Theme - Kyrgyzstan

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 190 (March 17, 2026)

1. Official Position: Concerns and Neutrality

The military operation launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026 may create serious economic challenges for the countries of Central Asia, particularly in the sphere of transportation. The war has significantly disrupted the functioning of two key transport corridors: the International North–South Transport Corridor (Russia – Caspian sea – Iran – India) and the southern branch of the Eurasian East–West transport corridor passing through Iran. This is unfolding against the backdrop of ongoing hostilities in the Black Sea region, which have already had a negative impact on transport routes linking the region with Europe.

Shortly before that, on February 21–22, 2026, the long-simmering conflict between Kabul and Islamabad sharply escalated. This armed confrontation may effectively block the Central Asia-Afghanistan–Pakistan–India transport routes. The hostilities in Iran may also exacerbate instability in Afghanistan due to the close economic ties between the two countries. As a result, the countries of Central Asia may either be forced to increase their involvement in addressing Afghanistan’s internal problems or face growing instability along the Tajik–Afghan and Turkmen–Afghan borders.

If hostilities were to spread to Azerbaijan (a possibility suggested by the Iranian drone strike on Nakhichevan) all international transport routes of Central Asian states could effectively be reduced to the Chinese corridor.

Across the region, there are widespread concerns that the war, and especially the potential collapse of the Iranian regime, could push the Greater Middle East (and subsequently Central Asia) into a period of geopolitical turbulence and uncertainty. Similar references to “turbulence” in the region are also widely found in the Russian press. Among the specific risks mentioned by the Central Asian experts are the possible inflow of refugees from Iran and other Middle Eastern countries into Central Asia.

At the same time, rising oil prices have had a positive impact on Kazakhstan’s economy, partly due to the shortage of oil supplies to China that previously came from the Persian Gulf. A similar dynamic may also benefit Turkmenistan to some extent. For the other countries of the region, however, rising oil prices pose significant economic risks.

Under these circumstances, the states of the region have generally adopted a neutral stance. Such a position allows them greater flexibility in managing the risks outlined above. At the same time, it broadly corresponds to the tradition of the multi-vector foreign policy that has long characterized Central Asian diplomacy.

Kazakhstan has taken a formally neutral but in practice cautiously formulated position that leans toward the Arab Gulf states. Astana has called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict but in its official statements has emphasized the security concerns of the Gulf monarchies and expressed solidarity with their leaders, while simultaneously seeking to maintain good relations with the United States and Israel. President Tokayev sent messages of support to the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan and held phone conversations with several of them, including the Emir of Qatar and the President of the UAE. At the same time, Astana expressed condolences to Iran over civilian casualties and called for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict but did not issue a separate presidential condolence message regarding the death of Ayatollah Khamenei.

Kyrgyzstan has effectively distanced itself from the conflict, limiting its response to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing serious concern over the escalation, calling for restraint, and urging a peaceful settlement in accordance with international law.

Uzbekistan has likewise called for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev sent condolences to Iran over the death of Ayatollah Khamenei but did so in cautious terms, avoiding criticism of either the United States or Israel.

Tajikistan, which maintains the closest cultural and political ties with Iran in the region, also expressed concern over the escalation and called for an end to hostilities and a peaceful settlement. At the same time, President Emomali Rahmon was the first leader in the region to send an official telegram of condolences to the Iranian leadership and people following the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, emphasizing solidarity with the “friendly and brotherly” people of Iran. Nevertheless, Dushanbe also avoided direct criticism of the United States or Israel, seeking to maintain the balance characteristic of its multi-vector foreign policy.

Turkmenistan, following its long-standing policy of neutrality, responded in the usual restrained manner. Ashgabat described the escalation of the conflict as “regrettable” and called for a diplomatic resolution. 

2. Divided Societies: Regional Patterns in Public Perceptions of Iran and Its Opponents

An analysis of discussions on social media suggests that although Central Asian societies (like their political elites) generally prefer to maintain neutrality, in some cases one can observe something resembling the gap between elites and “the street” known from the Arab world in attitudes toward the United States and Israel. However, the scale of this divide remains far smaller than what is observed in the Middle East.

The depth of this division also varies significantly across the region due to Central Asia’s cultural heterogeneity. One can distinguish between the classical historical Turan — an Eurasian nomadic civilization encompassing most of Kazakhstan, northern Kyrgyzstan, and much of Turkmenistan — and regions shaped by a mixture of historical Turan and historical Iran, namely the sedentary agricultural areas that today largely belong to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Accordingly, public sympathy toward Iran tends to increase significantly in areas where the influence of fundamentalist Islam is strong (notably in the Uzbek-controlled part of the Ferghana Valley) and in regions where cultural, linguistic, and political-economic ties with Iran are particularly close (especially in Tajikistan). By contrast, in the countries of what may be called classical Turan — where the legacy of Eurasian nomadic culture remains strong and the social role of Islam is somewhat less pronounced (partly in Turkmenistan and especially in northern and central Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyzstan) — sympathy toward Iran is noticeably weaker. Consequently, the gap between elite positions and public opinion is also smaller in these areas.

This societal divide, together with the presence of certain pro-Iranian sympathies within the public sphere, acts as a constraint on Central Asian elites when it comes to cooperation with the United States and Israel. This situation is similar to the Arab nations.

These internal cultural and religious considerations operate alongside geopolitical constraints stemming from the need to maintain good relations with China and Russia. Given the regional cultural patterns described above, Kazakhstan’s leadership faces the least domestic pressure in terms of religiously motivated public sympathy toward Iran. At the same time, however, Kazakhstan is subject to a certain degree of Chinese influence and very substantial informational and cultural influence from Russia. Since both of these states support Iran, their positions inevitably shape public opinion within Kazakhstan as well. A similar combination of Chinese and Russian influence can also be observed in Kyrgyzstan.

Another important factor is the degree of state control over public expression. As early as the summer of 2025, the Uzbek authorities called on the population to exercise caution when commenting on the Iran–Israel conflict in order to prevent radicalization and potential threats to domestic security. As a result, most Uzbek media coverage limited itself to reporting factual developments and practical consequences for Uzbek citizens (for example, those evacuated from Persian Gulf countries). The same is largely true for Turkmenistan, where the authorities generally prohibit political expression on the Internet altogether.

Kazakh society, by contrast, enjoys a comparatively higher degree of freedom to discuss foreign policy issues than other Central Asian societies. For this reason, the relationship between public attitudes toward the war in Iran and broader political and identity-based orientations can be observed particularly clearly in Kazakhstan.

For Kazakhs, as for other Muslim peoples, it is significant that the hostilities coincided with the month of Ramadan. This inevitably heightens emotional reactions among fasting Muslims. At the same time, contemporary Kazakh society is highly pluralistic and characterized by a complex and multi-layered identity.

As noted above, the Kazakh people historically emerged from a Eurasian nomadic civilization that was not originally connected to the Islamized Middle East. Yet Kazakhstan has long been a crossroads of different cultural and religious traditions. As a result, several distinct influences coexist within the country today:

1. the relatively liberal Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence within traditional Sunni Islam, which predominates among Turkic peoples;

2. elements of the liberal-modernizing Jadidist Islamic tradition that spread among Turkic peoples in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries prior to the establishment of the Communist rule, and from which the contemporary liberal current sometimes described as “Euro-Islam” later developed (primarily among Turkic and Balkan Muslims);

3. the influence of conservative Sunni Islamic traditionalism that expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union and is often associated with Saudi Arabia, other Middle Eastern countries, and Pakistan;

4. a composite influence of fundamentalist propaganda originating in the Middle East (Arab countries, Turkey, and Iran), including both Sunni and Shiite components;

5. the legacy of the Soviet anti-religious tradition together with the growing influence of Western culture among younger generations following the economic reforms that began after the dissolution of the USSR.

Accordingly, under the influence of these different factors, very different assessments of the war can be heard both among the general public and among opinion leaders. Many Kazakh nationalists in the Kazakh-language segment of the internet supported the actions of the United States and Israel, a position that has been sharply criticized in the pro-Russian segment of the online space. Supporters of a more generalized form of Islamic fundamentalism that does not emphasize Sunni identity as in other parts of the world tend to express stronger support for Iran. Advocates of closer alignment with the “Global South” and with the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have likewise criticized the military operation against Iran.

Liberal groups that favor a pro-Western orientation, while showing a certain degree of sympathy toward the West and Israel, generally support Kazakhstan’s official policy of neutrality. Many centrist commentators similarly defend and justify the government’s neutral stance.

As a result, when the issue of Islamic solidarity arises — particularly during the month of Ramadan – it is interpreted very differently by various groups within society. For fundamentalists or supporters of the “Global South,” solidarity primarily means solidarity with Iran. For supporters of the official state position, it tends to mean solidarity first and foremost with the Arab Gulf states. For some nationalists or pro-Western groups, it may even take the form of sympathy for the Iranian opposition.

Social media activism can sometimes spill over into street-level activity. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, a pro-Iranian rally is reportedly expected to take place. In Kazakhstan, however, such public mobilization is currently unlikely because events in the Middle East are unfolding against the backdrop of more pressing domestic political developments, most notably a referendum on a new constitution on March 15. In the other Central Asian states, where political regimes are generally less liberal, authorities routinely prohibit uncontrolled public demonstrations. Nevertheless, the spread of anti-Israeli and anti-American narratives on social media, combined with the suppression of street-level protest that might otherwise release some of this pressure, may create potential security risks, including the possibility of terrorist acts by pro-Iranian activists.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 155 (September 28, 2025)

At the United Nations General Assembly this year, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov did not disguise where Bishkek’s loyalties lie. In his speech, he castigated Western sanctions on Kyrgyz banks and reaffirmed that his country would not sever ties with Russia. That intervention was not just diplomatic theater. It was a blunt reminder that Kyrgyzstan’s leadership views Moscow not as an optional partner but as the central axis of its political and economic survival.

The sanctions Japarov decried point to the deeper problem. In 2025, Washington and London sanctioned a Kyrgyz bank acquired by a company linked to Ilan Shor, the Moldovan oligarch and convicted bank fraudster with strong ties to the Kremlin. Shor, wanted in Moldova and sanctioned by the U.S. and EU, has reinvented himself as a political operator and fixer for Moscow. According to The Insider, he has offered gifts and cultivated ties with Kyrgyz elites, including providing Japarov with a private jet. More critically, Shor’s networks have been implicated in sanction-evasion schemes, including the use of crypto tokens pegged to the Russian ruble to facilitate cross-border transfers. His involvement in Kyrgyz financial institutions allowed Moscow to reroute transactions through Bishkek at a time when conventional channels were closing. For Washington and Brussels, this was an unacceptable breach; for Japarov, it was apparently a matter of business as usual. His public defense of Kyrgyz banks after the sanctions landed signaled that Bishkek was not only aware of these arrangements but prepared to shield them from international scrutiny.

The financial entanglement dovetails with deep industrial dependence. Russia’s Inter RAO Export is in active negotiations to build a 500-megawatt thermal power plant in Kyrgyzstan, an undertaking that would cement the country’s reliance on Russian capital, equipment, and fuels for decades. The project is not isolated. Moscow and Bishkek are also advancing plans to expand transmission capacity and modernize the national grid. Within the next two years, Russia plans to finish the construction of a solar power plant (SPP) in Kyrgyzstan. There’s another project to build a wind farm with the help of Rosatom in the Central Asian republic. For Kyrgyzstan, where energy shortages are perennial, these projects are politically indispensable. But they come at the price of sovereignty: Kyrgyzstan’s future power supply would be bound by Russian financing and Russian conditions.

The cultural and linguistic sphere is no less saturated by Russian influence. Far from phasing out Moscow’s imprint, Bishkek has deepened it. This year, Kyrgyzstan and Russia launched new cultural initiatives, including digitization of libraries, training for cultural workers, and expanded quotas for Kyrgyz students at Russian universities. Deputy Prime Minister Edil Baisalov went further, explicitly assuring the public that Russian would remain an official language. The decision is not symbolic. Russian is not just a lingua franca in urban Kyrgyzstan; it is the language of commerce, higher education, and labor migration. As hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz citizens work in Russia each year, remittances flow home through Russian-language contracts, Russian banks, and Russian bureaucracies. Maintaining Russian as an official language means maintaining direct access to those lifelines — and keeping Kyrgyz elites fluent in the language of their patron.

For Moscow, these policies are the essence of soft power: a guarantee that Kyrgyzstan’s next generation will continue to think, study, and work in Russian. For Bishkek, they are a political calculation: dismantling the Russian language’s official status would risk alienating Moscow at a moment when the country’s economy cannot afford the blow.

Russia’s ambitions in Kyrgyzstan extend well beyond energy and language. Moscow has positioned itself as the indispensable partner for cultural policy, higher education, defense cooperation, and infrastructure. Russian universities provide scholarships for Kyrgyz students, binding the country’s professional class to Russian institutions. Security coordination, though less publicized, also continues through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), of which Kyrgyzstan is a member. These mechanisms ensure that Bishkek’s maneuvering room remains narrow, whatever the rhetoric of sovereignty.

And yet, Kyrgyzstan is not entirely passive. In late 2024, Bishkek finally broke ground on the long-delayed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, a major Belt and Road Initiative project aiming to connect China with Central Asia and Europe. When completed, the corridor could carry up to 15 million tons of cargo annually, linking Central Asia directly to Chinese markets and bypassing traditional Russian-controlled routes. For Kyrgyzstan, the project is a lifeline to diversification. For Beijing, it is another spoke in its Belt and Road strategy. But construction will take years, and financing remains uncertain. For now, the railway is a promise of future autonomy; Russia’s influence is the present reality.

The picture that emerges is not of a state balancing two powers with equal dexterity, but of a client state tethered to Moscow while cautiously entertaining Beijing’s overtures. Kyrgyzstan’s leadership, financial system, industry, and cultural policies are all structured in ways that prioritize Russian interests. China may be gaining ground with long-term infrastructure, but it has yet to dislodge Russia’s dominant position.

For Western policymakers, the implications should be clear. Treating Central Asia as an immutable Russian sphere of influence is a strategic mistake. It ensures that Moscow will retain control by default and that Beijing will only expand its presence unchallenged. Kyrgyzstan’s case shows both the risks and the opportunities: a country whose dependence on Russia is entrenched, but whose leaders are pragmatic enough to accept alternatives if they are offered. The West’s failure to invest politically and financially in the region is not neutrality — it is abandonment. And abandonment leaves Central Asia with only two choices: Moscow’s grip or Beijing’s embrace.

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 103 (Dec 14, 2024)

Western weapons and electronic components continue to surface in Russian military hardware deployed in Ukraine, despite ongoing international efforts to restrict Moscow’s access to advanced technology. Recent reports from both European and Ukrainian investigative sources indicate that key Western-manufactured parts, including microchips and optical systems, have been identified in Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other military equipment used in the war.

According to the recent report by the French intelligence news platform Intelligence Online, Western components have been discovered in the Merlin VR, a Russian experimental intelligence-gathering drone. It appears that the downed UAV contained parts produced by American semiconductor company Analog Devices and Dutch manufacturer Ampleon. The experts note that all of the circuit boards appear to have been acquired from Western sources. 

The drone was developed in 2021 by the Smolensk Research Institute of Modern Telecommunications Technologies and is capable of flying at an altitude of over 4,800 meters. It is designed for advanced reconnaissance missions and can stay in the air for almost ten hours. Ukrainian officials reported finding a French-made infrared sensor (Lynred Pico1024) on board when they shot down the first Merlin-VR in 2022.

Russia employs elaborate networks involving multiple intermediaries and shell companies to obscure the final destination of procured components. Russia often routes goods through several countries, altering their documentation to conceal their origin and end use.

At the moment, it is still unknown where exactly these components came from, but since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the main bypass routes have been the countries of the former USSR, with Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan being the most frequently mentioned.

The strategic partnership between Belarus and Russia in procuring Western microchips has significantly bolstered Russia’s military capabilities. Investigations revealed that Belarusian companies exported over $125 million worth of microchips, including Western-made ones, to Russia between September 2022 and June 2024. Russia received around 10,000 microchips of American and European origin. These include Intel products used in the operation and navigation of aerial bombs, Su-35S and Su-34 fighter jets, Korsar UAVs and Kalibr missiles.

Complex schemes involving companies connected to the close allies of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made these supplies possible.

The largest supplier of Western microchips from Belarus to Russia is Pervy Kontinent, a company established just two months after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. From January to June 2024 alone, Pervy Kontinent sold 1,665 microchips to Russian firms, valued at $155,000. BIC identified the company’s owner as Ilya Tarasyuk, who has nearly 20 years of experience working in Belarus’s defense industry. The company’s primary buyer in Russia is Staut, a firm under U.S. and E.U. sanctions. 
In response to Belarus’s support for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, the United States and the European Union have implemented a series of sanctions targeting tens of Belarusian individuals, entities, and economic sectors. 

Armenia also stands out from the «blacklist» of those circumventing sanctions, as it is openly distancing itself from the Kremlin regime. However, the actions bear greater weight than mere words. A joint statement by the U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, and U.S. Treasury identified Armenia as among “third-party intermediaries or transshipment points to evade Russian- and Belarusian-related sanctions and export controls.” The New York Times revealed a 2023 document from the Bureau of Industry and Security that Armenia witnessed a staggering 515% surge in the import of chips and processors from the United States in 2022 compared to 2021, and a 212% increase from the European Union during the same period. Furthermore, Armenia subsequently exported 97% of these products to Russia. 
Russia also used Armenia to circumvent sanctions by purchasing through it items classified as dual-use—intended for civilian applications but also applicable in military contexts. Armenia can legally acquire certain technologies, which are later diverted to military use by the Russians.

According to Ukrainian sources, Armenia actively utilized the maritime route connecting the ports of Batumi (Georgia) and Novorossiysk (Russia) to re-export sanctioned goods to the Russian Federation. Consequently, the Armenian Shipping Company was responsible for the weekly transportation of 600 containers along the Batumi-Novorossiysk sea route.  Despite all this, the United States and the European Union failed to impose sufficient sanctions on Armenia.

Kazakhstan also emerged as a significant conduit in the process of circumventing the sanctions. In 2022, Kazakhstan’s imports of microchips more than doubled, exceeding $75 million. Subsequently, exports of these microchips to Russia increased seventyfold, from $245,000 in 2021 to $18 million in 2022.
Also, Kazakhstan imported nearly $5 million worth of drones, primarily from China, and re-exported $1.23 million worth to Russia. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s drone imports were negligible.

A recent joint investigation by The Insider, Investigace.cz, IrpiMedia, and Vlast.kz revealed that companies from the EU, the US, and Türkiye have increased weapon exports to FSU countries such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan over the past three years. The weapons were re-exported to Russia, enabling sanctions circumvention.

The export of sniper rifles and shotguns from Italy to Armenia has increased almost 30 times over four years. Kyrgyzstan did not purchase any weapons from Italy in 2020 and 2021, but it received 882 units in 2022 and 4,434 in 2023. Weapon exports from Turkey to Georgia rose from 8,426 units in 2019 to 18,843 in 2023.

The investigation also discovered links between the Luxembourg-based branch of the Beretta holding company and Russian firms. Journalists highlighted that the holding remains the majority owner of a Russian arms importer despite sanctions, directly violating both US sanctions and the EU Council’s 2014 resolution.

Such findings highlight multiple layers of concern. They point to the incomplete efficacy of current sanctions and export controls. Despite wide-ranging restrictions designed to prevent Russia from acquiring advanced components, loopholes and less-scrupulous intermediaries appear to be undermining those efforts. Companies in Europe, North America, and Asia may inadvertently supply parts that end up in Russian military hardware, often through opaque supply chains.

These revelations call for more stringent international cooperation to tighten technology transfer controls. Governments and industry stakeholders need to conduct more thorough vetting of end-users, impose mandatory “end-use certificates” subject to verification, and implement advanced monitoring of supply chains. To quickly detect and thwart any suspicious procurement attempts, institutions overseeing global trade must strengthen their intelligence-sharing frameworks.