role is especially prominent in issues concerning national identity (e.g., the dispute with North Macedonia over the country’s name). Institutional memory and state stability reduce the intensity of discursive struggle compared to Georgia.

The author concludes that desecularization in Orthodox societies manifests itself through the strengthening of the church’s role in constructing national identity, with digital space becoming a key arena of this struggle. Discursive strategies of Orthodox churches depend on institutional context: in Georgia, the church actively uses digital platforms for mobilization in conditions of a weak state; in Greece, it acts more cautiously, relying on traditional institutions. Religious nationalism remains a powerful force fueling conservative-populist movements and complicating democratic transformations (especially in Georgia).

The study demonstrates that even within a shared Orthodox tradition, variations in the political influence of the church are determined by historical experience, state capacity, and the degree of digitalization of the public sphere.

The article contributes to desecularization theory by offering a comparative analysis of cases beyond the contexts traditionally studied by scholars. Empirically, it shows how digitalization transforms religious practices, creating new forms of political mobilization and competition over the definition of national identity. The study also underscores the necessity of accounting for institutional and historical specificities when analyzing the interaction between religion and politics in Orthodox countries.

The study “International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s ‘Pivot to the South’ and Trans-Eurasian Connectivity” can serve as a rare contemporary example of effective academic collaboration.

Researchers from India—Sandeep Tripathi and Urvashi Singh—are working as visiting researchers at Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia, and publish their findings in Yerevan State University (YSU Journal of International Affairs 2025, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 141–159). In the context of transformations in global political and economic alliances, as well as the fragmentation of the international order, trade and economic relations between India and Russia are acquiring renewed strategic significance.

Tripathi and Singh conduct a comprehensive analysis of the potential of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) as an instrument for strengthening bilateral trade and as an important geopolitical lever. The study seeks to answer key questions: how the INSTC can redefine the scale, efficiency, and structure of economic exchange between the two countries, and how it can influence the regional balance of power amid increasing global fragmentation and the use of trade as a tool of political pressure.

Despite a long history of cooperation, the authors note that after the collapse of the USSR, economic ties between India and Russia remained underdeveloped, with a significant trade deficit in Russia’s favor. One of the key problems is the mutual lack of awareness among business communities about market opportunities. Diplomatic efforts and formal agreements have yet to realize the full potential of trade connectivity. In this situation, both sides view the INSTC as a strategic project for expanding commercial opportunities. It is telling that in 2022, Indian Prime Minister N. Modi, speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum, emphasized the importance of the corridor, alongside other initiatives, for the future development of relations, noting India’s growing presence in the Russian Far East.

Established in 2000, the International North–South Transport Corridor is a multimodal transport network linking the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf via Iran with the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Europe. The corridor includes three main routes: Western (via Russia and Azerbaijan, ~5,100 km), Eastern (via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, ~6,100 km), and Trans-Caspian (using ferry crossings, ~4,900 km). Its primary goal is to ensure faster, more efficient, and cost-effective movement of goods and passengers. According to studies, the INSTC can reduce transport costs between India and Russia by about 30% and cut transit time from 40 days to 23–25 days, serving as an alternative to the traditional route via the Suez Canal.

In the context of the globalization of Western sanctions against Russia and the new tariff policy of the Trump administration toward India, this transport corridor acquires new geo-economic significance as a viable alternative logistics artery.

For Russia, the corridor represents an instrument for diversifying exports beyond Europe and an “economic path to salvation.” For India, it has strategic value by providing access to Central Asian and Afghan markets while bypassing Pakistan, and by serving as a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly its component—the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which New Delhi views as encroaching on its sovereignty (as it passes through disputed Kashmir).

The study shows that the use of the INSTC is already demonstrating positive effects. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian crisis, bilateral trade has grown, reaching $11.9 billion between April 2021 and February 2022 (an increase of approximately 46%). The corridor is expected to further boost trade volumes, including in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, agricultural products (onions, spices, tea), diamonds, and coking coal. The development of the corridor also stimulates institutional cooperation: negotiations are underway on a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), interbank links have been established, and business forums are being held.

The study examines the INSTC in detail as India’s strategic response to China’s expansion. Unlike the BRI, which the authors criticize for its “debt trap” and lack of transparency, the INSTC is presented as a transparent, multilateral, and fair model of regional integration based on consensus. It allows India to project soft power, strengthening its image as a responsible leader of the Global South. India’s investments in the port of Chabahar (Iran) are a key element of this strategy, ensuring control over a critical node of the corridor.

Despite optimistic forecasts, the implementation of the INSTC faces serious challenges, the article notes. These include the consequences of the conflict in Ukraine and related sanctions, instability in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s return to power, complex relations among corridor participants, and the growing rapprochement between China, Iran, and Russia, which complicates the strategic landscape. The success of the project will depend on diplomatic flexibility and the ability of participants to overcome geopolitical disagreements.

The authors conclude that the INSTC represents not merely a trade route, but a transformational geopolitical instrument capable of reshaping Eurasia’s economic landscape. It offers India and Russia a path toward reducing dependence on conflict-prone routes and asserting their roles in the emerging multipolar world. The corridor can provide India with energy security and Russia with economic resilience. However, its full operationalization remains contingent on the resolution of existing regional conflicts and the consolidation of efforts by all interested parties.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 172 (December 19, 2025)

Selecting an overarching frame for the academic works we chose for the December issue of our monitoring bulletin, we noticed that all of them, in one way or another, touch upon the civilizational influence of the Soviet Union—an influence that has not ended even today, 34 years after the USSR ceased to exist, in December.

The post-Soviet space—and, more broadly, the post-Soviet perimeter of geopolitical influence—is not merely a historical shorthand for the past. It remains an operative category, a geopolitical reality today—already, in just a few days, in the second quarter of the twenty-first century. This makes our work—researching conflicts in the post-Soviet space—ever more relevant.

The article “University-industry collaboration in post-Soviet states: A bibliometric study with implications for educational policy and practice”  caught our attention as a rare example of an objective, quantitative analysis of humanitarian and social processes. Its authors are Kairat Moldashev, Assylbek Nurgabdeshov, and Sanat Kozhakhmet, and it was published in the Journal of Pedagogical Research, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp. 37–57. The article was submitted on August 4, 2025, revised on November 5, 2025, and published online on December 9, 2025.

The journal’s emphasis on interdisciplinary approaches to education and pedagogy makes it an appropriate platform for this work, given its focus on how university–industry collaboration intersects with curriculum reform and pedagogical practice.

Kairat Moldashev works at SDU University in Kazakhstan. His conclusions are grounded, in part, in personal experience of Central Asia’s transitional period, where the post-Soviet legacy continues to shape higher education and innovation systems. Assylbek Nurgabdeshov, the second author, is based at Edinburgh Business School, Heriot-Watt University (United Kingdom), enabling him to bring a global perspective to regional issues. Sanat Kozhakhmet of Oxford Brookes University (United Kingdom) contributes expertise in business and management in transition economies.

In their work, the authors combine Kazakhstan’s local specificities with international academic rigor, making their analysis especially relevant for understanding the dynamics of the post-Soviet space.

The article argues that in post-Soviet states the university–industry collaboration (UIC) mechanism has become an important instrument for innovation, economic development, and educational reform, yet its development remains constrained by the historical legacy of centralized planning, state dominance, and systemic transition.

The authors’ central claim is that, whereas in the West UIC often follows market-driven models, in post-Soviet settings it operates within a “state-centered” Triple Helix model, where government remains the dominant actor, limiting the autonomy of universities and industry. This creates structural barriers but also opens opportunities for education-oriented reforms—such as curriculum modernization and workplace learning—that can improve graduates’ competitiveness in the labor market and contribute to broader societal stability.

The study fills a gap in the literature by presenting what the authors describe as the first comprehensive bibliometric synthesis of UIC research in post-Soviet states from 1991 to 2024, supplemented by a thematic analysis of 37 selected studies.

It argues that inter-university communication systems do more than configure academic roles and student engagement. Persistent problems—state dominance, weak demand from industry, underdeveloped infrastructure, constraints in human capital, and cultural barriers—continue to hinder effective collaboration. In the authors’ view, aligning UIC activity with pedagogical reforms directly affects the development of a knowledge-intensive economy. They therefore argue that future research should prioritize longitudinal, multi-level studies to inform policy and practice, especially in transitional environments prone to instability.

In the context of conflict dynamics, this claim is persuasive: the economic vulnerability of post-Soviet states—stemming from severed Soviet-era linkages and slow market transformation—often fuels conflicts over resources, jobs, and influence. By presenting UIC as a bridge for human-capital development, the authors indirectly suggest a path to reducing such tensions, aligning with broader debates on how innovation ecosystems can stabilize fragile regions.

The authors ground their argument in the Triple Helix framework (Etzkowitz, 2000; Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz, 1996), adapted to post-Soviet realities. They argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union forced universities to rethink their role, transforming from state-subordinate entities into active partners in a market economy; yet path dependence—such as the high share of state R&D and weak business demand—produced a state-centric configuration (Ranga & Etzkowitz, 2013).

Methodologically, the study uses a two-stage design: (1) bibliometric mapping of 223 Web of Science publications (1991–2024) using VOSviewer and Bibliometrix to analyze co-citation, bibliographic coupling, and thematic mapping; and (2) a thematic analysis of 37 purposively selected articles focusing on national innovation systems.

The thematic analysis identifies five core issues:

1. State dominance and path dependence: Governments prescribe innovation rather than facilitate it, producing “innovation by coercion” and formal compliance. In Russia and Kazakhstan this appears as dependence on state budgets, inconsistent policy, and top-down implementation.

2. Weak industry demand and low absorptive capacity: Firms prioritize imports over R&D and lack the capacity to absorb academic knowledge. Cross-sector distrust confines partnerships to informal ties, reducing joint-innovation potential.

3. Underdeveloped infrastructure: University-to-economy technology transfer mechanisms are bureaucratic and ineffective; unclear IP legislation and outdated infrastructure impede commercialization.

4. Human capital and cultural barriers in academia: Scholars, detached from economic needs, focus on basic research and often lack entrepreneurial motivation. High teaching loads and risk aversion further reduce engagement.

5. New opportunities: Despite obstacles, UIC can reform curricula through co-design, internships, and employability programs. Funding diversification and digital tools open new developmental pathways.

These arguments are supported with concrete illustrations: publication trajectories showing growth, collaboration networks highlighting transatlantic ties, and thematic maps classifying trends. The authors contend that the educational consequences of UIC—restructuring teaching through the integration of industry into pedagogy—remain underexplored, but are promising for transition economies.

They conclude that post-Soviet innovation mechanisms remain guided by state logic, limiting market-oriented transfer, yet enabling interventions that are primarily education-focused. They synthesize patterns: state dominance constrains absorptive capacity; infrastructure lags; but educational opportunities can have short-term impact through curriculum reform and workplace learning. Theoretically, this supports “capacity governance” models and calls for multi-level analysis incorporating motivational constructs. Practically, they recommend longitudinal research, study of digital innovation hubs, and policy alignment to balance teaching, research, and “third mission” objectives.

For conflict processes, the implications are substantial: across post-Soviet spaces where economic inequality is a driver of conflict (for example, competition for resources in Central Asia or rivalry among post-Soviet republics in the South Caucasus), strengthening university–industry collaboration may contribute to stability.

This article enriches our understanding of post-Soviet dynamics by reminding us that conflict resolution often begins with expanding educational opportunities and practices. We encourage readers to consult the full text for a deeper exploration of the subject.

The next publication we selected for our monitoring bulletin engages with ongoing debates about far-right populism, Russian influence in Europe, and Germany’s persistent political divide.

The study offers a timely—and therefore unexpected—perspective on how historical materialism shapes pro-Russian sentiment within Germany’s “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), especially in the context of post-socialist transformations in Eastern Europe.

Our analysis is based exclusively on the text provided, highlighting the study’s contribution to understanding conflict dynamics that resonate across the former Soviet bloc, including economic discrimination, the resurgence of nationalism, and geopolitical transformation.

The article “From Ostpolitik to Putinpolitik: The AfD’s Affinity for Russia”  was written by Rachel Orse, a researcher at the University of Kansas, and published in the Kansas Undergraduate Journal of International Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1.

Orse’s work combines quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze contemporary German politics through a historical lens. Positioned as a case study of AfD’s pro-Russian sentiment, it contributes to broader debates on populism and extremism in Germany after reunification.

Rachel Orse’s affiliation with the University of Kansas underscores the work’s academic grounding and suggests it may form part of a wider research project—an inference supported by the study’s methodological rigor and its unusually extensive use of primary sources.

The publication’s core claim is that pro-Putin or pro-Russian sentiment is disproportionately common among AfD members from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), which the author explains through the distinctive historical and material conditions of East Germany.

This argument frames AfD’s eastern wing as a particular form of right-wing populism rooted in post-socialist sentiment, generating sympathy for Russia as a counterweight to Western liberalism—arguably the study’s main innovation. The article contends that these attitudes arise from a combination of economic stagnation, cultural alienation, and historical ties between the GDR and the Soviet Union, preserving a Cold War-era divide that continues to shape European conflicts.

Using historical materialism as her theoretical framework, Orse argues that material conditions—such as deindustrialization and unemployment after German reunification—shaped an East German identity in opposition to the West, making a pro-Russian stance a logical expression of that identity.

Several secondary claims develop this foundation. Orse argues that AfD leverages eastern resentment by aligning with illiberal figures such as Vladimir Putin, potentially undermining Germany’s role in the EU and NATO. She emphasizes that eastern German populism is marked by cynicism toward democracy and nostalgia for authoritarian stability. The article also proposes a synthesis of Western and Central–Eastern European populist styles within AfD, where economic nationalism intersects with anti-Western narratives to advance pro-Russian policy.

Orse structures her argument around historical, economic, and sociocultural dimensions, drawing on a literature review, methodological discussion, and empirical analysis. Beginning with historical context, she argues that German reunification in 1990 exacerbated rather than resolved the East–West divide. Citing surveys and studies (e.g., Köpping, 2019), Orse notes that nearly 60% of East Germans after reunification felt like second-class citizens, viewing the process as an “annexation” by the West. This resentment stems from rapid deindustrialization, mass privatization, and job losses, producing cycles of poverty and unemployment (Weisskircher, 2020; Lazzo & Gabriellcic, 2020). Economically, East Germany continues to lag behind the West, feeding a sense of cultural opposition to “Western liberalism” and European integration. Orse argues that this material deprivation pushes eastern voters toward right-wing populism, with AfD emerging as a key beneficiary, campaigning under slogans of economic nationalism and phrases such as: “Our country first—we are on your side!” (Alternative für Deutschland, 2023).

Her claims are supported through both quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, Orse collected demographic data on all 80 AfD Bundestag members (2021) using publicly available sources such as Bundestag.de and social media. She coded positions using keywords such as “Putin” and “Russia”: pro-Putin (explicit praise or defense), neutral (ambiguous or absent), or anti-Putin (condemnation or pro-NATO views). A regression analysis in STATA found a strong correlation: members from eastern states scored 0.62 units more pro-Putin (p = 0.00), while other variables—age, gender, or education—were statistically insignificant (p > 0.05). Notably, all seven anti-Putin members were from western states, underscoring geography as a key predictor.

Qualitatively, Orse examined historical events such as GDR–Soviet alliances, the economic consequences of reunification, the 2008 crisis, and the impact of anti-Russian sanctions. She coded statements thematically—“economy,” “history,” and “sociocultural identity”—translating them into English for consistency. This revealed recurring patterns in which eastern representatives invoke an “Ossi” identity—resentment of perceived Western “predatory” dominance—to portray Russia as an ally. By casting Russia as a victim of Western aggression, AfD rhetoric reinforces the East–West divide and frames pro-Putin positions as a form of cultural resistance.

In the analytical section, Orse integrates these strands to argue that sociocultural factors—especially the distinctive “Ossi” identity—help drive pro-Russian sentiment. She claims AfD politicians draw on historical tensions to depict Russia as a “like-minded country from the East” opposed to Western liberalism. The regression analysis supports this, showing eastern origin as the dominant factor, implying that post-GDR material conditions foster a populist alignment with Putin. Orse warns that this may intensify conflicts in the post-Soviet space by weakening European unity against Russian actions, such as the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Orse concludes that pro-Putin sentiment within AfD in East Germany is driven by interconnected historical and economic conditions. She argues that reunification’s failures—economic stagnation and cultural marginalization—perpetuated Cold War legacies and left East Germans more receptive to Russian narratives. Through a historical-materialist lens, the article concludes that material foundations shape populist ideology, and that pro-Russian sentiment functions as an identity-building tool against the West.

In the context of our research on post-Soviet conflicts, Orse’s work highlights parallels between East Germany’s experience and that of other former Warsaw Pact states, where economic nationalism intersects with Russian influence. It underscores the importance of analyzing how Soviet-era linkages persist in shaping contemporary geopolitics.

This study stands out for its rigorous application of historical materialism—a method unfortunately rare today—to a contemporary case, avoiding excessive simplification by integrating regression analysis with thematic coding. Its strengths include statistical data that quantify the German East–West divide and a contextualization of populist styles that enriches debates about the drivers of the “rightward turn” in the politics of post-Soviet states and post-socialist Eastern Europe as a whole.

The interconnection between geopolitics, transport infrastructure, and regional rivalry in the Black Sea–Caspian region—a region central to post-Soviet conflicts, energy disputes, and great-power competition—has always been at the core of our attention. As always, our goal is to provide an in-depth analysis of how academic research illuminates the dynamics of instability, cooperation, and shifting balances of power in this volatile zone.

The article featured in this issue is titled “Black Sea-Caspian Region in Global Context: International Transport Corridors” (in Turkish: “Küresel Bağlamda Karadeniz-Hazar Bölgesi: Uluslararası Ulaşım Koridorları”). It was published in Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi (GABD), Volume 19, Issue 37, in December 2025.

Elena Savicheva, a professor at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University) in Moscow, specializes in international relations with particular attention to regional cooperation and Eurasian geopolitical configurations. Erman Tatlıoğlu is a PhD holder and independent researcher based in Moscow. His work often intersects geo-economic analysis and transport logistics.

Both authors, connected to Russian academic circles, offer a perspective that is broadly balanced yet sensitive to regional specifics, supported by bilingual (English–Turkish) abstracts and footnotes referencing a range of sources.

This article is especially relevant to our bulletin because it analyzes how international transport corridors (ITCs) in the post-Soviet space function both as instruments of cooperation and as flashpoints of conflict. The Black Sea–Caspian region—encompassing former Soviet republics such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, as well as Russia, Turkey, and Iran—has, since the USSR’s dissolution, been an arena of ethnic conflicts, frozen disputes, and external interventions. The authors argue that international transport corridors such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) are reshaping these conflict processes by altering trade flows, alliances, and centers of power against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia.

The article opens with an abstract outlining its main focus: the role of the Black Sea–Caspian region in international relations and global politics, with special attention to international transport corridors and the factors shaping regional stability and security. Since 2013, the Trans-Caspian transit corridor (also known as the Middle Corridor) has been presented as a potential driver of increased freight movement between Central Asia and Europe. It aligns with the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, which invests in logistics links with Asia as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Although the Caspian Sea is landlocked, it functions as a transport junction, a trade hub, a platform for regional cooperation, and a theater of intense competition. The authors emphasize that the conflict in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia pushed formally neutral Central Asian states to promote TITR as an alternative to the Russia-dependent Northern Corridor, bypassing Moscow. The region is thus depicted as integral to emerging geopolitical configurations—potentially a zone of interaction or an “apple of discord” among rivals. The comparative advantage of competing logistics projects may reshape trade across vast territories and shift power centers in an evolving world order. Keywords include the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, ITCs, the Middle Corridor, and TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia).

The authors’ key thesis is that the war in Ukraine (since 2022) and Western sanctions accelerated a shift from Russia-controlled routes toward alternatives such as TITR, in the name of autonomy and neutrality. This, they argue, may change global trade patterns and the structure of power. A second thesis highlights the Caspian Sea’s dual role: a source of cooperation (through energy and transit) and competition (over resources and routes). The authors also claim that privileging one corridor over another—such as EU-backed Global Gateway projects versus China’s BRI—can produce transformational change in socio-cultural flows, political alliances, and conflict resolution trajectories across the post-Soviet space.

They develop their argument using historical, geopolitical, and economic approaches, drawing on the region’s post-Soviet evolution. The paper shows how the region’s location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East makes it vital for global trade and energy flows. The authors argue that international trade routes—TITR, the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, and Caspian maritime links—are indispensable for goods transit, intensifying great-power competition. Regional security problems—rivalries, territorial disputes, and external pressure—complicate infrastructure development, as illustrated through investment patterns in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The broader claim is that the region’s strategic significance will grow, shaping post-Soviet conflicts by either strengthening or undermining state sovereignty.

Additional arguments focus on specific corridors:

• The Caspian–Black Sea Corridor: announced in 2018, connecting Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Romania via ports such as Turkmenbashi, Baku, Poti/Batumi, and Constanța. It fits the EU “Global Gateway” concept as a counter-project to BRI, reducing cost and transit time. A 2019 meeting in Bucharest (foreign ministers’ declaration) emphasized sovereignty and multimodal transport. The authors highlight national interests: Turkmenistan (LNG export diversification), Romania (Constanța as an EU hub, potentially for NATO cargo), and Azerbaijan (market access and cross-border projects: East–West, North–South, Southwest).

• The Lapis Lazuli Corridor: linking Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, providing Afghanistan direct access to Europe while bypassing Pakistan/Iran. The authors stress the economic and political gains of integration—especially for Afghan sectors—and its strategic relevance to stability in the Caspian region and the South Caucasus amid post-Soviet ethnic tensions.

Throughout, the paper links corridors to conflict mitigation or escalation: they increase resilience to shocks (e.g., the war in Ukraine) yet provoke rivalry as powers compete for control. The authors argue that regional interconnectivity promotes the autonomy of transit states, potentially easing frozen conflicts through economic incentives, while simultaneously creating risks of new disputes over routes.

The authors conclude that the Black Sea–Caspian region is an integral element of geopolitical structures, capable of becoming either a zone of convergence or an arena of conflict. In the emerging world order, prioritizing projects such as TITR over Northern corridors may transform trade, shift power centers, and realign alliances. They emphasize that Central Asia’s pivot toward TITR is presented as a bypass strategy designed to preserve neutrality on Ukraine while strengthening ties with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the EU. Their concluding warning is that such prioritization may trigger broader shifts in the global architecture of power, with international trade hubs acting as catalysts of post-Soviet conflict evolution.

From the standpoint of conflict processes, this article shows how infrastructure becomes an instrument of power struggle in the post-Soviet space. The emergence of alternative transport corridors against the backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine war illustrates a form of “geo-economic war,” where sanctions compel route changes—potentially thawing frozen conflicts (for example, in the South Caucasus) through economic interdependence, while risking new rivalries (for example, Russia versus the EU in Central Asia).

This article deepens our understanding of how transport corridors mediate conflict, urging policymakers to treat logistics as an instrument of stability.

In this issue, we also could not ignore a topical—and in academic terms, even provocative—article devoted to the transformation of Russia’s nuclear policy against the backdrop of its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. As an editor, I am pleased to present a detailed analysis of this study, which sheds light on how strategic military doctrines adapt to protracted conflicts—a relatively new phenomenon in the political landscapes of both Europe and the Middle East. Our review is based exclusively on the text provided and offers a comprehensive analysis of the authors’ contribution to understanding nuclear deterrence in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war.

The article under review is titled “Russia’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine in the Shadow of Its Invasion of Ukraine”, which immediately sets an advocacy-tinged tone for how the topic of strategic deterrence is framed. This advocacy may be treated as a weakness of a work aimed at a different task—analyzing the transformation of nuclear deterrence models—but the authors, Ayşegül Ketenci and Kahraman Süvari, produced a genuinely strong analysis, and the framing does not dilute their results. Ayşegül Ketenci is affiliated with İstanbul Kültür University (Republic of Türkiye). This work was published as a preliminary study in Connections: The Quarterly Journal, Volume 24, No. 2 (2025), issued by the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. Connections is a respected peer-reviewed journal that supports scholarly dialogue on security issues, particularly in Euro-Atlantic and post-Soviet contexts.

In the abstract, Ketenci and Süvari present their main thesis: Russia’s revision of its nuclear doctrine in 2024 was driven by the Russia–Ukraine war that began in 2022, which disrupted the regional and global balance of power.

They argue that this pushed Moscow to lower the threshold of nuclear deterrence and expand the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. The revised doctrine, in their view, is an attempt to demonstrate a tougher nuclear posture rhetorically, while in practical terms adapting to a changing security environment.

Their core argument is that, although Russia’s nuclear rhetoric intensified after the invasion, doctrinal changes—however partly rhetorical—reflect a strategic adaptation. They challenge interpretations emphasizing continuity in Russian nuclear policy (citing Lydia Wachs), arguing instead that the revisions represent a meaningful shift aimed at signaling resolve to the West and consolidating domestic support. They stress that doctrinal evolution is not merely empty threats, but a response to stalemate in the war, failure to achieve military goals, and threats to centralized authority.

Since the Cold War, Russia has periodically updated its military doctrines to match global changes, often in connection with major historical events. The authors review these documents chronologically, noting that the ongoing war has had a systemic impact on the 2024 update.

Key arguments include:

• External pressure: Strong opposition from the EU and the US, including sanctions, pushed Russia toward tougher policy, such as lowering the nuclear threshold. The authors cite Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov describing the changes as a “signal to the West.” They also reference Rishi Paul and Nicole Grajewski, who characterize the changes as manipulative instruments rather than operational plans, aimed at deterring Western support for Ukraine.

• Domestic objectives: The authors argue nuclear rhetoric serves a dual purpose: deterring external actors and mobilizing the Russian public (citing Michal Smetana and Michal Onderko, drawing on public opinion data).

• Strategic maneuvering: Russia uses nuclear threats as a bargaining chip, creating room for maneuver by expanding conditions of use and enhancing the credibility of its threat posture.

A substantial portion of the article addresses historical context, arguing that Russian doctrines evolve in response to geopolitical developments. The authors describe four iterations since 1993:

• 1993 Doctrine: a transitional document after the USSR’s collapse, focusing on defense against large-scale strikes, sustaining nuclear deterrence, and managing local conflicts; it emphasized democratic reforms and a new international system (citing the Federation of American Scientists and Charles J. Dick).

• 2000 Doctrine: adopted after Putin’s election; aligned with national security concepts, prioritized nuclear capacity for deterrence, lowered thresholds, expressed readiness for arms reductions while keeping nuclear weapons central (citing lessons from Kosovo and Chechnya via Jyotsna Bakshi and Alexei G. Arbatov).

• 2010 Doctrine: amid budget surpluses and global influence; promoted partnerships (e.g., BRICS, SCO), adhered to international law, preserved great-power status, and addressed emerging threats without major policy shifts (citing Michał Pietkiewicz).

• 2014 Doctrine: revised amid rising tensions in Ukraine; refined terminology and responded to challenges from the US and EU. Putin described it as defensive but firm, emphasizing post-1990s security threats (again citing Pietkiewicz).

The authors argue these doctrines reflect shifting threat perceptions within the Kremlin, with each update tied to events such as NATO expansion or regional wars. They connect this tradition to the Putin era, in which documents like the “Security Concept” and “Foreign Policy Concept” codify priorities. This historical context supports their claim that the 2024 revision continues a pattern of adaptation.

Their analytical framework compares the 2020 “Basic Principles of State Policy… in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” (approved June 2, 2020) with the 2024 version (approved November 19, 2024). The authors use a selective textual analysis focused on substantive changes.

Key points include:

• Overall shift: the 2024 doctrine expands conditions for nuclear use to include conventional attacks threatening Russia’s (or Belarus’s) sovereignty/territorial integrity. Putin called this an “extreme measure” adapted to new threats (as quoted via RBC radio). The 2020 version clarified ambiguities without major change (citing Nikolai Sokov).

• Article 5: in 2020 nuclear weapons are described “exclusively” as a deterrent tool; in 2024 the word “exclusively” is removed, implying broader scope.

• Article 9: the 2024 document defines adversaries as states/coalitions possessing WMD or capable military forces, including those providing territory/resources for aggression (implicitly Western support for Ukraine).

• Articles 10–11: aggression by coalitions or by non-nuclear states backed by nuclear powers is treated as joint attack.

• Articles 15/16: “minimally sufficient” nuclear forces become “sufficient,” and references to arms control compliance are removed, signaling weaker attachment to international agreements. “Military threats” broaden into “military risks and threats,” enlarging room for adaptation.

• Articles 17/18: the 2020 text limits nuclear use to WMD attacks or existential conventional threats; the 2024 text adds Belarus and “critical threats” to sovereignty/territorial integrity.

The authors argue these changes reflect a “sharper and more assertive” discourse that lowers deterrence thresholds amid a stalemated war in Ukraine. They interpret the revision primarily as perception management—deterring Western assistance and preserving strategic maneuver space—rather than signaling imminent nuclear use. This supports their thesis that external and internal drivers produced a doctrine that demonstrates resolve without fundamentally rebuilding strategy.

In their concluding remarks (based on the provided text), Ketenci and Süvari argue that Russia’s doctrinal changes, while presented as defensive, enable more flexible nuclear positioning.

The final article featured this month offers, in our view, a subtle and elegant perspective on Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet challenges, emphasizing the link between inherited infrastructure and contemporary state-building efforts. The article “Baikonur and Kazakhstan’s Sovereignty Dilemma: Security, Environment, and International Law”  was written by Sofia Bari (The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.).

Although the work was not formally published in a peer-reviewed journal, it represents a rigorous academic study typical of international relations scholarship.

Drawing on historical, legal, and environmental dimensions, Bari’s analysis contributes to a growing literature on post-Soviet securitization trends—specifically, how Soviet-era assets perpetuate unequal power relations.

Bari’s central idea is that the Baikonur Cosmodrome—a Soviet-era relic leased to Russia until 2050—embodies Kazakhstan’s “sovereignty dilemma”: a multi-layered conflict in which economic dependence, geopolitical pressure, and environmental degradation undermine national autonomy. She frames Baikonur as a dual-threat site: a traditional security issue tied to erosion of sovereignty and territorial control, and a non-traditional issue encompassing human security and environmental harm. This classification aligns with broader models of securitization in the post-Soviet Central Asian context, where inherited infrastructure sustains asymmetric interstate dynamics.

The author argues that fragile post-Soviet sovereignty in Kazakhstan emerged during the transition from the USSR, when economic dependence and external pressure compelled the maintenance of Russian control through the 1994 lease treaty (extended in 2004). While the treaty increases Kazakhstan’s geopolitical significance, it simultaneously constrains independent space capabilities and heightens tensions in scientific development, legal compliance, and regional cooperation. Bari introduces the concept of “sporadic sovereignty” (citing Kopack, 2019), whereby Kazakhstan exercises intermittent authority over Baikonur, undermined by Russia’s jurisdictional dominance over the city, launch sites, and surrounding areas (Shatalov, 1997).

A key argument revolves around cultural and narrative dimensions. Baikonur symbolizes Soviet technological pride, yet perpetuates a Soviet hierarchy of territorial power within the former USSR. Bari argues that selective memory—celebrating Soviet triumphs while excluding the ecological and social costs borne by Kazakh communities—marginalizes local experience and reinforces Russia’s soft power (Hunter & Nelson, 2021). This curated narrative positions Kazakhstan as a passive backdrop, diminishing agency and linking security to foreign-policy inertia.

Politically, Bari argues that Kazakhstan’s domestic legislation—such as the 2012 “Space Activities” Law and the 2015 National Space Law—remains merely aspirational for Baikonur because of Russia’s extraterritorial control. These laws emphasize peaceful space use, legalize state functions in space development, and codify principles of growth (Musinovich et al., 2015). Yet the mismatch undermines enforcement, rendering Kazakhstan’s membership in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space largely symbolic and weakening diplomatic leverage. Globally, Bari argues, the ongoing “space race” positions Baikonur as an exploited frontier within colonial-capitalist projects, risking future commercial conflicts over asteroid mining (Hunter & Nelson, 2021).

In the context of regional autonomy, the author highlights the technopolitics of space as a motivating factor for Kazakhstan’s nuclear and space programs (Bekus, 2022). She describes this as an instance of “environmental authoritarianism,” where sacrifice zones are justified in the name of progress, activism is suppressed, and strategic imperatives take precedence (Kernanen, 2024).

Geopolitically, Bari argues that long-term consequences include agricultural degradation, biodiversity loss, and pollution. Major incidents (1999, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2013) caused significant damage, while compensation (for example, after the Proton incident in 2013) failed to trigger reform (Porter, 2017). Safer alternatives exist, such as kerosene and liquid oxygen mixtures in Soyuz and Angara rockets, but institutional inertia slows transition. This hinders Kazakhstan’s diversification of partnerships with China, the EU, and the US.

Bari develops her argument both chronologically and thematically, beginning with historical background. Baikonur, founded in 1955 as a secret missile range, launched Sputnik in 1957, symbolizing Soviet dominance. After 1991, Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia produced lease arrangements that preserved the status quo despite rising costs. She supports this with evidence of dual pressure: economic necessity to maintain existing arrangements and geopolitical inertia constraining development.

In addressing non-traditional threats, Bari details what she describes as “environmental injustice.” Russian operational practices create exclusion zones, while crises are obscured by euphemism. Contractors such as “Garysh Ecology” operate under strict isolation and lack the ability to publish data independently.

Bari concludes that Baikonur has evolved from Soviet ambition into a reminder of incomplete sovereignty, dependence, and vulnerability—a site of enduring contradiction. At the same time, multipolar competition, environmental civil-society pressure, and the democratization of space create openings for restoration.

The article captures persistent post-Soviet processes, where Soviet legacies such as Baikonur maintain hierarchical dependence. Bari’s dual-threat framing underscores how traditional sovereignty erosion intersects with non-traditional ecological conflict. Her discussion of environmental authoritarianism shows how opacity and secrecy suppress dissent—echoing similar techno-ecological conflicts across the Caspian and Aral basins.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 171 (December 15, 2025)

The role and place of the new U.S. National Security Strategy (2025) within the framework of the existing international order

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS-2025) is not merely another political memorandum but a coherent conceptual framework marking a radical departure from the paradigms of U.S. foreign policy that dominated the post–Cold War period. The system-forming principle of NSS-2025 is the “America First” doctrine, elevated to the status of a strategic imperative. This approach implies a fundamental reassessment of traditional commitments, alliance relationships, and security-provision methods, shifting the focus away from global governance and the maintenance of the liberal international order toward the direct, unconstrained pursuit of the United States’ narrowly defined material interests in the short and medium term.

A number of interrelated operational principles flow from this doctrine, which together shape a new, rigidly pragmatic context for all international relations.

First, there is the primacy of national sovereignty, understood as the absolute right of a state (above all, the United States itself) to define its interests independently, without regard to the norms of transnational institutions or ideological dogmas.

Second, there is a predisposition toward pragmatic non-intervention, which sets an extremely high threshold for foreign-policy actions beyond direct threats to national security, thereby de facto legitimizing the existence of spheres of influence of regional powers.

Third, this is a strategy of burden-shifting, under which allies and partners are required to bear the primary burden of both financial costs and strategic risks associated with ensuring regional stability, while the United States retains the role of supreme arbiter and holder of the key levers of influence.

Finally, fourth, there is the recognition of economic security and technological superiority as the main arena of global competition, where issues of trade, control over supply chains, access to critical resources, and the protection of intellectual property are treated as equal in importance to military-political confrontation.

For the post-Soviet space—a region characterized by a high density of “frozen” and active conflicts, incomplete processes of nation-building, and intense competition among external actors—the application of these principles carries significant transformative potential. NSS-2025 introduces a different optic through which Washington will assess developments from Donbas to the Fergana Valley. Conflicts that were traditionally viewed through the prism of violations of territorial integrity, human rights, or threats to European security risk being re-evaluated exclusively in terms of their impact on U.S. economic interests, the balance of power among great powers, and the degree of strain placed on American diplomatic and military resources.

This approach does not merely alter U.S. tactics; it reconfigures the very environment in which conflicts exist and evolve, encouraging certain actors while weakening others, legitimizing some methods of action and marginalizing others.

 Methodological Approaches

The present analysis constitutes a structural study of the potential impact of the key provisions of the new U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS-2025) on the dynamics of conflicts across the former Soviet space.

In this analysis, the doctrinal document is treated as a set of operational principles capable of reshaping the region’s political context—even in cases where a specific conflict in the post-Soviet space is not explicitly mentioned in the text of NSS-2025.

We conceptualize the post-Soviet region as an interconnected system of conflict nodes, which encompasses both interstate confrontations and internal crises of nation-building and statehood.

The analysis consistently applies the principles of NSS-2025 to each subregion and major conflict, identifying likely trajectories of change, opportunities for regional actors, and a fundamental shift in the paradigm of external intervention—not only on the part of the United States, but also of other global actors.

 Fundamental Principles of NSS-2025 and Their Interpretation for the Post-Soviet Reality

1. “America First” and a Narrowed Definition of the National Interest:
   The Strategy explicitly states that its objective is the protection of strictly concrete, even material, U.S. interests, discarding ideological goals. This signifies a de-ideologization of the U.S. presence in global affairs—and, in particular, in the post-Soviet space.

   • “The purpose of foreign policy is the protection of core national interests; that is the sole focus of this strategy.”(Section I.1).

   • “It is not grounded in traditional, political ideology. It is motivated above all by what works for America—or, in two words, ‘America First.'”(Section IV.1).

2. A Predisposition toward Non-Intervention and the Primacy of National Sovereignty over the Expansion of American Values as the Basis of Influence Policy: The document formally proclaims sovereignty as a supreme political principle, which in practice may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the right of strong regional powers—within the post-Soviet context, above all Russia—to their own zones (or regions) of interest. In addition, this significantly broadens the boundaries of what is deemed permissible in the domestic politics of other states—even when such practices do not align with U.S. domestic political norms. In essence, authorities across the former Soviet space are granted a de facto carte blanche regarding the degree of regime rigidity, with the obvious exception of actions and measures that are unacceptable under contemporary international law.

   • “We recognize and affirm that there is nothing inconsistent or hypocritical in acting according to such a realistic assessment or in maintaining good relations with countries whose governing systems and societies differ from ours…”(Section 1, the Principle of “Flexible Realism”).

   • “For a country whose interests are as numerous and diverse as ours, rigid adherence to non-interventionism is not possible. Yet this predisposition should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention.”(Section IV.1, the Principle of “Predisposition toward Non-Intervention”).

3. The Balance of Power and Burden-Shifting: The Abandonment of the Global Policeman Role: The United States openly declares the end of the era in which it bore the primary burden of global security, shifting this responsibility onto its allies. When projected onto Europe’s fragmentation and political weakness, combined with the lack of clearly articulated interests in the post-Soviet space among other U.S. allies (with the exception of Turkey), this amounts to a transition from the expansion of a “unified West” to selective, case-by-case engagement in situations where threats to U.S. interests (or opportunities for advancing them) emerge.

   • “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.”(Section IV.2, the Priority of “Burden-Sharing and Burden-Shifting”).

   • “President Trump has set a new global standard with the Hague Commitment, which pledges NATO countries to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense…”(Section IV.2).

   • “As the United States rejects the ill-fated concept of global domination for itself, we must prevent the global, and in some cases even regional, domination of others.”(Section IV.1, the Principle of “Balance of Power”).

4. Economic Security as the Central Arena of Competition:
   The document unambiguously identifies the economy as the main front of global competition, placing technological dominance, the reindustrialization of the United States, and American control over supply chains at the forefront. For the post-Soviet space—which, from the perspective of economic geography, constitutes a logistical expanse spanning eleven time zones and a major global resource base for the minerals essential to the sixth technological paradigm—this approach is of critical importance.

• “economic security is fundamental to national security”(Section IV.2, the Priority of “Economic Security”)

• “the United States must never be dependent on any outside power for core components—from raw materials to parts to finished products—necessary to the nation’s defense or economy.”(Section IV.2).

• “We reject the disastrous ‘climate change’ and ‘Net Zero’ ideologies that have so greatly harmed Europe, threaten the United States, and subsidize our adversaries.”(Section IV.2, the Priority of “Energy Dominance”).

Detailed Regional and Country-Specific Analysis

Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic States: Managed De-Escalation and the Burden of European Responsibility

• Ukraine: From a Paradigm of Victory to a Paradigm of Settlement.
  The Strategy explicitly identifies a ceasefire as the objective rather than Ukraine’s victory. The primary burden of support is shifted onto Europe.

  • “It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and reestablish strategic stability with Russia…” (Section IV.3.C).

  • “Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less. As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” (Section IV.3.C).

• Belarus: Legitimation through the Principle of Non-Intervention.
  The abandonment of democracy promotion largely removes pressure on Alexander Lukashenko and the political model he has constructed. Moreover, the stability and resilience of the Belarusian regime—unique within the post-Soviet space—its proven capacity for negotiation, and the complete absence of conflicts with other former Soviet republics (with the exception of certain frictions with the Baltic states) transform Minsk into a valuable asset for the pursuit of U.S. interests in the post-Soviet region.

  • “We seek good relations and peaceful commercial relations with the nations of the world without imposing on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories.” (Section IV.1, the principle of “Flexible Realism”).

• The Baltic States: Self-Defense and a Reduction in the Level of Guarantees. The requirement to spend 5% of GDP on defense, combined with rhetoric about Europe’s weakness, calls into question the absolute nature of NATO guarantees toward the Baltic states. To an even greater extent, the Baltic countries find themselves in a zone of political risk due to practices of political restrictions that are often mistakenly associated solely with limitations affecting the Russian-speaking population, but which in reality extend far beyond the so-called “problem of Russian non-citizens.” Clear, high-profile steps by the Trump administration in support of European traditionalists—most notably Alternative for Germany (AfD)—demonstrate the United States’ willingness to support internal opposition within allied countries if, in Washington’s view, their policies undermine “freedoms.” This, in turn, creates an additional instrument of pressure.

  • “We will oppose elite-driven, anti-democratic restrictions on core liberties in Europe, the Anglosphere, and the rest of the democratic world, especially among our allies.” (Section IV.2).

The South Caucasus: A Theater of Pragmatic Deals and Power Redistribution

• Armenia–Azerbaijan: Trump’s “Deal Diplomacy” Model.
  The conflict is cited as a successful example of settlement, signaling the United States’ readiness to act as an arbiter based on the balance of power and direct American benefit (the Zangezur Corridor).

  • “President Trump has leveraged his dealmaking ability to secure unprecedented peace in eight conflicts throughout the world… He negotiated peace… between… Armenia and Azerbaijan…” (Section IV.1).

  • “Seeking peace deals at the President’s direction, even in regions and countries peripheral to our immediate core interests, is an effective way to increase stability, strengthen America’s global influence, realign countries and regions toward our interests, and open new markets.” (Section IV.2, the Priority of “Realignment through Peace”).

• Georgia: “Freezing” and the Removal of Territorial Integrity from the Agenda. The principle of taking the de facto balance of power into account, combined with a focus on direct threats to the United States, leads to the marginalization of “frozen” conflicts.

  • “But to focus on everything is to focus on nothing. America’s core national security interests shall be our focus.” (Section IV.1, the Principle of “Focused Definition of the National Interest”).

Central Asia: A Field of Resource Competition and Managed Instability
General Trend: From Democracy to Resources.
The region is becoming a field of economic competition—primarily with China—for resources and logistical supply chains.

• “We must re-secure our own independent and reliable access to the goods we need to defend ourselves and preserve our way of life. This will require expanding American access to critical minerals and materials…” (Section IV.2).

• “The United States should instead look to partner with select countries to ameliorate conflict, foster mutually beneficial trade relationships, and transition from a foreign aid paradigm to an investment and growth paradigm…” (Section IV.3.E).

Counterterrorism: Targeted Engagement without an Expanded Presence. The United States will provide resources to combat terrorism while avoiding long-term commitments and, even more so, a sustained military presence.

• “And we must remain wary of resurgent Islamist terrorist activity in parts of Africa while avoiding any long-term American presence or commitments.” (Section IV.3.E). This principle, originally formulated with Africa in mind, is directly transposed to Central Asia as well.

Russia: No Longer an Opponent, but a Potential Deal-Making Partner and, in Part, a Competitor

• From Total Confrontation to Managed Engagement within the U.S. Orbit of Influence (“Nixon in Reverse”). The document recognizes Russia as a great nuclear power with which pragmatic relations must be built, based on a combination of deterrence and the pursuit of negotiated deals.

  • “President Trump uses unconventional diplomacy, America’s military might, and economic leverage to surgically extinguish embers of division between nuclear-capable nations and violent wars caused by centuries-long hatred.” (Section IV.1). This directly indicates a readiness for dialogue with nuclear powers, including Russia.

  • “Managing European relations with Russia will require significant U.S. diplomatic engagement, both to reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass, and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.” (Section IV.3.C). This confirms that the United States views itself as a mediator in establishing a new balance with Russia, rather than as a party to the conflict.
    

 Comprehensive Risks and Conclusions Derived from the Strategy

1. Escalation of Local Conflicts Due to the Perception of a Power Vacuum.
   This approach предусматривает preventing the dominance of others, but it does not guarantee protection for any actor in the post-Soviet space in situations where U.S. interests are not directly affected or where such protection would entail high risks for the United States. The doctrine creates a new arena for deal-making over spheres of influence at specific points across the former Soviet space and in specific resource-related conflicts.

   • “The outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.”(Section IV.1).

2. Fragmentation of the Region into Competing Spheres of Influence. The Strategy encourages states to prioritize their own interests (“the Primacy of Nations”). This leads to the erosion of common rules and the formation of ad hoc coalitions. The document explicitly supports the creation of such coalitions to counter—first and foremost—China, but also Iran, a logic that by analogy is applicable to other regions of the former Soviet space as well:

   • “We should form coalitions that use our comparative advantages in finance and technology to build export markets with cooperating countries.”(Section IV.3.B).

3. The Rise of Authoritarianism and Coercive Methods. The abandonment of democracy promotion, combined with a readiness to use force to protect interests (as reflected in the “Trumpian corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine), sets the overall tone. This logic, articulated in the NSS-2025 section on policy in the Western Hemisphere, demonstrates a willingness to undertake unilateral coercive actions, thereby legitimizing the use of force-based approaches by other actors as well.

   • “Targeted deployments to secure the border and defeat cartels, including where necessary the use of lethal force to replace the failed law enforcement-only strategy of the last several decades”(Section IV.3.A).
     

 Conclusion and Systemic Findings

The text of the U.S. National Security Strategy (2025) consistently constructs a vision of a world in which Washington abandons the role of guarantor of the liberal international order in favor of that of the principal pragmatic actor within a global system of power and economic competition. As the document explicitly states, “The world works best when nations prioritize their interests.” (Section IV.1, “Primacy of Nations”).

For the post-Soviet space, this implies a systemic devaluation of multilateral institutions and ideological commitments. Conflicts that were once framed as problems requiring resolution are, within the logic of the document, transformed either into instruments for concluding deals advantageous to the United States (“Realignment through Peace”) or into peripheral issues, responsibility for which is delegated to regional powers.

The end result will be a return to intense competition over spheres of influence, in which the rights of small states and their societies will depend directly on their resource value and on the ability of local elites to forge short-term, pragmatic alliances with external centers of power.

A key philosophical pillar of the Strategy is the Primacy of Nations, which affirms sovereignty and the right of states to place their own interests first. When combined with a Predisposition to Non-Interventionism, this creates the foundation for the de facto recognition of spheres of influence of great powers—among which the Doctrine explicitly and unambiguously includes the Russian Federation.

The U.S. retreat from the ideology of promoting democracy and human rights (explicitly stated in the sections dealing with Europe and the Middle East) reduces ideological pressure on authoritarian regimes aligned with Russia (Belarus and Central Asia). This may strengthen the Kremlin’s position in conflict management on its own terms (“the Russian world,” peacekeeping on Russian-defined conditions), without regard for Western criticism. The emphasis on “respect for different systems of governance” diminishes the potential for U.S. pressure on the authoritarian tools employed by post-Soviet governments (the suppression of protests in Belarus, the situation in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan).

The Strategy proclaims economic competition as the central battlefield. The goals of U.S. “reindustrialization,” securing supply chains, and ensuring access to critical materials directly affect the resource-rich post-Soviet region. The region becomes an object of competition for access to rare earth elements, hydrocarbons, and transport corridors. References to Africa as a zone for investment in critical minerals are, by analogy, applicable to Central Asia as well. As the United States seeks to reduce its dependence on China, it may intensify economic diplomacy with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. This could alter the balance of influence in a region currently dominated by Russia and China and potentially become a destabilizing factor if local elites maneuver between competing centers of power.

The Strategy proclaims successes in the settlement of numerous conflicts (Cambodia–Thailand, Pakistan–India, and others) as a model. This model (Realignment Through Peace) is based on the president’s personal diplomacy and the use of economic and military leverage for the “surgical” de-escalation of conflicts. Such an approach, which relies on rapid (and often weakly institutionalized) deals among elites, may ignore the deeper root causes of conflicts, including historical grievances and identity-related issues.

The section on the Western Hemisphere notes a willingness to employ lethal force against cartels. While this provision does not directly concern the post-Soviet space, it reflects a broader posture favoring uncompromising use of force to protect national interests.

If implemented, the new U.S. National Security Strategy will mark a fundamental shift from global interventionism to focused pragmatism.

For the post-Soviet space, this creates a paradoxical situation. The weakening of U.S. security guarantees for Eastern Europe, the potential reduction of support for Ukraine, and the retreat from an active role in “frozen” conflicts may generate a power vacuum. This vacuum is likely to be filled by regional powers (Russia, Turkey, Iran) and a global competitor (China), increasing the risk of a new wave of tensions and a redistribution of spheres of influence. At the same time, countries of the region—especially those rich in resources and possessing strategic positions (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan)—may gain greater room for maneuver, pursuing multi-vector policies by leveraging economic competition among the United States, China, and the European Union.