Theme - Israel

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 234 (September 29, 2026)

August is traditionally considered a month when academic activity grinds to a halt—a trend that applies particularly to publishing. It is precisely in August that reputable journals make room for publications with unusual or even exotic themes, and authors find the time to work on such pieces. In this edition of our monitoring report, we have not strayed beyond the scope of conflicts in the post-Soviet space—and yet, we will be discussing epic heroes, artificial intelligence systems in public service, and medical education amidst political instability.

The article “Multilingual Education in Kazakhstan: Policy and Practice,” authored by Kulpash Koptleuova of Baishev University, Akhmaral Khairzhanova of Kh. Dosmukhamedov Atyrau University (corresponding author), Kamar Aldasheva of Abai Kazakh National Pedagogical University, and colleagues Kulyash Bainiyeva, Alla Leonova, and Gulim Saiynova, appeared  in the International Journal of Society, Culture & Language in August 2026. It offers a timely examination of Kazakhstan’s language education policy as an instrument of nation-building and conflict management in a multiethnic post-Soviet state.

The study centers on how official discourses and institutional measures shape the roles of Kazakh as the state language, Russian as the language of interethnic communication, and English as the vehicle of global integration. The authors ask what policy discourses, language ideologies, and status-planning mechanisms define Kazakhstan’s educational language regime, and how far official statistics reflect the stated goal of balancing the three languages. Their method is qualitative document analysis of the Constitution, the 2003 Law on Languages, the State Program for the Development of Education and Science 2020–2025, the 2023 Concept for preschool and secondary education, CLIL guidelines, and national statistical reports, including the 2021 census and 2023 sociological surveys on language proficiency. Following a six-phase thematic procedure adapted from Braun and Clarke, they identify five interlocking themes: the ideological framing of the “Trinity of Languages,” the construction of language hierarchies through status planning, mechanisms of pedagogical implementation, teacher preparation as a persistent challenge, and the tension between nation-building and global competitiveness.

The analysis reveals that the “Trinity” is not a neutral technical arrangement but an ideological construct that privileges Kazakh symbolically while preserving Russian’s functional dominance and casting English in instrumental terms. Constitutional and statutory provisions place Kazakh at the apex, yet Russian retains de facto primacy in administration, education, and everyday life, with 90.6 percent overall proficiency. English has advanced modestly—29 percent of adults report some competence—but advanced command remains limited. Statistical trends confirm a steady expansion of Kazakh-medium schooling and higher education, from roughly 37 percent of students in 1993 to over 70 percent of recent school graduates, yet the authors underscore the uneven rollout of trilingual instruction, the conflation of basic CEFR B1 proficiency with genuine CLIL pedagogical capacity, and the absence of transparent criteria for institutional readiness. These gaps reproduce regional and resource asymmetries, leaving the policy’s equity claims only partially realized.

For scholars of the post-Soviet space, the article contributes a carefully documented case of how language planning seeks to prevent interethnic conflict while consolidating statehood. Its relevance to Israeli academic readers lies in the parallel challenges of managing linguistic diversity within multiethnic societies, the strategic use of education to foster social cohesion, and the delicate balance between national identity and international competitiveness—issues that resonate with Israel’s own experience of nation-building amid competing cultural claims and its growing engagement with Central Asian partners. By illuminating both the achievements and the structural tensions of Kazakhstan’s trilingual project, the study supplies a nuanced lens through which to view language as a potential site of both conflict and accommodation in the wider post-Soviet region.

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Artem Hmelnykov of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and Nataliia Khoma of Lviv Polytechnic National University examine the conceptual interdependence of local democracy and local political management in an article published in the Baltic Journal of Economic Studies, volume 12, number 1, 2026. Drawing on a neo-institutional approach, the authors treat local democracy as a value-institutional dimension centred on citizen participation, legitimacy of authority, transparency and accountability, while presenting local political management as the organisational-managerial dimension concerned with the development, adoption and implementation of decisions at the territorial level. Their working hypothesis holds that local democracy supplies the institutional foundation of procedures, norms and practices that confer legitimacy and participatory quality on local governance, and that political management in turn supplies the technologies, competencies and mechanisms through which democratic principles are realised.

The analysis proceeds by first mapping the regulatory and legal prerequisites that enable genuine local democratic institutions—constitutional guarantees of self-government, statutes regulating referendums, public hearings, electronic petitions and participatory budgeting, anti-corruption standards, inclusion norms and financial transparency rules. These elements together constitute the “operating environment” within which management operates. The authors then formulate a dialectical relationship: democracy shapes the rules and opportunities for management, while the quality of management either strengthens trust, participation and institutional resilience or, conversely, undermines them through bureaucratic insulation or opacity. A concise conceptual formula crystallises this mutual dependence: local democracy provides the institutional, value-based and procedural foundation; local political management, resting on that foundation, ensures the formulation and execution of decisions; together they constitute a coherent system of democratic community governance.

Particular attention is given to the prospective post-war reconstruction. Under wartime conditions, local democracy adapted by prioritising mobilisation, solidarity and secure online and offline participation, while local political management performed critical crisis functions—evacuation coordination, defence support, assistance to displaced persons and rapid infrastructure repair. The authors argue that the legitimacy of these managerial actions rested on residual democratic trust. Looking ahead, they contend that reconstruction will amplify the same interdependence: large-scale resource allocation, priority-setting and integration of veterans and returnees will require inclusive consultation, public oversight and budgetary transparency if they are to avoid corruption, social discord and loss of legitimacy. Without robust democratic institutions, even well-funded programmes risk inefficiency; without competent management, democratic procedures remain empty formalities.

The study’s contribution lies in reframing two concepts usually treated in isolation as mutually reinforcing elements of contemporary local governance, and in demonstrating the continued validity of this coordinate system under conditions of existential conflict and recovery. For Israeli academic readers concerned with post-Soviet conflicts, state resilience and the management of contested territories, the analysis offers a timely reminder that the durability of local institutions under external pressure is inseparable from the quality of the democratic-managerial nexus that sustains them. The Ukrainian case illustrates both the vulnerability and the adaptive potential of that nexus, providing comparative insight into how communities maintain governance capacity amid war and prepare for reconstruction without sacrificing legitimacy.

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Neda Atanasoski and Redi Koobak’s article “Automated Myth and the Postsocialist Digital State: The Imperial Trick of the Kratt AI Initiative in Estonia,”  published in Imaginations: Journal of Cross-Cultural Image Studies, volume 17, number 1, 2026 (pages 131–165), examines Estonia’s national strategy for incorporating artificial intelligence into public services. The authors analyze the state’s decision to name these systems after the kratt, a mythic servant from Estonian folklore constructed from everyday objects and animated through supernatural means, which turns on its master when left idle. They advance the concept of “automated myth” to describe folklore embedded in AI systems that naturalizes the link between technological progress and liberal democracy.

The study addresses how cultural narratives shape AI governance in a postsocialist context. Methodologically, the authors combine Roland Barthes’s understanding of myth as depoliticized speech with Evgeny Morozov’s critique of techno-solutionism. They examine state promotional materials for Bürokratt, the world’s first public-service AI virtual assistant, alongside two artistic responses: Eugénie Baccot and Cyril Abad’s digital photo essay The Kratt Metaphor (2024), commissioned for Tartu 2024, and Rasmus Merivoo’s horror-comedy film Kratt (2020). This approach reveals how policy branding and cultural interfaces construct national identity while obscuring geopolitical entanglements.

The central conclusion is that the automation of the kratt myth performs an imperial trick. It indigenizes technofutures as Estonian national heritage, presenting AI as an organic extension of local folklore and identity, while simultaneously masking the influence of Silicon Valley capitalism that has driven postsocialist digital reforms since the 1990s. The authors argue that this process erases the Soviet technological foundations of the present, depoliticizes citizens by recasting them as consumers of efficient services, and naturalizes a model of governance oriented toward global competitiveness and foreign investment. Analysis of Bürokratt shows how the state contrasts the new transparent digital servant with the opaque Soviet bureaucrat, yet the system ultimately aligns Estonia with transnational capital through initiatives such as e-residency. The photo essay aestheticizes technology as continuous with sacred Estonian landscapes and rituals, thereby defanging potential risks, whereas the film satirizes techno-utopianism by exposing hidden costs, including exploited labor and residual imperial relations.

The article contributes to both postsocialist studies and critical AI research by demonstrating that folklore operates as an infrastructure of state power in the era of algorithmic administration. For an Israeli academic audience concerned with transformations in the post-Soviet space, the work illuminates how digital statecraft and techno-nationalism reconfigure sovereignty and identity after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It highlights cultural mechanisms that sustain new forms of imperial entanglement under the appearance of national innovation and democratic service, offering comparative insight into the long-term political effects of technological modernization in the region.

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Veja Lianga’s master’s thesis, submitted on 1 August 2026 for the Erasmus Mundus Euroculture program jointly awarded by the University of Strasbourg and Uppsala University, examines the discursive construction of opposition to the Istanbul Convention in Lithuania. Supervised by Sandrine Beaudry (Strasbourg) and Andreaz Fagerberg (Uppsala), the work is framed as an original contribution to the study of anti-gender politics in Central and Eastern Europe.

The central research question asks how Lithuanian political actors discursively constructed “gender” (translated as “social gender”) in opposing ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence between 2018 and 2024, and how these constructions relate to the broader European anti-gender mobilisation and the restriction of women’s rights. Drawing on literature on the anti-gender movement (Kuhar and Paternotte, Graff and Korolczuk), Europeanization theory, norm contestation, post-Soviet historical legacies, and moral-panic frameworks (Cohen, Butler), the author employs qualitative critical discourse analysis. Primary material consists of quotations from politicians, political spokespeople and religious figures published in mainstream Lithuanian news outlets. The analysis identifies six recurring discursive constructions: gender as ideology, gender as moral threat (especially to children and family), gender as foreign imposition, legal/pragmatic irrelevance, confusion, and cultural irrelevance.

Lianga demonstrates that anti-ratification discourse systematically portrays “gender” as an ideological project that endangers traditional family structures, national sovereignty and cultural identity. These framings closely mirror rhetoric circulating in other EU member states and in Russian discourse, positioning the Istanbul Convention as a symbolic battleground for anxieties over European integration, social change and patriarchal order. The thesis argues that such constructions generate a moral panic that impedes the advancement of gender-equality measures and leaves gaps in protection against gender-based violence unaddressed. Lithuania’s specific post-Soviet and Catholic heritage intensifies the framing of “social gender” as an externally imposed threat, whether attributed to Brussels or residual Soviet influence. Counter-discourses exist but remain marginal within the political arena examined.

By focusing on a smaller Baltic state often overlooked in English-language scholarship that privileges Poland and Hungary, the thesis enriches understanding of how transnational anti-gender narratives are localised and adapted. For an Israeli academic audience interested in conflicts and identity politics in the post-Soviet space, the study offers insight into the mechanisms of norm contestation, the instrumentalisation of historical memory, and the entanglement of religious nationalism with resistance to European legal frameworks—dynamics that illuminate broader patterns of sovereignty claims and cultural security discourses across the region.

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The syllabus under review, authored by Professor Julia Verkholantsev of the Department of Russian and East European Studies, outlines the intellectual framework and structure of the undergraduate course.

The course is offered at the University of Pennsylvania (Penn).It is a specialized Benjamin Franklin Seminar (BFS) that is currently scheduled for the Fall 2026. Although presented as a pedagogical document rather than a conventional monograph, it functions as a carefully reasoned scholarly intervention into the study of how medieval narratives and material culture have been mobilized to construct modern national identities across Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.

The subject of the course is the phenomenon of “national antiquities”—genealogical origin stories, hagiographic traditions surrounding holy figures of national significance, and sacred objects such as crowns, manuscripts, and icons—and the ways these elements have shaped nationalist discourse from the nineteenth century to the present. Verkholantsev situates the inquiry against the backdrop of contemporary European political rhetoric that continues to draw on medieval sources to assert ethnogenetic claims, territorial entitlement, or historical grievance. The methodological approach is comparative and critical: students are guided to examine primary medieval texts and later historiographic traditions, distinguishing between information, interpretation, argument, and significance, while remaining alert to the methodological weaknesses that allow such materials to be instrumentalized. The syllabus emphasizes active, AI-free engagement with approximately thirty to sixty pages of reading per session, regular production of concise reading notes, and two in-class assessments derived largely from students’ own analytical takeaways. The culminating project requires each participant to curate an imagined national museum, selecting and arranging a limited set of antiquities so as to construct a coherent narrative of national identity.

The central conclusions advanced by the syllabus are that national pasts are not simply recovered but actively constructed, that medieval materials acquire political force only through successive layers of interpretation, and that scholarly scrutiny of these layers is essential for dismantling the uncritical authority they still command in public discourse. Verkholantsev argues that nineteenth- and twentieth-century philological and historiographic scholarship transformed origin myths, royal sainthood, and sacred objects into instruments of nationalist mobilization; the task of contemporary scholarship is therefore to expose the selective and often anachronistic character of those transformations. Case studies of Bohemia and Moravia, Hungary, Poland, the Rus’ lands and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (encompassing modern Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus), and Croatia illustrate how the same medieval repertoire—Attila and Scythian ancestry, St. Wenceslas and the Knights of Blaník, the Holy Crown of St. Stephen, the Częstochowa icon, Varangian legends, Glagolitic script—has been differently appropriated to serve distinct national projects.

The scholarly contribution of the syllabus lies in its insistence on treating national antiquities as objects of critical rather than celebratory study. By combining ethno-symbolic approaches to nationalism with close attention to medieval textual and material evidence, it offers a model for historicizing the very claims that continue to structure political debate in the region. For an Israeli academic audience concerned with conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the syllabus is particularly relevant. Its examination of competing origin narratives in Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, and of the symbolic resources deployed to legitimize or contest political boundaries, supplies analytical tools for understanding how historical memory shapes contemporary identity conflicts. The neutral, source-critical posture modeled throughout the course encourages precise discussion of competing national myths without recourse to partisan labeling, thereby enriching scholarly discourse on the region’s enduring tensions.

Orhan Gültekin, a doctoral student at the Social Sciences University of Ankara’s Institute of Area Studies, published the article “The Social and Political Impact of Turkish TV Series in Central Asia in the Context of Cultural Diplomacy” in the International Journal of Idil-Ural and Turkistan Studies, volume 8, issue 2, pages 337–353, in 2026. The study examines the influence of Turkish television series on the Central Asian Turkic republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, framing these productions as instruments of soft power and cultural diplomacy in the post-Soviet environment.

The research rests on a qualitative literature review and secondary-data analysis that draws together sectoral reports, academic studies, field inquiries, and institutional publications. Gültekin organizes the inquiry around a central question: how Turkish series shape political perceptions, everyday social practices, and collective identity constructions in these societies, and through which mechanisms—linguistic affinity, shared religious and historical references, and a synthesis of modern and traditional values—they operate. The analysis proceeds along three interrelated dimensions: the political, the social, and identity formation.

At the political level the author argues that the series transmit Turkey’s experience of modernization and its democratic values, thereby raising the visibility of a “Turkish model” and lending societal legitimacy to interstate diplomatic ties. Socially, linguistic closeness and common cultural codes allow the productions to affect consumption patterns, family norms, and lifestyle preferences; historical dramas reinforce notions of shared ancestry and unity. In the realm of identity, the series supply a unifying reference point of “Turkishness” for populations still negotiating national self-understanding after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Gültekin concludes that Turkish television drama functions not merely as entertainment but as one of the most effective tools of cultural diplomacy, amplifying Turkey’s regional influence, catalyzing social change, and nourishing a common cultural foundation. The study introduces the notion of “dizi diplomacy” as a contribution to the broader literature on soft power.

For scholars concerned with the post-Soviet space the article offers a concrete case of non-state cultural actors shaping political and social realities in Central Asia. It demonstrates how media flows can reinforce or reconfigure identity narratives in societies that emerged from Soviet institutional frameworks, and how such flows interact with state-led initiatives such as those of TİKA and the Organization of Turkic States. The findings therefore illuminate the softer dimensions of regional realignment and the ways cultural proximity can translate into durable political capital—issues of direct interest to Israeli academic and policy communities that monitor stability, identity politics, and external influence across the former Soviet periphery.

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The article “Digitalization of medical and healthcare education in a Low- and middle-income country: a mixed-method case study of institutional transformation at Yerevan State Medical University,”  authored by Karine Sargsyan and colleagues affiliated with Yerevan State Medical University, the Medical University of Graz, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, and related Armenian institutions, appeared in Frontiers in Digital Health in August 2026. It examines the deliberate institutional shift toward digital modes of medical training in Armenia, a post-Soviet low- and middle-income setting marked by infrastructural constraints, a lingering Soviet-era pedagogical legacy, and recurrent regional disruptions.

The study is framed as a mixed-methods institutional case study covering the period 2019–2023. Its central subject is the translation of constructivist and activity-based pedagogical theories into practical digital infrastructure, faculty development, student digital literacy programs, simulation-based training, telemedicine, tele-education, and hybrid learning formats. The authors pose the question of how a resource-limited medical university can sustain educational continuity and quality amid pandemic pressures and regional tensions, including the conflict in Artsakh. Methodologically, the work rests on an institutional transformation framework that sequences strategic vision, faculty digital-competency training, infrastructure development, student engagement, digital interventions, assessment, and quality assurance. Supporting evidence is drawn from an anonymous electronic survey of 513 undergraduate medical students (response rate 12.6 percent of the eligible cohort), employing eleven Likert-scale items and optional open comments. Analysis remains descriptive, reporting frequencies, percentages, and mean scores without inferential testing, and is supplemented by institutional observation and process documentation.

The principal findings indicate high levels of student-perceived satisfaction, with an overall positive response rate of 90.2 percent and mean scores ranging from 4.26 to 4.51 on a five-point scale. Respondents reported gains in theoretical knowledge, clinical skills confidence, digital literacy, and appreciation of hybrid flexibility; simulation training received particularly strong endorsement among clinical-year students. Technical barriers scored lowest, suggesting they were not perceived as insurmountable. Qualitative comments praised simulation centers and telemedicine sessions while noting occasional internet instability and the need for further faculty digital preparation and bilingual materials. The authors position these perceptual outcomes as evidence that a coherent institutional strategy—rather than technology alone—can overcome infrastructural, pedagogical, and equity obstacles. They stress that the results reflect self-reported experience rather than objectively measured learning or patient-care gains, and they explicitly limit claims of generalizability to a single institutional trajectory.

In scholarly terms the study contributes a concrete, context-sensitive roadmap for digital transformation within the post-Soviet medical-education landscape. It demonstrates that strategic alignment of mission, sustained faculty development, active student participation, and modest infrastructure investment can generate resilient hybrid and remote educational capacity even under conditions of regional instability. For an Israeli academic audience concerned with conflicts and institutional resilience across the post-Soviet space, the Armenian case offers instructive parallels: the capacity of higher-education institutions in geopolitically exposed environments to maintain professional training pipelines, to mitigate brain-drain pressures, and to preserve human-capital continuity during crises. The documented emphasis on simulation, tele-education, and quality-assurance mechanisms underscores practical pathways for sustaining medical expertise when physical access is constrained—an issue of enduring strategic relevance for regional security and public-health preparedness.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 226 (August 24, 2026)

Diplomatic Prelude

Since their restoration on the eve of the collapse of the USSR, one can conventionally divide relations between Russia and Israel into three main stages.

The first, covering Boris Yeltsin’s presidency in the 1990s and Vladimir Putin’s first term in the early 2000s, was characterized by rather restrained relations between the two countries. Although high-level political dialogue already existed at the time, the approach of the Israeli political establishment rarely extended beyond strengthening ties with Russian Jews and encouraging their repatriation to Israel, importing energy resources, and taking rather sluggish steps to provide diplomatic and legal support for the activities of Israeli businesspeople in the Russian market.

Visits to Russia by senior Israeli officials were highly irregular and sporadic at the time. They were intended either to urgently defuse a sudden crisis in bilateral relations (as, for example, during Netanyahu’s 1997 trip, when he attempted to derail the Russian-Iranian nuclear contract in a single stroke), or to present the Kremlin with yet another regional initiative that had already been agreed with the United States, the European Union, and the Arab states. Or simply to appear on Russian television channels broadcast in Israel ahead of yet another election in pursuit of Russian-speaking voters.

Within the framework of Russia’s Middle Eastern interests, the Israeli track also remained relatively peripheral for a long time, although bilateral trade and tourism gradually increased, joint industrial and commercial projects existed, and references to the “million compatriots living in Israel” became almost ritualistic. Another factor was the Kremlin’s understanding that Russia, unlike the USSR, could not stand in the region “on one Arab leg” alone and therefore sought, at least outwardly, to observe a principle of “balance of interests.”

The second stage, which coincided with Putin’s next two presidential terms and his tenure as prime minister, as well as with Russia’s “return” as one of the important players in the Middle East in the second half of the 2000s, saw a noticeable improvement in Russian-Israeli relations. Moving Israeli-Russian relations toward a close partnership was declared one of the foreign-policy priorities of Benjamin Netanyahu’s second government in 2009–2013. The same period also marked a significant strengthening of Russian-Israeli economic partnership. This included growth in bilateral trade, investment in real estate and finance, and joint projects in transportation, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, space, information technology, high tech, and other sectors.

There were also experiments with transfers of Israeli defense technologies—although this practice was discontinued in 2014 after Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. At various times, prospects for Russian participation in strategic Israeli infrastructure and energy programs, including the development of new gas fields, were discussed, though they ultimately came to nothing. Scientific, cultural, and other humanitarian ties also expanded, while tourism grew rapidly after the visa regime was abolished in 2008. Mutual visits at the highest, intergovernmental, and interparliamentary levels reflected, in the words of Russian political scientist Fyodor Lukyanov, the unusual situation in which Russia’s relations with Israel (with the exception of the Iranian issue) were better than with virtually the entire Arab world.

It is generally believed that the rapprochement between Moscow and Jerusalem was largely driven by the “special personal relationship” between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including the existence of a kind of “hotline” for direct communication between them, allowing misunderstandings and frictions to be resolved in real time. From his return to the post of prime minister in 2009 until he went into opposition in the summer of 2021, Netanyahu met Putin around two dozen times—roughly twice as often as he met with the presidents of the United States, Israel’s closest partner and ally. In reality, this was less a matter of friendship than of mutual trust between two politicians who respected one another. In a sense, in the eyes of the Russian president, Netanyahu symbolized Israel as a powerful regional superpower capable of withstanding external pressure while possessing a strong lobby in America. Bibi, for his part, clearly regarded his relationship with the Russian leader as an important resource not only in foreign policy but, to a considerable extent, in domestic politics as well.

Even then, however, some members of Israel’s elite and broader society expressed concern that Russia, as the successor to the USSR, which had led the anti-Western camp during the Cold War, was by definition a power whose fundamental interests would sooner or later come into conflict with those of Israel. This was particularly so because the Kremlin’s Middle East policy, in some respects, also catered to growing anti-American sentiment in Russian public opinion. But there was another view as well: that Russian-Israeli relations had failed to reach the level of a strategic partnership not because of insurmountable “civilizational and political contradictions,” but simply because Israeli and Russian interests in the region did not always coincide. Accordingly, it made sense to develop relations with Moscow in areas of mutual interest while keeping outside the scope of those relations the issues on which Israel and Russia had “agreed to disagree.”

In any case, at that stage the relationship was better described as a tactical partnership based on overlapping interests and agreements to observe rules of the game acceptable to both sides. Overall, it was clear that if the vector changed, the interests would change as well.

Two Wars and a New Format of Relations

This assessment was fully borne out during the current, third stage of interstate relations, whose formal and substantive beginning was Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. It makes sense to distinguish two sub-stages—before and after October 7, 2023, when militants from Hamas, the terrorist organization controlling the Gaza Strip, carried out a brutal massacre of residents of Israeli communities near the border. Israel responded to this aggression with the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) counterterrorism operation “Swords of Iron,” which became the prelude to the current major Middle Eastern war between Israel and its allies, on the one hand, and Iran and its radical Islamist proxies, on the other.

In the years since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, virtually every major dimension of Israeli-Russian relations—political and diplomatic partnership, civil and cultural contacts, and economic cooperation—has undergone an evident decline.

Israel immediately condemned the Russian invasion, has provided and continues to provide Ukraine with substantial humanitarian and material assistance, diplomatic and political support, and has supplied the Ukrainian Armed Forces with protective equipment and certain types of defensive, non-lethal weapons (as well as some other items not publicly disclosed). However, unlike NATO member states, which had previously provided Ukraine with security guarantees, Israel, contrary to Kyiv’s expectations, did not directly join the bloc of Western countries confronting Russia.

The Israeli leadership, concerned with ensuring the security of the Jewish state amid the clearly growing threat posed by Iran and its regional satellites, apparently continued by inertia to assume that the Russian-Israeli understandings and mechanisms developed in previous years had not lost their relevance. At first glance, this position by Jerusalem also initially seemed officially acceptable to Moscow. Gradually, however, the latter began to display increasing irritation as voices in Israel grew louder in arguing that, in light of Russia’s strategic rapprochement with Iran, the previous paradigm of relations with Moscow had run its course.

Many expected a change of direction on the Jerusalem-Moscow track after Benjamin Netanyahu returned to the Israeli prime minister’s office in November 2022. Such hopes (or fears) were based on the fact that, while in opposition from July 2021 to December 2022, Netanyahu sharply criticized then-prime minister Naftali Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, who succeeded Bennett as prime minister in July 2022. Netanyahu claimed that Lapid, by supporting Ukraine and condemning Russian aggression, had allegedly destroyed the “balanced, measured, and responsible relationship with Russia that had been built over years” and endangered “interests vital to Israel.” These included, according to Netanyahu, the “coordination between the IDF and the Russian military in the security sphere over Syrian airspace” that he himself had achieved and that, in his view, constituted a “cornerstone of Israel’s national security.” However, after Netanyahu’s Likud party and its allies returned to power, no substantial changes occurred in relations between Israel and Russia. Nevertheless, for some time both sides continued trying to maintain the appearance of “business as usual.”

After October 7, this became considerably more difficult. Russia almost openly supported Hamas as an Iranian satellite, as demonstrated by a long list of moves by official Moscow: from receiving members of the terrorist organization’s leadership at the official level and accusing Israel of “war crimes” to high-profile anti-Israeli diplomatic steps and Russian economic assistance to “Hamasstan.” This was accompanied by the pronounced anti-Israeli line adopted by Russia’s state-controlled media.

Russia’s support for the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank, whose leaders sided with Moscow from the very beginning of Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, fits into the same pattern. In return, Moscow continues to repeat the mantra that the creation of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital is the key to resolving the Middle East conflict—even though the relevance of this idea has long been in doubt.

Still, although some in Israel acknowledge that pro-Palestinian, including pro-Hamas, narratives frequently voiced in Moscow at the governmental level and in the media fuel anti-Israeli sentiment in the region, the assumption of Russia’s direct involvement in the current war appeared doubtful. Far more obvious were the benefits the Kremlin might hope to gain from the new situation. These included the propaganda effect of portraying the outbreak of Israel’s war with “Hamasstan” as a failure of American diplomacy, and the slowdown of Saudi-Israeli normalization, which would effectively have brought the century-old Arab-Israeli conflict in its classical forms to an end. Another potential gain was the disruption of a possible defense alliance involving the United States, Israel, and pro-American Arab regimes (a “Middle Eastern NATO”), which would have posed a serious challenge to the interests of Russia, Iran, and China in the region.

In the broadest sense, Moscow’s regional geostrategic vision still appears to fit the normative framework characteristic of a substantial and influential segment of Russia’s foreign-policy elite: Iran is Russia’s strategic partner in the region. Accordingly, the survival of Iranian proxies such as Hamas, which in Russia is regarded as an organization with which it is acceptable to engage, corresponds to Russia’s Middle East agenda—unlike the interests of Israel, a strategic ally of Russia’s adversary, the United States.

There is no doubt that the current war between the United States, Israel, and their allies, on the one hand, and Iran and its terrorist proxies, on the other, is affecting other regional conflicts, including the Russian-Ukrainian war. As expected, the reactions of the leaders of these two opposing states were diametrically opposed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky issued an official statement supporting the military strike against the ayatollahs’ regime, while Moscow, equally predictably, condemned the attack.

History, Politics and People-to-People

Among the achievements of the brief Russian-Israeli “honeymoon” of the latter half of the 2000s and the 2010s was the development of a shared narrative framework regarding World War II, including criticism of attempts to revise its outcome and of Holocaust denial. In 2018, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of only two foreign leaders—the other being Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić—who joined Vladimir Putin at the military parade in Moscow commemorating the 73rd anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Netanyahu also made a symbolic gesture at the time that generated considerable discussion in Israel and internationally: he took part in the “Immortal Regiment” march, a commemorative initiative launched by Russian civil society that soon became part of the state’s official ideological narrative.

However, the information and propaganda campaign accompanying Russia’s war against Ukraine—one prominent component of which is the Russian side’s characterization of supporters of Ukrainian independence as “Banderites” (radical nationalists) and fascist accomplices of Hitler—has led to a sharp erosion of the previous understandings between Moscow and Jerusalem. For the same purpose, the Kremlin also actively manipulates the concepts of genocide and the Holocaust, using them as tools to accomplish a range of objectives related to delegitimizing the Ukrainian leadership. Ukraine, in turn, where many leaders are of Jewish origin, has advanced the thesis of “Russian aggression as a new Holocaust,” widely used to influence international public opinion and draw Israel into the confrontation. As long as the war continues, a restoration of the previous shared narratives in this area does not appear likely.

Economy and Trade

Available data show that economic relations—trade, investment, and other business activity—between the two countries are substantially weaker today than they were half a decade ago. Israel did not join the sanctions packages imposed by Western countries on the Russian economy, but neither did it make efforts to circumvent them. Understandably, Israeli state-owned and private companies, in addition to moral considerations for those guided by them, have had to take into account the possibility of secondary sanctions from the EU and, especially, the United States.

One result, in particular, was a noticeable decline in Israeli exports to Russia in 2022 (around $640 million) compared with the previous year (approximately $720 million). In the following year, 2023, Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics recorded a modest 2% increase, but in the first half of 2024 Israeli exports to Russia again fell by one-third, from $310 million to $218 million, while Israeli exports to Ukraine tripled in the same year. Imports from Russia to Israel also declined by 20%, from $103 million to $83 million.

Overall, according to Bloomberg, although the volume of bilateral trade fluctuated that year, it reached $3.86 billion. Israeli exports consisted mainly of agricultural products, fruit and vegetables, as well as certain optical instruments, and totaled $489.96 million. Russian exports to Israel in 2024 amounted to $2.37 billion and were distributed fairly evenly among oil, grain, and construction materials; in the following year, 2025, the figure remained virtually unchanged at $2.36 billion.

Another factor has been the tariff policy of the U.S. administration. Thus, in early 2026 it became known that, in an effort to persuade Washington to ease tariffs on Israeli exports, the Israeli government intended to impose a 50% tax on feed wheat from all countries except the United States. If this decision is implemented despite protests from Israel’s agricultural lobby, Russia will be the most adversely affected party, having supplied 60% of Israel’s total wheat imports in 2025.

Among projects of this kind, one may mention the opening of the first hotel in Israel by the Russian hotel chain Azimut Hotels, owned by Russian-Jewish businessman Alexander Klyachin. This was announced on Monday, June 8. The new hotel complex is located in central Jerusalem on Shamai Street, near the Ben Yehuda pedestrian mall. Investment in the project exceeded 150 million shekels.

Outwardly, Russian-Israeli relations today represent a combination of tactical clashes of interests on one level and fundamental uncertainty on another. As a participant in a discussion at the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry told the author, the current leitmotif of Russian-Israeli business contacts can be summed up as follows: “This is a tactical pause for now, but we are prepared and looking to the future with optimism.” A similar narrative prevails among Russian experts and officials involved in business.

Future Prospects

It can be concluded that, overall, there has been no definitive rupture in ties between Jerusalem and Moscow. The Russian leadership continues to condemn the actions of Israel and the United States in their current war with Iran and their policies toward Iranian satellites, but at the same time generally avoids steps that could lead to irreversible escalation in relations with Washington and Jerusalem. It appears that, for the time being at least, Russia does not wish to see Israel among its overt enemies. This does not, however, prevent certain members of the Russian political establishment, and especially pro-Kremlin media circles, from participating in anti-Israeli propaganda campaigns; it is difficult to doubt that such campaigns have been sanctioned at a sufficiently high level.

As for the Israeli government, it continues, to one degree or another, to maintain with Moscow the appearance of “business as usual,” although the “special relationship” between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Vladimir Putin, forged at the height of the Israeli-Russian “honeymoon” in the second decade of this century, has clearly become a thing of the past. It is possible that the current Israeli leadership’s policy toward Moscow will also take into account the approach of the Donald Trump administration, which does not regard Russia’s presumed support for Iran as a major problem. And, as some observers believe, it is prepared to ease anti-Russian sanctions as part of a worldview rooted in the 1980s—one that is not particularly realistic in the present circumstances and may even be destructive and risky, especially for the Middle East: friendship with Moscow combined with confrontation with Tehran, skepticism about NATO’s authority, and the use of tariffs.

On the other hand, certain developments that have become public knowledge may lead to adjustments in this approach. In addition to Russia’s supply of drones to Iran, attention was drawn to information obtained by The Jerusalem Post, according to which Russian intelligence provided Iran with a detailed list of 55 sites belonging to Israel’s critical energy infrastructure, potentially enabling Iran to carry out precision missile strikes capable, in principle, of paralyzing the country’s national energy system.

It is difficult to say whether developments of this kind, should they recur, will become a “red line” requiring the Israeli leadership to abandon its traditional “balance of interests” and substantially reassess relations with the Russian Federation. For now, what is visible are isolated cases such as the coordination in April of this year between Russian diplomats and the Israel Defense Forces over the evacuation of around two hundred employees of Russia’s state atomic energy company working at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant following Israeli-American strikes in the area.

At the same time, the real “red lines” remain fairly clear and can be reduced to a simple formula: Israel does not participate directly in the war in Ukraine and does not provide it with large-scale military assistance, while Russia does not intervene in the Middle Eastern conflict on Iran’s side and does not directly assist the development of Iran’s nuclear program.

It should be assumed that the principal dialogue between Jerusalem and Moscow takes place behind the scenes, and for now its substance can only be guessed at.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 219 (July 23, 2026)

One of the geopolitical aftermaths of the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, is the deteriorating bilateral relations between Israel and Türkiye. The South Caucasus state of Azerbaijan, which considers both states its closest allies, unsurprisingly once again serves as a mediator between the two antagonists. Drawing on expert interviews and qualitative data, this paper will be the first to illuminate these mediation efforts in greater detail. Focusing on Azerbaijan’s mediation formats and policies enables analysts to gauge the current state of Israeli-Turkish relations more precisely. In addition to generating policy recommendations for Jerusalem at the end, this analysis will also highlight why Jerusalem and Baku should consider Germany a constructive additional component in the Azerbaijani-led mediation efforts between Israel and Türkiye.

Talk to My Friend

Since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the Turkish government around President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has hardened its rhetoric against the Jewish state to such a degree that it openly fantasizes about invading Israel and capturing Israel’s capital Jerusalem. Unsurprisingly, such rhetoric multiplies Israeli concerns that a Türkiye-led Sunni axis might replace the plummeting Iran-led Shia axis. One state, however, sees both countries as its most important allies: Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Baku often served as a mediator between the two states. The Azerbaijani President Ilham Alijew first officially mentioned Azerbaijani involvement in such initiatives in April 2025 during an address at the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Academy (ADA) in April 2025 when he stated:

“Both countries [Israel and Türkiye] are close friends of Azerbaijan. […]. As it is already known, though we never made it public ourselves, but already it has been circulated quite broadly. The first successful reconciliation between Türkiye and Israel was to a certain degree facilitated by Azerbaijan. […]. But I would say that Azerbaijan was number one in this process. Again, it was behind the scenes. We never made it public. […] We just wanted to help our ally and brother Türkiye and our friend Israel to rebuild their relationship.”

These Azerbaijani mediation efforts, especially after October 7, 2023, deserve more attention, as their format and procedures reveal much about the current state of Israeli-Turkish relations and, more broadly, about the trilateral relations among Baku, Ankara, and Jerusalem. Drawing on expert interviews and qualitative data, this analysis will be the first to illuminate these mediation efforts in greater detail, focusing on their formats. By doing this, this BESA paper will formulate policy recommendations for Jerusalem at the end. Moreover, it will showcase why Baku and Jerusalem should consider Germany as a constructive additional component in the Azerbaijani-led mediation efforts between Israel and Türkiye.

Azerbaijan and its Mediation Efforts in the Israeli-Turkish Conundrum since October 7, 2023

Since Israel’s creation in 1948, Türkiye always managed to be a reliable strategic partner of the Jewish state, while at the same time supporting Palestinian statehood and a so-called “Two-State Solution.” Although Erdoğan’s rise to power since the early 2000s and his departure from Atatürk’s secularism produced the first eruptions in bilateral relations, a radical qualitative change occurred after October 7, 2023. Erdoğan replaced his pro-Palestinian stance with an open pro-Hamas stance. This circumstance became particularly evident by hosting parts of the Hamas politburo in Türkiye and labeling this internationally recognized Islamist terrorist organization “freedom fighters.” Considering the poor state of the Turkish economy, the flourishing corruption practices, and high youth unemployment in the country, it is nothing new in world history that leaders with such domestic problems play the Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism card to distract from their domestic problems. As was often the case in human history, anti-Semitism helps such governments to create a rally-around-the-flag effect among the actually economically and politically unsatisfied citizenry in support of their government. Interestingly, one can observe a similar development in the left-wing Pedro Sánchez -led minority government in Spain. The latter cannot escape continuous political, economic, and corruption scandals, yet has proclaimed itself the West’s alleged moral compass – especially when it comes to Middle East affairs.

Taking notice of the rising tensions, Azerbaijan has conducted several mediation initiatives between Israel and Türkiye between 2008 and 2010, in 2018, and between 2022 and today. These helped ease Israeli-Turkish tensions. Yet, after regular periods, these disagreements erupted repeatedly. Because of this, some observers express skepticism towards Baku’s mediation initiatives. This critique often states that, although Baku has made several mediation attempts between Israel and Türkiye since 2008, relations between Jerusalem and Ankara have always returned to disputes. Thus, doubts could emerge about the effectiveness of these Azerbaijani mediation efforts. At first glance, this could seem like a legitimate critique, yet another perspective on this issue might be more crucial.

Independently of each other, Azerbaijani and Israeli experts familiar with this matter point out that the Azerbaijani mediation initiative should not be seen as the ultimate panacea for Israeli-Turkish disagreements. Rather, they constitute ad hoc measures to de-escalate tensions between Jerusalem and Ankara, aiming to prevent them from spilling over into an open military conflict. The establishment of a direct communication line between the Turkish and Israeli militaries in Syria via Azerbaijani diplomacy in May 2025 is one such instance. It aims to help both states avoid unintended clashes in post-Assad Syria.

The Mediation Formats as an Expression of the Current State of Affairs between Jerusalem and Ankara

Strikingly, the changed Turkish attitude towards Israel since October 7, 2023, is also reflected in the way the Azerbaijani-mediated Israeli-Turkish talks proceed. Throughout 2025, most of these talks proceeded only indirectly. Allegedly, only in one of the discussion rounds in 2025 did both antagonists manage to talk directly to each other. This situation exemplifies once more the often-mentioned current low point in Israeli-Turkish relations. If one considers that in September 2023 Azerbaijani officials managed to organize a personal meeting between Erdoğan and the current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in New York on the sidelines of the annual UN General Assembly and compares it to the above-mentioned current situation where both sides mostly do not manage to sit in one room anymore, this deterioration of relations becomes even more evident.

What is also interesting is that these talks are allegedly not conducted at the level of the foreign ministries, but rather directly through the presidential offices of Azerbaijan and Türkiye, as well as the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. Although this is not an unusual practice in international relations, the fact that the highest hierarchical levels of the executive branches in all three states deal personally with this issue shows how much weight all three involved parties (Azerbaijan, Türkiye and Israel) place on the current tensions between Israel and Türkiye.

For Azerbaijan, this is a particularly delicate issue, as it fears that an escalation between its two most important allies could put it in a political dilemma. This concern is one of the reasons why Baku tries so relentlessly to calm the waters between Jerusalem and Ankara again and again. As discussions with Azerbaijani experts reveal, for Baku, the best-case scenario would be a strong, stable trilateral strategic partnership among Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Israel.

Conclusion: Policy Recommendations for Jerusalem

As the author of this analysis mentioned in his previous BESA paper, discussions with Israeli and Azerbaijani experts highlight in a repeated manner how both sides view the current Turkish-Israeli relations as simultaneously the biggest risk (should the Turkish-Israeli relations further deteriorate) and the biggest (economic and security-related) opportunity for the Azerbaijani-Israeli strategic partnership (as soon as the tensions between Ankara and Jerusalem calm down). The points above showed what these mediation initiatives look like and, more importantly, what they tell about the seriousness of the current tensions between Israel and Türkiye.

As the Middle East security order is still evolving after the ongoing crumbling of the Iran-led Shia axis, new (potential) conflict zones between Middle Eastern states emerge, making it profoundly difficult to say with guarantee that the Azerbaijan-led mediation efforts in Israeli-Turkish relations will succeed. Thus, this analysis calls for a dualistic Israeli foreign policy approach by extending an open hand and a fist towards Ankara. Such an approach could consist of Israel’s expressed readiness to de-escalate further its relations with Türkiye if Ankara shows a gesture of goodwill –for instance by giving up its holding of a protective hand over the living rest of the Hamas politburo members residing in Türkiye) (“the open hand”). In parallel and until then, precautionary measures should remain the call of the hour for Israeli foreign policy as well (“the fist”) – especially when it comes to Erdoğan’s Neo-Ottoman aspirations, which are also seen critically by Baku and other predominantly Muslim states in the region. Additionally, Israeli foreign policy should consider the following points in this regard:

1. Differentiating between Turkish Domestic and International Rhetoric: Although the current Turkish foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, has tempered his tone toward Israel in a recent media appearance on July 10, 2026, stating that Ankara is not in conflict with Israel, but rather with the current Israeli government, analysts should register Fidan’s mood change with utmost caution. Fidan made this statement to a foreign media platform (The National). In interviews with domestic media outlets, the Turkish foreign minister’s rhetoric is exactly the opposite. This fact became clear just one week before his interview for “The National” when he described in an interview for CNN Türk that the “[…] [Israeli] people have become a burden that humanity can no longer bear.” Moreover, as the analysis above showed, even if Fidan is truly committed to de-escalation, Israel should keep in mind that the foreign ministries of both states are not the primary actors in the crisis management of the Israeli-Turkish tension, but the presidential and prime ministerial administrations of the respective countries. Thus, it remains unclear how much political weight Fidan’s de-escalation statements truly have.

2. The Repercussions of Reducing the Role of National Foreign Ministries in Crisis Management: Circumventing or reducing the role of national foreign ministries and their diplomats in the crisis management of Israeli-Turkish relations risks missing the opportunity to fortify the relationship between Israel and Türkiye. Elected officials come and go, and the same applies to their staffers within their administrations. Diplomats, however, remain in their profession, often throughout their careers. States should view such binding measures and contacts between the diplomatic personnel of all involved states as a political investment in the future, especially given that some of these diplomats might later assume political offices. Their collective experience in dealing with “the other side” might be an important trust base on which future Israeli-Turkish relations can operate.

3. Keeping the New Syrian Regime out of Lebanon: Although US President Donald Trump hinted in June 2026 that he would like the new regime in Syria (instead of Israel) to fight against the Shia terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon, Jerusalem should be aware of the risks this might entail. As the new Syrian regime is closely aligned with and highly dependent on Ankara, the danger might arise that Türkiye might use the Islamist militias around the new Syrian leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, as a proxy to increase its influence in Lebanon. Indeed, such a scenario showcases once more the security risk for Israel of inadvertently replacing the former Iran-led Shia crescent with a Türkiye-led Sunni crescent.

4. Strengthening the Hellenic Alliance further: As a precautionary measure, Israel should expand the existing security ties within the Hellenic Alliance, namely the already-established security partnership among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, to counterbalance Turkish influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and gain bargaining chips vis-à-vis Ankara. Moreover, the issue of Cyprus, with its since 1974 Turkish-occupied northern part, presents one of several other unexploited loopholes (like the Kurdish issue) allowing Israel to highlight the contradictions within Ankara’s international demeanor – especially concerning Ankara’s constant condemnation of Israel’s security policies in the Palestinian territories. Here, a newly recalibrated and more profoundly designed Israeli public diplomacy than before (by relying also on international expertise) can highlight the hypocrisy of Turkish foreign policy and the ignorance of the current paradoxical international liaison between Islamism and left-wing self-proclaimed progressivism in many Western states.

5. Germany and the Azerbaijani-Led Mediation Efforts in the Strained Israeli-Turkish Relations: Germany should be considered an additional pillar of support for these mediation efforts. Not only is Berlin, due to its past dark role in Jewish history, now one of the strongest allies of Israel, but it is also the home of the largest Turkish diaspora in the world (approximately 3 million people, of which 1,5 million are German citizens with voting rights). Therefore, similar to Azerbaijan, an escalation of the current Israeli-Turkish relations might also put Germany in a very precarious position. For Azerbaijan, this would allow it to deepen its ties with the biggest economy in Europe. For Germany, it would be a step toward stepping up its role as a peace facilitator. Several German officials practice self-criticism by pointing out that Germany has lost its past role as a mediator between Israel and the Lebanese government. However, it seems the officials in Berlin have not yet recognized that the Israeli-Turkish tensions might be even more significant to them than the Israeli-Lebanese issue, as it could also affect very sensitive German domestic issues. Furthermore, for Israel, it would be an opportunity to strengthen an important ally, such as Germany, on the international stage. This goal might be particularly important now, as Germany suffered an international blowback in June 2026 in its failed quest to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In addition to miscommunication between Germany and other EU states seeking such seats (Austria and Portugal), an anti-German campaign by Russia among UN members from the so-called Global South, driven by Berlin’s siding with Ukraine, also contributed to Germany’s defeat. However, an additional reason for Germany’s unsuccessful application lies in its open support for the Jewish state’s security. Thus, strengthening the international role of an ally like Germany also has advantageous implications for Jerusalem.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 203 (May 15, 2026)

For more than two decades, U.S. policy in Central Asia and the Caspian region was closely linked to the military operation in Afghanistan. The region was viewed primarily as a logistical and political periphery of the Afghan campaign: supply routes ran through it, transit agreements were concluded, and counterterrorism cooperation was developed. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 marked not only the military end of the campaign, but also the end of an entire era of U.S. regional policy. The Afghan factor ceased to be the structural element of the American presence in Central Asia. A strategic vacuum emerged: whereas security had previously defined the agenda, after 2021 Washington no longer had an obvious new “anchor” for a systematic policy in the region. Under these circumstances, the key question is as follows: what will become the new driver of U.S. strategy in Central Asia and the Caspian region? In 2026, the United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019–2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity expired. Accordingly, a process is underway to formulate a new U.S. strategy. Below, I analyze the new trends that may form a strategy that has in fact been taking shape under the Trump administration in Central Asia and the Caspian region. Many elements of this new policy were already outlined in the 2019–2025 strategy and in the policy of the previous administration; however, the specific features of the Trump administration’s foreign policy have clearly accelerated the transition to a new model of relations. This model can be described as one based on business transactions and flexible diplomatic formats.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as the key Eurasian players in the Board of Peace

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan played the role of important participants at the inaugural summit of the Board of Peace on February 19, 2026. They were the only representatives of the post-Soviet space (along with Azerbaijan and Armenia). They also represented (together with Azerbaijan) a distinct Eurasian, Turkic and Former Soviet cluster of participants in this organization. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were the only Soviet countries that assumed certain financial, political, and even military commitments during this summit. Kazakhstan agreed to participate in the reconstruction of Gaza, undertook financial commitments, and expressed its readiness to send peacekeepers. Uzbekistan declared its readiness to take part in the construction of housing, hospitals, schools, and kindergartens.

In the context of the evolving relations between the Trump administration and these three countries, this carries strategic significance. The participation of the three states signals their willingness to deepen dialogue with the United States on terms that do not imply military-political confrontation with Russia or China — a matter of fundamental importance for the states of Central Asia. All of them pursue multi-vector foreign policies, seeking to maintain good relations simultaneously with the West, Russia, and China. The active participation of the regional countries in the inaugural summit of the Board of Peace demonstrates their readiness to work with Washington outside traditional multilateral frameworks — such as the UN. The emphasis of U.S. foreign policy under the current administration is shifting toward flexible diplomatic formats, business transactions, and infrastructure deals. The countries of Central Asia and the Caspian region are actively seeking to integrate into this model, adapting their multi-vector diplomacy to it.

The renewed interest of the current U.S. administration in Central Asia

It is important to emphasize that the Board of Peace summit continues and consolidates an already existing trend in U.S. relations with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as two regional leaders of Central Asia.

The most recent U.S.–Central Asia summit in the C5+1 format took place on November 6, 2025, in Washington under the chairmanship of President Donald Trump. It demonstrated a shift toward concrete economic deals. The emphasis was placed on critical minerals, energy, transport infrastructure, and supply chains.

Uzbekistan announced its intention to purchase American goods and services worth approximately $100 billion over the next decade and about $35 billion in the next three years. Kazakhstan presented a package of 29 agreements, including joint investments totaling nearly $17 billion.  At the same time, Kazakhstan announced its support for the Abraham Accords, which creates a favorable political and diplomatic backdrop for economic cooperation with the United States, as well as with Israel as Washington’s key Middle Eastern ally.

In December 2025, Donald Trump invited the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to participate as guests in the G20 summit in Miami in 2026, thereby elevating their international status.

The above-described line of the Trump administration toward flexible diplomacy based on business deals became even more evident during the visit of U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor to Kyrgyzstan and his participation in the B5+1 summit in Bishkek on February 4–5, 2026. “B5+1” is a two-day business forum that brought together representatives of business communities and government bodies from Central Asian countries and the United States. During the forum, discussions focused on the development of agriculture, tourism, the financial and banking sector, transport and logistics, e-commerce and information technology, as well as cooperation in the field of critical minerals.

Gor noted that the “B5+1” forum in Bishkek became a logical continuation of the “C5+1” summit in Washington. He also stated that the United States would strengthen its economic presence in the countries of Central Asia in the coming years. At the same time, the key instrument of engagement will be the private sector. The U.S. government intends to support American businesses operating in the region in order to reduce investment risks. Gor also emphasized the role of TRIPP and the Middle Corridor in enhancing the economic interconnection between the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Will the Middle Corridor Become “Western” Again Rather Than “Chinese” project?

The Middle Corridor (TITR – Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) connects China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe. In recent years, it has gained additional relevance for the countries of Central Asia surrounded by the conflicts in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan and the Middle East. In 2026, in particular, southern trade routes from Central Asia have become constrained due to the crisis surrounding Iran and internal instability in Afghanistan. Consequently, the importance of the Middle Corridor for the functioning of Central Asian economies has increased significantly.

From the perspective of geo-economic competition, it is important to note that although today the Middle Corridor is integrated into China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its institutional roots lie in the supported by the West TRACECA project, launched in the 1990s as a tool to ensure the economic independence of the newly independent states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This fundamental Western interest in the Middle Corridor persists today.

The intensification of U.S. policy in the South Caucasus (including the TRIPP project -Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) and Central Asia under current administration may restore the Western geo-economic dimension of the Middle Corridor and reduce the dominance of the Chinese aspect in the logic of this route. In this sense, the revitalization of the corridor can be seen as a kind of “return” of the Western agenda to Eurasian logistics, with significant geo-economic consequences.

Economic cooperation with the United States within the context of multi-vector foreign policy of Central Asian states

Cooperation with the United States in matters related to transport infrastructure not only serves economic interests but also aligns with the logic of the multi-vector foreign policies pursued by the countries of Central Asia. Through such cooperation, they do not enter into confrontation with China or Russia, while diversifying their foreign partnerships and strengthening their agency in the international arena.

China allows the states of Central Asia to pursue multi-vector foreign policies, provided that China itself remains one of their key vectors. The Middle Corridor — although ideologically and strategically not entirely favorable for Beijing — has significant practical economic importance for the Belt and Road project, particularly at a time when the war between Russia and Ukraine negatively affects the Northern Corridor, and the crisis surrounding Iran constrains the Southern route. Beijing would compete with Washington in Central Asia using geoeconomic instruments, which would be useful for the countries of the region.

Russia has traditionally viewed the Middle Corridor negatively, proposing the Northern route as an alternative. However, in the context of the war with Ukraine and the crisis in its relations with Europe, Russia cannot guarantee the uninterrupted functioning of the Northern route as a viable alternative for Central Asian economies. Moreover, Russia has traditionally anchored its position in Central Asia through military and security-based instruments, whereas China has projected its influence predominantly through economic penetration, infrastructure investment, and trade integration. Consequently, U.S. transaction-based engagement in the region increasingly places Washington in direct geoeconomic competition with China, not with Russia — not only over the development of the Middle Corridor, but also over the long-term configuration of Central Asia’s economic architecture.

Iran has historically taken the most negative stance toward any idea of transit across the Caspian Sea. This project competes with the North–South Corridor via Iran and also contributes to the distancing of the northern Eurasian neighbors from Iran. In the past Iran even attempted to block the division of the sea into national sectors for this purpose. However, under the current conditions of military crisis surrounding Iran, it will not be able to exert significant pressure on the countries of Central Asia. So, the degree of Iranian influence in Central Asia is much less than the influence of China or Russia. Therefore, Central Asian elites may afford serious disagreements with Iranian policy concerning cooperation with USA and Israel.

Conclusion. From a military logic to a logic of geoeconomic influence

If the Afghan era defined the nature of the American presence in Central Asia through security and military instruments, the geoeconomic model emerging under the current administration places strong emphasis on infrastructure, transit, resources, and flexible diplomacy. Formally embedding these three pillars in an articulated U.S. regional strategy would send a clear message to the Central Asian states that American engagement is not ad hoc or crisis-driven, but designed as a durable, long-term framework adapted to contemporary geopolitical realities.

The C5+1 summit in Washington on November 6, 2025, demonstrated the consolidation of the economic agenda as central to U.S. strategy. The focus on critical minerals, investment, and infrastructure became the core element of the dialogue. The Board of Peace (2025) further strengthened the trend toward flexible diplomatic engagement with the countries of the region.

For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states, it is fundamentally important today that engagement with the United States not be perceived as an anti-Russian or anti-Chinese geopolitical project. The geo-economic logic of cooperation with the United States and flexible engagement formats enables them to maintain balance within the framework of their multi-vector foreign policies. Thus, the demand of Central Asian states has aligned successfully with the new foreign policy emphases advanced by the Trump administration. The softer geoeconomic approach it proposes — compared to the period of the Afghan campaign — is the only politically acceptable format for the countries of Central Asia today.

At the same time, this policy allows for minimizing costs to American taxpayers while maximizing commercial benefits for U.S. investors. Moreover, it enables the United States to address many strategic objectives in a “containment-light” style. Washington is beginning to operate in Central Asia not through direct geostrategic containment of China, Iran, and Russia, as before, but through regionalization, trade, and infrastructure integration. At the same time, it is precisely in Central Asia and the Caspian region that Washington now has a realistic opportunity to engage China on symmetrical terms — through geoeconomic instruments capable of competing with Beijing’s model of outward economic expansion.

Paradoxically, despite the deep ideological differences between the Trump administration on the one hand and the overwhelming majority of European political elites on the other, the administration’s political style in several respects resembles European approaches to Central Asia. The European Union and individual European states operating in the region similarly prioritize pragmatic economic cooperation while avoiding large-scale geopolitical initiatives that could carry significant risks of conflict. That said, unlike the Trump administration, European policy in Central Asia also incorporates support for civil society and the promotion of European values.

For Israel, the Trump administration’s shift in Central Asia toward business-oriented initiatives and transactional diplomacy may prove broadly advantageous. Israel itself has pursued a comparable approach in the region. At present, Central Asian states are actively seeking to expand economic and diplomatic engagement with Israel. In this context, the administration’s operational style in the region can be seen as largely compatible with Israeli approaches.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 194 (April 4th, 2026)

Part 1

Epic Fury in the Social Networks: Anti-Israeli and Anti-American Discourses

In the situation described above, a wide range of anti-Israeli and anti-American stereotypes have spread widely across social media. Numerous videos portraying the alleged “successes” of Iranian strikes against Israel and American forces have circulated widely, particularly in the Tajik-language online environment. More broadly, Iranian propaganda describing supposedly massive losses suffered by the United States and Israel tends to resonate with certain groups within the Central Asian segment of the internet, especially since it is often amplified by channels associated with Islamic fundamentalism or with Russian media networks. At the same time, it should be noted that a significant number of Russian propagandists, who are well-known in Central Asia, have publicly distanced themselves from Iran and emphasize that the war is economically advantageous for Moscow.
Various conspiracy theories have also spread widely in the region and across the broader post-Soviet space. For example, many users claim that the Pakistani airstrikes against Afghanistan were in fact orchestrated by the United States and/or Israel. This interpretation has been particularly widespread in Russia but it has also gained traction in Central Asia.

Many mythologized conspiracy narratives have entered the Central Asian information space through Western media and social networks. In particular, discussions of the current war frequently refer to the so-called “Epstein files.” Several versions of this interpretation circulate online. One of them has an anti-Trump orientation and claims that the war is being used to distract public attention, in a manner reminiscent of the plot of the film Wag the Dog. Another version takes an anti-Israeli form, asserting that Israel allegedly controls American politics through such mechanisms — a narrative that structurally reproduces older conspiracy tropes associated with the infamous forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

In some comments, even broader generalizations appear that question the democratic character of the political systems of the United States and Israel. Within such conspiratorial interpretations, these states are portrayed as being controlled by corrupt elites acting in the interests of hidden backstage forces. Such arguments reproduce a typical narrative found in conspiracy discourse about the “secret governance” of political processes.

Critical assessments also frequently appear in the comments, reproducing arguments common in a number of Western media outlets, where the legality of military action against Iran is questioned from the standpoint of international law. Discussions also often include criticism of the Arab Gulf states that is typical of Islamist and more radical anti-Western narratives. For example, one commenter writes:

“They are direct accomplices in an act of aggression against a sovereign state. Iran repeatedly issued official warnings to all the countries where these traitors, lackeys of the USA (written in the original in lowercase), have allowed American military bases to be deployed. Such is the fate of such piglets — Tabaki jackals (a reference to Rudyard Kipling’s The Jungle book). This is the natural right of a defending state according to the norms of international law. A country that hosts the aggressor’s military bases — from which strikes are launched, and where command centers, communications systems, surveillance equipment, radars, air defense systems, etc. are located — automatically becomes an accomplice to aggression, and therefore military facilities located in those countries become legitimate targets”.

Such arguments reproduce a widely circulated claim found in a number of anti-Western political narratives — that states allowing the deployment of U.S. military bases on their territory automatically become parties to armed conflicts involving the United States.

It is also noteworthy that the comment uses expressions such as “piglets” (podsvinki in Russian) and “Tabaki”. These metaphors are less characteristic of Middle Eastern propaganda rhetoric than of the Russian information space, where similar language has been used in political polemics, including in public discourse—albeit usually in reference to conflicts in Eastern Europe. From Eastern Europe also comes the insulting practice of writing the names of rival states with lowercase letters, e.g. usa instead of USA.

Finally, one can encounter arguments framed in the spirit of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. For example, some users claim that “the conflict is acquiring civilizational dimensions and Pakistan should threaten to transfer nuclear weapons to Iran in order to force the United States and Israel to stop the war”.  This reflects the well-known notion circulating in the global information space about a common “Islamic nuclear bomb”.

Three Sources and Three Components of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in Central Asian Social Media

The examples discussed above illustrate that it is possible to distinguish three groups in Central Asia that express anti-Israeli and anti-American attitudes and that originate from fundamentally different external sources of influence. At the same time, these three informational influences often intersect and closely interact with one another.

These are: Islamist-fundamentalist discourse, Western left-radical discourse, and a Russian-language anti-Western discourse (which in some cases also carries anti-Semitic undertones).

Islamist-Fundamentalist Discourse. The first source of anti-American and anti-Israeli attitudes is connected with religious-political and Islamist narratives that circulate through Islamic media outlets, preaching networks, and social platforms. These narratives are frequently built around themes of solidarity within the Muslim world, support for Palestine, and criticism of Western intervention in the Middle East.

Studies of media discourse show that in Islamically oriented media, the Palestinian question is often interpreted through a religious and civilizational lens, which strengthens emotional mobilization among audiences and helps form durable political interpretations of the conflict.

Such narratives spread not only through traditional media but also through social networks and messaging platforms, which have become key channels for the circulation of politically and religiously framed information about conflicts in the Middle East. Research on digital communication shows that these platforms play an important role in forming transnational networks that support and disseminate political interpretations of international conflicts.

At the same time, within Central Asia the sources of such influence differ from country to country. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, these ideas tend to spread primarily through Arab and, especially, Turkish media, as well as through religious organizations and transnational Islamic online platforms. Erdogan-era Turkish political-Islamic media, for example, actively shape discourse around the Palestinian question, presenting it as a central element of broader political and religious solidarity within the Muslim world.

In Tajikistan, by contrast, Iranian informational and even direct political influence may be more visible due to linguistic and cultural proximity. This includes media platforms and cultural initiatives aimed at Persian-speaking audiences. In such cases, political and religious narratives spread through Persian-language information channels and religious networks, which distinguishes Tajikistan’s information environment from that of other Central Asian countries.

Western Pro-Iranian Discourse. A second source of such ideas is a Western pro-Iranian discourse that spreads through international activist networks, English-language social media, and global online platforms. This discourse takes different forms — here we focus primarily on its more radical interpretations, which draw on the concepts of anti-imperialism. In its most radical form, which also influences some anti-Western interpretations in Central Asia, these approaches portray Middle Eastern conflicts involving Iran as part of a broader struggle against “colonial” and “neo-colonial” structures of global power. Such arguments largely echo the official rhetoric of Iranian propaganda. According to some experts, the spread of this discourse is supported by covert Chinese financial backing.

These ideas circulate actively in English-language social media and are often absorbed by part of the younger audience in Central Asian countries, particularly among users oriented toward Western educational and cultural environments.

Russian Anti-Western Discourse. Another important source of the anti-Western narratives discussed above is the Russian information space, which continues to play a significant role in media consumption across Central Asia.

A large share of the region’s population regularly receives news and analytical commentary from Russian television channels, online outlets, and social media platforms. Within this discourse, the United States and Israel are frequently portrayed as key actors of the “collective West,” pursuing an aggressive foreign policy and seeking to preserve global hegemony. Consequently, international crises are often interpreted as the result of Western actions, while their opponents, Iran in this case, are presented as victims or participants in defensive struggles.

Such interpretations are actively disseminated through Russian-language media and the blogosphere and are easily transmitted into local debates in Central Asian societies. Despite the broad presence of Russian media in the region, however, I would rank Russian sources only third in terms of their influence on the formation of anti-Western and anti-Israeli discourse in Central Asia. Among Russian commentators, not only pro-Iranian positions are widespread but also a more moderate alternative perspective articulated by the press secretary of President Putin, Dmitry Peskov: “The war that is taking place is not our war… We must minimize the consequences of global upheavals for our economy and extract benefits where possible…”

The Intersection of Discourses. In the information space of Central Asian countries, where different informational influences intersect, these three types of narratives frequently overlap in practice. In the digital environment, users often reproduce arguments originating from different informational ecosystems simultaneously — for example, combining anti-Western interpretations from Russian media with rhetoric of Islamic solidarity and left-radical critiques of imperialism.

As a result, a hybrid information space is emerging in Central Asia in which ideas that originate in different geopolitical and ideological contexts mix together and are adapted to local political and cultural conditions.

Conclusion

The reaction of Central Asian states to the 2026 war between the United States, Israel, and Iran demonstrates a clear contrast between official diplomacy and the dynamics of public discourse. Governments across the region have adopted cautious neutrality, driven primarily by economic vulnerability, geopolitical constraints, and the long-standing tradition of multi-vector foreign policy. For Central Asian elites, maintaining balanced relations simultaneously with Russia, China, the West, and the Middle East remains a central strategic priority.

At the societal level, however, the situation is far more complex. Social media discussions reveal a fragmented public sphere in which different ideological, cultural, and geopolitical influences compete. Sympathy toward Iran is stronger in regions where Islamic identity or Persian cultural connections are more prominent, particularly in Tajikistan and parts of the Ferghana Valley, while societies shaped more strongly by the legacy of Eurasian nomadic culture tend to display weaker pro-Iranian sentiment. In most cases, however, these differences do not translate into open political confrontation between elites and society, unlike the deeper “elite–street” divide observed in parts of the Arab world.

The analysis also demonstrates that anti-Israeli and anti-American narratives circulating in Central Asian social media originate from three overlapping external information ecosystems: Islamist-fundamentalist discourse, Western radical pro-Iranian discourse, and Russian-language anti-Western (and sometimes simultaneously anti-Semitic) media narratives. Although these discourses differ in origin and ideological foundations, they frequently merge within the digital environment, producing hybrid interpretations of international conflicts. This fusion creates an informational landscape in which religious solidarity, geopolitical resentment, and conspiracy narratives reinforce one another.

Despite this active online environment, the political consequences of these narratives remain limited for now. In most Central Asian countries, strict state control over public demonstrations prevents the transformation of online discourse into mass political mobilization. Nevertheless, the continued spread of anti-Western narratives, especially when combined with Islamist ideological frameworks, carries potential long-term risks for regional security.

Overall, Central Asia’s response to the war reflects the region’s broader geopolitical condition: political neutrality at the level of states, but cultural and political pluralism — and sometimes polarization — within society. As global conflicts increasingly unfold in digital spaces, the interaction between external propaganda networks and local cultural contexts will likely play an increasingly important role in shaping political perceptions across the region.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 179 (January 22, 2026)

Since gaining independence, the Central Asian states have maintained a position of neutrality toward Israel. Following Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords on 6 November 2025, Israel may find itself presented with an opportunity to significantly expand its diplomatic presence in both Central Asia and the Caspian Basin (after Azerbaijan joined the “Central Asian Five” in 2025, the two spaces may reasonably be viewed as a single international region — a point that will be elaborated below). It is therefore worth examining how Israeli diplomacy has begun to make use of this emerging “window of opportunity” and what potential trajectories might exist for Israel’s foreign policy in this context.

1.  Israel’s diplomatic activity on the Kazakhstan track

On 10 January 2026, at Israel’s initiative, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a telephone conversation with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan. During the exchange, the two leaders reaffirmed the steady and long-term development of bilateral cooperation and discussed further ways to deepen engagement across a broad range of issues on the bilateral agenda. A central subject of discussion was Kazakhstan’s decision in 2025 to join the Abraham Accords. Netanyahu expressed deep appreciation to Tokayev for this decision and underscored its importance for strengthening peace and international dialogue.

Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords makes it the first Central Asian state to join the initiative and extends the geographical scope of the framework beyond the Middle East and North Africa. This significantly enhances Astana’s value for Israel—not only as a partner in bilateral economic projects but also as a key participant in multilateral peace initiatives.

The Netanyahu–Tokayev conversation took place one week before the expected visit of Israel’s foreign minister to Astana. Gideon Sa’ar plans to visit Kazakhstan immediately after his official visit to Azerbaijan on 26 January 2026. The preparation for this visit has been underway since November 2025, when — in the context of Kazakhstan’s decision to join the Abraham Accords — the foreign ministers of the two countries discussed prospects for cooperation in technology, water and agriculture, as well as the establishment of direct air transport links.

Several directions of dialogue can be reasonably anticipated during the visit:

• Discussion of a possible expansion of the political dialogue in the context of the expanding Abraham Accords. Such political dialogue corresponds well to Kazakhstan’s traditional multi-vector foreign policy, aimed at maintaining balanced and mutually beneficial relations with both Western and Eastern partners.

• Discussion of regional security issues in light of multiple ongoing conflicts worldwide, including in the Middle East. The conflict surrounding Iran has become particularly salient, given the possible reaction of the United States and Israel to the violent suppression of mass protests by the Iranian authorities (as well as Iran’s previous pursuit of a nuclear program and its “hybrid” confrontation with Israel and the United States in the Middle East). For Kazakhstan, it is of fundamental importance to minimize the negative spillover effects of existing conflicts — including the potential outbreak of a new war in Iran — on Central Asia.

• Further development of cooperation in energy, technology, and agriculture. This dimension is critical in the context of Kazakhstan’s current economic modernization agenda. Technologies related to artificial intelligence are of particular interest, as emphasized in Tokayev’s 2025 Presidential address to the nation. Israel holds substantial expertise in this field.

2.     Strengthening traditional ties with Azerbaijan

The forthcoming expansion of the Israeli–Kazakh dialogue will unfold against the background of the further consolidation of the Israeli–Azerbaijani partnership. As noted above, Sa’ar plans to visit Azerbaijan on 26 January 2026 for a one-day official visit prior to traveling on to Kazakhstan.

Information on the preparation of this visit had already begun to circulate in late 2025. The focus was on deepening bilateral cooperation in the fields of economics and security in connection with broader discussions on peace and stability in the Middle East and the South Caucasus — including Trump’s mediation on the Zangezur question, the situation in Gaza, and issues related to Iran.

Azerbaijan is of strategic importance to Israel at present for several reasons:

• The country maintains a long-standing structural conflict with Iran. Estimates suggest that between 6–7 million and up to 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis reside in Iran’s northwestern provinces — a range that is itself indicative of the opacity surrounding demographic data in the Islamic Republic. By contrast, the population of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan is roughly 10 million, making neighboring Azerbaijan a natural point of attraction for Iranian Azerbaijanis. During the 20th century, the USSR even sought to detach Southern Azerbaijan from Iran, although the effort ultimately failed due to firm resistance from the United States. Beyond the issue of Azerbaijani self-determination, Tehran and Baku have also experienced other disputes, including over the delimitation of the Caspian Sea. Added to this were longstanding ideological frictions between Azerbaijan’s secular post-Soviet regime under the Aliyev family and Iran’s fundamentalist religious leadership. In the event of a territorial fragmentation of Iran as a result of revolutionary upheaval, Azerbaijan — alongside Kurdish autonomous entities in Iraq and Syria and the Baloch movements in Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan — could play a highly consequential role.

• Israel has become a key supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan. Between 2016 and 2020, Israel accounted for roughly 69% of Azerbaijan’s arms imports. Deliveries included drones (such as the Searcher and Heron platforms), air-defense and missile-defense systems, as well as simulators, personnel training, and technical support. Baku has not hesitated to signal its strategic partnership with Israel to Iran, treating this as an element of deterrence. In recent years, open-source reporting has frequently pointed to a broader security relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan, including alleged intelligence cooperation. Officially, however, Azerbaijan maintains a position of neutrality vis-à-vis Iran.

• Azerbaijan occupies a unique position in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Basin as a transit corridor for the Central Asian states — and even for parts of East Asia — bypassing both Iran and Russia. The transit architecture has a major energy component, which has become especially relevant for Central Asian exporters after the Black Sea route became increasingly risky for hydrocarbon shipments due to the Russia–Ukraine conflict. This was particularly evident in 2025–2026 amid attacks on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium carrying Kazakh oil to the Russian port of Novorossiysk. As a result, Kazakhstan accelerated its reorientation toward Azerbaijani infrastructure. The long-standing idea of exporting Turkmen gas to Europe via Azerbaijan also remains on the table. Such projects could play a significant role in mitigating Europe’s ongoing energy crisis.

• After its victory in the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan’s regional role in the South Caucasus increased substantially — to the point where assessments began to describe Baku as a potential new regional hegemon. In 2025, Baku entered into a rather sharp confrontation with Russia, which also claims hegemonic status in the South Caucasus. At the same time, under Trump’s mediation, new prospects emerged for resolving the decades-long Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict, while Prime Minister Pashinyan intensified Armenia’s shift away from reliance on Russia and Iran.

• Finally, recent years have witnessed an expansion of economic cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan, particularly in technology, energy, and tourism. Sa’ar has emphasized, for example, that the flow of tourists from Israel to Azerbaijan increased sharply in 2025, and that sustaining this trend is considered a priority.
  

3.   Israeli diplomatic activity in the context of the regional system of international relations in Central Asia and the Caspian Basin

Let’s analyze Israel’s relations with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in a broader diplomatic context. It is clear that the degree of proximity between Israel and these two states is not the same. With Azerbaijan, Israel has developed close military, strategic, intelligence, and economic ties. With Kazakhstan, the relationship remains a form of “soft cooperation,” centered on multilateral diplomacy and economic engagement. Cooperation with Azerbaijan gives Israel an avenue for deeper participation in Caspian projects and for expanding its soft economic presence in Central Asia. At the same time, Kazakhstan — as the most economically developed country in the region and the source of more than half of Central Asia’s GDP — may serve as a key intermediary target for such gradual penetration. Israel and Kazakhstan have significant room for developing their economic partnership. Moreover, the evolution of this partnership may function as a positive precedent for other Central Asian states, all of which maintain normal diplomatic relations with Israel.

For Israel itself, such an opening would represent the next step in expanding diplomatic contacts across the Islamic world, following the recent recognition of Somaliland.

How might the deepening of Israeli–Azerbaijani and Israeli–Kazakh cooperation be perceived by the principal actors in the region?

From Washington’s perspective (because of US-Israel strategic partnership), the emerging configuration could serve as one of the mechanisms for compensating the deficit of U.S. influence in Eurasia that resulted from the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. Without such a compensatory strategy, it will be difficult for the United States to address a number of broader strategic challenges associated with its confrontation with China, Iran, and Russia simultaneously. For the United Kingdom and the European Union, the logic would be broadly similar, and in general they are likely to support any regional initiatives that reinforce Western diplomatic presence and connectivity in Central Asia, especially, in the forms of “soft power”.

Turkey’s position is more nuanced. In principle, Ankara has grown accustomed to the strategic alignment between Azerbaijan and Israel, as well as to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. For that reason, Turkey is unlikely to obstruct such cooperation directly. Moreover, Turkey has historically shown an ability to treat the foreign relations of other Turkic states as an additional diplomatic resource. A notable example is Kazakhstan’s role in facilitating the reduction of tensions between Turkey and Russia during the Syrian crisis through the “Astana Process”. However, given the current depth of Turkish–Israeli disagreements, President Erdoğan is not inclined to welcome a visible rapprochement between Israel and the Turkic world. The most realistic scenario is a policy of pragmatic tolerance: Ankara will neither endorse nor hinder such cooperation, while preserving room for maneuver and seeking to ensure that it does not alter the balance of influence within the Turkic political space.

For Russia, Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel — as well as Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy — are no longer surprising. While the situation is strategically disadvantageous for Moscow, it is unlikely to trigger a harsh response in the short term. Two factors explain this restraint. First, the Kremlin is currently preoccupied with its confrontation with Ukraine and the European Union and is therefore willing to engage in various forms of “geopolitical trade-offs”, as illustrated, for example, by its behavior in the Syrian theater. At this stage, Israel and the United States are seen as a lesser strategic challenge compared to the EU–Ukraine axis. Second, this posture is also shaped by the ideological profile of the current Russian leadership. With its pronounced ultra-conservative worldview, the Kremlin perceives figures such as Trump and Netanyahu — representatives of the Western right — as ideologically more proximate than the more left-liberal leadership in Europe.

China’s strategic focus in the region remains economic expansion. Beijing grants the Central Asian states a relatively wide margin of autonomy, particularly regarding multi-vector and pragmatically oriented external partnerships, as long as the Chinese vector remains among the central pillars of their foreign policies. If cooperation with other external actors contributes to the development of projects that align with China’s own interests — such as the trans-Caspian connectivity corridor — Beijing tends to view such engagement calmly, even if it simultaneously benefits Western actors.

The state most predisposed to react sharply to the expansion of Israeli influence near its northern borders is Iran. Baku’s foreign policy is perceived in Tehran as a direct strategic risk. The extension of the Abraham Accords beyond the Middle East has also generated significant irritation in Iran, as it undermines Tehran’s efforts to forge a unified “Global South” front against Israel and the United States. However, for the moment, Iran is deeply absorbed by its own internal challenges, including ongoing revolutionary upheavals and the severe weakening of its “Axis of Resistance” in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon and Syria. As a result, Tehran is unlikely to take meaningful action on this front in the near term.

Moreover, Kazakhstan has pursued a balanced diplomacy and complemented its multi-vector approach with gestures towards Iran. Notably, on 10–11 December 2025, President Masoud Pezeshkian paid an official visit to Astana, during which the sides discussed the expansion of regional cooperation in transportation and energy.

The Turkic states of Central Asia — and Uzbekistan in particular, as the region’s second political and economic center after Kazakhstan — are likely to take a cautiously positive view of the deepening partnership between their neighbors and Israel. In this context, Kazakhstan’s policy could become a useful precedent. Should Astana’s cautious engagement with Israel prove beneficial and unfold without major costs — including reputational ones — other Central Asian states may eventually line up to explore cooperation with Israel in a similar manner and within comparable formats.

4.   Most positive scenario: establishing a permanent consultative format between Israel, the Central Asian states, and Azerbaijan

If the scenario described above materializes, the question arises as to where Israel’s diplomacy could move next in its relations with the Central Asian region. One plausible direction would be for Israel to adopt, at a later stage, a version of the “Central Asia 5+1” mechanism currently independently employed by the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and India.

The defining characteristics of these formats are well known: they are non-institutional, do not impose binding bloc-type obligations, focus on concrete pragmatic projects, and remain largely depoliticized and demilitarized. In other words, they are optimally tailored to the multi-vector foreign policies pursued in different degrees by the Central Asian states.

The “core” regional format independent of external actors remains the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, often referred to as the “Central Asian Five.” A significant development in 2025—largely overlooked outside the post-Soviet space—was the expansion of this format from a five-party to a six-party framework. At the Consultative Meeting held in Tashkent in November 2025, Azerbaijan officially joined the format, thereby transforming the informal “Central Asian Five” into a regional “Six”.

In this sense, the traditional 5+1 format is becoming insufficient not only for regional actors but also for external partners. The emerging reality suggests that a 6+1 framework is already more relevant. For Israel, such a configuration would be particularly advantageous, as it simultaneously includes two key states with which Jerusalem has developed strong, sustainable relations: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan also maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. In the latter, Israel even opened a resident embassy in 2023 — an important symbolic and institutional step. None of these states espouse an official ideological anti-Zionism; their relations with Israel are better described as “latent” or “dormant” rather than adversarial. According to the dominant pattern of multivector foreign policies their political and administrative elites approach external partners through a pragmatic lens, focusing primarily on trade, investment, technology, and connectivity.

The most complex bilateral track for Israel is with Tajikistan (the only non-Turkic state of the region), largely due to Iran’s cultural and linguistic proximity and Tehran’s sustained influence in that country. Nevertheless, even Tajikistan maintains formal diplomatic relations with Israel, and Israel is represented in Dushanbe through its embassy in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), accredited concurrently to Tajikistan. Moreover, within its own multi-vector foreign policy, Tajikistan readily engages in multilateral, pragmatic, technically defined initiatives.

Under these conditions, the groundwork could be laid for the establishment of a non-binding diplomatic consultative format between Israel and the “Central Asian Six”, initially at the level of deputy foreign ministers and/or relevant sectoral ministries responsible for specific projects.

It is equally clear that such a format, especially in its initial phase, should remain modest and strictly pragmatic — though, over time, it could be conceptually linked to the broader ecosystem of the Abraham Accords. The platform could serve to facilitate discussions on economic and infrastructure development, agricultural modernization, water-management technologies, and a range of emerging technological fields (including digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence applications).

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 173 (December 24, 2025)

A working visit to Israel by Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan on November 27 triggered a sharp reaction in Iran. Particular concern was caused by the fact that Israeli media placed special emphasis on the topic of the “Trump Corridor,” or, as it is called in Azerbaijan, the Zangezur Corridor, which would create a route from Central Asia to Europe bypassing Iran and Russia. Armenian officials have now been forced to justify themselves, demonstrating a still-persistent vassal loyalty.

Iran’s reaction to Armenia’s recent diplomatic signaling toward Israel and the West reveals deep strategic anxiety rooted in geography, regime security, and long-standing regional red lines. The visit by Kostanyan, although framed in Yerevan as a limited diplomatic engagement, was perceived in Tehran as part of a broader and dangerous trajectory: Armenia’s gradual drift away from exclusive dependence on Iran and Russia and toward Western and Israeli political, security, and technological networks.

For Iran, Armenia occupies a uniquely sensitive position, as it is considered a vital geopolitical asset. It is Iran’s only direct land bridge to the Eurasian Economic Union and—critically—a buffer preventing the emergence of a continuous Turkic corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan and onward to Turkey. Any Armenian realignment that weakens Tehran’s influence in the region therefore triggers alarm far beyond routine diplomacy. Even the slightest sign of Israeli involvement inflames Iranian fears of an isolation scenario—Turkic countries to the north and east, Israelis and Arab states to the south.

Iranian media commentary following Kostanyan’s visit to Israel was telling. Outlets such as Tehran Times, Eghtesad, Tabnak, and Mehr News explicitly linked Armenia’s outreach to Israel and the West with the threat of the Trump/Zangezur Corridor. In Iranian strategic thinking, this corridor is not merely a transport project. It is viewed as an existential threat that could sever Iran’s direct access to Armenia, reduce Tehran’s leverage in the Caucasus, and facilitate greater Israeli, Turkish, and Western penetration along Iran’s northern border.

From Tehran’s perspective, the corridor is part of a larger containment architecture. Iranian analysts increasingly frame it as a geopolitical extension of U.S. and Israeli pressure—one that would encircle Iran from the north just as sanctions and military pressure constrain it from the west and south. In this narrative, Armenia’s current engagement with Israel—however modest in practical terms—feeds suspicions that Yerevan could be drawn into hostile intelligence, surveillance, or logistical arrangements targeting Iran.

This anxiety has translated into pressure. Iranian officials and media have issued repeated warnings that any change to internationally recognized borders in the region is unacceptable. Behind closed doors, Tehran has aggressively pushed Yerevan to publicly reaffirm loyalty and restraint.

Here are several examples:

December 17 – Mehr News, controlled by the Islamic Propagation Organization (IPO) and a long-time disseminator of IRGC messaging, described the fears connected to the visit: “During a recent meeting between Armenia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Zionist regime, the parties discussed cooperation in the fields of high technology, medicine, agriculture, and tourism. These are precisely the areas that Israel typically uses as instruments of soft, long-term influence. Its objectives are:

1. Closing the chain of Israeli influence in the South Caucasus.
   Israel has long maintained a presence in Azerbaijan. A warming of relations with Armenia creates the possibility of forming a ‘triangular corridor of influence’ along Iran’s borders.

2. Penetration through low-cost but highly effective development projects.
   Projects in modern agriculture, healthcare, or crisis management are far from being purely technical. As a rule, they involve a prolonged presence of experts, the formation of institutional networks, stable contacts, and the creation of new communication channels. In a number of countries, such mechanisms have served as a foundation for intelligence, economic, or political penetration.

3. Yerevan’s limited ability to change its foreign policy course.
   After the military defeats of 2020 and 2023, Armenia is searching for alternatives to its traditional foreign policy pillars. This structural need turns Israel into a ‘window of opportunity’ for Yerevan.

4. Gradual distancing from traditional axes and a shift in the balance along Iran’s borders.
   The deeper Armenia’s cooperation with Israel becomes in sensitive areas—from agriculture and healthcare to education and crisis management—the further Yerevan moves away from its traditional foreign policy alignments.”

December 19 – The Tabnak agency, linked to former IRGC commander-in-chief Mohsen Rezaei, hinted at possible Iranian countermeasures: “The TRIPP initiative has also affected Iran’s usually calm relations with its neighbor Armenia. Although Armenia seeks to reduce Iran’s concerns, its consent to the creation of a U.S.-managed corridor in such close proximity to the heart of Iran inevitably generates tension. Iran views Armenia as a vital route to Europe and a protective shield against the growing influence of its Turkic-speaking neighbors; any sign of Armenia’s inclination toward Western influence causes alarm among Iran’s leaders, accompanied by a heavy heart and a suspicious gaze. Iran is assessing its future options, which may include covert efforts to slow the construction of this corridor or extensive use of diplomatic consultations with Armenia.”

Similar hints were voiced by the regime’s mouthpiece, Tehran Times: “Without doubt, the central focus of Kostanyan’s talks with Israeli officials concerned the ‘Trump Route,’ otherwise known as the Zangezur Corridor… Engaging in direct consultations with Israel, without sufficient regard for Tehran’s considerations, signals Yerevan’s prioritization of foreign policy alignment with the West and the United States. Kostanyan’s trip, in fact, offers a clear picture of Armenia’s foreign policy trajectory: a country that, in pursuit of economic and geopolitical goals, does not place Iran’s security concerns at the forefront, while simultaneously seeking to expand the influence and support of external partners. Consequently, this move could intensify regional tensions and further complicate the security balance in the Caucasus. It also heightens the sensitivity of Iran’s role in countering projects such as the Zangezur Corridor.”

The result of this pressure has been a visible rhetorical retreat by Armenian officials. Statements from Yerevan increasingly describe Iran as Armenia’s “main ally” and “strategic partner,” language clearly intended to reassure Tehran and de-escalate tensions. Iranian media widely circulated these statements, in particular to demonstrate to the domestic audience that the regime has the situation with Armenia under control.

Tasnim News, one of the IRGC’s principal media outlets, published an extensive interview with Armenia’s ambassador to Iran, Grigor Hakobyan: In particular, it stated that “relations between Armenia and Iran have always been distinguished by such a quality of mutual respect, trust, and good-neighborliness that gives them unique value in the region… these relations are developing not only within the framework of ordinary conditions and motivations, but also with a specific purpose and perspective—to acquire a strategic character.”

Regarding the Trump Route, Hakobyan noted: “It should be emphasized that throughout this entire process Yerevan has remained faithful and committed to an atmosphere of friendship and mutual trust, has officially taken into account Tehran’s vital interests, and has conducted active negotiations on ongoing developments at various levels. It should be noted that these principles have always been the foundation and key pillars for both Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and their preservation fully corresponds to the interests of both countries.”

The relatively reformist outlet Eghtesad provided details of a meeting between Armenia’s ambassador in Tehran and Ali Akbar Velayati, adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader on international affairs. Velayati directly told Hakobyan of Iran’s disagreement with what he called the “Trump plan for the Caucasus”—a transit route envisaging the connection of Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan through southern Armenia. “Armenian officials rejected these concerns, emphasizing that this is a commercial project that takes into account the vital interests of neighbors, including Iran. Vice-Speaker of Armenia’s National Assembly Ruben Rubinyan stated that this project is not an alternative name for the Zangezur Corridor and that no extraterritorial corridor through Armenian territory will be created,” the outlet quoted the Armenian diplomat as saying.

On December 21 – Mehr News, in turn, reported that the Iranian Islamic Coalition Party and the Prosperous Armenia Party signed a cooperation agreement. “The development of such party and parliamentary ties is viewed as a complement to official diplomacy and as a factor in deepening and enhancing the resilience of interstate relations. This memorandum can create a foundation for expanding exchanges between political parties, media representatives, and civil society institutions of the two countries,” the outlet noted.

In this context, it is worth recalling the above-mentioned Mehr publication about Israel’s “soft influence”—in essence, the alliance between the two parties represents a kind of Iranian response to the “Israeli plans.”

Most likely, Armenia’s behavior reflects its constrained position rather than ideological alignment. Given limited trust in Russia and only nascent Western support, Yerevan cannot afford open confrontation with Iran. Apologetic messaging toward Tehran following the Israel visit underscores Armenia’s fear of Iranian retaliation—whether through economic pressure, diplomatic obstruction, or covert destabilization.

In sum, Iran’s fear is not about a single diplomatic visit. It is about losing strategic depth in the South Caucasus. Any Armenian move toward Israel or the West, however symbolic, is interpreted in Tehran through the lens of regime security and encirclement. The TRIPP/Zangezur Corridor remains the focal point of this anxiety, and until that issue is definitively resolved, Iran will continue to pressure Armenia to remain firmly within Tehran’s geopolitical comfort zone—even as Armenia quietly searches for alternatives.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 140 (July 9, 2025)

The current article provides a glimpse into Russia’s reaction and comprehension of the 12-day war in the Middle East.

Israel and the United States targeted Iran’s nuclear program to reduce the threat to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. However, Russian experts believe that this approach also carries the risk of favoring military force over diplomatic solutions.

The risks of Iran’s nuclear program

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, Iran has dramatically stepped up production of enriched uranium. By November 2024, 182 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent had been produced, and in May 2025, IAEA inspectors stated that Iran had at least 408 kg. This amount of weapons-grade uranium is enough to produce nine nuclear warheads, the inspectors concluded.

As a result, in June 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution officially accusing Iran of failing to comply with its nonproliferation obligations for the first time since 2005. Mikhail Ulyanov, the Russian representative at the IAEA, considered the resolution very bad and unfair and believed that it would further worsen the current situation.

On the other hand, when enrichment of uranium of 60% to 90% is a quick process to create modern nuclear weapons, Israel felt there was little time to address Iran’s nuclear program, says a former Foreign Ministry adviser, Mikhail Gavrilov.

The military solution

On June 13, 2025, the IDF launched an attack on dozens of Iranian nuclear facilities, military bases, and infrastructure, as well as several key military commanders. Without weapons capable of penetrating Iran’s underground factories, Israel has received the support of the United States, and on June 22, B-2 strategic bombers fired twelve GBU-57 bombs at the Fordow facility and two more bombs at underground facilities in Natanz.

Russia’s representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzia, has accused the United States and Israel of violating the UN Charter and its Security Council resolutions, as well as the IAEA Charter and relevant resolutions of the General Conference. According to the Foreign Ministry, Iran has been subjected to unjustified aggression, which is a direct and dangerous violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), particularly Iran’s right to peaceful use of atomic energy guaranteed by Article 4 of the treaty.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also regarded these attacks as an attempt to change the Iranian regime. However, Pavel Luzin, a military expert, notes that while Israel may indeed want to see a change in the Iranian government, the main objective of the attacks was to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program.

The IAEA crisis

The Russian Foreign Ministry believes that attacks by Israel and the United States against Iran negatively impact the effectiveness and credibility of the IAEA, an organization that should support the rights of NPT member states to peaceful nuclear energy.

The MFA emphasizes that IAEA documents do not provide evidence of Iran’s nuclear weapons development, which has resulted in a loss of credibility for the agency due to its failure to convince Israel and the U.S. of the peaceful nature of Iran’s program.

Iran has already suspended cooperation with the IAEA. This means that the international community will not have reliable information about the current state and progress of Iran’s nuclear program for several years, if not decades, Mikhail Gavrilov says.

Potential damage

Russian nuclear experts agree that the main centrifuge production facilities and enrichment plants were heavily damaged or destroyed as a result of the attacks.

According to the IAEA and satellite images, aboveground and underground uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz have been destroyed. The nuclear power plant in Isfahan has sustained extensive damage to its buildings and infrastructure. Tunnels that were used to store uranium materials have also been damaged. Given the dynamics of the attack, they might not have time to remove the uranium reserves from there. The facilities also suffered blows to their electric power infrastructure, which disables centrifuges that were not damaged by the impact, and now they require months of repair because of the volume of damage, says a physicist at the Kurchatov Institute.

If the Fordow facility were indeed seriously damaged, it would be a significant setback for Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons materials. Attacks on Natanz and Isfahan would further delay the program. In general, experts from the Institute for Nuclear Safety of the Academy of Sciences note that Iran could lose both its operating centrifuges and the potential for their reproduction.

Technical prospects of Iran‘s nuclear potential

U.S. President Trump and Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu have already declared that Iran‘s nuclear program has been eliminated and the threat is gone. However, this seems as an overly optimistic assessment. The future of Iran’s nuclear program depends on the extent of the damage caused and the likelihood of any secret nuclear facilities or materials that Iran may still have.

A few days before the attack in the Fordow area, satellites recorded truck convoy traffic in the region. This may confirm Iran‘s claims that it has removed stocks of enriched uranium. Iran has not allowed the IAEA to monitor or verify the production of centrifuges since the beginning of 2021. Consequently, the IAEA does not know how many centrifuges Iran has and where they are located. It could have a site with hundreds of new centrifuges in another secret location, nuclear experts from the Russian Foreign Ministry say.

According to the latest reports, the facility at Fordow could have up to 2,700 centrifuges and at Natanz up to 15,000. In addition, Iran continued to build new, more efficient centrifuges, which could allow it to set up a secret small enrichment plant, which houses up to 1,000 centrifuges and produces weapons-grade uranium to 90%. This can be relatively easy for Iran, as it could produce at least 1,500-2,000 centrifuges per year, according to experts from the Kurchatov Institute. If Iran has managed to move uranium enriched to 60% and has retained its enrichment facilities elsewhere, this may cause concern.

Given that the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow were constructed in secret and remained undetected for approximately seven years, it is likely that a smaller facility would be more challenging to detect. Mikhail Gavrilov, a former advisor to the Foreign Ministry, has suggested that such a facility may already exist.

Dmitry Smirnov, a military expert, expresses doubts about Iran’s ability to have taken the uranium out before the US strike. He argues that Iran may not have had enough time to do so, as the attack was unexpected. If they did manage to remove the uranium, Israeli intelligence, which has knowledge of the whereabouts of the entire Iranian leadership, would be able to successfully locate the transported uranium.

There is still time to analyze the damage and discover possible uranium reserves. The resulting highly enriched uranium is not sufficient to create nuclear weapons. Additional time will be needed to convert the uranium into a metallic form and prepare it for use in weapon components. It will also be necessary to develop special explosives, detonators, and warheads for installation on Iran’s missiles. Iran has reportedly attempted to undertake these tasks, although there is no evidence of success, according to Mikhail Gavrilov, a former Foreign Ministry adviser.

Political prospects for Iran‘s nuclear program

The U.S. is willing to negotiate a deal with Iran in hopes that it will completely abandon its uranium enrichment program. However, Mikhail Gavrilov, a former adviser to the Russian Foreign Ministry, has suggested that such a deal is unlikely. He argues that even after losing its nuclear facilities, Iran still has scientific expertise and human resources that can be used to recreate a nuclear program within a few years. If nuclear facilities were preserved in another secret facility, then Iran may decide to accelerate the development of nuclear weapons.

Russian Orientalist Ruslan Suleymanov says that forces in Iran advocating a tightening of their domestic and foreign policies became stronger. They also insist on the prompt development of nuclear weapons. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has already officially stated that Iran will continue enriching uranium.

Vladimir Orlov, the director of the PIR Center and a nuclear expert, agrees with this view. According to him, such attacks could potentially slow down Iran’s nuclear program by a year or two. However, he also points out that such attacks could lead Iran to restructure its nuclear program, making it more secretive and focused on developing nuclear weapons.

Israel has a radical approach to Iran’s nuclear program, Suleymanov says. Israel has shown that it is willing to pay a high price to eliminate Iran’s nuclear potential, which means that new strikes can easily occur if Iran’s nuclear program is revived. President Trump also confirmed that the United States is ready to carry out strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities again if its nuclear program continues to exist.  The fear of attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities has disappeared. If this does not stop the nuclear program, it significantly delays its development. This practice will continue if necessary, say experts from Russian Defense Ministry.

However, Dmitry Polikanov, Deputy Head of Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), states that the presence of nuclear weapons in Iran will no longer impact security in the region. He argues that nuclear weapons are no longer a guarantee of protection against attacks, as they are not some sort of magical solution. For instance, India and Pakistan continue to engage in military conflicts despite having nuclear weapons, so the expert believes that the situation in the Middle East is unlikely to change.

Ruslan Suleymanov points out that there are also forces in Iran who would like to take a tactical break and reach a deal in order to prevent the opponents from bombing the country. They fear that if the situation continues to escalate, a ground operation against Iran may be possible. Previously, Iran was strong with its proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, Shiites in Iraq, and the Assad regime in Syria. Now these forces are greatly weakened, which means that Iran is also weakened.

The Russian Foreign Ministry calls the enrichment of uranium to 60% a direct result of the policy of the United States and Israel. That is, Iran did not agree to stop uranium enrichment, fearing that such a decision would affect the country’s security, some Russian experts explained. However, Iran has been hit for continuing enrichment. In other words, any decision by Iran on the future of its nuclear program will be risky for it.

Whether Iran will be willing to risk potential attacks on its territory or would prefer to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for some guarantees and the lifting of sanctions remains to be seen.

Risks of proliferation

Iran‘s development of nuclear weapons will threaten not only Israel, but also other countries in the Middle East. Such a strengthening of Iran is not beneficial to many neighboring countries. This situation may encourage other states in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to develop their own nuclear weapons, says Anton Khlopkov, Director of the Center for Energy and Security. Iran’s creation of nuclear weapons can show that even with a dangerous neighbor, being subjected to sanctions and missile attacks, it is realistic to implement a military nuclear program.

Despite the official rhetoric, Moscow would not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and would be satisfied with maintaining the nonproliferation regime. Under Medvedev’s presidency, Iran was seen by Russia as more of an enemy than an ally. Despite public statements of friendship and cooperation, Russia never deviated from its position that Iran should not possess nuclear weapons. Since at least 2010, the Kremlin has favored Israel. Iran’s conflict with Israel has placed the Kremlin in a difficult position, sources in the Russian special services say.

Russia also does not benefit from a nuclear-armed Iran, because it remains the only Caspian country that has not ratified the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. According to Adlan Margoev, a researcher at MGIMO University, it will be more difficult to negotiate with nuclear Iran on any controversial issues in bilateral relations and in neighboring regions.

Iran’s war with Israel has put the Kremlin in a difficult position. Moscow is now much more concerned about internal problems, and there is simply not enough attention to Middle East diplomacy.

Economic risks

Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that the actions of the United States and Israel are undermining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. They also stated that, unfortunately, the slow and weak response of the IAEA contributes to this process. Thus, Russia says that it understands Iran’s dissatisfaction with the IAEA. However, Minister Sergey Lavrov is seeking to convince Iran not to halt cooperation with the IAEA, as this would interfere with Russia’s economic interests.

A potential withdrawal from the NPT could lead to new anti-Iranian sanctions by the UN Security Council. Russia, which supports the nuclear non-proliferation regime, could stop supplying nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant and freeze the construction of the second and third power units. It could also halt scientific and educational projects in Iran related to the peaceful use of atomic energy, says MGIMO expert Margoev. In addition, Rosatom had plans to build another new nuclear power plant in Iran, which is why Russia is not interested in severing Iran’s relations with the IAEA.

Military results

In general, military experts agree that Israel, even without the support of the United States, has shown military superiority over Iran. Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, said that in the military sphere, Iran has been engaged in simulating the creation of a supposedly high-tech military, but without having a sufficient level of technological and industrial development to support it. As a result, when truly modern technologies came to the battlefield, the Iranian military failed.

According to a colonel Mikhail Khodarenok, the Israeli Air Force has completely overwhelmed Iran‘s air defenses and had total air dominance. Iran’s response to the bombings within its territory has been unusual. It appears that Iran’s military capabilities have been undermined. The Iranian air force was unable to quickly identify and neutralize Israeli planes or prevent U.S. bomber attacks. Iran was also unable to conduct an immediate retaliatory strike against Israel. To counter Israel, Iran has only ballistic missiles, which, although they have hit Israeli territory, have had no impact on the enemy’s military forces and its bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities. The ceasefire has brought a temporary respite, according to Russian military analyst.

The attacks on Iran have weakened its military power, but the country still has the potential to cause a global political and economic crisis. For this reason, it is crucial that the parties reach a peaceful agreement with Iran, said Igor Korotchenko, the adviser of the Defense Ministry.

According to Andrey Frolov, associate professor at the Higher School of Economics, Iran will not be able to overcome the technological gap on its own. Iran can reduce this gap by directly purchasing arms and military equipment from Russia and possibly China, specifically in those categories that are the most expensive. Iran will need at least 100 Su-35 fighter jets and, in the future, possibly Su-57E, as well as various air defense systems, radars, advanced electronic intelligence and electronic warfare systems, and non-nuclear submarines equipped with missile systems. The expert estimates that this will require tens of billions of dollars. This puts Tehran in a difficult situation: it must either develop its conventional military forces to deter a potential future attack or focus all its efforts on its nuclear program. Given Iran’s historical reluctance to engage in military-technical cooperation, it may simply try to return to its previous status quo.

The role of Russia

The Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, arrived in Moscow on June 23 for consultations with the Russian leadership, hoping to secure Moscow’s support both internationally and regionally. However, despite these hopes, Moscow failed to provide the support he had sought. According to Nikita Smagin, a Russian expert on the Middle East believes that the current conflict in the region is actually beneficial for Russia. Firstly, oil prices are rising. Secondly, the West has temporarily shifted its attention from Ukraine to the Middle East. In addition, it is not possible to directly intervene in the conflict, and it would be pointless to transfer advanced weapons to Iran at this point.

Moscow understands that since the ideology of complete rejection of Israel is still being promoted in Tehran and the conflict is not over, military operations may resume. Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that Russia is ready to mediate the conflict between Israel and Iran. However, Ruslan Suleymanov admits that there is distrust of Moscow in Tehran. Iran believes that Moscow shared information with Israel about Iranian generals in Syria and supports the UAE on the disputed islands in the Strait of Hormuz.

In addition, Russian experts are aware of the opinion in Iran that Russia has sought to disrupt negotiations with the United States to maintain anti-Iranian sanctions and to isolate Tehran from the West both politically and economically.

At the same time, there are also anti-Israeli voices who call the Israeli nuclear program the reason for Iran’s nuclear ambitions. For example, Konstantin Kosachev, vice speaker of the Federation Council, suggests that Israel should join the NPT and put its nuclear program under the control of the IAEA. Agreeing with this premise, Anatoly Antonov, former deputy defense minister, first suggests that Israel should join the Chemical Weapons Convention and Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, and then return to the idea of creating a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. In other words, Moscow can hardly claim any mediating role in the conflict between Iran and Israel.

Conclusions

Many experts interviewed note that the attack on Iran sets a dangerous precedent. Under the pretext of solving the problem of nuclear proliferation, these or other forces may continue to threaten other states with missile attacks, especially those that have nuclear programs or are about to develop them.

Israel understands that diplomacy is being used by Iran to achieve its economic interests and preserve its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea has also used diplomacy while simultaneously developing its nuclear missile forces. This demonstrates that it is possible for states to preserve the nuclear non-proliferation regime through force. On the one hand, this is a positive outcome. On the other hand, this could have a negative impact, as the nuclear programs of other countries may be seen as a threat by their neighbors.

The Russian experts underscore that Israel’s success could make it a potential hegemon in the region. This is something that Arab countries like Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia would not want. Due to this, they may develop their military capabilities and increase their arsenals in order to counter Israel’s aspirations. The Russians view a military approach to Israel’s nuclear proliferation as becoming a dangerous precedent that could destabilize the situation in this region and others around the world.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No. 135 (June 18, 2025)

Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran’s ballistic missile attacks on Israel have made it clear where the two main rivals in the South Caucasus — Azerbaijan and Armenia — stand. Monitoring of media and social networks in both countries shows that Baku immediately adopted a neutral position, merely expressing concern over the consequences of military actions. In contrast, Armenian state-affiliated outlets, parties, and diaspora organizations worldwide took a clearly pro-Iranian stance.

For many Armenians, the conflict between Iran and Israel presents an opportunity to pursue political goals and to that end have disseminated and amplified fake news originally circulated by Iranian media and social networks affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Azerbaijan’s Position

On June 13, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement: “We are seriously concerned about the military operations carried out by the State of Israel on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We strongly condemn the escalation of tensions and call on the parties to resolve their existing disagreements exclusively in accordance with international law, through dialogue and diplomatic means. We particularly emphasize the importance of ensuring the safety of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure.”

On June 14, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov told his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi during a phone conversation that Azerbaijan will not allow its territory to be used by the armed forces of any third country—including against ‘neighboring and friendly Iran.’

This statement came in response to a wave of fake news in Iranian media alleging that Baku’s airfields were being used as launching points for Israeli drones, that Azerbaijan had helped Israeli planes refuel, and that ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran were being used as agents by Israel against the Islamic Republic.

That same day, Hikmet Hajiyev, Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan and Head of the Department for Foreign Policy Affairs of the Presidential Administration, called the claims that ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran were being used as agents “absurd and fabricated.”

On June 17, Azerbaijan sent a message through various channels to Israeli leadership, urging them not to strike civilian areas in Iran inhabited by ethnic Azerbaijanis and to avoid harming civilian infrastructure and non-combatants. In particular, this referred to Tabriz, the cultural center of the so-called “Southern Azerbaijanis” — Iran’s largest ethnic minority—which has faced around a century of discrimination by the Pahlavi dynasty and then the Islamic Republic.

Notably, there were no reported strikes in Tabriz’s inhabited areas.

On the same day, the Fars news agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), released an Arabic-language video addressed to the youth of Muslim countries including the UAE, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan. The video claimed that the Israelis in these countries are “in fact, members of the Zionist regime’s military and must be killed.” “Zionists are legitimate targets, and by eliminating them, you will help accelerate the destruction of the Zionist regime,” the agency stated.

Since the beginning of hostilities, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has held talks with leaders of various countries, including Turkey, regarding the conflict. However, none of the official statements from these discussions have included any direct condemnation of Israel.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijani media has taken a much more pro-Israel stance. For example, a headline from the pro-government outlet Haqqin reads, “By tearing out Tehran’s fangs, Israel is saving humanity.”

Position of Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora

Typically, in Armenia, official bodies, opposition groups, and diaspora organizations rarely align. However, since the breakout of hostilities, these forces have shown unanimous in supporting Iran.

On June 13, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the attack on Iran was “unilateral” and is, “taking place especially ahead of the next round of negotiations, it endangers the peaceful efforts as well as overall regional stability & global peace. We condemn such action & call for immediate cessation of hostilities & adherence to international law.”

A similar statement was made by Alen Simonyan, Speaker of the Armenian Parliament, calling Israel’s attack “unilateral” and a “shatter[ing] global and regional peace efforts.”

On June 14, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, Dashnaktsutyun) — a nationalist and socialist political party highly active in the diaspora — went further, calling Israel’s strikes a violation of international law, saying  they “endanger the right of life” of Iranian civilians, and condemning “Israel’s actions against Iran and the Iranian people.”

That same day, the liberal newspaper Aravot published an article arguing for supporting Iran on realpolitik grounds.

“Israel is clearly not a friendly country to us—it is, in fact, a close ally of Azerbaijan… Yet, my sympathy in this conflict lies with Iran… Yes, the Iranian regime is undoubtedly authoritarian—but that matters less to me than the fact that Iran genuinely wants to see Armenia as an independent state… Let us recall how Aliyev recently tried to persuade Iran to soften its opposition to the opening of the so-called ‘Zangezur corridor’ — a route that would run through the sovereign territory of Armenia. It’s clear, isn’t it, who benefits from Iran’s weakening?”

The National Democratic Union of Armenia made a more emotional appeal for supporting Iran, speaking of a “millennia of shared history” and “strong friendship forged through numerous trials.”

Well-known Armenian journalist and blogger Mika Badalyan, leader of the opposition movement “Azatagrum” (“Liberation”), said that, “Iran’s success in this confrontation is a vital national interest of Armenia, and I’m glad to see that the broad masses — except for some marginal grant-eaters — understand this and stand with Iran.”

On June 16, Ishkhan Saghatelyan, MP and representative of ARF Dashnaktsutyun’s Supreme Council in Armenia, spoke of concern for Iran’s “large Armenian community” and decried “broad military action against a friendly country.”

On June 17, Iran’s Ambassador to Armenia and likely a high ranking officer in the IRGC, Mehdi Sobhani, said at a press conference in Yerevan that Tehran was grateful for the Armenian government’s “resolute stance in condemning the Israeli aggression” and “the support of the Armenian people.”

Armenian media outlets widely covered this statement.

Position of the Armenian-American Diaspora

The most influential Armenian-American political advocacy group the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), also harshly condemned Israel, claiming that its ally Azerbaijan was planning to attack Armenia under the cover of Israeli strikes on Iran. The ANCA statement said Israeli air strikes would “create a cover” for Azerbaijan to strike Armenia, threaten trade routes that “Armenia relies upon for its survival” and spark a “broad regional conflict that reaches the South Caucasus.”

Numerous Armenian media outlets and Telegram channels actively disseminated Iranian fake news — both those alleging direct Azerbaijani involvement in the conflict and other fabrications.

This can be explained by a desire to provoke Tehran into targeting Baku — seen as an easier target than Israel — with the aim of weakening Azerbaijan. Especially popular were fakes claiming that the territory of Karabakh, cleared of Armenian separatists, was used by Israelis as a launch pad for airstrikes. Through such an argument, some Armenians may hope to convince Iran that Azerbaijani control of Karabakh is a threat to both Yerevan and Tehran.

Motivations Behind Disinformation

It’s important to note the difference in target audiences for Iranian and Armenian fakes. As Joseph Epstein, Director of the DC-based Turan Research Center pointed out, Iranian propaganda seeks to create an imaginary “ring of fire around Iran” by claiming that it is fighting not just Israel but a large coalition, which includes the United States, Azerbaijan and Turkey. For years, Tehran has committed itself to destroying Israel and has bragged about its military superiority while dismissing the Jewish State as a vulnerable colonial outpost reliant on foreign powers for its existence. Now, Israel’s military domination of Iran is turning that narrative on its head.

As a result, it is crucial to save face by convincing Iranians that the mighty Islamic Republic could only be crippled by a coalition of nefarious actors supporting Israel behind the scenes.”

For Armenia, the purpose is to further solidify the Iranian-Armenian alliance, foment hostility towards Azerbaijan in Iran and gain support among left and right-wing critics of Israel by tying in Israel’s strikes on Iran to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No. 133 (June 11, 2025)

Almost half a decade has passed since the diplomatic breakthrough in the previously informal relations between Israel and the “moderate” Sunni regimes of the Saudi-aligned Arab countries. The establishment, under U.S. auspices, of full diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in September 2020 marked the beginning of the “Abraham Accords” process, which was subsequently joined by Sudan (North) and Morocco.

However, the widely anticipated “wave” of recognition of Israel by Arab states did not materialize at that time. There were several reasons for this, including two primary ones. The driving force behind these agreements—U.S. President Donald Trump—was not re-elected for a second term in the November 2020 election. Those countries that had opted to wait for the outcome of the U.S. election before joining the process—such as Oman, which was expected to inaugurate a second round of agreements—ultimately did not become part of it.

Another influential factor was the position of King Salman bin Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—the leading country of the pro-American Arab bloc—who declared that his nation would be the last to normalize relations with Israel, and only after Jerusalem demonstrates a willingness to establish a Palestinian state. Moreover, this would be expected more in accordance with the parameters of the Saudi (Arab) Initiative than with the provisions of the “Deal of the Century”—a comprehensive regional conflict resolution plan presented by U.S. President Donald Trump on January 28, 2020.

 Abraham Accords 2.0

The Democratic administration of Joe Biden was, to a considerable extent, aligned with the vision of official Riyadh, yet nevertheless sought to continue the policy trajectory of its predecessors and, as far as can be judged, considered the normalization of relations between Israel and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to be one of the primary focal points of its Middle East policy. As a result, at a certain point, the Saudis appeared to be relatively close to establishing diplomatic relations with Israel without making the creation of a Palestinian state a precondition.

However, the war launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023, disrupted this trajectory. According to internal Hamas leadership protocols cited by The Wall Street Journal and discovered by Israeli forces in tunnels under Gaza, one of Hamas’s principal goals was to derail the process of Israeli-Saudi rapprochement.

Just days after October 7, officials from Saudi Arabia announced the suspension of talks with the United States regarding normalization with Jerusalem and, as expected, joined the chorus of Arab-Muslim states and antisemitic (and anti-Zionist) circles in the West accusing Israel of committing a “genocide of Palestinians.” The reason lay in the powerful anti-Israeli sentiments of the “Arab street,” which even the pro-Western Arab leaders—often lacking deep pro-Palestinian sentiment themselves—could hardly afford to ignore, especially in the wake of the region’s past upheavals during the Arab Spring and the “ISIS Summer,” and given the renewed wave of public radicalization sparked by the Gaza war. That said, it would likely be inaccurate to speak of a complete identity between the sentiments of the Saudi establishment and those of the broader society.

For instance, a study published in December of last year (2024)—a content analysis of thousands of opinion articles and columns published throughout the year in leading Saudi English-language media outlets (Asharq Al-Awsat, Arab News, the Saudi Gazette, and others)—conducted by the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Information and Consulting Center of the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), revealed two opposing trends. On the one hand, the tone of the overwhelming majority of the analyzed publications regarding Israel was very negative, or at best simply unfavorable, with an almost complete absence of articles presenting the Jewish state in a positive light. On the other hand, articles specifically addressing the issue of normalization between KSA and Israel tended, in most cases, to present this topic in a relatively neutral and balanced manner.

It would be premature to interpret this data as an indication of a return to the pre-October 7 status quo. Nevertheless, one may reasonably concur with the conclusion drawn by the authors of the study: in a country where the media operates under the control of the monarchy, such a tone in relation to the idea of normalization likely reflected a directive from the authorities. If this is the case, then the chances of a resumption of the negotiation process along the Riyadh–Jerusalem track should not be considered negligible.

Such assessments gained additional momentum following the return of Donald Trump to the White House, along with renewed hopes for the resumption of processes that could expand the circle of participants in the Abraham Accords. The cost of such an agreement had long been understood: the first and foremost component remains Riyadh, which would normalize relations with Israel in exchange for US security guarantees; US assistance with the kingdom’s nuclear program; cooperation on technology; and progress on Palestinian statehood. The final demand left open the question of how much progress would precisely be required—indicating that the Saudis would, for the time being, be willing to settle for general statements of intent.

A certain cooling in relations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump—particularly in terms of divergent interests and approaches to resolving Middle Eastern conflicts, and most notably the White House’s growing frustration with the Israeli leadership’s position on how to bring the Gaza war to a close—also influenced the sentiment of the United States’ Arab allies. With some of these allies, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Trump reportedly preferred to negotiate with minimal (if any) coordination with Israel. One indicator of this was a recent statement by Saudi Crown Prince and de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman, who declared that normalization of relations with Israel would not begin until the war in Gaza ends and a political process is initiated that leads to the creation of a Palestinian state. At this stage, vague declarations of intent to move in such a direction are clearly no longer sufficient for the Saudis and their Arab allies.

Nevertheless, it can be asserted with a high degree of confidence that the idea of abandoning plans for expanding the Abraham Accords as a strategic American-Israeli-Arab regional project is not under consideration. This possibility—indeed, its potential realization in the near future—was hinted at on May 5, 2025, during Israel’s 77th Independence Day celebration at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., by U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. It is safe to assume that policymakers in both Washington and the Arab capitals fully understand that “not pursuing this treaty would be rewarding Hamas”.

Moreover, in this new, second phase of the Abraham Accords, consideration is being given not only to expanding the agreements to Arab countries within the Saudi-aligned bloc that currently lack diplomatic relations with Israel but also to including certain non-Arab Muslim states. Importantly, this includes countries that already have relatively close partnerships with Israel, which may also be integrated into the emerging strategic alliance.

Azerbaijan in the New Regional Order

First on the list of this third category of potential members of the expanded Abraham Accords is Azerbaijan—a post-Soviet country in the South Caucasus whose long-standing partnership and alliance with Israel surpass, by a significant margin, those linking Jerusalem with any of the Arab signatories of the original Abraham Accords. The most frequently cited fact—namely, that Azerbaijan supplies Israel with 50% of its oil needs and, in return, receives 60–70% of its weapons imports from Israel—is perhaps the most vivid indicator of this phenomenon. Another illustrative example: despite widespread anti-Israel sentiment in the Muslim world since the outbreak of the current war with Hamas in Gaza, and despite pressure from Turkey on Azerbaijan to halt its energy exports to the Jewish state, Baku did the opposite—substantially increasing oil shipments to Israel.

Jerusalem and Baku are also connected through a wide array of business, diplomatic, scientific, technological, cultural, and other forms of cooperation. Many of these areas represent only the “tip of the iceberg” of a far-reaching strategic partnership between the two states, which extends well beyond the confines of bilateral relations. Among the public examples of this partnership, one of the most recent is a $900 million deal through which Azerbaijan’s national oil company, SOCAR, acquired a 10% stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field. As part of the same deal package, SOCAR, in partnership with British Petroleum, won a March 2025 tender for new natural gas exploration in Israeli waters. Notably, it was clear from the outset that this cooperation extends far beyond purely economic considerations.

For Baku, Israel is a vital partner in the pursuit of its regional and supra-regional interests. Among other factors, the rapprochement between the two states is grounded in shared geopolitical challenges—first and foremost, those posed by the radical Islamist regime in Iran. The key difference, however, is that while Israel has long regarded the Shiite fundamentalist regime of the Iranian ayatollahs—who regularly threaten to “wipe” the Jewish state “off the political map of the Middle East”—as an open and declared enemy, Azerbaijan officially maintains what President Ilham Aliyev has termed “working relations” with the new administration in Tehran. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that in Baku—despite formally accepting Iranian leaders’ rhetorical assurances of “good neighborly intentions”—Iran’s imperial ambitions in the eastern segment of the “Greater Middle East” (including the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and the South Caucasus) are perceived as an existential threat to national security.

For its part, Baku, whose foreign policy doctrine is based on building balanced relations with Turkey, Israel, Russia, the European Union, the United States, and China, is ready and willing to respond to requests to mediate conflicts in the Middle East—or to initiate its own diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions—whenever such initiatives are in line with its national geopolitical interests.

In this sense, Jerusalem’s efforts to promote Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords—in its renewed form as a regional economic and defense alliance capable of effectively countering Iranian and other threats — are fully consistent with Baku’s geopolitical vision. This alignment has, from time to time, been conveyed to Israeli interlocutors (including the present author) by members of the Azerbaijani political and diplomatic establishment directly involved in strategic decision-making processes within the country.

It is telling that in Tehran, this possible course of events is viewed as entirely realistic—and evidently causes considerable concern. According to the Tasnim news agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran expects that following Azerbaijan, the “reconciliation pact” (i.e., the Abraham Accords) will attract the participation of Central Asian states and the broader Turkic world. In Tasnim’s words, “Baku plays a key role in persuading these countries.”

This conclusion is further supported by Azerbaijan’s launch of an ambitious initiative to position itself as one of the critical links in the Middle Corridor (TITR)—a trade route connecting Southeast Asia to Europe via Central Asia. From its side, Baku has recommended that Israel join this promising framework as well.

But the scope of potential expansion does not stop there: the broader vision for the Abraham Accords includes not only additional Arab nations—from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia (the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country)—but also states across Africa. Moreover, a number of experts and political figures have proposed that the “extended” Abraham Accords vision could be effectively integrated with the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)—a 5,000-kilometer network including railway lines, an electricity transmission cable, a hydrogen pipeline, a high-speed data cable, and other strategic infrastructure components —envisioned as an economic and geopolitical alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Finally, one of the most significant contributions of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) could be its potential to reduce the global economy’s reliance on critical maritime chokepoints such as the Suez Canal. The corridor offers an alternative route that could alleviate congestion and significantly enhance trade resilience for countries like India, another major Israeli and American ally in South and Southeast Asia. This would represent an entirely new strategic configuration, offering both new and existing participants in the “Abraham Accords 2.0” substantially broader long-term geopolitical and economic prospects.

Accordingly, the inclusion of Azerbaijan in the U.S.-Israeli regional development framework—encompassing investment, technological partnerships, defense cooperation, and other strategic engagements—as part of an economic, diplomatic, and defense alliance built on the foundation of the Abraham Accords would constitute a full realization of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical potential within the emerging architecture of the “Greater Middle East.” It is also reasonable to assume that Baku could expect tangible benefits from participation at an early stage of implementation. For example, at a minimum, it might seek dividends comparable to those received by the Muslim-majority states that joined the Abraham Accords in 2020, including the lifting of U.S. sanctions under Section 907.

There is ample reason to believe that, if these plans come to fruition, the Washington–Jerusalem–Baku axis would emerge as a key structural pillar of the broader geopolitical framework outlined above. In strategic terms, it would play a role on the western-northern flank of the Middle Eastern–South Caucasian macro-region analogous to that which, on the western-southern flank, appears increasingly likely to be assumed by the Washington–Jerusalem–Riyadh vector. Within a framework of coordinated and complementary efforts, both axes could play a decisive role in constraining the destructive influence of the Iranian ayatollah regime and in advancing the interests of alliance members and their partners across critical domains such as energy, infrastructure, and regional security.

If the initiators of the “expanded version” of the Abraham Accords indeed share this vision, then the pairing of Israel and Azerbaijan on one axis and Israel and Saudi Arabia on the other—each operating under the aegis of Washington—will play a leading role in the implementation of corresponding programs on the ground.

The only distinction lies in the fact that, as of today, the formalization of the Israel–Saudi Arabia partnership, including the establishment of full diplomatic relations, remains contingent upon a series of preconditions set forth by Riyadh, as previously mentioned, and is further complicated by the negative public sentiment toward Israel within the kingdom in connection with the ongoing war in Gaza.

By contrast, the diplomatic relations between Jerusalem and Baku, established a quarter-century ago, have consistently experienced positive development, ultimately evolving— as demonstrated above—into a relationship of strategic partnership between the two states.

Notably, there have been no public protests against Israel in Azerbaijan in response to the current events in the Middle East. On the contrary, there have even been expressions of solidarity with the Jewish state, further underscoring the distinctive nature of Israeli-Azerbaijani relations in the context of the broader regional landscape.

The Cancelled Visit and Future Prospects

However, even on the Azerbaijani-Israeli track, certain challenges have emerged in the present context. One of the outward manifestations of these issues was the cancellation of a planned visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Baku on May 7 of this year, where he was scheduled to meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. The timing of the visit was not accidental: the meeting between the two leaders was intended to take place shortly after the visit to Baku by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and then that of U.S. Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff, during which Azerbaijan presented itself as a mediator in regional stabilization efforts—reflecting the prevailing view in both Israel and the United States of Ilham Aliyev as a figure capable of engaging in dialogue with virtually all sides in the region.

The five-day program for the Israeli prime minister’s visit was to include the presentation of Israel’s perspective on the content and prospects of the U.S.–Iran nuclear negotiations. However, the main focus was expected to be the discussion of final details and parameters—largely outlined during Witkoff’s visit—regarding Azerbaijan’s accession to the Abraham Accords. Notably, this was likely to occur within the broader macro-regional geopolitical context mentioned above, including, according to media reports, “strengthening Baku’s influence in Central Asia.”

However, the Netanyahu visit ultimately did not take place. On May 3, the Prime Minister’s Office announced his decision to postpone the trip to Baku to a later date, citing “developments on the Gaza and Syria fronts, as well as an intensive schedule of political and security commitments.”

Nevertheless, other explanations have circulated in the information sphere. One such version claims that Netanyahu’s visit to Azerbaijan was postponed due to threats from senior Iranian military officers, including IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami. Supporters of this theory refer to information published by Raja News, the media outlet of Iran’s ultra-conservative Front of Islamic Revolution Stability party, and subsequently cited by several media sources.

A third version, presented by the popular Israeli news agency Walla, cites its own sources and suggests that Netanyahu was forced to cancel the trip due to Turkey’s refusal to allow his aircraft to transit through Turkish airspace—a significant development given that Israeli–Turkish relations had already reached a “boiling point” following the events of October 7, 2023—and the inability to secure alternative flight routes.

If the first explanation did not convince everyone in Israel—at least because throughout a year and a half of war, even amid dramatic political and security developments, Netanyahu still found time for international visits—then the second and third versions appear, at first glance, more plausible. Indeed, both similar explanations were acknowledged as early as November 2024, when Israeli President Isaac Herzog canceled his planned appearance at the United Nations COP29 climate conference in Azerbaijan, citing “security considerations” as the official reason.  However, commentators suggested that the real reason was Turkey’s refusal to allow the “Wing of Zion” jet to pass through its airspace.

In fact, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s objectives are not limited to hostile anti-Israeli rhetoric—bordering on, and at times crossing into, antisemitism—nor to the demonstrative trade embargo on Israel (which, incidentally, was ignored by Baku, which not only refused to curtail but significantly increased the flow of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through Turkish territory after October 7, 2023).

Erdoğan’s ambitions are far broader and more global. Upon coming to power in 2003, and in contrast to the earlier “European orientation” of Turkish foreign policy, he advanced the doctrine of “Neo-Ottomanism”—a vision of dominance in the Mediterranean region formerly ruled by the Ottoman Empire and, through that position, the aspiration to be a major actor in both the Arab-Islamic world and global politics more broadly.

The gradual cooling and eventual dismantling of the strategic partnership that had existed between Turkey and Israel since the era of Ben-Gurion and Atatürk, along with Erdoğan’s claim to be a protector of the Palestinian Arabs (allegedly “suffering under the yoke of Israeli occupation”), was envisioned as a natural path to winning influence and prestige among Arab nations and populations. This strategic calculation, however, proved fundamentally flawed. The proclaimed Turkish policy of “zero problems with neighbors” quickly devolved into conflicts not only with Israel, but with nearly every country in the region, as well as with many external powers. As a result, Neo-Ottomanism was, for a time, shelved.

In recent times, however, amid the noticeable weakening of the Iranian Shiite axis—which has suffered significant damage from Israeli Defense Forces operations against Iranian proxies including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, and (in coordination with the U.S.) the Houthis in Yemen—and a corresponding shift in the regional balance of power, Erdoğan’s team has made efforts to resurrect the earlier doctrine.

In this context, a major success for Turkey was the fall in November 2024 of the pro-Iranian Alawite Assad regime in Syria and the rise to power of a pro-Turkish Sunni government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani), the head of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a jihadist group that originally split from ISIS. Following these developments, Ankara, as the chief patron of the new Syrian regime, dramatically increased its presence in Syria, including a significant military buildup.

It is evident that Jerusalem views with little enthusiasm the prospect of replacing the collapsed hostile Iranian-Shiite foothold on territories adjacent to Israel’s northeastern borders with a similarly adversarial Turkish-Sunni presence. This concern is particularly acute given that, beyond Erdoğan’s standard “ideological” anti-Zionist motives, there may also be a desire to deflect attention from Turkey’s domestic problems by escalating confrontation with Israel.

Such a volatile situation not only further complicates already severely deteriorated bilateral relations between Jerusalem and Ankara, but also threatens the integrity of the entire northern flank of the geostrategic alliance being constructed on the basis of the expanded Abraham Accords framework.

This turn of events inevitably raises concern in Baku, where, by all indications, the leadership is seriously committed to joining the alliance and playing one of its key roles. Judging by recent developments, Azerbaijan does not intend to remain a passive observer. On April 9, 2025, during a keynote address at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy on the country’s geopolitical strategy, President Ilham Aliyev emphasized the following: “Both countries [Turkey and Israel] are close friends of Azerbaijan.” With the former, he noted, Baku has officially been allied since 2021, and regarding the latter, “for many years, mutual friendship [between Azerbaijan and Israel] has been demonstrated in difficult times for both of us.” He further underlined that: “It is always bad when your friends have bad relations. It is bad for them. It is bad for us, and bad for the world.” Finally, Aliyev expressed his hope that “despite legitimate concerns and despite quite a high level of mistrust, still, there can be found the grounds for normalization, and the areas of mutual interest.”

In fact, Baku already has experience mediating between Jerusalem and Ankara: this occurred in 2022. Following the visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Ankara, and Erdoğan’s meetings with then-Prime Minister Yair Lapid—after which, in August 2022, Israel and Turkey restored full diplomatic relations—and later with Lapid’s successor Benjamin Netanyahu, it seemed that the bilateral relationship might finally emerge from years of decline.

At the time, Aliyev’s role in this process was not publicly acknowledged (he officially confirmed it for the first time in the aforementioned April 9 address). Understandably, it was not his fault that, after October 7, 2023, Erdoğan chose to deliberately dismantle the fragile Israeli–Turkish détente from within.

Nevertheless, President Aliyev clearly did not consider the situation irreversible. In fact, on the very same day he expressed confidence in the possibility of détente on the Turkish–Israeli track, talks were already underway in Baku at his initiative between an Israeli negotiating team—led by National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi—and a high-level Turkish delegation. In Jerusalem, the meeting was described as the launch of a “dialogue for the sake of regional stability”; in turn, Ankara referred to it as the “first technical meeting between Turkey and Israel aimed at establishing a deconfliction mechanism to prevent unwanted incidents in Syria.” This appears to have been, at least in part, a response to the warning reportedly issued during the Baku contact that Israel “made it unequivocally clear that any change in the deployment of foreign forces in Syria, in particular the establishment of Turkish bases in the Palmyra (Tadmor) area, is a red line.”

According to the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation, Israel is pressing two principal demands: (1) the prevention of the deployment of forces that could pose a threat near its border with Syria, and (2) opposition to the presence of strategic weaponry on Syrian territory that might be used against it.

Despite mutual distrust, these contacts appear to have had some tangible impact. In mid-May, it was reported that Israel and Turkey have established a permanent direct communication line to prevent misunderstandings and possible military escalation in Syria.

A few days later, it was further revealed that direct, non-public talks between Israeli and Syrian officials had taken place in Azerbaijan, with Turkish observers present.

Finally, according to a Reuters report citing Middle Eastern sources, Israel and Syria are holding direct talks in an Israel-controlled area along the border between the two countries.

In parallel, rumors began circulating in diplomatic and media circles—shortly after the May 14 meeting between Donald Trump and Ahmad al-Sharaa in Riyadh—regarding a (still unconfirmed) interest on the part of Damascus in joining the Abraham Accords. This would potentially include mutual recognition of Israeli and Syrian sovereignty, the establishment of official diplomatic relations, and the formal conclusion of the state of war that has existed between the two countries since 1948.

In an interview with the Jewish Journal, Syria’s new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa addressed the subject of Syrian–Israeli relations:

“We have common enemies, and we can play an important role in regional security.”

He called for a return to the 1974 disengagement agreement, which, as the publication noted, he invoked not merely as a ceasefire line, but as a potential foundation for mutual respect. Al-Sharaa also stressed the need to protect civilian populations, particularly the Druze communities residing in southern Syria and the Golan Heights.

None of this, of course, would have been possible without a “green light” from the Turkish leadership to Damascus and strong encouragement from Washington to Israel. The remaining question is what policy line Jerusalem should adopt—especially considering that the level of trust toward Ankara, even after all these developments, remains only marginally above zero, and not without reason.

Currently, neither sustainable cooperation nor a strategic partnership seem feasible. The most Israel can realistically afford under current conditions is to follow the same principle that Baku applies to Iran: namely, to maintain what President Ilham Aliyev has termed “working relations” with the new administration in Tehran—formally accepting Iranian leaders’ rhetorical assurances of good neighborliness while realistically assessing their imperial ambitions through the lens of Azerbaijan’s national interests and security.

If this analogy holds, then the process of constructing—even if not yet fully consolidated—a triangle of Israeli–Azerbaijani–Turkish relations, facilitated by what might be termed the “Baku Process” (a term still unofficial), and, in parallel, the development of substantial segments of the emerging “Abrahamic Alliance 2.0”, would indeed hold significant long-term promise.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 131 (May 14, 2025)

Russia has always been a country of significant interest to Israelis, partly because a substantial portion of Israeli Jews have familial roots in either Tsarist Russia or the USSR. On the one hand, Russia — as the successor to the USSR, which led the anti-Western camp during the Cold War — has long been perceived by Israeli society as a force with fundamentally opposing interests. Such views persist among much of Israel’s intellectual and political elite today. On the other hand, at the level of public consciousness, Russia has never been considered an “inherent” enemy of Israel.

The renewed interest in Russia in the early 2000s stemmed from two key developments: Moscow’s “return” to the Middle Eastern arena as a significant player directly affecting Israel’s interests, and the successful integration of the “Great Aliyah” (Jewish repatriation) from the late USSR and post-Soviet states. Over a third of this aliyah consisted of immigrants from Russia, contributing to a sharp increase in cultural, familial, and emotional-historical ties between citizens of the two countries. These factors influenced public opinion in both nations — an element their leaders had to consider, albeit to varying degrees, when shaping bilateral relations.

Since Benjamin Netanyahu’s return to power in February 2009, the intensification of Israel’s foreign policy toward Russia has been evident across nearly all levels — from intergovernmental and interparliamentary contacts to joint commissions on trade, economic and cultural cooperation. This approach marked a radical departure from the policies of previous governments (including Netanyahu’s first term), which focused primarily on strengthening ties with Russian Jews, encouraging their immigration to Israel, importing energy resources, and providing only lukewarm diplomatic and legal support for Israeli businesses in the Russian market. Vladimir Putin’s visit to Israel in May 2012, which Israeli authorities deemed highly significant, solidified this “new trend” in bilateral relations.

This intensification is typically explained by two main factors. First, Israel’s desire to find alternative spots of support amid strained relations with the United States following the Obama administration’s pressure on Israel as part of its reevaluation of Middle East policy. Second, the Israeli political establishment’s recognition of Russia’s growing influence in political and economic-strategic processes directly tied to Israel’s interests in both the “small” (the Arab-Israeli conflict zone) and “greater” (from the Maghreb to Central and South Asia) Middle East.

Reactions to these processes within Israeli political, media, business, and analytical circles were mixed. These circles —along with Israeli society as a whole — quickly split into two camps, each interpreting the Middle East implications of the “new reading” of Russian geopolitical and economic interests quite differently. The “Kremlin pessimists” continued to suspect that the Kremlin’s new course was de facto reinforcing a pro-Arab and therefore anti-Israeli bias in Moscow’s strategy. It was expected that, as Russia sought to reclaim its status as a major world power — and increasingly entered into political confrontation with the U.S. and the West in general — it would eventually revert to the global political models and perceptions of the late Soviet era, including a view of Israel as a potential adversary due to its strategic partnership with the U.S.

Their opponents — the “Kremlin optimists” — believed Russia’s assurances that it was returning to the Middle East not as a bearer of ideology, but for purely pragmatic reasons. From this perspective, Russian military supplies to Israel’s enemies — Syria and Iran (including weapons that, despite numerous agreements and assurances from the Russian side, often ended up in the hands of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations in southern Lebanon) — were seen as “nothing more than business.” According to this view, Russia’s shifting policies toward these regimes were simply a matter of price — in the most basic and transactional sense of the word.  https://ridl.io/russia-and-israel-the-end-of-special-relations/

Amid these dynamics, the community of immigrants from the former USSR — often referred to as “Russian Israel” — served as a kind of reference group for Israeli elites and society. For example, the introduction of a visa-free regime with Russia in 2016 (and later with Ukraine and Belarus) was adopted by the Israeli government primarily at the insistence of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, which represents the interests of Russian-speaking voters. Yisrael Beiteinu made visa-free travel a condition for joining the ruling coalition.

At the time, the political, diplomatic and economic benefits of this step were far from obvious to most Israeli leaders. However, politicians could not ignore the sentiments and demands of the nearly one-million-strong community of former Soviet immigrants, which at various times accounted for 13% to 16% of the electorate — and often played a decisive role in determining the success or failure of candidates for prime minister and several Israeli parties in national elections. For Israeli politicians, “good relations with Russia” are seen as a key to securing the support of the Russian-speaking electorate, though the community’s actual views are far more nuanced.

Do “Russian” Israelis Need Russia?

Between 2009 and 2017, the sociological agencies Mutagim and PORI, following a program proposed by the author of this article, conducted a series of four surveys among Russian-speaking Israelis. These surveys measured, among other things, attitudes toward the idea of an Israeli-Russian strategic partnership. The results indicate that this topic was quite relevant to respondents: only about 10% — peaking at 17% in 2015 — refrained from expressing an opinion on the issue.

However, support for shifting away from the U.S. in favor of partnerships with other strategic allies, including Russia, remained limited — ranging from 4−5% to just over 10%. Roughly two to three times as many respondents held the opposite view, asserting that “Russia’s interests will primarily lie in the Arab world, so the reliability of its partnership with Israel will always be questionable.” Among immigrants from Moscow and St. Petersburg, this view was nearly 1.5 times more prevalent than among those from other regions of Russia.

“Russian” Israelis clearly understood that, in the existing global political context, Israel could not pursue a policy of “permanent neutrality”. As a result, the share of “isolationists” advocating for “equidistance from various global centers of power” remained low, fluctuating between 15% and 20%. At the same time, the majority of former Soviet immigrants did not believe that an unconditional partnership with the U.S. was Israel’s only foreign policy option.

The most popular stance — garnering votes from between one-third and nearly half of post-Soviet immigrants — was the view that Israel should “strengthen and expand its relations with Russia, but not at the expense of its special relationship with the U.S.” Fluctuations in support for this position (ranging from 8% to 12% across the four survey waves) were attributed to both external and internal factors, including frustration with the Obama administration’s pro-Arab stance, the arrival of a large group of immigrants following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, the introduction of visa-free travel, and other events.

No significant differences were observed among supporters of different parties or among representatives of various waves of aliyah from the former USSR on this issue. The exception was a slightly higher share of “Kremlin optimists” among immigrants from Russia who arrived during the post-default era of the late 1990s — many of whom were motivated to emigrate to Israel primarily by economic considerations. Additionally, a higher proportion of this group returned to Russia after the crisis there had subsided.

Overall, the data demonstrate that the community of former Soviet immigrants is not characterized by so-called “ex-patriotism of political consciousness” — that is, an orientation toward their country of origin or identification with its political interests. Studies of immigrants from the former USSR show that the vast majority (for example, nearly 70% of respondents in a PORI survey conducted in March 2017) consider themselves “to a large extent” or “exclusively” Israeli. The share of those who do not identify as Israeli has rarely exceeded 20% in surveys, a trend observed not only among ethnic Jews but also among their family members of mixed or non-Jewish background. Early 1990s expectations — voiced by some left-wing and Arab circles — that the secular and partially non-Jewish immigrant population would weaken Israel’s Jewish character have not been borne out.

“Russian Israel” as a Party to the Conflict

A 2014 study, conducted shortly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, revealed that the “Russian” Israeli community was almost evenly split on the issue. One segment supported one side in the conflict, while the other sympathized with neither Russia nor Ukraine — had no opinion at all. Among those who did take a side, support for Ukraine outnumbered support Russia by a ratio of two to one. However, only about 10% of respondents advocated for active Israeli support for either side, with a slight preference for Kyiv. By 2017, that share had declined to just 5%.

Differences in opinion were influenced by length of residency in Israel and country of origin. Immigrants from 1988−1989 — often former activists in the Jewish movement in the USSR — tended to hold pro-Ukrainian views, seeing Russia as the heir to the empire they had once resisted and fled. Pro-Ukrainian sentiments were also common among immigrants who began arriving in the early 2010s, particularly those from major cities who were socially established, relatively young, and part of the first (“Crimean”) wave of “Putin’s Aliyah” from both Russia and Ukraine.

Among immigrants from Ukraine, active pro-Ukrainian positions were far more common than pro-Russian ones. Among those from Russian-speaking regions of eastern Ukraine — primarily Jewish immigrants from the 1990s and early 2000s — supporters of Kyiv outnumbered those backing pro-Russian separatists by nearly four to one. However, two-thirds of respondents in 2017 supported neither side or expressed no interest in the issue.

At first glance, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 appears to have radically altered this picture. The shock felt by citizens of many countries was shared by Israelis — especially as one of the first consequences of the conflict was the emergence of tens of thousands of Jewish refugees in Europe for the first time since World War II. In March 2022, over 70% of Israelis told researchers at the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) that they were following events in Ukraine “very closely” or “fairly closely”, with an even higher share—85%—among Russian-speaking Israelis. Two-thirds of Israelis overall, and three-quarters of Russian-speaking Jews, blamed Russia’s leadership for starting the war, while the share attributing blame to Kyiv fell within the margin of error.

Israeli civil society — particularly its organized and informal Russian-speaking segment — enthusiastically mobilized material aid for Ukrainians and engaged in pro-Ukrainian public diplomacy. Pro-Kremlin groups, meanwhile, remained largely invisible, especially after Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, when Russia adopted an anti-Israel stance, at least at the declarative level.

However, there is another aspect of this issue — namely, the relationship between Israeli and Ukrainian leadership following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Israel immediately condemned the invasion and, from the first weeks, provided Ukraine with extensive humanitarian and material aid, as well as diplomatic and political support. While Israel did not officially join the Western economic sanctions against Russia, it also took no steps to help circumvent them. Although Israel is not a NATO member and does not serve as an official guarantor of Ukraine’s security, it supplied protective gear, certain defensive systems, and non-lethal weaponry. According to Israeli leaders, these actions demonstrated the country’s commitment to Ukraine and its people. However, Kyiv did not consider Israel’s support sufficient.

At the same time, about 60% of Israelis — and slightly more among former Soviet immigrants — who participated in the aforementioned 2022 IDI study fully or mostly supported the Israeli government’s approach to the war in Ukraine. Similar sentiments were observed in subsequent periods. According to a 2024 study, the results of which were kindly shared with the author by its initiator, Elina Bardach-Yalov, roughly one-third of surveyed former Soviet immigrants — half as many as seven years earlier — supported neither side in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and believed Israel should not intervene. A similar share expressed passive support for Ukraine (and very few for Russia). Only a quarter believed Israel should openly support Ukraine, while just 1−3% favored Russia. This time, differences between “veteran” immigrants and members of “Putin’s Aliyah” were minimal.

In other words, the Soviet and post-Soviet heritage of immigrants — including those from the most recent “war aliyah” from Russia — once again proved less significant than their Israeli experience, contrary to stereotypes. While they were not lobbyists for unconditional Israeli-Russian cooperation, they were, at certain points (especially during the Russian-Israeli rapprochement of the 2010s), quite willing to serve as a key bridge for rationally structured cooperation. However, they hardly saw themselves as a local branch of the “Russian world.” Over the three decades since the start of the “Great Aliya”, Russian-speaking immigrants have largely integrated into Israeli society and adopted its dominant system of values and political beliefs.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 119 (March 15, 2025)

“Azerbaijan is an important strategic ally of Israel in the Caucasus region, with relations encompassing cooperation in security, trade, technology, and energy sectors. Israel will continue to strengthen cooperation with Azerbaijan and the US, and will stand firmly against any attempt to undermine it,” Israel’s Prime Minister’s office said on March 5th, announcing that Jerusalem was in active talks with Washington to advance a three-way alliance, according to The Jerusalem Post.

A week later, on March 14th, Steve Witkoff, the special envoy of US President Donald Trump, landed in Baku after an overnight visit to Moscow, in what appears to be a well-coordinated diplomatic move between Israel, the US, and Azerbaijan. “Sources involved in Israeli-Azeri relations reveal that coordination for the visit became particularly intensive after March 5, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized his commitment to the trilateral partnership between the countries in the Knesset,” The Jerusalem Post reported.

For the last month, numerous US and Israeli publications mulled the initiative to integrate the Republic of Azerbaijan into the Abraham Accords. In our two previous papers on the issue, we described how deep the relations between Baku and Jerusalem are and brought up several recommendations on how to effectively engage Azerbaijan in Trump’s regional plans and for the sake of Israel’s interests.

But there are some skeptics who attempted to argue the alleged impracticality of the idea. Their main counterarguments are:

• This initiative is irrelevant in the context of Azerbaijan, as the Abraham Accords are signed exclusively between Israel and Arab countries.

• These agreements are signed between Israel and Arab states that were previously in a state of war with the Jewish state. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has never been at war with Israel and established diplomatic relations with it more than 30 years ago.

• The Abraham Accords are strictly a Middle Eastern initiative and therefore have no direct relevance to Azerbaijan.

Conceptual Clarifications

·       It must be noted that our policy papers did not merely discuss Azerbaijan’s accession to the Abraham Accords, but rather its inclusion in the “club“ of signatory states (“Azerbaijan should be included in the ‘Abraham Accords Club’”). Later, during his address in the Knesset, the MP from the SHAS party, Simon Moshiashvily, similarly stated not only the necessity for Azerbaijan to sign the accords but also that “it would be appropriate to integrate Azerbaijan itself into the Abraham Accords framework.” In both cases, the rationale was based on the fact that following the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, the Negev Forum [1] was established in 2022, bringing together the United States, Israel, the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, and Bahrain as a functional mechanism for implementing the agreements. The forum was designed with a structured institutional framework, including a presidency, a steering committee, and working groups focusing on key areas such as: food security, water technologies, clean energy, tourism, healthcare, education, regional security.
Steering Committee meetings were held in Bahrain (June 2022) and the UAE (January 2023), while the first working group seminar took place in Washington (June 2023). However, under the Biden administration, this mechanism did not develop substantial momentum. Now, with the Trump administration’s anticipated expansion of the Abraham Accords, this mechanism is expected to be restructured and relaunched in an updated format. The goal is to establish a formalized platform for multilateral regional cooperation, backed by financial support from the United States and the UAE. When discussions arise about Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the “club” or “framework” of the Abraham Accords, the reference is specifically to this institutional mechanism, just ahead of its planned restructuring.

·       The claim that the Abraham Accords are intended exclusively for normalizing relations between Israel and Arab countries is contradicted by numerous publications in leading Israeli media (December 2024 – February 2025), citing sources within the Trump team. According to their information, there are plans to expand these agreements to 14 Muslim-majority countries, including non-Arab nations in Africa and Southeast Asia.

·       The assertion that these agreements are signed only by countries that were or still are de jure in a state of war with Israel is refuted by the precedent of the UAE. The United Arab Emirates did not participate in any Arab-Israeli war, never declared war on Israel, and therefore, prior to signing the Abraham Accords in 2020, were not in a state of war with the Jewish state.

There are also skeptics in Azerbaijan, who undermine the initiative, claiming it has no real value for Baku. But they have missed at least three obvious points:

1) The idea of integrating Azerbaijan into the Abraham Accords framework reshapes the prevailing perception of Azerbaijan in the U.S., which has been largely confined to the Armenian issue and the limited geopolitical scope of the South Caucasus.

2) The initiative brings out the following issue: other Muslim-majority countries that have merely signed the Abraham Accords receive political, military, and economic assistance from the U.S. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, which has been Israel’s most reliable Muslim-world ally for decades, remains subject to U.S. sanctions under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Israeli politicians and Jewish leaders are already calling Trump’s administration to repeal it, as it is outdated and unjust.

3) “Azerbaijani model” of relations with Israel can be set as a precedent for other Muslim-majority countries, that wish to join the Abraham Accords. The essence of this approach is as follows: the Abraham Accords risk becoming ineffective because every time Israeli-Palestinian tensions escalate, Arab signatories immediately freeze all regional partnership initiatives outlined in the accords. This enables Hamas (and Iran) to sabotage the implementation of the Accords, as seen on October 7, 2023: Hamas’ attack derailed the imminent signing of the agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. As for Azerbaijan, it continues to strengthen its partnership with Israel regardless of the Israeli-Palestinian relations, and despite external pressures from Iran and Turkey. If accepting Azerbaijan’s approach to its partnership with Israel turns to be the prerequisite condition for the future Abraham Accords members, it might not only enhance Azerbaijan’s image in Israel and the U.S., but also strengthen its strategic position in the eyes of Muslim-majority countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia that are looking to advance their own lobbying efforts in Washington.

The concept and recommendations presented below were developed by the authors, who are Israeli experts, based on discussions with several former Israeli diplomats and ex-Knesset members, as well as with several American and Azerbaijani Jews. What unites us all is a commitment to strengthening regional alliances and deepening Israel’s integration into the “Greater Middle East.” Our approach is guided solely by the long-term interests of the Jewish state.

The authors have not coordinated their position with any official representatives of Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is only natural that situations may arise where Azerbaijani officials express opinions that contradict the authors’ perspective.

On January 15, we published a conceptual paper titled “Azerbaijan: One of the Pillars of Israel’s Regional Security System – A Brief Overview for the Trump Administration“. This publication is based on statements from Israeli officials, including heads of government and numerous ministers, as well as materials from Israeli media and think tanks covering the strategic partnership with Azerbaijan from 1995 to 2024.

Our “brief overview for the Trump Administration” sparked widespread discussion in Israel, the U.S., and, quite unexpectedly, even in India. Prestigious publications and think tanks that referenced it or analyzed our data and conclusions included: Atlantic Council, Forbes, The National Interest, Townhall, The Jerusalem Post, Israel Hayom, The Economic Times. The document was discussed during the recent forum on religious tolerance, convened by the U.S. Jewish organizations in Congress, with participation of the congressmen, legislative staffers, and State Department representatives. The booklets containing our analysis were distributed among them.

As the office of Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar informed the chief rabbi of Baku’s Sephardic community Zamir Isayev, the BESA report from January 15 “serves as an example of the importance of Israel-Azerbaijan relations and presents the substantive richness of their ties in the most positive light. A copy has been provided for [personal] review by Foreign Minister Sa’ar.” Our briefing also garnered significant interest among senior officials of major Jewish organizations in the U.S. Moreover, we have reliable information that several members of the new president’s inner circle have carefully reviewed the BESA report.

As a result, in recent weeks, we have been contacted by Knesset members, prominent figures in American Jewry, and representatives of leading conservative think tanks in the U.S. Many of them noted that, despite their deep understanding of Middle Eastern realities, they had never considered Azerbaijan’s geopolitical significance specifically within the framework of Israel’s regional strategic security architecture. Furthermore, our interlocutors emphasized that they share this broader vision of Israel’s ally in the Caucasus. At the same time, they raised an important question: What can be done to elevate Azerbaijan’s regional status and rebrand it in the eyes of the new administration in a way that would further strengthen Israel’s position? Initially, we addressed this question individually for each inquiry. However, as the number of such requests continues to grow, we decided to prepare another report—this time with practical considerations. But first, let us revisit the key indicators of Azerbaijan’s special significance from the perspective of Israeli interests, as outlined in our previous publication.

Key Indicators of Azerbaijan’s Special Role for Israel

• Among all Muslim-majority countries, Azerbaijan has the longest-standing and most comprehensive partnership with Israel. 

•  It is the only strategic partner in the Muslim world of the U.S.’s main ally in the Middle East that shares borders with both Iran and Russia.

•  The long-term partnership between the two countries positions Azerbaijan as one of the pillars of Israel’s regional strategic security architecture. This is reflected in three areas that are vital to the Jewish state:

1. For 30 years, this Muslim-majority country has been a key pillar of Israel’s energy security, serving as its largest supplier of energy resources. Israel’s economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s was significantly supported by Azerbaijani energy supplies. In 2024, during the war with Hamas and Hezbollah, when the IDF had an urgent need for an uninterrupted fuel supply, Azerbaijan increased its oil exports to Israel by 55%.

2. Azerbaijan is one of the largest importers of Israeli defense products. The billions of dollars generated from these deals not only support the livelihoods of many Israelis working in the defense industry but also fund new military developments essential for Israel’s own security.

3. Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s key partners in countering Iran. Both countries view the Ayatollah regime as an existential threat and have been cooperating in this context for many years.

• Despite pressure from Iran and Turkey, during Israel’s war against Hamas and Hezbollah, Azerbaijan not only maintained but even intensified its partnership with Israel. This occurred at a time when all other moderate Muslim-majority countries, including those that signed the Abraham Accords, distanced themselves from the Jewish state. A similar situation occurred during the Second Intifada (2000–2004), when Azerbaijan remained Israel’s only reliable partner in the Muslim world.

• The special importance of Azerbaijan for the Jewish state is recognized by representatives of all major political factions in Israel, even those that often disagree on other foreign policy issues. Thus, the significance of the partnership with Azerbaijan falls within the framework of a broad Zionist consensus.

• Azerbaijan serves as a model of Muslim-Jewish coexistence and actively facilitates Israel’s engagement with other Muslim countries. Prime Minister Netanyahu has described this as an example of “how Muslims and Jews work together to secure a better future for both.” According to recent report by the Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT-se), a British nonprofit organization that analyzes schoolbooks and curricula around the world, Azerbaijan has become the first Muslim-majority country to include a definition of antisemitism in its textbooks. The report emphasized that Judaism is “highly regarded in the textbooks,” and the books also correctly portray the Holocaust as a genocide of six million Jews, highlighting antisemitic measures such as arbitrary killings and imprisonment rather than trying to downplay or deny the Nazis’ atrocities.

Current Geopolitical Clarifications

Against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s efforts to reshape the global order, Azerbaijan’s significance—both for U.S. and Israeli strategic interests—has grown even further. This is driven by key trends in Washington’s new foreign policy approach, within which Azerbaijan’s advantages and capabilities can be effectively leveraged:

• Setting the stage for the normalization of U.S.-Russia relations. It is important to consider that, under Western sanctions, Russia’s dependence on Azerbaijan for exports to Iran and the Middle East has sharply increased. A significant portion of Russian freight transport in the southern direction passes through Azerbaijan (from 2021 to 2023 alone, the capacity at the land border tripled).

• The desire to exert maximum pressure on Iran to force it to abandon its nuclear program.

• Implementation of a comprehensive plan for integrating Israel into the “Greater Middle East” through Saudi-Israeli normalization, expansion of the Abraham Accords, and inclusion of the Jewish state in regional development and defense projects. As noted in our previous material, Azerbaijan has facilitated Israel’s efforts to establish relations with the Gulf monarchies, particularly the UAE, as well as other moderate Muslim countries. Furthermore, since 2008, official Baku has served as an unofficial communication channel between Ankara and Jerusalem.

• A policy of strengthening regional alliances among U.S. allies to reduce American defense expenditures. In this context, Azerbaijan serves as a model of long-term military-strategic partnership between a Muslim-majority country and the Jewish state. The impact of this cooperation can be significantly enhanced by integrating bilateral defense projects with specific areas of military collaboration between Israel and the U.S., as well as between Israel and the UAE—and, in the longer term, with certain other Gulf monarchies.

How Israel and Pro-Israel Forces in the U.S. Can Leverage Azerbaijan in Trump’s Plans for Restructuring the “Greater Middle East”

1. In the U.S., Azerbaijan is predominantly perceived through the lens of certain lobbyists who claim to represent Armenian interests and have close ties to the Democratic Party. To advance their own agendas, they extensively exploit the memory of the tragic events of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, a deliberate effort is made to portray Azerbaijan as a puppet of Turkey. From this, the conclusion is drawn that Azerbaijan is allegedly seeking to repeat the genocide. This statement is completely refuted by Azerbaijan’s entirely independent stance on its partnership with Israel. In 2024, amid Israel’s war against Hamas and Hezbollah, Ankara persistently pressured official Baku to halt its cooperation with Jerusalem. However, Azerbaijan, on the contrary, intensified this partnership. Unfortunately, even those American Jews who wholeheartedly support Israel are often unaware of the unique role this Muslim country plays in the regional security architecture of the Jewish state. Therefore, it is crucial for pro-Israel forces in the U.S., both Jewish and non-Jewish, to stop viewing Azerbaijan through the narrow narratives promoted by certain factions within the Armenian diaspora. It is essential to view Azerbaijan within a broad regional perspective. This is especially important as the Trump administration works to pressure Iran and to further integrate and solidify Israel’s presence within the framework of the “Greater Middle East.” As for certain ethnic lobbyists linked to the Democratic Party, even Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has distanced himself from their outdated positions. This suggests that their primary concern is not the well-being of modern Armenia but rather the preservation of their own status and influence in American politics. As a result, they seek to perpetuate hostility and mutual grievances between Armenians and their closest neighbors, even at the expense of Armenia’s legitimately elected leadership. Meanwhile, Yerevan and Baku are engaged in negotiations to reach a peace agreement and renounce territorial claims. Applying pressure on Azerbaijan through the lens of century-old narratives only complicates the process of normalizing Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. Of course, it is entirely legitimate that certain politicized diaspora figures have personal interests that do not necessarily align with the position of official Yerevan. Likewise, it is equally legitimate that pro-Israel forces in the U.S. have their own interests in strengthening Israel’s role in integration processes with the moderate Muslim world and in countering Iran. It is within this context that Azerbaijan’s regional significance should be understood and promoted. And there is no need to shy away from this: this stance is not anti-Armenian but rather pro-Israel. Moreover, it fully aligns with the strategic foreign policy priorities of the Trump administration.

2. The foundations of the Israel-Azerbaijan partnership were laid in the U.S. exactly 30 years ago. This took place during a meeting between the leaders of the two countries, Yitzhak Rabin and Heydar Aliyev, in New York in October 1995. However, according to a December 2024 assessment by the leadership of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Azerbaijan’s longstanding support for Israel and its contribution to regional stability have not been adequately recognized by the United States. Moreover, since 1992, the U.S. Congress has enforced “Section 907,” a legislative amendment that discriminates against Azerbaijan compared to other post-Soviet republics in terms of receiving American assistance. After September 11, 2001, the Bush administration managed to secure only a temporary suspension of this amendment due to the need for security cooperation with Azerbaijan—a collaboration that ultimately proved highly effective. However, to this day, the amendment remains an obstacle to the development of U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. This has led to an absurd situation in which the U.S. provides extensive financial and political support to Muslim countries that only agreed to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic relations in 2020 under the Abraham Accords. Meanwhile, the only Muslim country that has been a reliable strategic partner of America’s key Middle Eastern ally for three decades receives no U.S. support and has, in fact, been subject to sanctions from Washington throughout this entire period. For the U.S. and Israel to fully leverage Azerbaijan’s advantages and opportunities within the new “Greater Middle East” architecture being shaped by the Trump administration, it is essential to eliminate the existing formal obstacles. Section 907 must be repealed.

3. Azerbaijan should be included in the “Abraham Accords Club”. The Muslim states that signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 received significant benefits in return: approval for advanced U.S. arms sales, official U.S. recognition of their territorial claims, and investments from the Abraham Fund—established by the U.S., Israel, and the UAE—to promote regional economic cooperation with the Jewish state. It is expected that countries joining this “club” during the upcoming expansion of the accords will receive similar, if not greater, dividends. It is absurd that Muslim countries that only recently recognized Israel stand to gain substantial benefits from establishing diplomatic ties, while Azerbaijan—one of the pillars of Israel’s regional security for over two decades—not only receives nothing in return but remains subject to U.S. sanctions under Section 907.

4. Azerbaijan’s unique conceptual and practical experience in Muslim-Jewish cooperation can be leveraged to expand the Abraham Accords to Muslim countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Several senior officials from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy have been actively engaged in bilateral relations with Israel for years and could serve as consultants for The Friedman Center for Peace Through Strength and The Abraham Fund as the accords expand. Building on Azerbaijan’s experience—and with the participation of Israel, the U.S., Azerbaijan, and other Muslim nations—new regional development projects can be launched in energy, agriculture, and healthcare. A crucial factor in this context is that the UAE, one of the architects and key participants in the Abraham Accords, is also Azerbaijan’s top partner in the Arab world (both in investment volume and frequency of high-level state visits in 2023-2024). This Azerbaijani-Emirati partnership can serve as an expert and conceptual foundation for expanding the Abraham Accords, while also providing a practical model for multilateral regional cooperation involving Israel and the U.S.

5. Israel and pro-Israel forces in the U.S. should actively advocate for Azerbaijan’s inclusion in American-Israeli regional development, investment, and technology partnerships. Israel is already advancing a trilateral partnership model for Morocco, involving American companies, and plans to extend this approach to Sunni Gulf monarchies and the U.S. in defense, AI, and cybersecurity as part of the Abraham Accords expansion. Azerbaijan’s participation in such initiatives would strengthen the Muslim component of Israel’s regional partnerships. Moreover, this fully aligns with the Trump administration’s strategy of expanding multilateral cooperation among U.S. allies to reduce Washington’s financial burden on regional development and defense projects.

6. President Trump has clearly outlined his intentions for the full-scale reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. On February 9, he stated that certain Middle Eastern and other countries might participate in the effort. Despite protests in the Muslim world, the American leader appears determined to follow through with his declared plans. If Washington ultimately manages to reach an agreement with key moderate Arab leaders regarding their participation—one way or another—in Gaza’s reconstruction, the U.S. will likely seek to involve additional Muslim countries in the project. However, if the proposed plan is adjusted to accommodate the positions of Riyadh, Cairo, and Amman, then the reconstruction—which is necessary in any case—will most likely involve the UAE, Egypt, and possibly other Arab states. In any scenario, Washington may turn to Baku with a proposal to participate on a humanitarian basis, acting as a free supplier of energy resources needed for reconstruction efforts and for the needs of the Palestinian population during the project’s active phase. Of course, Azerbaijan’s involvement would only be considered if at least several other Muslim countries also take part.

7. Between 2007 and 2024, Azerbaijan, through the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, sponsored the restoration of at least two dozen world-renowned cultural and historical monuments and religious sites in France, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and the Vatican. For example, the foundation contributed to the restoration of the Notre-Dame Church in Strasbourg, the Basilica of Saint Paul, and the Catacombs of Saints Marcellinus and Peter in the Vatican. Despite Azerbaijan investing millions of dollars in these projects, European countries have not publicly highlighted its role in preserving key symbols of Christian civilization. Meanwhile, in the Middle East and North Africa, there are numerous historical sites revered in Islamic, Jewish, and Christian traditions, as well as 26 Jewish and Christian sites in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, some of which are in a state of partial ruin. In this context, an initiative could be proposed—aligned with the spirit of the Abraham Accords—to establish a joint fund with the participation of Azerbaijan, the UAE, and ideally Turkey (which, notably, has shown particular care at the state level in preserving religious sites of all three faiths). This fund could take on the role of restoring, preserving, and promoting these monuments internationally. Such an initiative would be especially relevant for countries in the region that have been affected by military conflicts in recent years. The project would benefit all three major monotheistic religions, as well as the states where these historical sites are located. In the long run, it could lay the groundwork for an international interfaith tourism program, which in turn could become a key avenue for the broader development of the Middle Eastern region.

The considerations presented here are advisory in nature. They can be further refined and adapted to specific projects and initiatives. Our goal was to provide a set of practical ideas that can now be utilized by consultants and officials in Israel, the U.S., and Azerbaijan who are interested in enhancing the Israel-Azerbaijan partnership and expanding their cooperation. By leveraging this experience, they can contribute to Israel’s deeper integration into the Greater Middle East and to the strengthening of regional stability.

The Trump administration, which begins its work on January 20th, places the security of Israel, its primary ally in the Middle East, at the forefront. Statements from Trump’s close associates clearly indicate that his doctrine includes provisions for expanding the Abraham Accords. In this context, the Israeli leadership and national diplomacy—both governmental and public—should judiciously direct Washington’s attention to those actors in the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Asia who have long-established strategic partnerships with Jerusalem and can positively impact the role of the Jewish state in Trump’s envisioned “new Middle East”.

Azerbaijan deserves special attention as it holds the longest and most comprehensive partnership with Israel among Muslim nations. During a December 2024 meeting with the President of Azerbaijan, leaders of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) acknowledged that the U.S. had not fully appreciated Azerbaijan’s longstanding support for Israel and contributions to regional stability. “For the Trump administration and the State of Israel, Azerbaijan holds significant value,” noted the Maariv, covering the meeting.

As Mark Fish acknowledges in The Jerusalem Post: “The arrival in Baku of both the current and incoming leaders of AIPAC demonstrates a clear recognition of Azerbaijan’s pivotal role in regional stability and its unwavering support for Israel. It also reflects an acknowledgment that past U.S. administrations did not fully appreciate the value of engaging with Azerbaijan”.

In its turn, Maariv emphasized that, against the backdrop of the weakening of Iranian influence in the Middle East, “the leader of Azerbaijan is capable of contributing to a reduction in tensions in a region that the American administration views as being of high strategic importance“.

Indeed, as Songer Cagatay of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) noted in 2005: “Washington has many reasons to further improve its relationship with Azerbaijan and to support that country in the international arena. In this context, it should applaud the Azerbaijani friendship with Israel”. Given the changed geopolitical realities, there are now more reasons to “improve relations with Azerbaijan”. Therefore, when shaping its policy in the South Caucasus, the Trump administration should consider the following factors:

1. Azerbaijan is the only country in the world that has maintained a 30-year-long military-strategic partnership with the U.S.’s key ally in the Middle East while bordering two of America’s geopolitical rivals—Russia and Iran.

2. Azerbaijan shares a 765 km border with Iran, with Tehran just 365 km away, and ethnic Azerbaijanis, Iran’s largest minority, comprise approximately 20% of Iran’s population (17.7 million).

3. Azerbaijan is vital to Europe’s energy security, supplying oil and gas to 17 EU countries as a key alternative to Russian supplies.

4. Azerbaijan is an important hub for regional transit trade. In November 2024, the Israeli ambassador to Baku stated: “Israeli companies are now recognizing the strategic importance of Azerbaijan, not only as a partner but also as a crossroads between East and West – the Middle Corridor – serving as a gateway to Central Asia”.

5. Azerbaijan is the largest country in the South Caucasus in terms of territory, population, economy, and military power.

Since the 1990s, Azerbaijan, a secular, Muslim-majority state, has been a discreet pillar of Israel’s regional security, key to U.S. interests.

According to Globes, these relations “have flourished since 1992” and are “the most stable” among all that the Jewish state maintains in the Muslim world. As reported by Haaretz, in 1998 Azerbaijan was already designated as a “key state” in internal documents of Israel’s MFA. In 2009, Deputy Director-General of the MFA, Pinhas Avivi, declared: “Relations between Israel and Azerbaijan are of a strategic nature“. In 2011, Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau remarked: “Israel needs a strong Azerbaijan”. In 2013, the Globes emphasized: “Israel views Azerbaijan as an important ally and a true friend…“. In 2022, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid stated: “Azerbaijan is an important partner for Israel”, while former Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon, noted: “Azerbaijan is one of our most important allies in Asia…“.

In December 2023, Ynet  noted that “Azerbaijan is the only Muslim country in the world supporting Israel in the war” (against Hamas and Hezbollah). In February 2024, INN  reported, citing government sources in Jerusalem and leaders of the Jewish diaspora, that despite pressure from other Muslim countries, President Aliyev unequivocally stands with the Jewish state amid the war. Around the same time, Srugim referred to Azerbaijani leader as a “friend of Israel“, emphasizing his special role in advancing bilateral relations. In July, representatives of both countries’ leadership, including Azerbaijan’s Minister of Defense, held talks on “strengthening regional cooperation”. Ynet highlighted that despite pressure on Baku, the intensification of the partnership occurred precisely during the height of the war (while all moderate Muslim countries distanced themselves from the Jewish state).

Even when most of the Western airlines suspended flights to Israel, Azerbaijan’s state-owned airline continued operating flights with only brief interruptions, and Israeli tourist flow to Azerbaijan increased by 50%. In October, Foreign Minister Eli Cohen once again reaffirmed that relations with this Muslim-majority country are “of strategic importance“. In November, Ynet noted that, against the backdrop of Yerevan’s anti-Israel stance and its ties with Tehran, Jerusalem intends to further strengthen its ties with Baku.

Azerbaijan holds the longest and most comprehensive partnership with Israel among Muslim nations. “Here is an example of how Muslims and Jews work together to ensure a better future for both,” PM Netanyahu stated in 2016.

The following facts demonstrate Azerbaijan’s special importance for the national security and regional defense capabilities of the Jewish state:

Since the 1990s, Azerbaijan has been key to Israel’s energy security. A senior Israeli intelligence source told Israel Hayom that Azerbaijani supplies were crucial even before Arab relations normalized (1994) and Israel discovered major gas fields (1999–2009). Azerbaijan’s energy bolstered Israel’s economy in the 1990s and 2000s, remaining its sole reliable partner in the Muslim world during the Second Intifada (2000–2004). The Israeli ambassador to Baku noted: “We believe that true friendship is tested in times of need, and I think this friendship between our countries has been proven in those critical times”. Israel Hayom reported in 2019 that Azerbaijan is the source of over 60% of the gasoline that Israelis consume. In 2021, Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi stated: “Azerbaijan is an ally, a friend, and the largest supplier of energy resources to Israel“. In 2022, the Zman.co.il stated: “Most of the fuel in Israel comes from Azerbaijan — from gasoline for private cars to jet fuel for the Air Force’s fighter jets“. As Ynet noted in 2024, during the height of the war (when Israel’s armed forces particularly needed uninterrupted fuel supplies), Azerbaijan increased its oil exports to the Jewish state by 55%.

 Since the late 2000s, Azerbaijan has been a top importer of Israeli military products, with Israeli supplies comprising 60–69% of its military imports in the 2010s. A new agreement was signed in September 2024. These deals generate billions, supporting Israeli jobs, funding new military developments, and contributing to joint Israeli-U.S. projects critical to Israel’s security.

Azerbaijan is a key Israeli partner against Iran, with both viewing the Ayatollah regime as an existential threat and cooperating for many years. “We share a common dangerous enemy—the Iranian tyranny that threatens the destruction of both our peoples”, Knesset members stated in 2023 in a collective message to their Azerbaijani counterparts.

It is symbolic that the foundation of this partnership to counter the Iranian threat was laid 30 years ago in the U.S. In October 1995, during a meeting in New York with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, President Heydar Aliyev emphasized that his “country has a very long and tense border with Iran” and requested assistance in the field of security[1]. In 1997, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Azerbaijan, where he held talks with Heydar Aliyev. This meeting gave a significant impetus to the strategic partnership between the two countries.

“Particularly since Ilham Aliyev became Azerbaijan’s president in October 2003, Iran has engaged in a campaign of intimidation toward the country. A group of high-level Iranian military officers visited Baku in August 2004, urging Azerbaijan to cease security cooperation with Israel and stop receiving Israeli military and intelligence officers…” noted WINEP. In June 2006, Infrastructure Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer stated: “Azerbaijan is a Muslim country with a large Shia population, bordering Iran. The location of this country is of great interest to us“. Government sources in Jerusalem clarified this statement in the context of the potential use of Azerbaijani territory in the event of an American or U.S.-Israeli operation against Iran. In December 2006, Brigadier General (Res.) Oded Tira emphasized: “We should also coordinate with Azerbaijan the use of airbases in its territory and also enlist the support of the Azeri minority in Iran“. In 2008, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni stated: “There are very close ties between Israel and Azerbaijan in strategically important areas such as security and intelligence sharing“. In 2009, U.S. Deputy Ambassador to Baku Donald Lu, describing the security cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan, quoted Aliyev in a document sent to the State Department. In a private conversation, Aliyev stated that these relations resemble an iceberg: “Nine-tenths of it is below the surface“.

In February 2012, the Associated Press noted that Azerbaijan had become an important base for Israeli intelligence. At the same time, The Times, citing a Mossad operative in Baku, reported that dozens of Israeli intelligence operatives were active in Azerbaijan. “Last year, we increased our presence, and this has brought us much closer to Iran,” the operative told the publication. In March 2012, Foreign Policy Magazine reported: “If Israeli jets want to land in Azerbaijan after an attack, they’d probably be allowed to do so. Israel is deeply embedded in Azerbaijan, and has been for the last two decades“.

The visit of Israel’s Defense Minister to Baku in 2014 “served as proof of the high level of military coordination between the two countries“. At the time, he confirmed that Azerbaijan and Israel are “engaged in broad-based strategic cooperation“. In 2015, The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) emphasized that the Iranian threat serves as a unifying factor, as both countries view it as an “existential threat“. “Mossad has a large and significant presence in Azerbaijan,” reported a prominent Israeli intelligence analyst in 2016. “Intelligence cooperation between the two countries makes it very difficult for the ayatollahs’ regime,” stated Israel Hayom in 2021.

The Second Karabakh War (2020) solidified Israel’s regional position
In the war, Azerbaijan reclaimed much of its territory—which had been occupied for 30 years with the tacit support of Iran, extending its border with Iran by 100 km. “During the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Israel sided with Azerbaijan, while Iran supported Armenia,” reported Globes. “The Iranians’ aspirations to ensure the success of the Armenians and to maintain the minimum length of the common border with Azerbaijan were effectively countered by Baku, which is relying on Israeli weapons on a large scale…,” noted Israel Hayom. “The Iranians did not like what happened during this war because it complicated their situation,” stated in February 2021 the former head of the AMAN Military Intelligence Analysis Directorate, Yossi Kuperwasser. “The effectiveness of the deep friendship between the two countries became evident to the entire world during the Second Karabakh War, in which Azerbaijan achieved a brilliant victory through Israeli arms,” emphasized Israel Hayom. The Azerbaijani Foreign Minister added: “During the war, Azerbaijan received genuine support from its Israeli friend“.

The members of the Azerbaijani parliament noted in a collective address to the Members of the Knesset: “The Azerbaijani people appreciate and will never forget Israel’s consistent support for Azerbaijan’s justified position during the 44-day patriotic war“. “The outcomes of the Second Karabakh War heightened tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan”, observed INSS. The Ayatollah regime attempted to pressure Baku. In 2021-2022, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps held two drills near Azerbaijan’s border simulating troop deployment, while Tehran and its proxies ran intimidation propaganda campaigns aimed at Azerbaijan’s leadership. They claimed that “Aliyev is a puppet of the Zionist regime” and that “the government has been in the hands of Zionists for 30 years“.

The deputy speaker of the Iranian parliament issued a clear warning to Azerbaijan’s leader: “Read some modern history to learn about the fate of leaders who trusted America and Zionism“. Blatantly antisemitic propaganda was also employed: Aliyev was depicted in a grotesque image as a religious Jew. Against this backdrop, in October 2022, Defense Minister Benny Gantz visited Baku and emphasized the “importance of the strategic relationship” between the two countries. A month later, Azerbaijan announced the opening of its embassy in Israel. In 2023-2024, Iranian provocations, subversive activities, and attempts to intimidate Azerbaijan continued, including those aimed at its relations with Israel.

Azerbaijan works to normalize Turkey-Israel relations and mediates during crises between them
“President Aliyev, who has previously proved his mediation capabilities between Turkey and Israel, is likely to play a similar role again in the coming years (under the Trump administration),” Maariv reported in December 2024. During the 2008-2010 Turkey-Israel crisis, Azerbaijan worked to restore dialogue. In June 2012, the IzRus website, focused on Israeli foreign policy in the former Soviet Union, reported, referring to “diplomatic sources in Jerusalem“: “Officials in Baku are trying hard to reconcile the opposing sides“.[2] That same year, INSS noted: “As Israeli-Turkish relations worsened, Turkey tried to pressure Azerbaijan to cool relations with Israel. President Aliyev’s regime has so far refused Turkey’s entreaties”.In 2018, the leader of Azerbaijan mediated between Ankara and Jerusalem, increasing efforts after the 2020 Karabakh War, when Azerbaijan relied on both partners’ support.

“Armenia’s military actions are supported by Iran and Russia, while Azerbaijan is supported by Israel and Turkey,” emphasized Globes in 2020. “Azerbaijan is one of the few arenas where Israel and Turkey have a common strategic interest…” In December 2020, NewsWalla cited governmental sources in Jerusalem, reporting that Aliyev, in his communication with Erdogan, was making efforts to normalize relations between Turkey and Israel. In 2021, the Assistant to the  Azerbaijani President confirmed: “We are interested in ensuring that our allies also maintain friendly relations with each other”.

The attempted normalization between Turkey and Israel in November 2021 – March 2022 took place with the tacit participation of Azerbaijan, namely its Foreign Intelligence Service (XKX), which maintains close ties with Mossad and MİT. “The fact that both Ankara and Jerusalem are perceived as important allies of Baku and that Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War is attributed in part to the assistance received from these two countries were among the factors that contributed to the warmer relations between Turkey and Israel over the past year”, noted INSS in the fall of 2022. In October 2022, during Benny Gantz’s Baku visit, Azerbaijan urged renewing Israel-Turkey military ties, leading to the first Israeli Defense Minister’s Ankara visit in 12 years.

Azerbaijan exemplifies Muslim-Jewish symbiosis and fosters Israel-Muslim ties
A century before the Abraham Accords, Azerbaijan became the first modern Muslim state to showcase such cooperation, evident in Jewish representation in its parliament[3], senior government[4] roles, and leadership of state institutions[5] during the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918–1920). Azerbaijan is the only Muslim country with a large Jewish settlement (over 3,000 residents). It is also the only place in the Muslim world where street names are displayed in Hebrew. As it was reported by Israel Hayom, “Azerbaijan is the only Muslim country in the world where, during celebrations and marches commemorating military victories, local residents display Israeli flags”. In December 2024, AIPAC leaders reminded that after Hamas’s invasion of southern Israel on October 7, 2023, Azerbaijani citizens brought flowers and lit candles outside the Israeli embassy to honor the victims. Expressions of sympathy and solidarity with Israelis were even voiced by members of Azerbaijan’s parliament.

This uniquely positive attitude towards the Jewish state, unparalleled in the Muslim world, reflects Azerbaijan’s exceptional relationship with Israel.As early as 2009, the Israeli ambassador in Baku noted that Azerbaijan could serve as a model for other Muslim countries in terms of relations with Israel[6]. In 2012, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman stated that Azerbaijan could act as a mediator between Israel and the Arab world. In 2020, Dr. Baram from the Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem emphasized that: “…Azerbaijan has played a behind-the-scenes role in facilitating Israel’s relations with Gulf states and moderate Muslim countries. I myself witnessed meetings in Baku between Israelis and senior figures from the Arab world years before they became official in Israel”. Immediately after the signing of the Abraham Accords, Baku became one of the first venues for establishing contacts between Israeli and UAE diplomats. In 2023, President Herzog, addressing President Aliyev, stated: “It is no secret that your country is a Muslim nation, with the majority of its population being Shia. Despite this, the love and affection between our peoples is an example of how we can change the world and move forward”. As Maariv underlined in December 2024, Azerbaijan serves as a “successful model of coexistence” between Muslims and Jews.

[1] Maariv 24.10.95 (saved in the printed version).
[2] Publication of the Israeli Russian-language site IzRus (saved in the printed version)
[3] Address-calendar of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 1920. Baku, 1920. Part IV. pp. 2, 45; Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920). Baku, 1998. p. 55;
[4] Address-calendar of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 1920. Baku, 1920. Part IV. pp. 3,13.
[5] Address-calendar of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 1920. Baku, 1920. Part IV. pp. 17.
[6] Haaretz, 28.06.09 (saved in the printed version)

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 109 (Jan 13, 2025)

In December 2024, Mart Kalm, the rector of the Estonian Academy of Arts (Eesti Kunstiakadeemia, EKA), announced that this university would not continue its cooperation with Dr. Jonathan Ventura from Shenkar College in Ramat Gan (Israel), whose course had been in the EKA curriculum since 2019 and was scheduled to take place again in February 2025. Prof. Kalm added that EKA was “no longer open” to cooperation with Israeli universities. There was no clear reasoning behind this: the rector said that the move was in line with what other European universities were doing, and that Israeli colleagues (without names or institutions mentioned) understood his decision.

The situation was not uncommon among European universities in recent years, with several institutions in Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and others having severed ties with Israeli higher education. However, in Estonia, the art academy decision became the “biggest academic scandal” in 2024, as I may quote Priit Hõbemägi, one of the most renowned Estonian journalists. After the refusal to work with Israeli academics was made public, many Estonian politicians openly disagreed with this controversial move. Among them were Riina Solman (ex-Minister of Public Administration) and Urmas Paet (ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Member of the European Parliament). Eerik-Niiles Kross (chair of the Estonian-Israeli parliament group, Reform Party) called Kalm’s decision “dim-witted antisemitism” and asked rhetorically if Estonian public universities should instead cooperate with universities led by Hamas. Marti Aavik, a prominent journalist, stated that it was a result of a “left-radical and Islamist alliance.” The country’s Prime Minister, Kristen Michal, along with Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Margus Tsahkna, and Education, Kristiina Kallas, asked Kalm to reconsider the decision’s utility and necessity. That recommendation was echoed by Maria Mägi-Rohtmets, the EKA’s Council chair, who reported that the Council had recommended Prof. Kalm reconsider the earlier move (which demonstrates, inter alia, that the rector’s demarche was rather spontaneous and uncoordinated). Sass Henno, a famous writer, demonstratively left his professorial position at EKA, and the Estonian Jewish Community unequivocally condemned Mart Kalm’s initiative.

It seems that the opponents of EKA’s anti-Israeli move numerically and influentially outweigh its supporters. Namely, the latter include some journalists from Eesti Päevaleht, one of the country’s leading newspapers (while another major newspaper, Postimees, seems to assume a more moderate, and sometimes even pro-Israeli, position), and some academic activists, mainly from Tallinn University. Two other big public universities, Tartu and TalTech, did not support the refusal to cooperate with Israel: the rector of Tartu University said that, if there were any institutionalized cooperation with Israeli institutions, TU wouldn’t cancel it, and the rector of TalTech stated that Kalm’s initiative “had a political air.” Tallinn University’s officials remained silent, and three lecturers from this institution, who self-represent as active members of “BDS in International Studies” (BDS – Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions, an international anti-Israeli influence group), published an open letter in support of an even broader anti-Israeli academic boycott. This had been their long-held and consistent position, judging by previous publications in the same Eesti Päevaleht newspaper; the latter’s opinion editor, Krister Paris, made his point of view crystal clear by stating that “first – Netanyahu to the Hague, then – normal relationships [with Israel].” The contrast with the attitude of some leading Postimees journalists is striking.

The division between the media structures seems to be more evident than the divide between the political parties on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the latter is also present, as in most other European democracies. While Isamaa (“Fatherland”), the Christian democratic party of national conservative orientation, criticizes all anti-Israeli demarches, the position of the center-left “Estonia 200” is more ambiguous. The conservative parties try to use the scandal to their advantage, criticizing the liberals for an “anti-Israeli turn”: in 2024, the Estonian MFA, controlled by “Estonia 200,” supported two anti-Israeli votes in the UN, which caused harsh critique from nearly all major parties in the country. In November, Margus Tsahkna (Minister for Foreign Affairs) said that Estonia would “take into account” the ICC arrest warrant against Benjamin Netanyahu. However, at least on the surface (and if we put aside the UN votes), the position of Tsahkna seems quite moderate, and he condemned the EKA decision as a “move in the wrong direction.”

Naturally, since Russia, as a neighbor of Estonia, remains a significant Other in public discourse, the issue of parallels with the war in Ukraine arises. Is Estonian policy consistent enough? The anti-Zionist critics compare Israel to Russia (and Gaza – to Ukraine) and ask rhetorically if the strict standards of international law should be applied differently to Moscow and Jerusalem. “If Estonia wanted Russia to be sanctioned for its crimes, it would be utmost hypocritical for us to think differently now in the case of Israel,” claims Kristi Ockba, an Estonian Middle East expert educated in Yemen, in her Eesti Päevaleht column. At the same time, the pro-Israeli public compares Israel to Ukraine, and Russia – to Hamas (as does, for instance, journalist Olga Štraube). Interestingly, the linguistic divide between Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking communities has not affected the debate: the discussions are equally vivid in both language “camps,” with Russian-speaking journalists, academics, and artists actively participating.

After the unexpected (to him) public outrage, Prof. Kalm tried to explain the decision to cease any collaboration with Israeli institutions (actually, Shenkar College was the only one with which EKA still cooperated, as some other bilateral agreements peacefully “died” during the COVID pandemic). He said that the decision was “purely technical and not political” (ironically, the technical aspect is extremely unclear; for instance, some commentators cannot understand if the move affects cooperation in the Erasmus+ framework or just the bilateral ties). According to Kalm, the demarche was meant to “retain a secure working climate” at the Academy (Does the presence of Israeli professors or students make the working climate insecure?). He claims to be sorry for his “unclear wording that led to false interpretations.” However, the Estonian Academy of Arts has been known for its support of the Palestinian cause even before the scandal, in the format of public discussions, movie screenings, and a student-led Instagram account “EKA community for Palestine”; in the spring of 2024, Gaspar Šabad (Tallinn city assembly member) noticed a Palestinian flag waving on the Academy’s campus. The uncoordinated and unfounded (with any previous discussions and declarations) demarche of Mart Kalm makes it even more complicated for his potential successors in the rectoral position: he leaves his chair in April 2025, either to Kirke Kangro or to Hilkka Hiiop, and now there is no way for them to avoid tackling the Palestinian issue. Notably, both of them have by now refused to comment on the scandal.

As scholars of antisemitism and other types of biased hate, we should remind countries and institutions that double standards, demonization, and delegitimization of the State of Israel may easily turn a legitimate critique of a country’s government into manifestations of antisemitism (the famous 3D formula by Nathan Sharansky). Also, “holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the State of Israel” is an inherent part of IHRA’s Working Definition of Antisemitism, which was adopted, in various forms, by many European institutions and countries (including Estonia in 2021). At the same time, we should not forget the immense support that Estonian politicians and the broader public have expressed towards Israel after October 7th. With Estonia remaining one of the most “non-anti-Zionist” countries in the European Union (judging by the parliamentary declarations and statements by the government officials), one should view the Estonian Academy of Arts’ decision as nothing more than an isolated and uncoordinated action that goes contrary to public opinion and official discourse. Nevertheless, the EKA scandal has finally turned the Middle Eastern conflict into a fully-fledged and widely discussed issue in Estonian society, and it is now not only (and not so much) about Israel but also about the intra-party divisions and media struggles, with the ghosts of Russia (as the – still – significant Other) and left-wing divide wandering over the debate.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 108 (Jan 5, 2025)

Faced with new challenges amid the war in Ukraine and increased pressure from Russia, Kazakhstan is taking a series of strategic measures to diversify its hydrocarbon trade and reduce dependence on the Russian route for transportation to Europe.

Traditionally, Kazakhstan has been heavily reliant on Russian transport infrastructure for exporting oil and gas. Given that Iran blocks Central Asian countries’ access to the Persian Gulf and considering the traditional supply routes to Europe established during the Soviet era, Russia’s territory appeared to be the most obvious path to Europe. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) route, via the Russian port of Novorossiysk, exported the majority of Kazakh oil. The CPC project was implemented with the participation of major international corporations at a time when relations between Russia and the West seemed stable, and thus, the potential risk of a “new Cold War” was not factored in. However, since 2022, this route has become highly vulnerable due to ongoing military actions in the Black Sea and Russia’s political pressure aimed at fully subordinating Kazakhstan to Russian priorities amid Moscow’s conflict with the West and Ukraine.

In response, Kazakhstan has intensified efforts in recent years to develop alternative routes, such as the Caspian Sea corridor. The Kazakh port of Aktau is becoming an important logistics hub for transporting oil and other goods to Europe via Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Overall, Kazakhstan is actively developing trade and economic relations with China, Turkey, the European Union, South Asia, and the Middle East. However, the main direction for diversifying Kazakh oil supplies to Europe—where the majority of oil from Caspian fields is exported—has become the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

The Trans-Caspian route has given rise to an intriguing geopolitical dynamic that diverges from the usual anti-Western Eurasian axis of Beijing-Moscow-Tehran. Iran has consistently and aggressively opposed any Trans-Caspian energy transportation projects, fearing competition with its own energy exports to Turkey and Europe. The large-scale supply of Caspian oil and gas to European markets would render Iranian exports economically unviable. This would enable Europe to support U.S. sanctions against Iran indefinitely without bearing significant economic costs. Conversely, in the absence of alternative supplies, Europe has historically hesitated to fully embrace such sanctions due to the economic harm they inflict—especially now, with Russian energy supplies largely blocked.

In this context, supporting energy deliveries via the Trans-Caspian route is a direct national interest for Israel, though this is rarely discussed in Israeli expert and political circles. Such support not only undermines Iran’s economic interests but also strengthens Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan, an informal strategic partner, and with Central Asian countries that maintain a neutral stance in Middle Eastern conflicts.

It is evident that supporting the construction of Trans-Caspian energy transportation routes—for both Kazakh oil and natural gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan—aligns with the interests of the EU and the broader Western coalition. These routes bolster the EU’s energy security amid its conflict with Russia, enhance the independence of Central Asian countries from both Russia and China, and encourage greater economic alignment of the South Caucasus with the West. Moreover, they tie Turkey more closely to its Western policy vector, reducing Ankara’s incentives to engage with Moscow. For the Turkish government, transforming Turkey into an energy hub is a critical strategy for overcoming its prolonged economic crisis. This goal becomes even more appealing when it involves the resale of energy resources from friendly Turkic nations.

Russia supports Iran’s stance against the construction of Trans-Caspian pipelines as such projects weaken Moscow’s leverage over Europe through energy pressure and create competition for Russian oil and gas. Additionally, Moscow fears that advancing Turkic integration projects through pipelines could undermine its influence in the southern post-Soviet region. Finally, the development of Trans-Caspian routes would further enhance the economic independence of Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan, and Georgia from Russia.

However, China’s interests in this case are opposite to those of Russia and Iran. For China, the Trans-Caspian routes represent the middle corridor of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), where the establishment of routes through Kazakhstan to Europe plays a crucial role. Due to the conflict in Ukraine, the northern corridor of the BRI through Russia to Europe has been blocked, while the southern corridor faces obstacles from conflicts involving Iran and the broader Middle East. Consequently, the middle corridor through the Caspian Sea becomes important for China. Thus, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries receive support for Trans-Caspian routes not only from the collective West but also from Beijing. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan garners backing from Turkey and other Turkic nations, which serve as significant partners in energy, logistics, and security.

Over the past five years, the export of Kazakh oil via various routes has undergone significant changes. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) through Russia remains the primary export route for Kazakh oil, accounting for about 80% of total shipments.

In 2019, 55.6 million tons of oil were exported through the CPC, accounting for 77% of Kazakhstan’s total oil exports. In 2020, exports via the CPC decreased to 51.8 million tons (75.6% of the total), driven by a general reduction in production and exports due to the pandemic. In 2021, exports through the CPC rose to 53.2 million tons (78.7% of the total). However, in 2022, exports via the CPC declined to 52.0 million tons (80.8% of the total). This decrease occurred despite a favorable post-pandemic recovery, which, under normal circumstances, would have led to a substantial increase in shipments. Russia’s pressure and Kazakhstan’s efforts to diversify supply routes were the reasons for the decline.

In 2023, 56.5 million tons of oil were transported through the CPC (80% of the total), an 8% increase compared to 2022. In 2023, Kazakhstan also significantly increased oil exports, bypassing Russian ports, doubling volumes to 3.73 million tons (primarily via the Caspian Sea) compared to 1.91 million tons in 2022. Shipments through the port of Aktau to Azerbaijan alone rose to 1.5 million tons from 0.3 million tons in 2022. Exports via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline increased to 1.4 million tons.

Thus, despite the dominant role of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) in exporting Kazakh oil, recent years have seen a trend toward increasing shipments through alternative routes, such as the Trans-Caspian route via Azerbaijan and Turkey. This shift reflects Kazakhstan’s desire to diversify export pathways and reduce dependency on the Russian route, particularly amid the ongoing war.

A significant factor in this development has been Russian political pressure, driven by the Kremlin’s discontent with Kazakhstan’s continuation of its multi-vector foreign policy during the conflict. In 2022, Russia repeatedly suspended Kazakh oil exports through the port of Novorossiysk, citing various reasons.

The alleged discovery of World War II-era mines in the port’s waters halted oil shipments through Novorossiysk in June 2022. The port area was fully closed for demining, leading to a suspension of exports. Demining operations were scheduled for June 20 and were expected to last until the end of the month.

In July 2022, Russia again blocked the operation of the pipeline transporting Kazakh oil through Novorossiysk. This occurred shortly after Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev publicly declared, in Putin’s presence, Kazakhstan’s non-recognition of the self-proclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine.

In August 2022, the CPC announced a reduction in oil flow through Novorossiysk due to defects discovered in the floating storage tank systems.

In 2023 and 2024, further suspensions of Kazakh oil shipments through the CPC to Novorossiysk occurred, including in December 2023 and April 2024. However, experts believe these suspensions were not politically motivated.

In light of the risks that emerged after 2022, Kazakhstan has formulated ambitious plans to expand oil shipments across the Caspian Sea, bypassing Russia.

Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy, Almasadam Satkaliyev, announced in November 2024 the country’s intention to increase oil shipments via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to 20 million tons per year. However, he did not specify a timeline for implementing these plans. In total, Kazakhstan is set to export 68.8 million tons of oil in 2024, including 55.4 million tons through the CPC pipeline via Novorossiysk, 8.6 million tons via the Atyrau-Samara pipeline also through Russia, 3.6 million tons across the Caspian Sea, and 1.1 million tons via the pipeline to China.

To support the growth of exports across the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are negotiating port modernization and increasing the capacity of maritime oil transport. Discussions are also ongoing regarding the potential construction of a Trans-Caspian oil pipeline, which could significantly shift the regional landscape. However, this project remains far from realization at present.

Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have also long expressed interest in building a Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline to Azerbaijan. However, this initiative faces technical, financial, and political challenges, including pressure from Russia and Iran. Nevertheless, the gas reserves of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are sufficient to address the European Union’s energy concerns arising from its conflict with Russia, should the project be completed.

Kazakhstan also wields leverage over Russia in the oil and gas sector, allowing it to continue exporting hydrocarbons to Europe through Russian territory. Russia has begun redirecting a small portion of its gas and oil, previously destined for Europe, via Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan. Additionally, Russia has unsuccessfully sought access to Turkmenistan’s gas transport network, which passes through Kazakhstan to China. Between 2022 and 2024, the transit of Russian oil through Kazakhstan’s pipeline system to China significantly increased. These shipments occur via a pipeline that transports oil from Siberia through Kazakhstan’s Priirtyshsk and Atasu to Alashankou in China. In 2023, the transit volume reached approximately 9.14 million tons, and this figure is expected to approach 10 million tons by the end of 2024. Thus, Kazakhstan exports oil to Europe via Russian territory, while Russia exports oil to China via Kazakh territory. This situation exemplifies classic mutual interdependence.

Plans are also underway to increase the export of Russian natural gas through a proposed pipeline from Russia via Kazakhstan to China. Unlike the stalled pipeline project between Mongolia and China, this route has not faced significant obstacles. The projected capacity of the pipeline is 45 billion cubic meters per year, with 10 billion cubic meters earmarked for gasifying various regions in Kazakhstan.

In addition to its energy role, Kazakhstan plays a crucial part in facilitating Russia’s foreign trade amid international sanctions. This includes the practices of Russian companies in the sphere of bypassing international sanctions. However, official Astana, in coordination with the U.S. and the EU, has taken significant steps to combat sanctions evasion. Despite these efforts, completely resolving this issue is nearly impossible due to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which creates an integrated economic space between Russia and Kazakhstan modeled after the EU.

Overall, Kazakhstan, alongside its diversification strategy, possesses certain tools that compel the Russian government to negotiate. Certain compromises between Astana and Moscow, particularly in oil and gas trade, are inevitable. These two countries share the world’s longest land border and have a high degree of economic interdependence, formally institutionalized through the EAEU.

Even if Kazakhstan successfully increases oil shipments to Azerbaijan to 20 million tons—although no specific timeline has been provided—this will still represent a small share compared to the 50-60 million tons of oil exported to Europe via the Russian port of Novorossiysk. The situation in oil supplies could be dramatically altered by constructing a Trans-Caspian oil pipeline, while the gas supply landscape could shift with the development of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. However, these projects would require significant political decisions from multiple international actors to overcome pressure from Iran and Russia, as well as substantial investments.

The collective West and Israel could have vested interests in supporting such initiatives. This could lead to the creation of a powerful regional coalition of post-Soviet states, Turkey, the West, and Israel against Iran and Russia, with China likely adopting a neutral stance. The development of Trans-Caspian energy routes, alongside the trade corridor from India to Europe via Arab countries and Israel, could contribute to a complete restructuring of the Greater Middle East. In essence, such a system of new transportation routes would encircle and isolate Iran entirely.